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ABSTRACT 
Problems of coherence and effectiveness have been repeatedly mentioned by external 
observers as affecting European Union (EU) external action. A theory-based 
explanation of this state of affairs is, however, lacking in the literature. This thesis aims 
to address this lacuna by focusing on a particular aspect of EU external action, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and by analysing CFSP actions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) throughout the period 1991-2006. Its primary goal is to 
determine which factors explain different degrees of coherence and effectiveness, and, 
in particular, whether or not, increasing CFSP institutionalisation has promoted 
coherence and effectiveness. 
After introducing the concepts of coherence and effectiveness, the thesis sketches the 
political and academic debate surrounding these concepts, and three key explanatory 
factors are singled out: interests, identities and institutions. The latter is taken as a 
starting point for analysis. Drawing on a historical institutionalist theory, it explores the 
CFSP institutionalisation and examines how the development of institutions, path 
dePendency, unintended consequences, learning and socialisation have affected CFSP 
coherence and effectiveness over time. Furthermore, it aims to find out whether changes 
in institutions have facilitated convergence of Member States' interests regarding EU 
policy towards BiH, as well as the development of the EU's broader international role. 
The thesis then proceeds to investigate CFSP activities in BiH, analysing coherence and 
effectiveness in eight case studies. It concludes that CFSP institutionalisation has 
partially increased levels of effectiveness over the period 1991-2006. As for coherence, 
greater institutionalisation has resulted in some problems of coherence in the short term, 
but leaming has been a significant factor correcting these in the medium and long term. 
While path dependency has resulted in problems of coherence and effectiveness, 
socialisation processes have been important in facilitating consensus among the 
Member States. Finally, CFSP institutionalisation is seen as having had an impact on 
the EU's international role moving it from a civilian to a normative power, willing to 
resort to military instruments when necessary. 
KEY WORDS: EUROPEAN UNION, COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, 
COHERENCE, EFFECTIVENESS, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, EUROPEAN SECURITY. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1991, just days before the war in Slovenia broke out, the Luxembourg Foreign 
Minister Jacques Poos famousli proclaimed that the 'hour of Europe' had come and that 
the European Community (EC) could handle a crisis in its backyard on its own. ' In the 
post-Cold War context, alongside a process of redefinition of the main Western security 
institutions, the EC was certainly expected to become a global actor. This rhetoric was 
not, however, matched by decisive EC intervention in former Yugoslavia, and many 
voices were raised to condemn the paralysis of the nascent Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). In response to these criticisms, the European Union (EU) has 
undergone changes in its external action by both enhancing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy - including its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - and 
boosting its economic presence on the world stage through its trade and development 
policies. However, problems of incoherence and ineffectiveness still hamstring EU 
external action. 
This thesis is problem-driven research in the sense that it addresses a real-world 
problem, namely the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action as identified in 
political debates and academic literature. CFSP has been described as a 'failure', a 
Gmisnomer', in a 'state of paralysis, 'uncommon', 'incoherent' and 'ineffective' (see 
European Commission, 1995; European Parliament, 1996; Gordon, 1997/1998; Peterson 
2 and Sjursen, 1998; Zielonka, 1998a; 1998b). This thesis argues that these claims cannot 
and should not be taken at a face value, and this for several reasons. First, extant 
analyses are often conceptually flawed and/or are not backed up by detailed empirical 
evidence. Any evaluation of EU external action ought to rest on a sound conceptual 
basis and specify which 'reality' constitutes the focus of analysis. In this respect, this 
thesis provides a working definition of coherence and effectiveness and its analysis 
concentrates on one component of EU external action, the CFSP. Second, despite 
continuous references by academics and policy-makers to these issues, a systematic 
exploration of the factors behind the aforementioned problems is still lacking. The thesis 
aims to fill this gap and to provide a theory-based explanation of problems of CFSP 
1 When reference is made in an historical context prior to the entry into force of the TEU, the term used is 
European Community (EC). For references after I November 1993, the term used is European Union 
(EU). 
2 For more on these debates on coherence and effectiveness, see Chapter 1. 
I 
coherence and effectiveness. In order to do so, it focuses on the EU's intervention in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during the period 1991-2006. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of CFSP 
activities in BiH. What factors, more specifically, explain the different degrees of CFSP 
coherence and effectiveness here? On this basis, the thesis is concerned with two 
intertwined questions. First, to what extent has the EU been able to speak with one voice 
in the case of BiH, or, what degree of coherence has it achieved? Second, to what extent 
has the EU been able to achieve its external action's objectives in the case of BiH, or, 
how effective has it been? Related to this, the research presented here aims to identify 
those factors which determine different degrees of CFSP coherence and effectiveness. In 
other words, the thesis is not only concerned with how well CFSP works, but also about 
why it either fails or succeeds. Moreover, the case of EU engagement in BiH will serve 
to explore in more detail the evolution of EU external action in recent years (1991- 
2006), trying to disentangle the specificity of CFSP mechanisms, policies and outcomes. 
The thesis makes use of historical institutionalist theory, which, it is argued, is useful in 
assessing the most important factors in CFSP institutionalisation processes. The focus in 
this regard will be the development of bureaucratic organisations, formal institutional 
rules and informal practices. It is argued that 'institutions matter' and that concentrating 
on institutions explains different degrees of CFSP coherence and effectiveness over 
time. 
The claim to originality of this thesis lies in three main areas. The first lies in the 
definition and application of the concepts of coherence and effectiveness to an empirical 
case study. The thesis offers clear definitions and criteria to operationalise these two 
variables, avoiding inaccurate judgements about CFSP failure/success and the snapshot 
analyses that have dominated in the literature to date. It aims to offer a better 
understanding of the factors behind CFSP coherence and effectiveness, and in this way, 
this thesis moves 'beyond establishing the existence of EFP [European foreign policy] to 
assessing its outcomes' and contributes to a narrowing of the theoretical capability- 
expectation gap in this area of the literature (Ginsberg: 1999: 429). 
Second, drawing on historical institutionalist theory, it explores the CFSP 
institutionalisation process focusing on a particular example, analytically divided into 
2 
several mini-case studies. By so doing, it provides rich empirical data about the 
development of the CFSP towards BiH and investigates in depth the impact of several 
factors stemming from the CFSP institutionalisation process: path dependency, 
unintended consequences, learning and socialisation. Third, the thesis has a policy 
relevance. It examines (1) the links between the design of institutions and their 
performance in practice; and (2) the interaction between two levels of the policy-making 
process: those concerned with decision-making and with implementation. 
THE TIME PERIOD AND THE CASE STUDY SELECTED 
The thesis is concerned with CFSP institutionalisation during the period from the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 to the end of 2006. While European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) had already established an informal network for the coordination of 
Member States' foreign policies in the 1970s, the ratification of the TEU can be seen as 
a 'turning point', bringing to life 'new patterns for development in foreign and security 
policy' (Sjursen: 2001,190). Moreover, 1991 is the year that marks the end of the 
Yugoslav Federation and the beginning of the war that ravaged BiH from 1992 to 1995. 
The cut-off for this thesis is 2006. The sixteen year period analysed by this thesis covers 
not only different phases of the conflict in the Balkans, from open war to post-conflict 
stabilisation, and towards closer integration with the EU; but it also analyses the 
evolution of EU external action, including later developments such as the nascent ESDP. 
Originally, this cut-off date was intended to cover the ratification and early stages in the 
implementation of the Constitutional Treaty; however, thus far, this process remains at a 
standstill (see Chapter 3). The empirical evidence is organised in three different periods 
from 1991 to 1995, from 1996 to 2000, and from 2001 to 2006, symbolising, in turn, 
different stages in EU external action in BiH: from an ineffective civilian power to an 
economic power without strategy to a normative power resorting to military instruments 
when required. The analysis focuses on eight mini-case studies or key CFSP initiatives 
and non-decisions during the selected time frame. 
However, this long-term approach is not without problems. The main trade-off concerns 
a limitation in the scope of the thesis, one that is both functional and geographical in 
nature. First, the thesis will focus on one aspect of EU external action, the CFSP. 
Second, it will only look at the CFSP activities towards one country: BiH. Aware that a 
comparative study involving more cases would have increased the number of inferences 
3 
relevant to the initial hypotheses, constraints of time and space made such an approach 
unfeasible. It is argued, nonetheless, that a single case study provides adequate evidence 
in support of the initial hypothesis and that future comparative work can add depth to 
these initial findings. 
Further, a focused analysis of the EU's extensive activities in BiH by itself provides rich 
empirical material for an understanding of the CFSP institutionalisation process and 
how this has affected levels of coherence and effectiveness over time. The EU's 
engagement in BiH can be considered as one of the most distinctive and dynamic 
features of its emerging external action. If in the early 1990s the crisis in BiH 
constituted one of the main challenges for the recently established CFSP, nowadays it 
has become a test-bed for new ESDP developments and continues to be a major focus of 
attention for policy-makers in Brussels. BiH was also where the EU first tried to 
introduce a comprehensive approach towards conflict management in line with the 
European Security Strategy (see, for instance, European Council, 2004). Throughout the 
period 1991-2006, the EU has deployed the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal 
in BiH, including political tools like conflict mediation, economic carrots (humanitarian 
aid and long term economic assistance), and military instruments (police and peace- 
keeping missions), in the process becoming a key security actor in the country. 
Furthermore, the EU has offered the prospect of membership to BiH as a way to 
promote stability in this war-tom country. 
It can also be argued that the case of BiH constitutes a 'hard case' for EU external action 
since, for most of the period analysed, it involved crisis management by contrast to 
6normal' external activities as conducted with third countries which enjoy a situation of 
peace and stability. While it is true that the crisis situation and the outbreak of armed 
conflict posed particular problems for a system of external action that was mainly 
civilian in nature, the conclusions drawn from the Bosnian experience demonstrate that 
the institutional variables outlined in this study (including socialisation of policy- 
makers) can operate even under these 'exceptional' conditions, where the existence of 
sensitive security interests might have predicted otherwise. 
That said, the case of BiH is, however exceptional in some respects when compared to 
other cases/regions such as the Middle East or the Caucasus. Not only because specific 
ethnic, religious, economic and political factors make this case a unique one, but also 
4 
because the prospect of membership offered to the Western Balkans has transformed the 
dynamics in EU-Bosnian relationships. The offer of membership involves a 
considerable commitment on the part of the EU towards the prospective candidates and 
at the same time, constitutes one of the most effective instruments at the EU's disposal 
to promote changes in these countries. This factor has to be borne in mind when 
analysing coherence and effectiveness of EU external activities in BiH because the 
conclusion might have been slightly different had another case been selected. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the thesis does not engage with issues such as the causes 
of the war in BiH. Neither does it deal in detail with the political system established by 
virtue of the Dayton Agreement, nor with certain issues involved in the implementation 
of that agreement. Comment on these questions may be occasionally necessary but other 
works have already analysed these questions in depth (Chandler, 2005b; Gow, 1997; 
Little and Silber, 1995; Woodward, 1995). The thesis instead deals with the conflict in 
BiH from the perspective of EU external action, discussing its coherence, effectiveness 
and capabilities, focusing on the EU's internal decision-making process, and the 
implementation of its policies. 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis relies on several types of primary documentary sources, comprised mainly of 
EU official documents, and also utilises the rich secondary literature on EU external 
action in BiH and the EU's s role as a global actor (see Box I). Primary sources are 
important for two reasons. First, because of the nature of this research, which covers 
security and defence issues, a policy area characterized by confidentiality and secrecy. 
Second, because many of the CFSP activities examined in this thesis have only recently 
been launched and consequently secondary literature is largely unavailable. 
Documentary sources are complemented by an online survey and semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners and other experts involved in the decision-making and 
implementation of the CFSP policies. 
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Box 1: Documentary Sources 
Primary sources: 
- EU Treaties 
- EU Joint actions, common positions, declarations and d6marches 
- Other legislative and official documents from other international organisations and 
countries (UNSC Resolutions, PIC Statements, OHR statements). 
- Official statistics 
- Internal reports 
- Speeches 
- Press releases 
- Articles and autobiographies of policy-makers 
Secondary sources: 
- Scholarly journals and books 
- Articles and contributions to collective 
books 
- PhD theses 
- Newspaper articles 
Some methodological comments are in order concerning the online survey and the 
interviews. As far as the former is concerned, in the spring and autumn 2005, a 
questionnaire was sent to Member State representatives to the CFSP Council working 
groups and other committees (see Appendix I). The survey sought to garner information 
about general patterns of cooperation and negotiation within the CFSP framework and 
the impact of institutional developments on coherence and effectiveness. In general, the 
survey explored questions about attitudes and behavioural patterns of the national 
representatives to the Council working groups. It also allowed an investigation of 
lengthy and detailed issues difficult to cover in an interview without running the risk of 
transforming the meeting into a very tedious exercise (e. g. by listing all the institutions 
that might have improved coherence and effectiveness). In other cases, the questions in 
the survey served as an initial exploration of issues that were further elaborated during 
the interviews themselves (issues such as the general tendency in CFSP to compromise 
or to share information). 
The questionnaire was sent by e-mail (with a link to the web page) and also handed in 
person to around 70 individuals. The response rate was 40 per cent (28 answers). Non- 
respondents were in general from the small and new Member States. 3 The questionnaire 
included yes/no questions; questions where the respondents had to indicate one out of 
3 These representatives often have to attend several working groups simultaneously, and in many cases, 
do not feel as obliged to cooperate with researchers as representatives from the more established Member 
States (especially from Germany, UK and the Nordic countries). 
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several alternatives; and questions where they could choose several alternatives. There 
were also questions that asked respondents to choose a numeric category (e. g. from I to 
4), some open questions, and text boxes in which to add comments. The questionnaire 
therefore constituted a type of short, structured interview where there was no contact 
between the interviewee and the interviewer. The data gathered by the questionnaire, 
once processed, was of a quantitative nature and allowed for (limited) predictions - 
qualified by the reduced number of respondents. 
Although this quantitative data is arguably more superficial than the material gathered 
through qualitative in-depth interviews, it does provide a useful and informative 
complement. The in-depth interviews themselves minimised other problems that could 
have arisen from the use of the questionnaire alone. Thus, elite interviews allowed for 
the exploration of the influence of the social and political context (such as the influence 
of 'Brusselisation' and socialisation, the impact of the No vote at the Constitutional 
referendum and the relevance of enlargement fatigue in the relationship between the EU 
and BiH). In addition, interviews lessened some of the rigidities stemming from the 
selection of the survey's questions/answers by allowing the interviewee to speak freely 
on a particular subject with his/her own words. 
In-depth interviews were carried out with 54 people, including EU officials 
(Commission and Council Secretariat officials); national representatives to several 
Council working groups and committees; EU personnel in BiH from the Commission 
Delegation, EUPM, EUFOR, EUMM and the EUSR; and Bosnian officials (see 
Appendix II). Contacting people for interviews was easier than expected, particularly 
when compared to getting diplomats to fill in the online survey. Many interviewees 
were willing to share their views about the EU's role in BiH and about the development 
of the CFSP more generally. Once contact was made with one key person in an 
organisation, or a 'gatekeeper', it was easy to access other people in the same or other 
organisations. Most of the interviews were recorded, with only a few cases arising in 
which interviewees objected to this method. Recorded material ensured accuracy, but on 
some occasions it came at the cost of limiting the information given by the interviewee. 
The interviews followed a script previously sent to the interviewee by e-mail together 
with a Declaration of confidentiality (see Appendix III). The semi-structured nature of 
the interview meant that the number of topics to be covered during the interview was 
chosen beforehand. The order of questions, however, was not fixed in advance, and it 
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depended on how the conversation developed. The script contained a number of open- 
ended questions that allowed the interviewee to talk at length and express his/her views 
and motivations. The flexible nature of the interview allowed for the raising of 
additional questions when necessary. There were also opportunities for various 'forms 
of probing' to ask the interviewees to elaborate on what they had just said (Devine, 
2002: 198). 
Because of the sensitive nature of security and defence issues, interviews in this case 
fulfilled three aims. First, they allowed one to gather information that otherwise would 
have been difficult to access (secret documents, closed discussions and meetings). 
Second, they allowed for the assessment of the impact of perceptions, norms and shared 
practices on EU policy-making. During the interviews, the body language also gave 
clues about the role and personality of the interviewee. Finally, since many interviews 
were held at the working place of the interviewees, this allowed for observation of the 
working environments of EU institutions and ESDP operations. For example, some 
interviews were conducted in the Commission and Council Secretariat Premises (the 
Police Unit, the Civ/Mil Cell, DG VIII), the EU Cell in SHAPE-NATO, the 
Headquarters of EUPM and EUFOR and other EU agencies in Sarajevo. 
Even though some social scientists may be critical towards qualitative research 
methods, especially because they are not replicable and it is difficult to generalise from 
them (Devine, 2002: 204) - here they are considered a valuable technique. Semi- 
structured interviews allowed the interviewees to speak at length and for themselves 
about how decision-making takes place in Brussels. Elite interviews thus constitute a 
flexible technique to explore attitudes, motivations and perceptions. Ideas of consensus- 
building, trust or credibility are phenomena that cannot be grasped adequately by 
quantitative measures alone. In any case, what is important is how these phenomena are 
perceived and interpreted by policy-makers in order to better identify the impact of 
socialisation and leaming processes within CFSP institutions. These benefits 
notwithstanding, elite interviews also presented certain drawbacks. These can be 
summarised as follows: it is difficult to access officials working on these issues; often, 
officials do not agree to be quoted with their names; accounts obtained from interviews 
are less detailed than what one might get from official documentation; and finally, 
officials may introduce some bias or mistakes into their accounts. Another specific 
problem encountered in this research was that it was very difficult to contact people 
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working on EU-Bosnian relations during the 1990s because of the high rotation levels in 
the EU policy-making bodies. 
By using several data-collection methods (survey, interviews and documentary 
analysis), it was possible to contrast and cross-check the information gathered by these 
different methods, allowing for a more accurate account. The next section summarises 
the content of the thesis and the main arguments discussed in each of the following 
chapters. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
The first chapter engages with conceptual issues, defines EU external action, coherence 
and effectiveness, introduces the main CFSP instruments and actors and summarises the 
political and academic debate over coherence and effectiveness in the context of EU 
external action. Three main variables have been singled out as potential explanatory 
factors for problems of coherence and effectiveness affecting EU external action: 
institutions, interests and identities (the so-called three I's). Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed theoretical analysis of the three I's and explains the choice of a historical 
institutionalist approach. It also presents some of the main factors highlighted by 
historical institutionalism: path dependency, unintended consequences, learning and 
socialisation. This approach is applied to the process of CFSP institutionalisation in 
Chapter 3. The first part of this chapter illustrates increasing levels of CFSP 
institutionalisation by looking at three types of CFSP institutions, that is, bureaucratic 
organisations, formal rules and practices. Then the second part of the chapter elaborates 
more on the CFSP institutionalisation process from a historical institutionalist 
perspective, identifying how factors such as path dependency, learning or unintended 
consequences have led to an increasing Brusselisation of CFSP. 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 entail the application of the theoretical framework to an empirical 
case. Here, three periods in the EU's activities in BiH are presented: the intervention of 
the EU during the war period (1991-1995); EU post-conflict activities during the years 
1996-2000 and finally, the most recent CFSP/ESDP developments in BiH from 2001 to 
2006. Each chapter is in turn divided into two or three mini case studies or initiatives 
carried out by the EU during the period analysed - for instance, the EC Peace 
Conference in 1991-1992 or the appointment of an EU Special Representative in 2002. 
9 
The empirical cases first analyse degrees of coherence and effectiveness at both the 
decision-making level and the implementation level and then try to link different 
degrees of coherence and effectiveness with the state of CFSP institutionalisation. In 
sum, the thesis runs as a ladder, with every chapter providing a step towards the 
Conclusion, which summarises the findings and further reflects on the explanatory 
power of the theoretical framework and on certain normative implications stemming 
from the thesis. 
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CHAPTERI 
Coherence and effectiveness of EU external action: 
The debate and conceptual definitions 
The European Union has made progress 
towards a coherent foreign policy and effective 
crisis management [ ... ] But if we are to make a 
contribution that matches our potential, we need 
to be more active, more coherent and more 
capahle. And we need to work with others. 
European Security Strategy (European 
Council, 2003b: 11, emphasis added). 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The current ongoing political and academic debate illustrates the existence of rising 
concerns about problems of coherence and effectiveness that affect EU external action 
in general, and CFSP in particular. These concerns have been confirmed on the ground 
by numerous failures since the foundation of CFSP. According to external observers, 
from the Yugoslav wars to the Iraq crisis, the EU has been manifestly incoherent and 
ineffective in responding to international events. Moreover, the subsequent reforms 
affecting CFSP aimed, to a great extent, at improving CFSP performance, that is, its 
effectiveness and coherence. Despite the abundant debate surrounding these issues, the 
broader conceptual and theoretical implications have hitherto been neglected. For 
instance, although effectiveness has become a buzzword in the EU's jargon, there has 
been no serious attempt to define what is meant by this term or to theorise the variables 
that impinge upon it. The aim of this thesis is to fill the gap in this area of knowledge 
and to provide a theory-based explanation of the problem. 
This chapter introduces the problematique and some key definitions in order to draw 
the boundaries of the research. The chapter starts with a brief description of the actors 
and instruments of CFSP. Then the subsequent section deals with definitions of 
coherence and effectiveness. After distinguishing coherence from consistency, an 
operational concept of the former is proposed. Different categories of coherence are 
also identified. As for effectiveness, a concept that has received little academic 
attention so far, a comprehensive definition is suggested here, trying to keep away 
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from categorical assessments of the CFSP. Effectiveness is better conceived in terms 
of scale, distinguishing different degrees of effectiveness in practice. 
The second part of this chapter explores some of the recent debates on effectiveness 
and coherence that have taken place among policy-makers and scholars. The account 
presented here points to the existence of diverse views on these problems amongst 
different actors according to the dimension(s) of EU external action taken as a baseline 
for the analysis. One of the purposes of this thesis is to make sense of these discussions 
and to theoretically explain the main factor(s) that determine different degrees of CFSP 
coherence and effectiveness. This chapter advances some possible explanatory factors 
explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the political and academic debate: institutions, 
interests and identities (the so-called three I's). Observers have criticised inappropriate 
institutional arrangements as causes of incoherent and ineffective policies. Divergent 
(material and geopolitical) interests between Member States are said also to be at the 
root of problems of (in)coherence and (in)effectiveness. Finally, many academics have 
suggested that the lack of a common European identity, usually understood as 
superseding Member States' identities, might explain low degrees of coherence and 
effectiveness. The three I's are developed in more detail in Chapter 2, where they are 
linked to broader theoretical debates. 
1.2. THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
1.2.1. CFSP as a component of EU external action 
Before analysing CFSP in detail, it is necessary to contextualise it within the broader 
framework of EU external action. By EU external action, this study refers to the whole 
array of purposive activities of the Union in relation to the outside world. 4 The EU 
external action has a cross-pillar dimension and includes different components: trade de 
policy, development cooperation policy, CFSP and the external dimension of Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA). Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) refers to 
4 When using the term 'external action', one should be careful to avoid confusions with the term 'external 
relations'. External relations refer to the whole of external activities of one state with third states. However, this set of activities is not co-ordinated, not purposive (purposive in the sense of aiming at 
some specific objectives fixed beforehand). 'External relations' is also the term used within the EU to refer to the Commission's external activities, traditionally, first pillar activities (trade and development), but nowadays, including activities from all the three pillars. 
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the following range of EU external activities: 'external relations, security, economic 
and development policies'. EU external action can also be conceived as a system 
embracing three parallel subsystems of foreign policy: national foreign policies defined 
within the CFSP framework, the CFSP (or the Union's foreign policy) and the 
Community's external relations (White, 2001). 
Traditionally, this complex of activities has being analysed under the label of European 
foreign policy (EFP). For Christopher Hill, EFP in a strict sense encompasses 'the 
ensemble of international activities of the European Union alone, albeit including 
outputs from all three of the EU's pillars, and not just that relating to the CFSP' (2002: 
3). Thus when considering EFP one should avoid regarding it simply as the 
aggregation of Member States' foreign policies. In other words, one cannot deny that 
some degree of coherent and purposive action has been achieved, to the extent that one 
can distinguish an EU foreign policy from those of the Member States. Although the 
EU does not possess all the attributes of a 'traditional foreign policy', it has the 
capacities and the instruments to formulate and implement coherent and purposive 
actions worldwide. 
Whatever the merits of regarding the EU as having a foreign policy of sorts, 
throughout the thesis the term 'EU external action' is preferred to EFP. This is in order 
to avoid some common mistakes or confusions, traditionally associated with the latter. 
Examples of this include the following: 
0A terminological confusion between 'European' foreign policy (i. e. the 
foreign policy of non-member European states + foreign policy of the Member 
States + CFSP + European Community external action) and the EU foreign 
policy (the co-ordination of Member States' foreign policies within the Union 
framework plus the external dimension of communitarian policies). 
0A conflation of the CFSP with EFP, that has often led to a reduction of 
EU external action to diplomatic and security issues (Smith, H., 2002: 8). 
External action includes more than the CFSP. The rest of the components of EU 
external action (trade, development and some aspects of JHA) are also 'proper' 
foreign policy. 
0 Misleading associations with 'traditional' approaches to national 
foreign policy. Foreign policy has been conventionally wedded to states, 
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governmental activities and national intereSt. 5 Brian White defines foreign policy 
as 'the governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the 
state and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system' 
(White, 1989: 1). In the same vein, Webber and Smith (2002: 2) define foreign 
policy as an exclusive attribute of states, in other words, 
Foreign policy is composed of the goals sought, values set, decisions made 
and actions taken by states, and national governments acting on their behalf, 
in the context of the external relations of national societies. It constitutes an 
attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national 
societies. 
In this light, a typical objection to the concept of EU external action might refer to the 
lack of state-like attributes that prevent the Union from realising unitary action. The 
fact that the EU does not have a centralised authority with a single executive and 
military capacity, has been the focus of a number of criticisms (Smith, H., 2002: 1-7; 
Allen, 1998). Moreover, the question of whether one can identify a genuine 'European 
interest' and which body is responsible for defining it, is difficult to elucidate due to 
the complexity and decentralisation of its structures (Allen, 1996; 1998). 
6 The EU 
hardly possesses the features that Webber and Smith associated with foreign policy 
(2002: 2-3). Nevertheless, one could argue that it does exhibit two key elements: 
'definition of foreign policy in terms of goals, values and decisions', and foreign 
policy involving 'tasks of design, management and control' (ibid. ), even if they are the 
result of the interactions among different bodies and levels of decision-making. Having 
clarified the concept of EU external action, the following section takes up the 
discussion of one of its components, the CFSP. 
5 Richard Whitman (1998) uses the term 'international identity' instead of EFP to avoid a concept that has 
been traditionally associated with state's images. 
6 However, other authors have argued that it is possible to identify a genuine 'European interest' 
(Ginsberg, 1999; Smith, H., 2002). 
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1.2.2. A functional focus on the CFSP 
Analysing all the dimensions of EU external action allows for a comprehensive review 
of the EU's role in the world scene. It offers a more balanced picture of the EU system 
because it takes into account the activities of both the Community pillar - highly 
supranational, decided by qualified majority voting (QMV), allowing for a strong role 
of the Commission and the European Parliament - and the intergovernmental pillars 
(CFSP and JHA) characterised by the use of unanimity, strong control by the Member 
States, and only a limited role for supranational actors. However, limitations of space 
and time oblige this research to circumscribe the object of study in functional terms. 
Notwithstanding the qualifications noted above, it concentrates on one component of 
EU external action, namely, CFSP. Problems of coherence and effectiveness are 
present in all components of EU external action, but they seem more pressing within 
the CFSP pillar, something which justifies a primary focus on this dimension. This 
thesis will consider whether these perceptions are well-founded and what factors give 
rise to this situation. 
In spite of this narrowing of focus, the results of the empirical research ought, ideally, 
to be of relevance to understanding problems which affect the whole of EU external 
action. This study thus argues that levels of coherence and effectiveness within the 
CFSP might affect and/or reflect levels of coherence and effectiveness in other 
components of EU external action, and that some of the theoretical tools used to 
analyse the institutionalisation of the CFSP could also be applied to EU external action 
as a whole. Before moving to definitional issues, the following sections aim to 
reacquaint the reader with the key actors and instruments of the CFSP. 
CFSP actors 
The main actors taking part in the decision-making and implementation of the CFSP 
are intergovernmental in character. The Member States dominate the agenda-setting 
and retain a veto power in the decision-making process given that unanimity is still the 
rule within CFSP, and QMV the exception. The Member States also play an important 
role in the implementation of the CFSP decisions. Having said that, it has to be noted 
that Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) have increasingly been displaced from the 
core of the process by the intergovernmental bodies located in Brussels, through a so- 
called 'Brusselisation' process (see Chapter 3). 
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Figure 1.1. CFSP actors 
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At the top of the CFSP structure (see Figure 1.1), the European Council is composed of 
the Heads of State and Government who meet at least twice per year. This is the body 
responsible for establishing the general guidelines of the CFSP and the overall political 
direction of the EU, adopting decisions by consensus. The General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) is the body actually in charge of the day-to-day working of 
CFSP matters and the main decision-making body. 7 This forum gathers together the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers. According to a pre-established rotating turn, each Member 
State holds the Presidency of the Council for six months. The Presidency has an 
important role in organising the daily activities of the EU. It is supported in its tasks by 
the Council Secretariat and usually works closely with the High Representative (HR) 
and the Commission. The Presidency chairs the Council meetings and, as a primus inter 
pares, facilitates compromises. It is explicitly responsible for the implementation of 
decisions and for representing the EU's position in international forums. Its role in EU 
7 Previously known as the General Affairs Council (GAC), it was reformed in 2002 by taking over the 
responsibilities of the Development Council. The formation of Defence Ministers can also meet under the 
umbrella of the GAERC. 
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external representation is accomplished within the Troika, composed of the Presidency, 
the Commissioner for External Relations and the HR. 
The Political Committee (PoCo), in place since the 1970s with the establishment of the 
EPC, and institutionalised with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), is composed of the 
Political Directors from the MFAs. It was the original body entrusted with 
responsibility for preparing EPC issues for the Council. However, the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) is now responsible for these tasks and, after the entry into 
force of the Nice Treaty (I February 2003), PoCo's role has been reduced to a 
symbolic one. Established as a consequence of the development of the ESDP, the PSC 
is in charge of monitoring the international situation and helping define policies and 
strategies in CFSP areas, as well as being responsible for the follow-up of CFSP 
implementation. It also has responsibility for the political direction and strategic 
control of EU crisis management operations. At a lower level, the European 
Correspondents are in charge of the co-ordination and communication between 
national foreign ministries. The contacts among national capitals are maintained 
through a telex system, often known as COREU. 8 
Another body involved in the decision-making process, preparing the decisions for the 
Council, is the Committee of Permanent Representatives, better known as COREPER. 
In fact, it is more accurate to talk about two fonnations within COREPER: COREPER 
I, dealing with European Community (EQ issues, and COREPER II dealing mainly 
with external relations. The first is made up of deputy ambassadors, and the second of 
permanent representatives, with ambassadorial status. Below these committees, the role 
of the Council working groups is to discuss and draft CFSP documents (Joint Actions, 
Council Conclusions and Action Plans). Currently, there are thirty-six working groups 
dealing with CFSP issues and these follow thematic or geographical lines. Two 
specialist working groups can be added: the Nicolaidis Group and the Antici Group, in 
charge of preparing the agenda of the PSC and COREPER II, respectively. Finally, the 
CFSP Counsellors are in charge of ensuring horizontal co-ordination between CFSP and 
Community matters. With the development of the ESDP, two new committees have 
been established, dealing with the military (EU Military Committee or EUMC) and the 
g COREU was the abbreviation of the first telex system named 'Correspondence Europdenne', which was 
then replaced by the COREU Terminal System (CORTESY) in 1997. The single messages are often 
referred by policy-makers as Coreus. 
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civilian aspects of EU crisis management (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management or CIVCOM). 
The HR is charged with the task of assisting the Council regarding CFSP matters, 'in 
particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of 
policy decisions' (Art. 26, TEU). The HR acts on behalf of the Council and conducts 
political dialogue with third parties and is also a member of the Troika. Under the 
responsibility of the HR, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (hereafter Policy 
Unit) produces security assessments and policy papers for the Council. In the last few 
years, other bodies have been created within the Council Secretariat, such as the 
Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS), the Police Unit or the Civ/Mil Cell to 
support the formulation and implementation of the ESDP. 
The Commission is fully associated to the CFSP activities. The Commission does not 
have an exclusive right of initiative in this area, but operates a shared right of initiative 
with the Presidency and the Member States. Its most important role has been the 
implementation of policies, sometimes together with the Member States. As far as the 
European Parliament is concerned, the Presidency has to consult the European 
Parliament on the main CFSP questions, take its position into consideration and keep it 
regularly informed. Yet the main role of the European Parliament involves the 
approval of the CFSP budget. According to the Treaties, the European Court of Justice 
does not have a formal role in the second pillar. 
CFSP instruments 
The CFSP has no instruments in the strict sense of the word, apart from the 
declaratory-political ones (dimarches, common positions, political dialogues, and so 
forth). The more 'operational' instruments (economic or military ones) are provided by 
the EC pillar or by the Member States. In these cases, even if the decision is taken 
within the context of the CFSP, it is implemented through other channels. This section 
follows Karen Smith's catalogue of instruments that can be used in the framework of 
the CFSP (1998 and 2003: 60-64). In the first place, the EU has at its disposal a range 
of diplomatic instruments. These include the following: 
8 dimarches 
declarations/statements and common positions 
high-level visits (by the Presidency, the High Representative or the troika) 
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0 activities in other international organisations: joint support of resolutions in 
the context of the UN or the OSCE. 
M diplomatic sanctions. 
diplomatic recognition. 
political dialogue (bilateral or regional). 
making peace proposals. 
0 sending special envoys. 
a sponsoring peace conferences. 
0 sending cease-fire monitors. 
a administering a foreign city. 
M sending election observers. 
M sending civilian experts (including civil servants, lawyers, judges). 
0 imposing arms embargoes. 
Second, military instruments have become increasingly relevant as the EU 
progressively builds its military capacity. At the Helsinki Council (December 1999), 
the Member States decided on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to put the 
Petersberg tasks into practice. 9 They also agreed to have a specific number of military 
and civilian personnel, including police officers, civilian experts, and judges at the 
EU's disposal. 10 The Headline Goal 2010 agreed in 2004 aims at further enhancing the 
EU's military capacities and a Battlegroup Concept has been developed. Currently 
(March 2006), the EU has eight ESDP operations on the ground, plus an EU Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, in cooperation with the Commission. 
Seven operations have been completed and a possible rule of law operation to Kosovo 
and a police mission to Afghanistan are in the planning phase. " 
Finally, the EU also uses economic instruments within the framework of the CFSP. 
Most of the EU's economic instruments, and particularly the 'carrots, are deployed as 
EC instruments under the first pillar (trade, financial assistance, technical, cultural and 
other forrns of cooperation), even if they can be complementary to wider CFSP 
' The RRF consists of a militarily self-sustaining force of 15 brigades (50,000-60,000 persons), capable of 
full deployment within 60 days, sustainable for at least one year and with appropriate air and naval 
support. 
10 At the Feira Council in June 2000, the Member States agreed to commit up to 5000 civilian police 
officers for civilian crisis management operations, as well as to create a Rapid Reaction Mechanism to 
enable emergency civilian aid to be available to help stabilise crises. The objective was to be able to 
deploy up to 1000 police officers within 30 days for crisis situations. 
11 For more on this, see ESDP website: 
http: //www. consilium. europa. eu/showPage. asp? id=268&lang=en&mode=g 
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strategies. As Karen Smith (2003: 64) notes, offering EU membership could also be 
considered a CFSP instrument, in the sense that it can serve political objectives, 
although it falls under the Community or first pillar. The fact that the CFSP pillar is 
able to utilise the economic strength of the EU via the EC pillar (Nugent, 2003: 423) 
makes the distinction between EC and CFSP instruments increasingly blurred, 
particularly when EC instruments are used for highly politicised purposes. Negative 
economic instruments (the 'sticks'), however, have usually been imposed following an 
EPC/CFSP decision. Sanctions would have to be agreed within the EPC/CFSP 
framework and then implemented with EC instruments. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that the EU can only impose effective economic sanctions in the area of treaty- 
based trade issues. In other cases (national development policies or investment flows), 
the Member States have to implement the decision (Smith, H., 2002: 116). Hence even 
though the EU can rely on an ample variety of instruments at its disposal, it is still very 
dependent on the Member States when it comes to the implementation of the CFSP. 
1.3. DEFINITION OF COHERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
This section defines the concepts of coherence and effectiveness, establishing different 
categories to be used in the cases studies of Chapters 4,5 and 6. In order to do so, this 
section relies on legal, public policy and European studies literature. 
1.3.1. Coherence 
The lack of coherence within Union activities has long been criticised, especially since 
the establishment of the tri-pillar structure under the Maastricht Treaty. The 
complexity of the institutional framework of the Union has made it hard to develop a 
coherent external action. However, problems regarding conflicting external policies 
and the lack of co-ordination of internal bureaucracies are not exclusive to EU external 
action. Even the most centralised governments in the world are unable or unwilling to 
solve these problems (see Allison and Zelikow, 1999). This does not mean that they 
should be neglected. In the light of the visibility, volume, and scope of the EU's 
external activities in the world, and even more after the enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is important to pay attention to the performance of its external 
action, and in particular, to the CFSP. 
6- 20 
Although referred to by many academics as 'consistency' (Krenzler and Schneider, 
1997; Nuttall, 2001; 2005), to assess and critically evaluate the CFSP, this study 
employs the term 'coherence' for several reasons, which will be discussed below. Both 
theoretical and political definitions of coherence are examined. Special consideration is 
given to the definition of an operational concept of coherence. Moreover, this section 
identifies the main types of coherence that can be observed in the CFSP: horizontal, 
institutional, vertical and internal. 
Coherence or consistency? 
For the purposes of this thesis, the concept of 'coherence' is used to analyse the 
performance of the CFSP. That said, the term 'consistency' also has a status in the 
TEU. In its English version, this term is used in preference to coherence, although it 
should be noted that there is reference to coherence in the context of enhanced 
cooperation (Art. 27a, TEU). In the other versions of the treaty, the term used is 
coherence: 'cohdrence' for the French version, 'kohdrenz' for the German version, 
'coherencia' for the Spanish version, and so forth. The fact that these two terms can be 
found in different versions of the TEU leads to the question as to whether there is any 
difference between them, and if so, which term should be used in the context of the 
CFSP? 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, coherence means 'the action or fact of 
sticking together and remaining united in arguments', as well as 'logical connection or 
relation; congruity, consistency. Harmonious connexion of the several parts, so that the 
whole "hangs together.. (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. 111: 449). On the other hand 
consistency implies 'the quality, state or fact of being consistent; agreement, harmony, 
compatibility' (ibid.: 773). Therefore, in the normal sense of the words (colloquial 
language), there is no substantive difference between these two terms and they could 
be used as synonymous. 
However, numerous studies that have analysed the concept of coherence in legal terms 
maintain that there is a difference. For some authors, the two terms, even though 
related, have differences of meaning (Medina Abelldn, 2002; Missiroli, 2001; Monar; 
1997a; Tietje, 1997). In other words, the wording of the Treaty in the various official 
languages is somewhat confusing, but it is not insignificant. According to this 
literature, consistency implies the absence of contradictions and this concept has a 
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negative and static sense. For its part, coherence involves positive interactions, 
generating synergies between policies or institutions. 12 In other words, two policies 
would be coherent if they arc mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, it means that it would 
be possible to distinguish different degrees of coherence (something can be more or 
less coherent), whereas consistency does not allow for such a distinction (it is either 
consistent or not). Furthermore, a relationship between consistency and coherence can 
be established, with the former being a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the 
latter (Medina Abcll6m, 2002: 3; Tictje, 1997: 212-213). Consistency would thus be a 
minimal requirement, whilc coherence would constitute a higher standard for the 
CFSP. IIcncc legal studies conclude that the English version of the TEU is misleading 
because what the EU has to achieve is coherence, not just consistency (Tietje, 1997). 
From a political point of view, however, the distinction may appear less important. 13 
Usually, consistency and coherence have been used to articulate a similar concern. Both 
terms express the need for the EU to speak- with one voice in the international scene 
through co-ordinated and unitary actions. The Member States should fulfil their 
international duties, acting in a coherent way within the Union (see European Council, 
1993: 2). In official documents, coherence and consistency are used interchangeably, 
although in recent years, the term coherence has become increasingly privileged, as the 
discussions within the Council and the Convention have illustrated (see Presidency of 
the Council of the EU, 2001; European Commission, 2006; European Council, 2003b; 
European Convention, 2002). 
In this light, this thesis takes the term coherence, to mean both consistency (minimal 
requirement) and coherence (a higher standard). However, it would be useful to bear in 
mind what was said regarding the legal distinction between consistency and coherence 
for this serves to introduce different degrees of coherence. On this basis, coherence is 
11 ibc term synergy refers to added value, in other words, the extra energy /power (in mechanical terms), 
or in this case, effectiveness, achieved by two or more people/institutions working together. In the Oxford 
English Dictionary it is defined as '[i]ncreased effectiveness, achievementý etc., produced as a result of 
combined action or cooperation' (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. XVII: 480). 
11 EU official documents do not offer an explicit definition of coherence, although its meaning can be 
deduced from multiple allusions. Coherence does not only refer to lack of contradictions, but also 
involves a positive dimension, being considered in terms of synergies between Policies and pillars. For 
instance, the Council proposed some measures to increase coherence in order to 'make better use of the 
collective means at the Union's disposal and improve the synergy between Community action and 
Member State action' (GAC, 2000). The European Convention also adopted a similar position, stating 
that 'the Union had to use all its instruments, political and economic alike, in a co-ordinated and mutually 
reinforcing manner' (European Convention, 2002: 16). 
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defined as the lack of contradictions between policies/iiistittitioiis/iiistrunients, plus a 
variable degree of synergy as a result of policies/iiistitLitioiis/instruiiients working 
togctlier in order to achieve a common objective. 
Measuring coherence can be a difficult task, and to assist matters a threefold distinction 
is proposed. This involves first negligible coherence, in other words the existence of 
contradictions between policies, institutions or the policies ofthe Union and the policies 
of the Member States. Over and above this, two degrees of coherence can be 
distinguished: minimal, in the case ofabsence ofcontradictions, but lacking synergies; 
and considerable whcri there are strong synergies as a result of policies and institutions 
working together towards a common purpose. In this case, policies converge to 
common goals. and make an efficient use ofcommon instruments, having the activities 
in one sphere beneficial effects in other spheres. Box 1.1 surnmarises the three levels or 
degrees ofcoherence that will be considered when analysing CFSP activities. 
Box 1.1. Degrees of coherence 
Negligible coherence: contradictions arnong objectives, instruments or/and 
policies. 
Minimal coherence: no contradictions among objectives, instruments or/and 
policies, but lack ot'synenmes. I L- 
Considerable coherence: no contradictions + synergies (instruments, policies 
and objectives working together in order to pursue a common goal) 
it is worth noting that coherence also Involves complementarity and co-ordination, and 
t'or this reason. these two terms will be used sometimes to refer to specific aspects of 
coherence. Co-ordination implies the existence of institutional structures that facilitate 
communication and linkages bemeen different actors (institutional bridge S). 14 Co- 
ordination would help to make policies. instruments and institutions work In an 
efficient and organized way. It can take place between FU institutions or between 
Member States and FT institutions (Duke. 1999b. 3). ComplernentaritY, meanwhile. 
14 Co-ordination can be defined as the 'harmonious combination of agents or functions towards the 
production of a result' (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. 111: 898). 
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refers to the perfect 'matching' of different policies, instruments or institutions 
working together, each of them adding some useful skills and/or features to the 
whole. 15 In official documents, the terms complementarity and co-ordination have also 
been used separately to refer to some aspects that this research includes under the 
general concept of coherence. 16 
A categorisation of coherence 
In order to facilitate the assessment of coherence in practice, it is also interesting to 
discuss different categories. Two types of coherence have been often distinguished by 
scholars: horizontal coherence among EU policies, and vertical coherence among EU 
policies and the Member States' policies (Smith, K. E., 2003,65-67; Smith, M. E., 
2004: 211; Tietje, 1997: 211). Nevertheless, according to Nuttall (2001; 2005), it 
would be better to establish a triple categorisation: horizontal, institutional, and vertical 
coherence. This study follows Nuttall's typology, but adds a fourth category, that of 
internal coherence. Hence, one can distinguish the following types of coherence: 
- Horizontal coherence or coherence 
between different EU policies. The TEU refers 
to this type of coherence in Article 3: 'consistency of its external activities as a whole 
in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies'. 
However, as Nuttall (2001: 4) notes, this formulation is incomplete because there is no 
reference to internal policies (CAP, EMU, JHA, environmental policies, etc. 
), 
neglecting coherence between internal and external policies. This category also applies 
to different elements of one policy, such as coherence between civilian and military 
aspects of the ESDP. 
- Institutional coherence means coherence between the two 
different bureaucratic 
bodies of the EU (the Council and the Commission), and basically between two 
decision-making systems: intergovernmental (unanimity) and communitarian (QMV). 
According to Nuttall (2005: 97), problems of coherence arise not because of different 
policy objectives (as is the case in horizontal coherence), but as a result of divergent 
approaches to the same problem by different bodies. 
15 'Mutually complementing or completing each other's deficiencies' (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. 
111: 611). 
16 The Council has often used the term co-ordination meaning coherence among the EU and the Member 
States' policies and between civilian and military instruments. See Development Council, 1997; Council 
of the EU, 1998b; and Le Courtier ACP-UE, 1996: 20-2 1. 
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- Vertical coherence refers to coherence between EU and national policies. In this 
case, the treaties establish concrete obligations for the Member States to support the 
Union's policies. It is formally established, for example, in the case of development 
cooperation policies (Art. 180, Treaty of Rome). Nothing similar exists for the CFSP. 
Even so, there is a general obligation that Member States 'shall support the Union's 
external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity' (Art. 11.2, TEU). In those cases where there is no agreed EU common 
policy (for example, in the case of non-decisions) and/or when the EU is in the process 
of defining/deciding on a common position, vertical coherence would refer to the 
existence of agreement among the Member States, and among the Member States and 
other EU bodies such as the Commission or the European Parliament. 
- internal coherence means coherence among the different actors in the chain of 
command of an existing EU operation and, in general, between actors in Brussels 
(decision-making level) and those on the ground (implementation level). 17 
Problems of horizontal and internal coherence are also experienced by the Member 
States. For example, incoherence between agricultural, development and trade policies 
have been a constant in their external policies. By contrast, institutional coherence, 
between the communitarian and intergovernmental pillars, and vertical coherence, 
between national and EU policies, appear as unique features of EU external action; 
they should therefore receive special attention in this study. 
The application of these categories to the case studies may lead to different measures 
of coherence for the same CFSP initiative across different categories. For instance, one 
can conclude that there is considerable vertical coherence, but minimal horizontal 
coherence. However, to simplify the analysis, those measures will be amalgamated into 
a single measure for the decision-making level and another for the implementation 
level. 
17 As K. E. Smith (2003) has stated, coherence not only has an internal dimension, but also an external 
one. Even when the formulation of policies is coherent within the Union, some policies may be applied 
differently according to which third country is concerned (problems of 'double standards'). This aspect of 
coherence is not examined since the empirical evidence draws on a single case study. 
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1.3.2. Effectiveness 
The concept of effectiveness 
To date, the concept of effectiveness has received little attention in the CFSP literature. 
This concept has generally been taken at face value by academics, as well as in official 
documents (see Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2000-2003; Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU, 2000; 2002; 2003a; 2003b). The CFSP has been often judged by 
observers to be 'effective'Pineffiective', but without explicitly stating what the criteria 
for effectiveness are. Certainly, since the 1970s an important amount of literature has 
attempted to describe and analyse the performance of the EU in world politics (Galtung, 
1973; Sjostedt, 1977; Allen and Smith, 1990,1998; Hill, 1990,1993; Piening, 1997; 
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Ginsberg, 2001). With this objective in mind, different 
concepts have been introduced attempting to capture the substance of the EU's external 
activities such as 'presence' (Allen and Smith, 1990), 'actorness' (Sjostedt, 1977) and 
'impact' (Ginsberg, 2001) or to describe the EU itself as a 'civilian power' (Duchene, 
1972; 1973), 'superpower' (Galtung, 1973), 'superstate' (Hill, 2002) or 'international 
identity' (Whitman, 1998). It is argued here that none of these concepts can serve to 
critically evaluate the CFSP in terms of effectiveness. Effectiveness is more than 
presence, actorness or just having an external political impact. 
Nevertheless, the yardsticks introduced by these concepts can be useful. First, to be 
effective, the EU should have a presence, i. e. it should have the capacity to act and 
mobilize resources, and it ought to be recognized by outsiders and shape their 
expectations and perceptions (Allen and Smith, 1990; 1998). Secondly, to be effective, 
the EU has to deploy a purposive action reflecting the political will of the Member 
States to define certain objectives, matched by the necessary resources and institutional 
capacities. These criteria amount to a measurement of actorness (Sjostedt, 1997). 
Actorness is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of effectiveness. The key 
distinction between both concepts is that the latter takes into account the degree of 
achievement of intended goals. Thus, as in public policy analysis, effectiveness in 
CFSP, relates to goal attainment (Vedung, 1999: 36-37). According to this, CFSP 
effectiveness is defined here as the ability of the EU to achieve the CFSP objectives that 
it was intended to. 
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This definition is not, however, entirely satisfactory. As mentioned above, analysts 
have tended to evaluate EU external action in terms offailure or success (Jorgensen, 
1998: 87). These judgements can suggest powerful images, especially when talking 
about failure; yet it is problematic to judge EU actions in this way. Failure/success 
assessments are too general and too simplistic. The reality is never so simple. They do 
not take into account the multiple dimensions that compose EU external action. As 
Jorgensen (1998: 96) has argued, 'to get a better understanding of the European 
Union's performance in world politics is to acknowledge the existence of multiple 
realities'. These different realities refer to the actors involved, the activities under 
examination, and the interest or telos pursued. When analysing effectiveness, one has 
to bear all these multiple realities in mind. 
In the political and academic debate, different conclusions about effectiveness have 
been drawn according to the elements incorporated into the analysis: the period of time 
selected (short/long term), the activities (CFSP/trade/development), the actors included 
in the comparisons (US, UN, Member States), or the finaliti politique behind the 
process of integration (supranational vs. state-like model). It is also worth noting that 
EU external action is a 'moving target', which makes a final evaluation of its 
effectiveness difficult. In other words, one cannot establish a general conclusion about 
the effectiveness of EU external action that would be suitable for any time. Rather, 
different degrees of effectiveness in different moments and in different geographical 
contexts should be distinguished. The same is true for the various components of EU 
external action: trade, development cooperation, and the CFSP. 
EU external action is also perceived in different ways depending on who the 'judge' is, 
who provides the criteria or standards, and what the criteria for the measurement of 
effectiveness of EU external action are said to be (Jorgensen, 1998: 88). These criteria 
can be set up by external observers (academics, public opinion, third states) or 
internally, by EU policy-makers. 18 But, even within the EU, assessments would differ 
between the Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, or the 
Member States. The only possible solution is to avoid 'universal validity claims' about 
success/failure and to acknowledge the limitations of one's suggested standards. 
Aware of these problems, this thesis is limited to the analysis of the CFSP through 
18 For example, in the academic literature, different criteria have been laid out by different authors to 
measure EU external outputs (Allen and Smith, 1998; Gordon, 1997/1998; Ginsberg, 200 1). 
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elites' perceptions, and particularly, EU elites. 
19 It is an internal assessment, in the 
sense that objectives are internally fixed. The criteria for effectiveness are established 
following the EU's own official objectives, i. e. those established in the treaties and, 
presumably, with an exclusive participation of EU elites (or in the best case, with 
narrow participation of EU citizens). The line of argument here would be that if they 
cannot even meet their own standards and expectations then what use would others' 
be? 20 In any case, the degree of achievement of these objectives is assessed taking into 
account not only insiders' perceptions, but also other external evaluations are 
considered. 
Defined as 'goal achievement', effectiveness takes into account not only outputs 
(decision-making), but also outcomes (implementation), analysing the whole policy 
process. An effective external action is not only an action that achieves the planned 
objectives, but also the action that achieves the objectives in the way it was planned .21 
This thesis will look at both the decision-making process and the implementation level, 
even though it might sometimes be difficult to establish a clear-cut distinction 
between 
the two. For example, some decisions can be an action in itself, such as in the case of 
dimarches; whereas in the case of non-decisions (see Chapter 4), the implementation 
phase is missing; and most of the time, the implementation process will 
feedback (and 
have an impact) on the decision-making process (Ginsberg, 2001). 
By effective decision-making process (or internal effectiveness) is meant the ability of 
the EU to produce decisions according to the CFSP objectives (see below). In other 
words, one should assess the EU's ability to reach a decision, as well as the 
substance/content of the decision itself. Effectiveness will be also analysed at the 
implementation level (or external effectiveness). Looking at policy implementation is 
relevant for several reasons. Firstly, effective decision-making is seen as a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for an effective implementation of the CFSP. One cannot 
expect that once a decision is taken, it will automatically produce the expected results. 
Implementation can deviate from what was projected by policy-makers and produce a 
different outcome. Secondly, effective implementation (trying to achieve the objectives 
19 EU elites include policy-makers from different EU institutions (Commission, Council Secretariat and 
European Parliament), as well as national representatives from the Member States involved in CFSP 
issues. 
20 Having said that, it is true that sometimes internally fixed objectives can also be overambitious. 
21 For this reason, effectiveness is also related to efficiency and the appropriate use of available resources. 
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in the way it was planned) is not always synonymous with effectiveness: 'even where 
implementation of a policy takes place as planned, it may well not lead to the predicted 
or anticipated results' (Webber and Smith, 2002: 79-80). Even a fully implemented 
policy can be ineffective because of unintended consequences or changes in the 
international context. Not only the nature of foreign policy, but also the uncertainties 
and complexities of the international arena, make it extremely difficult to control all 
the variables that can affect policy implementation. Thus, any analysis of CFSP 
performance will have to take into account the impact of exogenous factors. 
To sum up, the concept of effectiveness as defined here can be helpful for the analysis 
of the EU's international performance for several reasons. It is an attempt to measure 
its performance according to the objectives defined by the EU itself, nor does it 
anticipate any judgement on the direction of the process of integration (towards a state- 
like or another sui generis actor). By introducing different degrees of effectiveness (see 
below), this thesis avoids simplistic judgements of failure/success of the CFSP. 
Furthermore, it is an attempt to keep away from explicit or implicit comparisons with 
other actors (Member States, US, international organisations such as NATO or UN) 
that pervade the analysis of EU external action. 
The EU's objectives for an effective CFSP 
Evaluating CFSP effectiveness depends, among other things, on which objectives the 
CFSP is intended to achieve. To be sure, the main purpose behind the establishment of 
a system of foreign policy cooperation in the 1970s was not to solve all the world's 
problems, but to promote internal cohesion amongst Member States and to avoid 
disagreements on foreign policy issues that could damage economic integration. It was 
a modest, but still difficult, attempt to consult and co-ordinate foreign policies among 
European states. According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 4), the 'EPC was not created to 
help Europe solve international problems; it was created to prevent international 
problems from disrupting the Community and, to a lesser extent, to make sure a 
common European voice was heard in international affairs. ' As this cooperative 
network developed, other objectives were added to the original one. Thus, the EPC 
and, later on, the CFSP were to assert the EUs international identity (i. e. to promote a 
common voice in the international scene) and to advance the EU's interests and values 
worldwide (Art. 2 and Art. 11, TEU). The first of these is analysed in this thesis under 
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the heading of coherence. The second set of objectives is encapsulated by the concept 
of effectiveness. 
Because the Member States have not been able to agree on specific 'European interests 
and values' to date, they have established only general (long-term) CFSP objectives. 22 
The TEU (Art. 11) mentions the following: the maintenance of peace and security; the 
respect for democracy, rule of law, and human rights; and the promotion of 
multilateralism. Since the CFSP long-term objectives are too broad to assess CFSP 
effectiveness, the empirical analysis will mostly be guided by certain CFSP short-term 
objectives, even if some references to mid and long term objectives can still be made. 
Thus, one can distinguish between the following objectives: 
- CFSP short-term objectives: objectives agreed for a given period of time (less than 
five years) for a specific country. These are often established in a Country Strategy 
Paper. On some occasions, they are decided ad hoc in order to prevent a violent 
outbreak, to achieve cease-fires or to start negotiations, and then endorsed by a Council 
Declaration (in the case of BiH, see European Council, 2004). CFSP short-term 
objectives should concur with mid and long term objectives. 
- CFSP mid-term objectives: goals set up for a particular region for a pluri-annual 
period (between five and ten years). Examples are the goals established in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which are revised periodically by the EU. 
These goals are set for every country in a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA). CFSP mid-term goals should be designed in accordance with CFSP long-term 
goals. 
-CFSP long-term objectives: established in the TEU (Art. 11) and other official 
documents. These are the respect for democracy, rule of law, human rights, the 
promotion of peace and stability and the promotion of multilateralism. 
' The problem of establishing priorities and operationalising European values and interests has been a 
constant one for the EU (Nuttal, 2000; Smith, K. E., 2003). Te attempt to ind 'Common values d 11 f an 
interests' before the signature of the Maastricht Treaty with the so-called 'Asolo list' failed, preventing a 
clearer definition of priorities in the TEU (Nuttall, 2000: 123). Another attempt to define them better led 
to the Lisbon Declaration Report (1992) where potential objectives for 'joint action' were identified. 
Eventually, the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003b) has established some 
geographical areas and some issues to mobilise EU action. 
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Operationalising CFSP effectiveness 
As noted earlier, this thesis rejects categorical assessments ofthe CFSP. It seems more 
meaningful to ask to what extent CFSP has been effective rather than to ask the 
question as to whether it has been effective or not. 23 Therefore. effectiveness is 
conceived here in terms of a scale or gradation. CFSP will be described as being more 
or less effective according to some criteria that will be defined in this section. In this 
way, one will be able not only to assess the effectiveness of a CFSP initiative at a 
given time, but also possible changes in the overall performance of the CFSP. The 
tables below introduce an operational concept of effectiveness (for a given CFSP 
policy). These tables will be used to analyse the cases studies in Chapter 4,5 and 6. 
The levels of effectiveness can be negligible, marginal, partial and considerable. At the 
clecision-making level (internal effectiveness). different degrees relate to the question: 
to what extent CFSP short-term objectives are incorporated into CFSII decisions'? In 
the implementation phase (external etTectiveness), degrees of ctTectiveness indicate to 
what extent CFSP short-term objectives have bccn actually achieved. 
Table 1.1. Different degrees of effectiveness of the decision-making level (goal setting) 
NEGLIGIBLE MARGINAL PARTIAL CONSIDERABLE 
NON-PURPOSIVE VURPOSIVI: ACTION PURPOSIVE ACTION II(JRI)()SIVI-'A('[ ION 
ACTION (AORITMENTON 
(No A(iR[-[-IMI-'N']') AC'l IONANACTION) 
NO C'01 ITCTIVE IVI: DI: CISION ('()I IAVI IVL DI CISION 
I)FCISION DI-CISION, BUTNOT ACCORDINGTO CFSP ACCORDINO TO CFSP 
ACCORDINOTO CFSP IVFSý BUT ()B. II'C'I"IVI: S, 
OBJECTIVES kk III IOU VFSTABLISI IINO I: S, I ABLISI IINO 
APPROPIATF APPROPIA IT 
I NS IRIJ N1 ENTSTO INS I RUMENTS TO 
ACI lll: Vl: 'I'll[: Sl' AC'Illi'Vl: 'I'Ill-. Sl: 
OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES 
23 Sjostedt (1977: 14) suggested sonlethim, similar to assess the EU's actor capability: '[ilt is not 
necessary to assume that the capacity of' being able to behave as an international actor is something 
undivisible, some sort of absolute quality which one has or has not [ ... 
I tile capacity of being an actor is 
most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or 
lesser extent. ' 
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Table 1.2. Different degrees of effectiveness of the iniplementation level (goal achievement) 
NEGLIGIBLE MARGINAL PA RTIA 1, CONSIDERABLE 
NON-PURPOSIVI.: PURPOSIVF ACTION PURPOSIVE ACTION PURPOSIVE ACTION 
Ac, rION (AGREEMENT ON 
ACTION/INAC'I ION) 
NO COLLECTIVE IMPACTON NON- IMPACTON NON- IMPACTON NON 
DFCISION: NO MI: MI3I: RS PERCEPTIONS MFMI3I: RS, Cl IANGFS IN WMBERS, CHANOFS IN 
IMPACT, NFITI IFR ON AND EXPECTATIONS, POLICIFS ACCORDING VO POLICIFS ACCORDING 
IlFRCF: IlTIONS NOR BUT NO Cl IANGI: S IN C'FSI'013JFC'I'IVI: S TO cl'sil Olull"CTIVI: s 
ON POLICIES 01: NON POLICIE'S ACCORDING FO (PARTIAL (TOTAL ACI III'VEWNT) 
MFMBFRS CFSP OBJECTIVFS ACIIIEVEMI-'Nl') 
1.3.3. Interactions between coherence and effectiveness 
Coherence and effectiveness interact in several ways. Sometimes, improvements in 
coherence can enhance CFSP effectiveness. especially. ifone considers that coherence 
implies synergy as a result of inutually reinforcing policies oriented towards a common 
goal. In most cases, coherence can be seen as a prerequisite for effectiveness. Without 
a coherent use of the entire panoply of instruments and resources, it is difficult to 
produce effective outcomes. In official documents, coherence is also mentioned as a 
requirement for effectiveness. For instance, the Council has stated that 'reinforcing the 
coherence of the Union's external action and realising its policy objectives are 
priorities if the Union is to pull its full weight in international affairs' (Council of the 
EU, 2000b). 'rhe assumption is that, by acting coherently, the EU also becomes a more 
effective international actor. 
I lowever, it can be said that this argumcnt. even it' true, needs qualifying at least. 
Coherence does not always guarantee effectiveness - e. g., when a coherent action does 
not help fultil the intended objectives. Besides. effectiveness has been hampered oil 
some occasions in the name ofa unitary action. The contrary is also ti-LIC. Sometimes, 
the EU has privileged effectiveness over coherence. Inconsistencies between the FU 
objectives and the EU short-term policies, for example, supporting or not censuring 
authoritarian governments. have been justified as a way ofachieving other EU goals in 
the long term (regional stability. security. democratic transition) (Smith, K. E., 2003). 
The creation ofthc Contact Group and other *coalitions of the willing' have also been 
justified in terms ofeffectiveness. For all these reasons, it is argued here that coherence 
and effectiveness require separate assessments. 
1.4. THE POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC DEBATE ON COHERENCE AND 
EFFECTIVENESS. 
This section sketches the debate on coherence and effectiveness of EU external action 
in general, and the CFSP in particular, that have taken place in political and academic 
circles. It first provides an overview of the degree of concern amongst policy-makers 
and scholars regarding these issues. Then it describes how coherence and effectiveness 
have been portrayed amongst officials and academics. It is argued here that 
assessments have differed according to the particular conceptualisation of the EU and 
its external action adopted by the observer. Finally, three factors have often been 
mentioned in order to explain these problems: institutions, interests and identities. 
These factors are discussed in relation to both the political and academic debate. 
1.4.1. The political debate 
This section takes up the discussions that have arisen among policy-makers (both 
Member States' and EU officials) about issues of coherence and effectiveness. 
Increasing concerns about the poor performance of EU external action have seemingly 
inspired subsequent treaty reforms. On the other hand, the way in which coherence and 
effectiveness have been perceived has depended to a certain degree on the different 
images held by policy-makers about what the EU's role in the world ought to be. 
Historical perspective 
Since the 1960s, a growing interdependence between economic and political activities 
made evident the need for greater co-ordination between the foreign policies of the 
Member States. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent oil crises were a good 
example of that interdependence. Hence, the Member States decided to move ahead in 
the process of political integration to allow the EC to speak with a single voice in the 
world. As a result, the EPC was instituted. The earliest official concerns about 
coherence and effectiveness came to the surface with the birth of this 
intergovernmental practice, especially regarding coherence. Both the Council and the 
Commission were aware of potential conflicts that could appear between EC and EPC 
policies. Therefore, the Luxembourg Report (1970) and the Copenhagen Report (1973) 
mentioned the requirement of coherence. The latter stated that the EPC machinery 
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should assume its tasks keeping 'in mind, inter alia, the implications for and the effects 
of, in the field of international politics, Community policies under construction. ' (Hill 
and Smith, 2000: 88). In the Paris Summit, the term 'consistency 24 appeared for the 
first time in a document covering EPC, and expressed the same concerns. 25 In 1983, 
the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart emphasized the need for more coherent action 'at 
all levels' in its international activities. The European Council was tasked with 
ensuring this aim. In the following years, the term coherence was incorporated into the 
4euro-jargon' and became a recurrent issue in official discussions. 
In fact, the problem of institutional coherence was more or less under control until the 
mid-1980s because the Member States were strongly opposed to the use of 
communitarian instruments to implement the EPC. Similarly, the Commission tried to 
avoid contamination of the Community pillar with intergovernmental practices 
(Nuttall, 2000: 25-27). However, the growing interdependence and the development of 
economic sanctions as an instrument of the EPC increased interferences and the risk of 
overlap. For this reason, the Single European Act (SEA) (1986) introduced some 
dispositions regarding this problem (it was also the first time the word 'consistency' 
appeared in a legal document). Moreover, coherence was linked with the objective of 
an effective external action. 26 Although the SEA introduced a general obligation of 
coherence between the two existing pillars (Art. 30.5, SEA), it did not put in place any 
real mechanisms to ensure it on the ground. At the same time, this document 
institutionalised the separation between EPC and EC policies, formalising two 
different procedures, bureaucracies and cultures. In the long term, it would complicate 
the overall requirement of coherence. It is not surprising that 'official' assessments of 
the EPC performance were not very positive: 
Tbrough the system of European Political Cooperation we tried at least to 
co-ordinate our policies, but it was all strong nouns and weak verbs: better 
at spawning committees and empty declarations than at driving policy 
(Patten, 2002a). 
24 As explained before, the term 6 consistency' is used in the English version instead of 'coherence', which 
would be, however, the appropriate term in this case. 
25 The Heads of State and Government 'considered it essential to ensure progress and overall consistency 
in the activities of the Community and in the work of political cooperation' (Hill and Smith, 2000: 99). 26 In its Preamble, the SEA affirmed 'the aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with 
consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common interests and independence'. 
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The Maastricht Treaty 27 was preceded by an intense debate as a consequence of the 
important challenges (internal and external) that the EC had to deal with. The 
discussions about the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) concentrated a lot of 
energies inside the EC. Outside, the collapse of the USSR, with the ensuing economic 
and political transformations in Eastern Europe, called for a stronger role for Europe in 
the world. In this context, the Belgian government issued a Memorandum on Reform of 
the Community (20 March 1990) that stressed the necessity for a stronger political 
union through some pragmatic reforms that would increase the effectiveness, the 
democratic component, and the convergence between EPC and EC mechanisms 
(Nuttall, 2000: 105). 
However, as some observers have argued, the initiative for an intergovernmental 
conference on political union, launched by Helmut Kohl and Frangois Mitterrand in the 
spring of 1990, was more a response to German re-unification than to the scanty 
performance of EPC (Nuttall, 2000: 4-5). Wanted or not, their proposal meant a 
significant progress on foreign policy issues. In their letter to the Irish Presidency, the 
two leaders affirmed that the objectives of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
were to 'strengthen the democratic legitimation of the Union, render its institutions 
more efficient, ensure unity and coherence of the Union's economic, monetary and 
political action, and define and implement a common foreign and security policy' 
(quoted in Nuttall, 2000: 113-114). Afterwards, the mandate addressed to the IGC by 
the national governments included the issue regarding how to ensure an 'effective 
implementation within an institutional framework' and 'procedures ensuring that the 
Union can speak effectively with one voice on the international stage' (European 
Council, 1990). 
Even if all the Member States agreed on the necessity of ensuring coherence of the 
Union's activities as a whole, discussions about how to tackle the question of 
coherence were determined by disagreements between those defending a supranational 
project and those in favour of an intergovernmental vision of the process of European 
integration (Nuttall, 2000: 119). During the 1991 IGC, differences between both 
approaches made it difficult to agree on specific provisions to avoid problems of 
coherence, in particular, regarding the bodies responsible for compliance, the process 
27 The Maastricht Treaty was agreed in December 1991 at the European Council in Maastricht (The 
Netherlands). It was signed in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. 
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of implementation and the financial procedures, the external representation or the 
possibility of judicial monitoring regarding coherence. Eventually, these differences 
led to the characteristic ambiguity of the Maastricht Treaty. Even so, it widened the 
concept of coherence and laid out some provisions on coherence between EU policies 
(inter and across pillars) and between the Union's and the Member States' policies, 
guaranteed by a loyalty clause (Art. J. IA, ToM). Innovations introduced at this stage 
such as the new instrument of joint actions aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the 
EU in the international scene. 28 
In spite of the innovations, the outcome of the CFSP was limited and the incoherence 
between pillars and policies continued to be obvious. Even though some informal 
practices had developed to improve matters (Smith, M. E., 2001), the Maastricht Treaty 
was a major disappointment for those who hoped it would set up the institutional basis 
for a more efficient and coherent external action. For instance, a Commission Report 
affirmed that 'the experience of the common foreign and security policy has been 
disappointing so far' (European Commission, 1995: 5), describing the policy in terms 
of 'conftision', 'incoherence', and 'paralysis' (ibid.: 63-75). One national 
representative in the Council affirmed in 1996: 
public opinion as well as the governments and even the institutions of the 
Union have been finding significant faults in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) due to its meagre results. Its inefficiency, its lack of 
credibility and lack of real influence on the international stage are constantly 
brought to the fore (Durdn Loriga, 1996: 3 1). 
The Maastricht Treaty created expectations that could not be fulfilled, as expressed in a 
statement of the European Parliament (1996): 
these problems would not exist if we were still dealing with EPC. The 
problem as far as the average Community citizen is concerned is that the 
name CFSP suggests that there is such a thing as a common foreign and 
security policy, in other words that, at least in certain areas, a broad 
consensus has been reached on the foreign and security interests of the 
28 For a full account of the institutional isation process and its impact on coherence and effectiveness, see 
Chapter 3. 
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Member States and that therefore, as in other policy areas, ways have been 
agreed of speaking to the world with a single European voice 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
These frequent criticisms promoted subsequent institutional reforms in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and later on, in the Nice Treaty (see Chapter 3). In European forums and 
institutions, concerns regarding effectiveness and coherence intensified with time, and 
both aspects were considered to be a condition for the Union to be a ftilly-fledged 
international actor. With this in mind, the European Council at Helsinki (December 
1999) invited the Council of Ministers 'to take the necessary steps to ensure that 
optimum use was made of the various means at the Union's disposal for more effective 
and comprehensive external action by the Union'. In the light of this discussion, the 
Council decided to hold an initial policy debate at the beginning of 2001 on the whole 
of the Union's external action and in particular on external aid and its effectiveness. 
The first orientation debate took place in January 2001. At that meeting, it was noted 
that EU external action needed a clarification of its political priorities, improved 
management of resources and better co-ordination of the whole range of instruments. 
The debate held in May 2002 highlighted the need for better inter-pillar co-ordination, 
developing comprehensive regional strategies and strengthening the EU's role in 
multilateral organisations. Other reports issued by the Council also drew attention to 
the deficiencies in the management of external action regarding definition of priorities, 
coherence between instruments, co-ordination between Community and Member 
States' activities, and financial problems (Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2003; 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2000,2002 and 2003a). 
Moreover, the Council adopted some measures to ensure coherence and effectiveness 
in specific policies: development, human rights, conflict prevention, and environmental 
policies. For instance, the requirement of horizontal coherence between policies was a 
growing concern in the Council in particular regarding development policy. The 
Resolution of the GAC on 5th June 1997 focused on specific areas where policy 
coherence was considered particularly important (Development Council, 1997). In 
March 1998, the Council approved some Guidelinesfor strengthening operational co- 
ordination between the Community and the Member States in the field of development 
cooperation (Council of the EU, 1998b). As regards conflict prevention, the European 
Council of Feira (2000) invited the HR and the Commission to submit concrete 
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recommendations to the Nice European Council to improve coherence and 
effectiveness. The Report presented at Nice identified the main challenges for the EU 
in this field (Secretary General/High Representative and Commission, 2000b). 
One of the last Council initiatives designed to improve the coherence and effectiveness 
of external action occurred as part of the 'Debate on the Future of the Union' launched 
after Nice. The Declaration ofLaeken (15 December 200 1) stated that the Union 'has to 
become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient'. The shortfalls detected 
in the external action of the EU obliged the Convention to establish a separate Working 
Group on External Action. The Convention members found early agreement that it was 
, important for the EU to be a strong, effective and efficient player on the international 
scene' (quoted in Duke, 2003: 3). The Convention, acknowledging the importance of 
these issues, devoted considerable time to discussing them and numerous articles of the 
Constitutional draft were designed to 'enhance coherence and efficiency' of EU external 
action (European Convention, 2002). Finally, the European Security Strategy also 
called for a more effective and coherent external action (European Council, 2003b). 
This document emphasized the need for the EU 'to be more active, more coherent and 
more capable', to contribute to an effective multilateral system and added that '[g]reater 
coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external 
activities of the individual Member States' (European Council, 2003b: 11; 13). 
As regards the European Parliament, the same concerns can be documented. In its 
report evaluating the implementation of the CFSP in 1995, the European Parliament 
(1996) underlined some institutional deficiencies, including the lack of clarity in the 
definition of CFSP objectives and security interests, and recommended the better use 
of the instruments provided by the treaties Ooint actions and common positions). 
Further reports maintained the same tone, describing CFSP developments as 
'disappointing as regards improving organisation, raising the Union's profile, and 
enhancing its ability to act' (European Parliament, 1997: 5). Similarly, on several 
occasions, the European Parliament criticised deficiencies in the implementation of the 
EU's human rights policy and 'deplored' the lack of common positions and new 
initiatives vis-a-vis the Mediterranean countries, Russia, and NATO and EU 
enlargement to Eastern Europe. 
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The Commission, concerned by these problems, embarked on an important reform of 
its external relations service as part of a more impressive reform after the debacle of 
the Santer Commission (European Commission, 2000). One of the goals of the reform 
was to enhance coherence and complementarity between programmes, DGs policies, 
Community policies and CFSP policies, and Member States policies. A similar attempt 
followed the negative outcomes of the referendums held in 2005 in France and The 
Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty. Given the need to improve coherence and 
effectiveness of EU external action, but aware also that the way for significant 
institutional reform was blocked, in 2006 the Commission issued a Communication 
suggesting some pragmatic steps that would 'enable the Union to define a strong sense 
of collective purpose in our external action and to ensure that this is backed by the 
necessary policy instruments' (European Commission, 2006: 2). These included better 
links between internal and external policies, better strategic planning and better co- 
ordination with the Member States and other EU institutions in external representation. 
Conceptualising the EU and its external action 
Assessments of coherence and effectiveness hinge on which conceptualisation of the 
EU integration model is used and which activities are included in the definition of EU 
external action. From the viewpoint of the Member States, the EU is conceived as an 
instrumental organisation allowing its member to reach their goals in a cooperative 
way. This process is not aiming to create a 'single' external action or a 'single 
European army', but a 'common' policy; facilitating harmonisation or rapprochement 
of the foreign policies of the Member States. Therefore, the term 'common' in CFSP is 
not comparable to what it means, for instance, in the existing Common Agricultural 
Policy. In Patten's words, 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy does not mean that there will be a 
single foreign policy. European Security and Defence Policy is not about a 
European army [ ... ]. We do not want to become a superstate like the United 
States. What we want is to work more effectively togethe in order to better 
project our combined potential and thus increase our capacity to contribute 
to the solution of global and regional issues (Patten, 2000, underlined in the 
original). 29 
29 In the same vein, the former French Minister for European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, argued that JI]a 
France ne souhaite pas fondre compktement sa politique 6trang&e dans I'Union europdenne [ ... ] 11 n'y 
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Since only a 'common' policy is expected, this has reduced policy-makers expectations 
about what can be judged to be an effective external action at the EU level, especially 
if one compares with more critical assessments by academics. However, even this 
limited objective, to co-ordinate and harmonise national foreign policies, is far from 
easy due to the continuance of different national idiosyncrasies and divergent interests 
in this area. 
The main components of EU external action (trade, development assistance and the 
CFSP) have usually received different assessments in the political discourse. While in 
the economic arena, the EU is considered to be a major actor, CFSP developments are, 
by contrast, seen as disappointing, even within EU institutions (see, for instance, Patten, 
2001). The meagre performance of the CFSP has also made it difficult to progress in 
other areas: 'the CFSP as it currently exists limits Europe's ability to have the influence 
that its economic and cultural weight deserves' (European Parliament, 1998: 7). The 
imbalance between the economic and diPlomatic/security dimensions has often been 
seen as preventing the EU from adopting a more active position in international 
conflicts. 
A common argument amongst some Member States and EU officials is that an effective 
external action requires the development of military capabilities and the framing of a 
common defence policy. 30 The perceived effectiveness of NATO's use of force (which 
might better be described as US' force) in the Balkans provided a justification for the 
development of an EU military capability (Prodi, 2003). This argument acquired strong 
support after the British-French St. Malo summit. According to the St. Malo 
Declaration, 
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage [ ... 
] To this end, the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
aura donc pas de fusion. En revanche, la PESC peut-dtre un instrument commun pour prolonger nos 
thýses, pour mieux les faire vivre et partager avec d'autres. Mais il y aura toujours une politique 6tran&e 
frangaise (Moscovici, 1999: 106-7). 
30 For instance, the Prime Minister of Greece, Costas Simitis, declared during the Greek Presidency of the Union (2003): 'As we strengthen the CFSP, we must also reinforce its defence element the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) [ ... ] it would create the conditions necessary for the development of 
a coherent, wide-ranging foreign policy' (Simitis, 2003). 
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decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises (Hill and Smith, 2000: 243). 
The European Security Strategy backed this argument by insisting that the EU has to be 
ready to engage, when necessary, in 'robust intervention', using all the instruments at its 
disposal, including military ones (European Council, 2003b: 11). Other European 
institutions, like the European Parliament, also agreed that the military dimension 
should be a tool to increase effectiveness and credibility of the CFSp. 3 1 However, this 
does not mean that policy-makers attach less importance to the EU's civilian 
capabilities. On the contrary, in recent years, the development of conflict prevention and 
civilian crisis management capabilities has been considered of utmost importance. The 
EU is believed to be 'well placed to engage in conflict prevention' and to treat the root 
causes of conflicts (Secretary General/High Representative and Commission, 2000b). 
The wide range of instruments at its disposal allows the Union to effectively manage 
pre and post-conflict situations. Furthermore, the EU is said to play a more important 
role in the long-term initiatives aiming to maintain stability, peace and economic 
development than in the short-term management of conflicts (Solana, 2000c). However, 
even in these cases, the EU has been criticised for acting slowly and in a reactive 
manner, which has hampered CFSP effectiveness. 
The next section moves to the discussion of how the extant CFSP literature has treated 
these issues. Firstly, it provides a historical overview of what has been said by 
academics about coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. Then, it argues that 
different accounts can be explained by referring to exactly how EU external action is 
conceptualised by scholars. 
1.4.2. The academic debate 
Historical perspective 
'The European Union's (EU) enormous international power and frequent inability to 
wield it very effectively in the pursuit of European interests surely constitutes one of the 
most fascinating paradoxes of the "European project"'. With these words, John Peterson 
(1998: 1) opened his reflection on the role of the EU as a global actor. As this section 
31 '[I]n order to make the CFSP more credible and more effective, the Union has created a common 
security and defence policy (CSDP), enabling it to draw on the full range of civilian and military instruments so as to protect its fundamental values and interests' (European Parliament, 2000: 7) 
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will show, this view about the EU is not an exceptional one among academics; on the 
contrary, it frequently comes across in the EU literature. The question of coherence and 
effectiveness of EU external action has been of increasing concern among scholars, 
developing in parallel with the emergent role of the EU in international affairs, 
especially since the beginning of the 1970s. 32 EC competencies in trade and commercial 
policy endowed the EC with important external instruments: common external tariff and 
trade agreements. However, this aspect of EU external action was usually 
underestimated by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Economic policies ('low politics') 
were not considered to be a part of foreign policy. In contrast, 'high politics', i. e. 
diplomacy and security policies, constituted the core of FPA. This conception of 
external action did not take into account either the importance of external economic 
activities or the fact that they became politicised very fast, and could be and were used 
as an instrument of 'high politics' (Smith, 1998). 
According to Piening, in this initial period, the EC built its external action capacities 
'by default'; however, from the end of the 1960s 'it chose to move toward developing 
a common foreign policy' (1997: 31), detached from its external economic activities. 
The establishment of the EPC added another component to EU external action that 
grew in importance with successive institutional reforms. Nonetheless, analyses of 
Europe's role in international affairs, taking 'high politics' into account, did not fully 
emerge until the beginning of the 1980s (Allen et al., 1982; Hill, 1983; Pijpers et al., 
1988, Nuttall, 1992). During this decade, certain events exemplified the incoherence 
and weakness of the EPC, especially because of unilateral policies and the conflicting 
interests of Member States: the unilateral action of France during 1982 regarding the 
Middle East (Soetendorp, 1999: 110); the case of the Falklands War, and the 
reluctance of Ireland and Italy to adhere to a common position; South Africa was also 
an example of incoherence and ineffectiveness at least until the end of the 1980s 
because of the dissension between the Member States (Smith, H., 2002: 185, White, 
2001: 84-93). All these episodes, which took place in parallel with the discussion of 
the SEA and the institutionalisation of the EPC, increased academic concerns and 
demands for a more coherent and effective external action. 
32 The first evaluations of the EC performance in the international economy did not appear until the 1970s. See, for instance, Galtung, 1973; Sjostedt, 1977. 
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Undoubtedly, the Maastricht Treaty provided the most significant boost to the analysis 
of these questions (Hill, 1993; Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994; Nuttall, 2000). In spite of 
the innovations introduced in the TEU, the capabilities of the EU were soon considered 
unable to fulfil its desired role in the international arena. Moreover, the fact that more 
objectives, instruments and mechanisms were created was seen as making it more 
difficult to achieve coherence. The development of external action entailed the 
deployment of numerous instruments in different areas that were not always 
compatible, and sometimes, the aims of economic, cooperation and security-defence 
policies simply clashed (Holland, 2002). 
In addition to the dynamics of the integration process, a combination of unexpected 
and traumatic events affecting the Union led to fresh analysis of EU external action. 
Many studies focused on the role of the EU in a more uncertain post-Cold War era 
(Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994). The end of the Cold War, as well as German 
reunification, the dissolution of the USSR, the emergence of post-communist states in 
Eastern Europe, and the Yugoslav wars certainly tested EU external action structures. 
In particular, Yugoslavia became the b9te noire of the CFSP during the 1990s 
according to scholars (Piening, 1997: 194). However, the EU's failure in Yugoslavia 
was only the tip of the iceberg. As two analysts wrote in the mid-1990s, 'the first 
experiences with the CFSP are on the whole negative. The handling of the Yugoslavian 
case is perceived not as an exception to otherwise positive experiences but as 
highlighting structural deficiencies' (Regelsberger and Wessels, 1996: 29). 
The concept of a 'capabilities-expectations gap' (Hill, 1993) was fonnulated by 
Christopher Hill in this context, referring to the difficulties of the EU in responding to 
the demands and expectations that had emerged with the integration process. These 
expectations emerged 'both inside and outside the Union' (Hill, 1993: 29). Inside, the 
demands were formulated by politicians, think tanks, lobbies, and academics who 
expected that the Maastricht Treaty would endow the EU with more efficient 
institutions and increase its role in the world. Outside the EU, a great variety of 
demands came from candidate countries, third countries seeking economic assistance, 
trade preferences or other economic agreements, demands for political dialogue, and 
US demands for a more significant involvement of the EU in world affairs (Hill, 1998: 
20-33). In Hill's words, 'the gap between capabilities and expectations was seen as the 
significant difference which had come about between the myriad hopes for and 
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demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited ability to deliver' 
(Hill, 1998: 23). 
The passing of the Amsterdam Treaty also generated a rich debate on these issues 
(Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; RegesIberger et al., 1997, Smith, M. E., 2001; Zielonka, 
1998a; 1998b). Nevertheless, the widespread view was very a pessimistic one. The 
instruments and resources of the CFSP were improved to some extent, but not enough 
to fulfil expectations. In Zielonka's words: 'from one case to another it has become 
increasingly evident that Europe's common (foreign) policy is neither coherent nor 
committed' and he added that '[t]he Union is either unable to formulate policies or 
unable to implement policies already adopted' (I 998a: 3). 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the challenges coming from the 
globalisation process, the adoption of the euro, and enlargement were viewed as having 
compounded the need for a more coherent and effective external action (Duke, 2003: 
2). However, at the same time as the EU tried to boost the integration process with a 
new Constitutional Treaty, the war in Iraq provoked a division between the positions of 
the Member States which was very harmful in terms of their credibility and 
effectiveness. 'After Iraq, it was a common view that it would take decades, at best, to 
shape a credible EU foreign policy, and that EU credibility in general had been badly 
damaged' (Everts and Keohane, 2003: 167). The war in Iraq was the best proof of the 
weaknesses of EU external action. Nevertheless, some experts talked about the EU 
'losing its innocence' or a 'new realism' encouraging new initiatives such as the 
European Security Strategy or the new provisions incorporated into the Constitutional 
Treaty (Everts and Keohane, 2003: 167). 
Conceptualising the EU and its external action 
As in official assessments, academic judgements have varied depending on the ideal 
model leading the observer's analysis. For some authors, the EU cannot have a 
common foreign policy because it does not fulfil the requirements of statehood and 
does not have the centralised institutions needed to implement a European foreign 
policy (Allen, 1998). For their part, Forster and Wallace associate an effective external 
action with the achievement of a superstate or federation: '(t)ransfer of effective 
authority (and budgetary allocation) over foreign policy and defence would create - or 
require -a European federation' (2000: 462). 
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By contrast to those who reject the idea of an EU external action, some authors would 
point at specific problems of incoherence and ineffectiveness of EU external action, 
but without denying the existence of such external action: '[t]he paralysis of recent 
years does not imply that the idea of a common foreign and security policy is by 
definition absurd' (Zielonka, 1998a: 7). Since other alternatives to a more coherent and 
effective external action are not viable - individual European states would not be able 
to effectively run a foreign policy in the complex post-Cold War era - changes in 
6policies, institutions and concepts' are seen as the best response (Zielonka, 1998a: 7). 
Some authors have indicated that problems regarding coherence and effectiveness are 
not exclusive to the EU. The majority of states and international organisations also 
suffer from it (Hix, 2005: 395; Smith, H., 2002: 6). The US, for instance, has failed on 
numerous occasions to reach its projected external goals - Vietnam, Afghanistan and 
Iraq provide obvious examples. 
At other times, and linked to the state-like model, criticisms have focused on the lack 
of military power (Hill, 1993, Gordon, 1997/98). For instance, Hedley Bull (1983: 
15 1) argued that 'Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem 
likely to become one' because it does not have real power, that is military power. Its 
influence in the international arena would hinge on the support of military power 
provided by other actors. By contrast, according to the thesis of 'civilian power' 
suggested by Duch8ne (1972; 1973), given growing economic interdependence the 
only feasible prospect for the EC to play a significant role in world politics was to 
emerge as a world economic power, using cooperative and diplomatic tools to promote 
its interests and values. Duch8ne believed it was neither likely nor necessary that the 
EC play a role in international affairs by developing its military/nuclear capabilities. 
To be a civilian power, Duch8ne argued, the EU needed to eschew the use of force in 
international relations and to pursue 'civilian' ends such as the promotion of 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, and multilateralism. 
From this viewpoint, the EU is seen as more effective and coherent in two principal 
domains. First, in the deployment of 'soft security' instruments rather than in 'hard 
security' (Howorth, 2003: 14); 33 and secondly, the EU is seen to be more effective and 
33 According to this division of international tasks, the EUs role has been often equated to the 'payer' 
rather than the 'player' (Ginsberg, 2001: 2) or in Dominique Moisi's image: 'the US fights, the UN feeds 
and the European Union funds' (quoted by Patten, 2002b). 
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coherent in long term situations than in solving conflicts in the short term (Smith, H., 
2002: 7). For Peterson, the EU may have been ineffective in solving crises (peace- 
enforcement), but it has been relatively effective in helping reconstruction, through 
peace-keeping and peace-building tasks (1998: 13). This perception of the EU as a 
civilian power implies that civilian and economic activities are seen to be generally 
more effective, and that the achievement of military power is neither essential, nor 
desirable (Manners, 2002; Smith, K. E., 2000; Zielonka, 1998a). For instance, 
Rosecrance (1998) places greater emphasis on the EU's economic rather than military 
power, and in the way that this power is used. Unlike the US, the Union gives 
preference to rewards and incentives rather than threats and punishments. In the same 
vein, Hazel Smith (2002) affirms that the EU is better equipped to provide the 'butter', 
while the US still concentrates on the 'guns'. Robert Kagan (2002) has argued however 
that the EU has favoured multilateral and diplomatic methods because it is weak, and 
not because it believes in the superiority of those practices; for its part, the US has 
privileged military instruments because it has the capabilities to do so. 
Assessments of the EU have also varied according to the activity concerned. As 
mentioned earlier, the reduction of EU external action to the CFSP has often led to 
pessimistic evaluations (Smith, H., 2002: 8-9). By contrast, analyses focusing on the 
external economic activities of the Union tend to be more positive (Hix, 2005: 404). 
Even if problems of (in)coherence and (in)effectiveness are common to all dimensions 
of policy, in general, when the EU is judged solely in relation to its economic power it 
is believed to be an important actor in world politics. For instance, Hill (1990) has 
argued that the EU could be seen as a 'power bloc' in the world economy system. 
Zielonka (1998a: 5) has considered the EU to be a 'strong and dynamic actor' 
regarding economic activities, but 'in a state of paralysis' regarding security and 
diplomacy. The poor performance of the second pillar has received numerous 
criticisms (Gordon, 1997/98; Peterson and Sjursen, 1998). Rosecrance (1998: 15) 
argued that the CFSP 'is a misnomer [ ... ], an acronym without empirical context'. In 
the same vein, Rummel and Wiedemann (1998: 53) considered that the CFSP 'is 
neither common, nor foreign, nor dealing with security, nor can be called a policy'. In 
conclusion, for some authors, the CFSP has neither the means, nor the capability to 
produce and implement foreign policy decisions. Even, on some occasions, the CFSP's 
performance has impaired the EU's image in world politics. As bluntly summarised by 
Peterson (1998: 11): 'there seems little question that the CFSP [has not made] the EU a 
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more important international actor, and may even have damaged its reputation as an 
international actor'. The next section explores the three factors brought up by policy- 
makers and scholars in order to explain the above-mentioned problems of 
(in)coherence and (in)effectiveness: institutions, interests and identities. 
1.4.3. Factors explaining coherence and effectiveness 
a) Institutions 
Institutions (or rather the lack of appropriate institutions) have frequently been 
identified as a factor explaining the problems the Union has faced in building a 
coherent and effective external action. Among policy-makers, this question has 
received a lot of attention, particularly, prior to IGCs (see contributions in Pappas and 
Vanhoonacker, 1996). From Maastricht to the Convention debates, lengthy discussions 
have been devoted to institutional engineering. Hans Van den Broek, former 
Commissioner of External Relations, affirmed: '[t]o some, the IGCs discussion over 
voting procedures and external representation may seem far removed from Bosnia, 
Chechnya, Rwanda or Algiers. But such technical issues are in fact of equal relevance 
to Europe's ability to act decisively in the future' (1996: 24). 
The three-pillar structure, the unanimity procedure, the lack of an external 
representative and the inadequate budgetary provisions have attracted most criticism 
(Bar6n Crespo, 1996; Duran Loriga, 1996, European Parliament, 1999; 2000, Van den 
Broeck, 1996). For example, during the debates of the European Convention, the 
possibility of increasing QMV in the CFSP was discussed (European Convention, 
2002: 24). A large number of delegates in the External Action Working Group 
concluded that the 'the current need for unanimity restricted the Union's capacity to 
act and that it resulted in a policy dictated by the least ambitious position' (European 
Convention, 2002: 24). On the other hand, the European Parliament, the Commission 
and other national officials have argued that merging the tasks of the HR and the 
Commissioner of External Relations will improve the visibility and coherence of EU 
external action. 
Academic evaluations of coherence have also concentrated on institutional 
arrangements (Allen, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Missiroli, 2001; Monar, 1997a; Smith, 
bbbbb, 
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M. E., 2004; Zielonka, 1998a). From this perspective, the main source of incoherence is 
the division in pillars that reinforce the development of two different procedures and 
two different bureaucratic cultures (Allen, 1998; Nuttall, 2000; Winn and Lord, 2001). 
For Rummel and Wiedemann (1998), it is difficult to harmonise intergovernmental and 
supranational cultures, resulting in ineffectiveness. They criticise the three-pillar 
structure because it undermines the coherence and unity of EU external action, 
separates policies in an artificial way and hinders interactions between EU institutions, 
and between the EU and other international organisations. In addition to the pillar 
structure, the limited use of QMV in CFSP issues, financial arrangements or the lack of 
a 'voice for Europe' have also been pinpointed in scholarly works (Allen, 1998; 
Monar, 1997b, Peterson, 1998: 6,10). In most analyses, the emphasis has been on 
formal arrangements and legal procedures; whereas informal practices and rules have 
often been excluded from the final picture. 34 
b. ) Interests 
Interests occupy a central place in political and scholarly explanations of coherence 
and effectiveness. Policy-makers, for instance, have often highlighted the centrality of 
national governments and MFAs in the making of EU external action. Since national 
interests have not disappeared, an effective action can only be achieved when national 
interests converge to a clear and evident common (European) interest. When national 
representatives were asked about which was the main obstacle for a coherent and 
effective CFSP/ESDP, 53.6% of respondents referred to 'divergences among Member 
States' interests', while 25% identified 'inappropriate institutions' and 17.9% 'the lack 
of a common identity' (On-line Survey, Appendix 1). According to the Working Group 
on External Action 'the capacity to act on an issue of foreign policy [is] determined by 
the existence of political will and convergence of views among Member States' 
(European Convention, 2002: 23). However, sometimes national interests are so 
entrenched that it is impossible to reach a common position. The resulting situation 
was neatly summarised by The Economist (2003) in relation to the Iraq crisis: 
Europe's leaders are gambling for high stakes over Iraq. If you feel in need 
of light relief at this time of world tension, try reading the European Union's 
Maastricht Treaty on the subject of foreign policy: 'Member States shall 
34 Some exceptions would be Nuttall, 2000; Smith, M. E., 2004; or Winn and Lord, 2001. 
k6bb. 
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support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly 
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. ' Perhaps there was some 
transcription error, and the real text reads: 'Member States shall actively 
undermine the Union's external and security policy in a spirit of loathing 
and mutual mistrust. ' That certainly comes closer to capturing reality. 
Academics have also expressed a similar view about interests and their impact in EU 
external action, although in this case, how interests are theoretically conceptualised has 
an impact on the final judgement (see Chapter 2). In general, academics have pointed 
to fixed and material national interests and have illustrated divergences between 
national interests and subsequent difficulties in reaching collective decisions. In his 
analysis, Soetendorp concludes that 'foreign policy making in western Europe is still 
the foreign policy of 15 nation-states rather than the foreign policy of one 
supranational state' (1999: 147). Soetendorp argues that only in areas where the 
interests of the national governments were close was it possible to achieve unified 
action. In the same vein, Ginsberg acknowledges that '[w]hen national foreign policy 
positions on a given issue are too diverse to be fashioned into a European one the 
EU will be unable to act in international politics' (2001: 276). 
In general, these difficulties are related to the unwillingness of the Member States to 
accept common policies. Unilateral actions have been frequent in the past, damaging 
the image of the Union inside and outside its borders. With this conduct, European 
states have appeared as 'inconsistant [sic] and divided' (Hill, 1990: 49). On other 
occasions, the EU has been criticised for its inaction: for example, during the 1996 
Turkish-Greek crisis in the Aegean when the EU was replaced by the US as the main 
mediator between the two NATO members (Zielonka, 1998a: 4). Ambiguity is also a 
common feature of EU policies, usually, as a result of divergent national interests. 
Enlargement and the difficulties of designing a clear strategy best exemplify this 
ambiguity (Allen, 1998: 57; Barbd, 1998). It has also been evident in the EU's 
relationships with its neighbouring areas (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Damireuther, 
2004). In short, for many academics, one of the most significant problems in 
implementing an effective and coherent external action is that this policy has to coexist 
with the foreign policies of Member States pursuing their own interest in the same 
arenas as the EU. Or, in other words, 'Europe as an entity has thus become an extra 
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dimension in an already complex web of international relationships still based 
primarily on state-to-state contacts' (Piening, 1997: 195-196). 
c. ) Identities 
It is possible to identify two different causal relationships between the output of EU 
external action and a European identity. On the one hand, identity can be seen as a 
factor determining the effectiveness of EU external action (i. e. a strong European 
identity might favour unitary action, facilitating the emergence and identification of 
common interests and values). On the other hand, an effective external action can be a 
factor promoting a European identity (see Preamble and Art. 2, TEU). Here the focus 
is on the former relationship: a common identity as a factor contributing to an effective 
and coherent external action. 
The 'official ideology' of the EU is based on the motto 'united in diversity', i. e. the 
recognition of national identities, while promoting the development of a European 
identity through the deployment of EU symbols: a coinage, a flag and an anthem 
(Prodi, 2003). 35 According to policy-makers, problems in forging an effective CFSP 
derive from the fact that sometimes it is not possible to reconcile these two identities. 
In these cases, national identity has often been privileged and it has prevented the EU 
from adopting a common position and hence from deploying an effective CFSP. Chris 
Patten explained the problem in this way: 
Because foreign policy goes to the heart of what it means to be a nation. If 
the separate members of the Union are to retain their national identities, as 
they can and must, they will inevitably be reluctant to relinquish control of 
their foreign policies. They are, after all, competitors in the world as well as 
partners (Patten, 2001). 
Some scholars have also argued that the lack of a common identity at the European 
level has frustrated attempts to establish an external action at the EU level (Peterson, 
1998,3; Zielonka, 1998a). According to Gordon (1997/98: 100), 'the lack - even after 
forty years of integration - of a European identity sufficient to permit delegation of 
35 A European identity does not try to take the place of national identity; but it must respect and promote 
these identities (Art. 5.1, TEU). The Preamble of the Draft of the Constitution similarly states: 'Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a 
common destiny'. 
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sovereignty to centralized institutions means that EU foreign policy cooperation will 
probably remain limited, fragmented, and intergovernmental'. 
Hill and Wallace consider that an effective foreign policy requires a strong sense of 
identity: '[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a 
nation-state's 'place in the world', its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations' 
(quoted by Aggestam, 1999: 1). The same requirement holds at the European level, but 
so far, it seems to be elusive. Thus, Lisbeth Aggestam has argued that 'the Union has 
not proved convincing in moving much beyond the primarily negative stage of 
integration (the removal of barriers) to a positive one that would promote a European 
identity and interest' (1997: 92). CFSP is still seen as an instrument to advance 
national interests in the world. As Dave Allen (1996: 294) has suggested 'participation 
in the CFSP is valued for the stimulus that it gives to the continued assertion of 
national individuality in international politics rather than as a step towards the 
submerging of those separate identities into some sort of European identity'. 
in sum, the academic and political debate has focused primarily on the need of 
appropriate institutions in trying to address problems of coherence and effectiveness. 
Convergence among Member States interests has been also pinpointed as a prerequisite 
for a coherent and effective action. Less attention has been paid to identities, although 
some policy-makers and scholars have noted that the lack of a shared identity at the 
EU level also helps explain some of the deficiencies of EU external action. 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced some of the key issues and problems that constitute the 
main focus of this research. These include the concept of EU external action, the main 
actors and instruments of the CFSP, and the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. 
As shown in section 1.4, there is a commonly-held view among policy-makers and 
scholars that EU external action, and more particularly CFSP, is incoherent and 
ineffective. This thesis attempts to ascertain to what extent this assessment is valid, 
concentrating on an examination of CFSP activities in BiH. 
51 
In order to facilitate this task, this chapter has defined the main concepts that will be 
used in the following chapters. Aware of the limitations of any definition, as an attempt 
to delimitate complex realities, this chapter proposes some working definitions for the 
concepts of coherence and effectiveness in order to study the CFSP. To avoid 
simplistic judgements on coherence and effectiveness, it is suggested here that a 
gradation, as well as the distinction between decision-making and implementation, can 
allow for a better assessment of CFSP policies in terms of coherence and effectiveness. 
This chapter has also described the intense debate that has taken place over coherence 
and effectiveness of EU external action, in both political and academic forums. Three 
main factors - institutions, interests and identities - have been pinpointed in order to 
make sense of these problems. Some conclusions can be noted here. As far as the EU's 
achievements in the international scene are concerned, official and academic views 
have been noticeably varied. From the most pessimistic positions to those that 
underscore partial successes (for example, in 'low politics' or 'soft security' policies), 
the range of perceptions make it difficult to draw a definitive assessment of EU 
external action. In general, one can say that there is widespread acceptance that the 
Union enjoys international presence (Allen and Smith, 1990), even though this 
presence shows numerous problems of effectiveness and coherence, even in its 
economic dimension. Countless failures of the EU in coping with international 
conflicts have alarmed external observers and institutional reforms have not dispelled 
concern on these issues. On the contrary, the increasing complexity of CFSP 
institutional design and the functional and geographical broadening of its activities 
seem to have exacerbated anxieties. Thus, incoherence and ineffectiveness are 
regarded both by academics and politicians as persistent obstacles in the way of 
advancing EU presence and actorriess. 
This thesis intends to contribute to the existing CFSP literature by examining these 
problems, and identifying those factors that may affect CFSP dynamics. As suggested 
above, a comprehensive account of CFSP coherence and effectiveness would point to 
the concurrent impact of three factors: institutions, interests and identities. On this 
basis, the next chapter explores in more detail alternative theoretical explanations and 
develops a theoretical framework that will serve to analyse the CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness of the selected case study. 
52 
CHAPTER 2 
Historical institutionalism: A framework for analysis 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to make explicit the theoretical assumptions that 
underpin the thesis. Theory is considered here as an essential tool if one wants to make 
sense of the world in a structured way. Yet the present chapter does not intend to 
undertake an endless theoretical discussion of competing theories and approaches - 
even, if one cannot completely set aside these meta-theoretical debates. Rather, it aims 
to establish the theoretical pillars that inform the empirical research and to elucidate 
certain underlying assumptions about the relationship between actors and their material 
and normative environment. In short, it should have a practical purpose: to illuminate 
the empirical puzzle that constitutes the focus of this study, namely the coherence and 
effectiveness of the CFSP. 
The present chapter is structured as follows: the first section consists of an in depth 
review of the factors introduced in the previous chapter - the so-called three I's - and 
advances some explanations regarding their mutual relationships. It is argued that 
institutions are the key variable in explaining levels of CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness. However, this choice does not neglect the relevance of interests and 
identities in the final explanation of EU external action. Section three comprises the 
bulk of the chapter. Taking as its starting point the argument of bounded rationality, it 
puts forward a historical institutionalist approach as a theoretical tool to make sense of 
the empirical analysis of CFSP. Historical institutionalism can incorporate both the 
rational and sociological elements of institutions and explain the impact of institutional 
arrangements over time. Arguably, other theoretical approaches such as those based on 
FPA or public policy could also have been helpful in order to explain CFSP coherence 
and effectiveness, in particular at the implementation level (see Dimitrakopoulos and 
Richardson, 2001; Hill, 2003b; Parsons, 1995; White, 2001; 2004). Even if not 
completely rejecting the insights provided by such perspectives, the approach selected 
in this thesis draws instead on International Relations UR) and European Studies 
theories as well as on organisational theory to disentangle the relationships between the 
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three I's identified in the political and academic debate. This analytical framework will 
serve to analyse the process of CFSP institutionalisation with special attention to path 
dependency, unintended consequences, learning and socialisation. 
2.2. THE THREE PS: INTERESTS, IDENTITIES AND INSTITUTIONS. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, one can best make sense of EU external action 
by analysing the complex interplay between three factors: interests, institutions and 
identities (see also Hyde-Price, 2004: 100; Landau and Whitman, 1997). A full 
understanding of EU external action is shaped by how these three factors are 
conceptualised. For instance, in the political and academic debate sketched in the 
previous chapter, institutions have usually been treated in a formal sense, as 
bureaucratic organisations and formal rules, whereas their sociological aspects, 
including the development of practices and norms, have been neglected. The next 
section is an attempt to critically explore the treatment of the three I's in the extant IR 
and European Studies literature. It discusses the main flaws in mainstream realist, 
neoliberal and constructivist perspectives and adopts a specific conceptualisation for 
each of the three I's. Based on this understanding of interests, identities and 
institutions, a historical institutionalist approach, it is argued, can better grasp the 
dynamics of the CFSP. 
2.2.1. Interests 
Interests constitute the starting point in rationalist analyses when explaining the 
behaviour of states at the international level. 36 A first question here relates to the nature 
of those interests. In the realist literature, interests are usually equated with power (in 
geo-strategic or economic terms). States seek to maximize their power, understood as 
the ability to get what they want, resorting to the use of force or threat when necessary. 
While power can have different faces, the most important for realists is military power 
because the main goal for states, the national interest par excellence, is survival. Thus, 
Waltz's neorealism (1979) takes states as the main actors in the international system and 
36 From a rationalist perspective, individuals behave according to instrumental rationality, i. e. a means- 
ends strategy. Individuals are usually portrayed as self-interested actors, seeking to maximize their own interests. 
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describes states' preferences in terms of maximizing their capabilities (their power) to 
maintain or improve their position in that system. 
In spite of some divergences between neorealists and neoliberals, 37 the latter follows the 
same assumptions regarding interests, seeing them as something fixed, exogenously 
given, taken for granted (not problematised), and mainly conceived in material terms. 
States enter into bargaining with some prior interests and they will strategize according 
to these given interests. Usually, rationalist analyses will not consider changes in 
interests, focusing instead on changes in strategies and behaviour as a consequence of 
interactions among actors. If there is a change in negotiating positions, it is not because 
a change in preferences has occurred, but because actors have changed their views 
about what the optimal strategies to achieve their interests are or because issue-linkages 
allow them to lower their demands in the current negotiations in exchange for 
concessions elsewhere. 
In the field of European Studies, both intergovernmentalism and rational choice 
institutionalism have followed this rationalist premise. According to 
intergovernmentalist analyses (inspired by the realist tradition), decisions are taken by 
sovereign states that act on the basis of material self-interest in an international context 
characterised by anarchy. Stanley Hoffman (1995) considers that states' interests are 
related to the protection of both geopolitical (national security and sovereignty) and 
economic interests. At the European level, states enter into cooperation because of 
egoistic interests - to deal more efficiently with problems at the international level - 
and they are keen to maintain a narrow control on the integration process, in particular, 
when vital interests are at stake. In Hoffmann's view, the diversity of national interests 
among Member States, the so-called logic of diversity, has prevented the development 
of a logic of integration (Hoffman, 1995: 71). A coherent and effective external action 
at the European level will only be possible in those cases when the national interests of 
European states coincide. From this point of view, institutional arrangements and 
ideational factors are less important when explaining degrees of coherence and 
effectiveness of EU external action. 
37 Neorealist and neoliberal approaches take issue, for instance, with the importance given to economic interests or military and geo-strategic power; relative/absolute gains; and how they perceive anarchy and 
cooperation in international relations (Lucarelli, 2000). 
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Moravcsik's 'liberal intergovemmentalism' shares some of the above assumptions, but 
is supplemented by a theory of preference formation at the domestic level (1993; 1994). 
Moravcsik proposes two levels of analysis. At the first level, domestic actors will try to 
influence a governmental position, and seek to promote their economic interests. At the 
second level, states are seen as unitary actors that have to bargain in order to defend the 
position that has been fixed at the national level. Policy outcomes at the EU level can be 
reduced to the preferences of the Member States and the distribution of power among 
them. Moracvsik maintains the postulate of state rationality, but in contrast to realist 
theory, he argues that state preferences are driven by economic rather than geopolitical 
interests and that inter-state bargaining can produce positive-sum outcomes. He also 
concedes some importance to the institutional environment which is information-rich, 
providing transparency and trust, and thus, liberal intergovernmentalism can be seen as 
a variant of rationalist institutionalism (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 76). 
Although rationalism has been successful in asserting this conception of interests, 
scholars have recently started to approach interests in a different way. Contrary to what 
is often assumed, rationalism and constructivism are not irreconcilable in their 
conception of interests. Rationalist analyses can incorporate ideational factors in actors' 
conceptions of utility (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 910; Jupille et al., 2003); 
however, they have often neglected the analysis of preference formation, while focusing 
on strategic choice. Constructivist approaches are instead process-oriented. From this 
perspective, interests are not fixed; rather they vary during the process of interaction 
and they do not always come from within the state, but can be shaped by internationally 
shared norms (Finnemore, 1996: 3,11). To paraphrase Wendt (1992), interests are 
'what states make of them'. Practices (what states do) construct states preferences and 
identities (what states are). States' interests are shaped by their interactions and their 
perceptions of the world they inhabit. 38 These perceptions can be the result of objective 
facts (the possession of wealth and natural resources), but also of social interactions that 
give meaning to objective facts, hence the importance of the institutional setting 
wherein these interactions take place. For this reason, 'what is needed is a decision- 
making theory which includes in its analysis the ways in which preferences, beliefs and 
38As Lisbeth Aggestarn has pointed out: '[t]he conceptual lenses through which foreign policy-makers 
perceive international relations tend to set the norm for what is considered rational foreign policy- 
making' (2004a: 84). 
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desires are shaped by participation in the decision-making process itself (Kerremans 
quoted by Checkel, 2001: 30). 
From a constructivist perspective (Christiansen et al., 1999; Tonra, 2003), rationality is 
not simply informed by economic, geopolitical or other 'material' interests, but it is 
argued that ideational and social factors also motivate individuals. Interestingly, some 
rationalist analyses have started to explore ways to incorporate ideas in their accounts of 
actors' motivations. 39 According to Goldstein and Keohane, 'ideas as well as interests 
have causal weight in explanations of human action' (1993: 4, emphasis in the original). 
However, from this viewpoint, all that is considered is how ideational factors could in 
principle alter actors' behaviour, not their interests or identities. For Goldstein and 
Keohane, (1993: 3), 
ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody 
provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-mean 
relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which 
there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political 
institutions. 
Finnemore and Sikkink offer a summary of this rationalistic approach to ideas. By 
treating ideas as mere information that reduces uncertainty or alters strategies, this 
approach results in 'politics without passion or principles, which is hardly the politics of 
the world in which we live' (1998: 916). In sociological analyses (e. g. Finnernore, 1996, 
chapter 1), by contrast, social factors (such as norms or identities) are incorporated into 
actors' preferences. Actors will try to behave in an appropriate way in a given situation 
following social rules or pursuing altruistic goals. 
However, in most sociological accounts, agency (and rationality) disappear from the 
analysis and are subsumed into and determined by structure. As will be explained 
below, this thesis departs from such a firrn structuralist interpretation, but retains a place 
for structural influence while also conceiving actors as rational and self-reflective. The 
39 In traditional realist analyses, ideas and, particularly ideologies, were treated as a mere disguises to hide 
the pursuit of egoistic material interests (see for example, Morgenthau, 1973: 14,88-91). However, some 
realist analyses do take subjective factors such as values and national traditions into consideration in 
order to explain foreign policy. This is the case with Hoffmann's concept of 'national situation' (Hyde- Price, 2004: 103). 
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concept of interests that informs this study suggests that: a) interests are not fixed and b) 
both ideational and material factors need to be considered in the construction of 
interests. The empirical research will seek to shed light on this framing by exploring 
whether Member States' interests have remained fixed or have been affected by the 
institutional context in which the Member States are embedded. It will also attempt to 
uncover the nature of the interests (ideational, economic and/or geopolitical) that guide 
Member States' behaviour. But this is only one part of the story, it is also necessary to 
understand the mediating effects of identities and institutions on interests. 
2.2.2. Identities 
Rationalist approaches consistently overlook the importance of identities. Actors are 
seen as rational, self-interested and driven by instrumental rationality. They all make the 
same means-ends calculations given the same conditions, independently of who they 
are. 40 Identities, as interests, are exogenously given and fixed. From the point of view of 
this research, identities are conceived of somewhat differently. They are socially 
constructed and they can vary as a result of social interactions; and, more importantly, if 
identities change, this will impact on the behaviour and interests of actors. Hence the 
more ambitious goal of this research is to clarify to some extent the role that identity 
plays in shaping CFSP policy and the relationship of a European identity to overall 
effectiveness and coherence. This involves explaining the relationship between 
identities and the other two factors considered by this study, interests and institutions. 
In the words of Michacl Barnett (1999: 9), '[a]n idcntity is the undcrstanding of oncself 
in relationship to others'. Identity is always a social and a relational concept. Identities 
are the result of the continuous interactions of one community or state with other 
communities or states, implying something socially constructed and contingent. 41 if 
identity is socially constructed, this notion allows of an important role for agency in its 
construction. Thus, Barnett (1999: 9) argues that a process of contestation or identity 
conflict can take place whereby different actors compete to impose their own 
interpretation of a collective identity. 
40 However, more sophisticated non-materialist rationalist analyses have started to take into account the 
role of identity factors in the final explanation. For example, Schimmelfennig's analysis of the decision to 
0 enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe showed how community and identity fact rs affect actors' 
strategies and can be used rhetorically to increase actors' bargaining power during negotiations 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). 
41 However, it is worth noting that even if identities are contingent, they are also quite resistant to change 
once they have been institutionalised (see Aggestam, 2004a: 84). 
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Of some importance for this study is the relationship between identities and foreign 
policy. It is argued here that identity constitutes a decisive link between institutional 
structures and interests (Jepperson et al., 1996: 59). In Wendt's words, '[i]dentities are 
the basis of interests. Actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry around 
independent of social context; instead, they define their interest in the process of 
defining situations' (1992: 3 98), and they define situations according to their identity. In 
other words, 'European identity thus provides the cognitive framework within which the 
EU's foreign and security policy is formulated' (Hyde-Price, 2004: 109). According to 
Barnett (1999: 10), a 'national identity is a source of interests. Identity, however, does 
not cause action but rather makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not 
so'. This implies that when analysing identities as an independent variable, we should 
conceive them not as a 'cause' of actions, but as enabling factors, determining the range 
of possible options (Sedelmeier, 2004: 13 1). It is expected that identities will have an 
impact on interests and then, an impact on foreign policy. Following from this, if a 
shared understanding about the EU's role in the world emerges among CFSP policy- 
makers, one could expect that this will affect the policy output. 
It has to be noted, however, that an EU identity is something recent and relatively weak 
and, crucially, in an ongoing process of emergence as a result of the interactions 
between the EU and its Member States. The complex interaction between European and 
national identities produces some sense of collective EU identity. 42 This is illustrated in 
the CFSP domain, wherein the Member States might identify collective goals as their 
own goals. Of course, the building of this European identity is easier if it is seen as 
compatible with national identities (Aggestam, 2004a: 85). 
To be clear, the notion of identity in this thesis refers neither to the understanding 
shared by the Member States' populations (mass attitudes), nor to the identities of the 
Member States as such (i. e. Germany's identity). It refers instead to the understandings 
shared by the EU elites (national representatives, EU officials) about the EU's 
appropriate role in the world or the EU's international identity. As put by Aggestam 
(2004a: 88), the concept of role provides 'an analytical and operational link between 
identity constructions and patterns of foreign policy behaviour' and suggests 'how 
cultural norms and values are translated into verbal statements about expected foreign 
42 As argued by Landau and Whitman, '[i]dentities encompass a set of loyalties that, rather than being 
exclusive, can coexist' (1997: 7). 
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policy behaviour and action orientation'. The key questions to be explored by this study 
will be whether the EU has acquired such an identity, i. e. is there a shared 
understanding about what the EU's international role should be? The objective will be 
to explore the ideas that define collective expectations of appropriate action. In the case 
of the EU, the thesis will investigate how ideas about the EU's role in the world, usually 
framed in terms of civilian/military power or soft/hard power have evolved throughout 
the period 1991-2006 in relation to the case of BiH. Moreover, it will assess how this 
collective identity affects coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP. The next section 
moves onto the last factor completing the equation to understand EU external action: 
institutions. As will be explained in section 2.3, by focusing on institutions, a historical 
institutionalist approach aims to unpack the complex interactions between the three I's 
and to judge how processes of institutionalisation have affected interests and 
contributed to the development of an EU international identity/role. 
2.2.3. Institutions 
In recent years, institutionalist analyses have increased in importance, in particular, 
following the seminal work of March and Olsen (1989; 1998). From this perspective, an 
important preliminary question regards the definition of institutions - what should be 
included within this category without risking 'conceptual stretching' (Lowndes, 2002: 
103)? According to North (1990: 83), institutions are the 'rules of the game'; however, 
his definition seems too broad since it includes tradition, custom and culture as informal 
institutions. More specifically, for March and Olsen (1998: 948), institutions are &a 
relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for 
specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in 
structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize 
particular identities'. 43 For his part, Peter Hall describes institutions as 'the formal rules) 
compliance procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy' (quoted in 
Peters, 2005: 74). Hall's definition seems more suitable for this research since it does 
not include cultural or customary factors, and therefore it is easier to operationalise. In 
this sense, institutions would encompass both formal and informal elements; both rules 
and practices Cstandard operating procedures'). Building on this definition, institutions 
43 Institutions understood in this way have also been labelled as 'norms' by political scientists (see Finnemore and S inkkink, 1998: 89 1). 
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are conceptualised in this thesis as including bureaucratic organisations, formal rules 
and informal practices. 44 
On the other hand, whether institutions have an impact or not and how they matter is 
still a source of contention. While international institutions are considered to be 
epiphenomena in neorealist analyses, i. e. they have no independent effect on states 
(Mearsheimer, 1994/1995), for neoliberal institutionalists, regimes and international 
organisations matter. Institutions have an independent impact: they constrain state 
behaviour and modify state strategies. For instance, Oran Young (1992) demonstrates 
that institutions can be effective even in 'hard cases' and discusses some critical 
variables that can determine the effectiveness of institutions. Institutions also facilitate 
cooperative outcomes by helping to overcome collective action problems (Keohane et 
al., 1993; Martin and Simmons, 1998; Ruggie, 1998). If defection and cheating are 
problems, then the establishment of rules that constrain state behaviour and make 
defection less attractive will help to increase opportunities for cooperation - this 
argument is also endorsed by liberal intergovernmentalism (see Moravcsik, 1993). 
Institutions provide information about governments' intentions thereby reducing 
uncertainty and making policies more predictable. They can serve as focal points for 
policy-making and reduce transactions costs (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1993: 400). 
Finally, iterative interactions within an institutional framework may increase the 
credibility of commitments and facilitate issue-linkages (Martin, 1992). In any case, 
states will seek to establish institutions that allow them to maintain their autonomy, 
while reducing the costs of cooperation. Intergovernmental arrangements will best suit 
states' interests and thus the expectation is that international institutions will be 
obstinately intergovernmental (Sjursen, 2004: 7). 
From a rationalist perspective, institutions are therefore seen as formal and informal 
structures only constraining actors' strategies, although some neoliberal institutionalists 
have acknowledged the independent impact of institutions on interests and identities. '5 
By contrast, from a sociological perspective, institutions are considered to be the 'rules 
of the game', shaping and defining the behaviour of a specific social group, and then 
44 For a distinction between bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and informal practices, see Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
4' For example, Keohane acknowledges that 'institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power 
of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power' (1989: 382). Yet, this issue has remained relatively unexplored in rationalist analyses. 
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having an impact on actors' interests and identities. As March and Olsen (1989: 159) 
point out, 'political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or 
instead of, by calculated self-interest; politics is organized around the construction and 
interpretation of meaning as well as, or instead of, the making of choices. ' 
Sociological approaches have devoted more attention to the deep effects of institutions 
on interests, exploring how institutions offer a cognitive and symbolic framework 
according to which actors define their preferences (see Katzenstein, 1996; Finernore and 
Sikkink, 1998; Legro, 1997; Risse et al., 1999). Because of limitations in rationality and 
because preferences are often disordered or complex, institutions are seen to offer a 
script to help order and/or specify preferences. According to March and Simon, '[t]he 
organizational and social enviromnent in which the decision maker finds himself 
determines what consequences he will anticipate, what ones he will not, what 
alternatives he will consider, what ones he will ignore' (1964: 139). Institutions also 
have constitutive effects over identities: they 'offer a normative context that constitutes 
actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of actors acquires meaning 
and value' (Katzenstein, 1996: 12-13). According to this sociological perspective, since 
some institutions become taken for granted, and in so doing determine the preferences 
and identities of individuals, this can make the possibilities for agential response very 
limited within this approach. It therefore has been criticised for its determinism in 
"writing actors out of the script" and treating them as "cultural dupes" (Tonra, 2003: 
735). 
The supposed impact of institutionalisation processes varies according to which notion 
of institutions guides the researcher. For example, in sociological analyses, 
institutionalisation refers not only to the establishment of formal and informal 
institutions, affecting individuals' behaviour, but also to the cognitive effects of 
institutionalisation: the emergence of 'codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and 
accounts in the context of acting on them' (March and Olsen, 1998: 948). For Zucker 
(1983), for instance, institutionalisation is both a 'phenomenological process by which 
certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted' and a state of 
affairs in which shared cognitions define 'what has meaning and what actions are 
possible' (quoted in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 8). The latter dimension is also 
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emphasized by Wendt, for whom this process will have deep effects in actors' interests 
and identities (1992: 399). In the CFSP context, M. E. Smith (2004: 30) argues that 
Institutions can thus shape the processes of goal selection and the strategies 
adopted to achieve these goals. This [ ... ] suggests the possibility of the 
formation of a distinct polity, as actors reconstitute their behaviours and 
interests in terms of European norms rather than national ones, although 
there are certainly overlaps between the two. 
For the purposes of this thesis, institutionalisation is defined as the process whereby 
CFSP institutions (bureaucratic organisation, formal rules and informal practices) are 
created and developed, shaping actors' behaviour, and even their interests and identities 
in the long term. Institutionalisation involves the establishment of some bureaucratic 
and political bodies, the development of formal rules and informal practices, which 
together constitute the 'institutions' of the CFSP. This process will have an impact on 
actors' behaviours since they will have to adapt their strategies to the new procedural 
and substantive rules that have been established. Besides, although it may well not 
happen in the short term, institutionalisation does not exclude the intemalisation of 
practices and rules in the long tenn (i. e. having cognitive effects). 
This research will try to clarify the impact of institutionalisation on actors' behaviour, 
e. g. how it has affected actors' strategies by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs 
and increasing incentives for cooperation, and how this can affect CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness. Furthermore, drawing on a broader understanding of institutions, a 
subsidiary goal will consist of determining the impact of institutions, if so, on interests 
and identities. For example, it will be interesting to test whether or not the increasing 
interactions of actors within an institutionalised framework has promoted the 
development of a 'we-feeling', or a sense of community, and/or whether it has led to 
changes in actors' preferences and/or identities. 
Figure 2.1 summarises the mutual relationships between the three Ps. First, institutions 
can be conceived as arenas within which particular interests and identities emerge and 
can even constitute those interests and identities. At the same time, institutions can also 
be an expression of interests and identities. Interests can determine the institutional 
design and in this way, institutions can be seen as 4waYs of propelling interests' 
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(Landau and Whitman, 1997: 8). For their part, identities serve as a cognitive 
framework for interests, i. e. they provide with cognitive lenses to policy-makers that 
help them define their interests. In sum, there is a historical and causal link, therefore, 
between the three I's. Policy makers must act in inherited institutions which can both 
facilitate and restrict their agency and constitute their identities; but by acting, policy- 
makers also shape these very same institutions. These links and the conceptualisation 
of the three I's that has been introduced underpin the theoretical framework of this 
research: a historical institutionalist approach. The next section discusses this 
framework in more detail. 
Figure 2.1. Complex interactions between the three I's 
IDENTITIES - INSTITUTIONS 
2.3. A FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONS: A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACH. 
It is argued that a historical institutionalist approach can better guide the empirical 
research and help to illuminate the impact of CFSP institutions on effectiveness and 
coherence. Although it concentrates on exploring 'how institutions matter', it does not 
neglect the role of the other two I's; on the contrary, it offers the methodological tools 
to analyse the complex interactions between interests, institutions and identities over 
time. As put by Thelen and Steimno (1992: 13), 
the emphasis on institutions as patterned relations that lies at the core of an 
institutional approach does not replace attention to other variables - the 
players, their interests and strategies, and the distribution of power among 
them. On the contrary, it puts these factors in context, showing how they 
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INTERESTS 
relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political situations are 
structured. 
Before discussing the different institutionalist variants, it is worth mentioning that this 
analysis takes as a starting point the rational actor: even in highly institutionalised 
frameworks, rationality plays a crucial role in determining actors' behaviour. As 
Finnemore and Sikkink have argued, 'rationality cannot be separated from any 
politically significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the 
normative context conditions any episode of rational choice' (1998: 888). The concept 
of rationality used here is one of bounded rationality. This approach acknowledges the 
limited cognitive capacity of individuals. Policy makers do not dispose of all necessary 
information to make the right choice (they might not know all the alternatives and/or the 
consequences attached to each alternative). Moreover, their preferences are too complex 
and they are not ordered. Hence, actors satisfice rather than maximize (Haas, 1990: 33). 
Most of the activities are concerned with finding satisfactory solutions, and only a small 
number try to achieve 'optimal' outcomes (March and Simon, 1964: 140-141). In this 
context of incomplete information, the institutional framework can provide some clues 
and patterns to decipher the environment and others' behaviour (North, 1990: 20). 
Actors do not act in a social or ideational vacuum. They are reflexive and take into 
account the social and normative context in which they find themselves when acting 
strategically. 
Drawing on this conception of rationality, an institutionalist approach seeks to analyse 
how 'institutions matter', how they affect policies, interests and identities. Given the 
density of institutional arrangements in the CFSP domain, the application of 
institutionalist theories to its study would seem particularly appropriate. Three variants 
of the new institutionalism can be distinguished in the extant literature: rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalism (HI) (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The first two 
actually mirror current debates between rationalist and constructivist approaches to 
understanding political decision-making as well as the two logics that can be said to 
underpin each approach; respectively, those of the 'logic of consequences' and the 
'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1989; 1998). In rationalist analyses, the 
logic of consequences, and then, instrumental rationality, occupies the main place in 
explanations. Actors will engage in a bargaining process according to their prior 
preferences, as well as to the expected outcome of their actions and others' actions. By 
65 
contrast, according to the logic of appropriateness actors are seen as rule followers or 
role players. The interests and identities of actors are not exogenously given, but 
socially constructed during the process of interaction. The third variant, HI, is suggested 
here as a way to transcend this debate, offering, if not a crude synthesis between rational 
and sociological approaches, an avenue for dialogue between them. 
When talking about the new institutionalism, it seems obvious that the adjective 'new' 
seeks to distinguish these approaches from 'old' institutionalist analyses. The latter was 
common in Political Science at the beginning of the twentieth century and focused on 
how political and formal structures (laws, constitutions, bureaucratic organisations) 
shaped the political outcome. While old institutionalism focused on formal, fixed and ex 
ante arrangements, new institutionalism incorporates broader phenomena into its 
analysis: formal and informal rules that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual 
actors. 46 From this perspective, to understand political outcomes, one should start by 
exploring the institutional structure and how it constrains the chances of actors. Yet, 
individuals (or agency) still play a role in institutional analysis. In Peters' words, 'the 
individual element of policy-making comes into play as the members of the institution 
interpret what the rules and values of their institutions are' (2005: 164). 
Even if the leitmotif of the new institutionalism, 'institutions matter', remains widely 
accepted, the thorny question, 'how do they matter' does not generate the same 
agreement. The different branches of institutionalist theory thus offer contrasting 
images of institutions and their concomitant impact upon actor preferences and 
identities. According to rational choice institutionalism, institutions are considered to be 
consciously created in order to facilitate cooperation (Garret, 1995; Pollack, 1997; 
Tsebelis, 1994). Put simply, they are understood as 'the outcomes of purposive actions 
by instrumentally oriented individuals' (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 8). They provide 
actors with information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the 
environment and the behaviour of others as well as transaction costs. In so doing, 
institutions affect individuals' utility calculations and help to overcome collective action 
problems. The role played by agency in the creation and design of institutions and the 
fact that there is room for learning and institutional change in these analyses are 
analytically attractive in explaining the development of EU external action. 
46 For a comparison between old and new institutionalism, see Peters, 2005, chapter 1. He summarises the 
main features of old institutionalism as being legalism, structuralism, formalism, and holism. This 
approach is also historical and normative. 
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However, rational choice analyses often focus on formal rules such as decision-making 
procedures or formal competences laid down in the treaties, while neglecting the 
importance of informal rules and norms. Moreover, even though these actor-centred 
approaches admit that actors' strategies can be modified as a consequence of 
institutional arrangements, they deny that institutions affect actor preferences. Interests 
are instead considered to be exogenously formed and to remain fixed. Hence EU-1evel 
institutional environments such as CFSP institutions are considered to have no impact 
upon the definition of national preferences since these are considered to be formed in a 
domestic context external to the institution itself and no changes would be expected to 
occur as a result of such routine interactions in Brussels. One could also expect lowest 
common denominator decision-making given the prevalence of unanimity, fixed 
national preferences and the fact that package-deals seem improbable in CFSP 
negotiations. 
For sociological institutionalism, by contrast, institutions shape not only actors' 
strategies, but also their preferences and identities (see Checkel, 2001; Lewis, 2005). 
Sociological institutionalism embraces a broader conception of institutions including 
informal rules and 'culture'. Institutions involve a normative dimension, prescribing 
norms of behaviour, and a cognitive one, giving meaning to the world and determining 
its interpretation and the limits of the thinkable (Hall and Taylor: 1996: 15). For 
sociological institutionalists, individual choices and preferences cannot be understood 
f outside of the cultural and historical frameworks in which they are embedded' (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991: 10). Even if it has problems explaining the origins of institutions, 
this perspective captures better the independent dynamics affecting institutions that 
sometimes make them rather ineffective, producing unintended results. From this 
perspective, interactions within CFSP institutions would facilitate cognitive processes 
such as socialisation and learning that may have not only shaped the process of goal 
selection and actors' strategies, but also led, in the longer term, to a reconstitution of 
actors' preferences and identities. As put by Tonra (2003: 738), 'CFSP might be better 
understood in terms of identity creation than as an exclusively rationally-based exercise 
in national self-interest. ' However, the fact that some institutions can become taken for 
granted, determining actors' preferences and identities, can in turn limit agent's ability 
to introduce institutional change. According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 8), 'institutions 
are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform 
that the individual is likely to make. ' For this reason, institutions are perceived as being 
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quite resistant to change and hence the problem of sociological institutionalism to 
explain it. 
For its part HI can be defined, following Pollack, as the analysis of 'the effects of 
institutions over time, in particular the way in which a given set of institutions, once 
established, can influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors who established 
them' (2004: 139; see also Peters, 2005: 71). In a similar vein as sociological 
institutionalism, preferences are seen as endogenously formed within a given 
institutional setting. This approach represents a clear rejection of rationalist 
explanations of institutions. First, institutions are never created from 'scratch', but build 
upon previous institutional settings. Second, institutions are conceived as developing in 
a different way than was intended by their original designers and therefore escaping 
from their control. To explain inefficient institutions, one has to go back to explain the 
interests at their creation and their subsequent evolution. The notion of path dependency 
(see below) constitutes one of the main features of HI, i. e. one can only understand the 
current political context (organisations, rules and practices) by understanding and 
analysing their historical development. Rationalist analyses that take political 
interactions as a 'one-shot interaction' miss this point, as well as the fact that historical 
development can trap actors in concrete dynamics. 
Although its notion of path dependency could lead to a reductionist notion of agency 
(past actions determine the range of possibilities for future action), most HI analyses do 
not neglect the possibility of strategic action affecting the institutional setting, and in 
this way, they can allow for a dialectical model of agency and structure. This model 
entails the possibility of creative agency, i. e. actors are capable of learning from past 
experiences and new available information, and are able to adapt and to respond to 
structural properties (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; Bulmer, 1998; Hay and Wincott, 
1998). 
The historical variant of the new institutionalism can also be conceived as a way to 
bridge the two logics of action (appropriateness and consequences). For Hall and 
Taylor, historical institutionalists 'tend to conceptualize the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms', and for this reason, it 
Gstands in an especially pivotal position', embracing explanatory elements of both a 
6calculus' (i. e. rationalist) and a 'cultural' (i. e. sociological) approach (Hall and Taylor, 
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1996: 7,24; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 10-11; Peters, 2005; Pollack, 2004: 139). 
For this reason, it can be used as a perspective to explore ways of bridging both logics 
of action, trying to conciliate them into a specific research design. Hay and Wincott 
(1998: 953) argue that HI must be erected as a distinctive explanation of the relationship 
between institutions and behaviour: '[i]t is only if historical institutionalism can 
transcend the unhelpful dualism of institution and intention, context and conduct, 
structure and agency that it can be identified as a coherent and consistent approach to 
institutional analysis in its own right'. The resulting model would be one adopting 
neither a calculus nor a cultural approach, but a model of strategic action within an 
institutional context, together with a dialectical model of agency and structure. Thus, 
according to Hay and Wincott (1998: 954) 
Actors are strategic, seeking to realize complex, contingent and often 
changing goals. They do so in a context which favours certain strategies 
over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best 
incomplete and which may very often reveal themselves inaccurate after the 
event 
This model sees actors as being strategic, but strategic action ought to be conceived here 
in line with the thesis of bounded rationality formulated above. Change will be the 
result of intended or unintended actions within a particular institutional framework (Hay 
and Wincott, 1998: 955). The following sections examine in more detail some aspects 
of the theoretical framework introduced above: path dependency, unintended 
consequences, learning and socialisation. 
2.3.1. Path dependency 
Path dependency appears as an important explanatory factor in HI analyses (Bulmer, 
1998; Pierson, 1996; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003). According to this literature, earlier 
decisions constrain the range of options that actors can consider in later moments. This 
means that not only does history matter, but what also matters is the particular sequence 
of events. External forces will not have the same result in every period; previous 
political outcomes will determine the impact of current external forces and then a 
specific historical development or 'path' (Pierson, 2000: 25 1). In other words, 'choices 
made at a particular moment eliminate a whole range of possibilities from later choices 
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while serving as the very condition of existence of others' (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 
955). Path dependent processes affect the creation of new institutions, since they are not 
created in a vacuum, there is no tabula rasa. According to Pierson, 'actors do not inherit 
a blank slate [ ... ] instead [they] find that the dead weight of previous institutional 
choices seriously limits their room for manoeuvre' (in Reynolds, 2007: 55). This will 
favour some decisions and exclude others, eventually, shaping the political outcome. 
Path dependency also implies that particular courses of action, once introduced, can be 
virtually impossible to reverse. Institutions are 'sticky', or resistant to change (Pollack, 
2004: 139-140; Pierson, 1996: 143). What is more, path dependency is self-reinforcing 
in the sense that steps in one direction induce more steps in the same direction (Pierson, 
2000: 252). The resulting situation would be one of institutional inertia and lock-ins. 
From a HI perspective, institutions are seen more as constraining than enabling actors, 
emphasizing the enduring effects of past policy choices and institutional inertia. 
However, change might still occur, usually as a result of a critical junctures or learning. 
HI analyses have often referred to critical junctures to explain institutional change, i. e. 
6moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a 
"branching point" from which historical development moves onto a new path' (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 10). In EU external action, these often occur as a consequence of 
external events (economic crises or military conflicts) or internal ones (for example, a 
new IGC or enlargement). Actors may exploit these 'windows of opportunity' to 
introduce innovative institutional changes, producing a clear departure from previous 
configurations. However, the problem with critical junctures is that they cannot be 
predicted, but only identified a posteriori. One of the main criticisms against HI 
regards the fact that, being mostly inductive, it has produced few hypothesis about 
under which conditions institutions become locked-in or produce path-dependent 
processes (Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001: 15; Pollack, 2004: 149). Pierson's attempts 
to better specify the conditions under which increasing returns occur (2000), as well as 
other studies trying to disentangle the dynamics of change (Ackrill and Kay, 2006; 
Lindner and Rittberger, 2003; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003) appear, in this respect, 
promising. 
A first attempt to specify conditions under which institutional inertia might occur was 
Scharpf s 'joint-decision trap' (1988). According to Scharpf, institutional change will 
hkhl,. 
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be less likely in institutions characterised by intergovernmentalism, unanimity and a 
default condition in which the status quo remains if there is a lack of agreement. 
Pierson (2000) has tried to explain institutional inertia by resorting to the concept of 
increasing returns. In other words, some institutions may require large set-up costs and 
therefore, the cost of maintaining existing institutions might be lower than the cost of 
establishing new ones. The same applies with learning effects (as actors learn how to 
use existing institutions) and coordination effects (new efforts to co-ordinate with the 
new institutions) (Pierson, 2000: 254). A high number of institutional veto points (i. e. 
the number of actors that can veto a decision on institutional change), divergences 
among actors about the desirability of institutional reform or uncertainties as to its 
potential pay-offs should also be mentioned as factors explaining institutional inertia 
(see Stacey and Rittberger, 2003). Following from these arguments, institutional 
change might occur when increasing returns of existing institutions are low. Change 
could also be expected when there are no veto points or there is high confidence 
(certainty) in how the institutional reform will work. For instance, in a policy domain 
such as the CFSP, where unanimity is the rule and the maintenance of the status quo 
only requires the veto of one Member State, it would be more difficult to introduce 
change than when QMV is the rule. Learning can also explain change as actors resort to 
information from past experiences and new available information to respond and to 
adapt to the institutional setting or to correct unintended consequences (Pierson, 1996: 
142). 
Before moving to the next section, some conceptual remarks are essential regarding 
institutional change. First, one has to differentiate between the institutional matrix (or 
policy framework) consisting of interdependent institutions, and the individual 
institutions themselves (the specific bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and 
practices) (Ackrill and Kay, 2006: 114). Change would be more likely at the level of 
single institutions than in the case of the institutional matrix, where continuity is 
expected. One can also distinguish between two types of change: incremental and 
innovative. The first entails solutions to new problems without altering the 
fundamentals of a given institutional setting. The second, by contrast, leads not to 
minimal adjustments, but to a fundamental alteration of existing structures (March, 
1991). In the case of the CFSP, for instance, change has usually been incremental rather 
than innovative (Smith, M. E., 2004). As the case study will show, learning, and in 
particular, learning by doing, has often led to incremental change, whereas innovation 
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has been less frequent. Critical junctures instead have facilitated innovation - the 
establishment of the ESDP as a result of the Kosovo crisis being a case in point here. 
2.3.2. Unintended consequences 
That rationality is 'bounded' (March and Simon, 1964) helps to explain the occurrence 
of unintended consequences. Actors do not have access to complete information and 
cannot foresee all the consequences of their actions when designing institutions. 
Individuals are not 'perfect statisticians' and make errors when drawing inferences from 
their experiences (Levitt and March, 1988: 323). The assumption of bounded rationality 
helps explain the existence of problems of co-ordination/coherence in EU external 
action. If actors had complete information and could make optimal use of it, they would 
'have little difficulty in co-ordinating their activities across the pillars in order to 
maximise pay-offs' (Winn and Lord, 2001: 58). Pierson (1996) also explains 
unexpected consequences as a result of the complexity at the European level and the 
fact that sometimes politicians do not take into account the long term effects of their 
decisions. 
Another source of unintended consequences might result from the delegation of powers 
to supranational institutions. Rational choice theories have often explained this 
delegation as occurring for functional reasons. Principals (i. e. the Member States) might 
delegate powers to monitor compliance to the agents (that is, bureaucratic 
organisations) to solve problems of incomplete contracting, to decide on complex 
regulations, and even, delegate agenda-setting powers (Pollack, 1997: 103-104). 
However, because of the limited cognitive capabilities and time horizons of their 
designers, once established, supranational organisations take on a life of their own and 
produce unintended consequences. As suggested by Rosamond (2000: 117), 
The institutional architects of the Community made their decision to 
formalize integration on the basis of particular motivations and preferences. 
But, the very act of creating particular sorts of institutions, with identifiable 
competencies and powers, unleashed logics that could not necessarily be 
predicted at the time. 
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Principal-agent analyses have explored how bureaucratic organisations such as the 
Commission or the European Court of Justice can act autonomously and perform their 
task in a way unforeseen by the Member States or even expand their competences 
beyond the role originally assigned to them (Pollack, 1997: 108; Dimitrakopoulos, 
2001). Agents usually enjoy more expertise and information about the decision-making 
process and implementation than the principals themselves. They can exploit the 
principals' uncertainty and incomplete information to act autonomously and to 
influence the decision-making process such as the (informal) agenda-setting. The 
analysis of the role of some CFSP bureaucratic bodies such as the Council Secretariat 
will help to clarify if that has also been the case in the context of the CFSP. 
2.3.3. Learning 
Learning appears to be an important mechanism explaining change in the CFSP domain. 
It enables actors to correct some errors or unintended consequences and to introduce 
incremental changes. Learning is facilitated by the CFSP institutional setting that 
prompts information-sharing, consultation and other communicative practices. 
According to Jack Levy (1994: 283), learning refers to 'a change of beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observations and interpretation of experience'. 
Learning is usually regarded in positive terms as a qualitative change in beliefs that will 
help to increase the effectiveness or efficiency of a policy: i. e. actors would improve 
their accuracy about the world what would facilitate their ability to achieve their aims 
(Levy, 1994: 291). Here it is argued in line with Levy's arguments that an 'accuracy' or 
an teffectiveness criterion' should not be included in the definition of learning (see also 
Haas, 1990: 24-26). Thus, even 'bad lessons' can be considered here as learning if they 
involve a change in individual beliefs as a result of interpretation of new information. 
The empirical research in the following chapters will determine in which cases learning 
has lead to an improved view of the world, increasing the EU's ability to achieve its 
goals, i. e. its effectiveness. 
A question which arises when discussing learning is under which conditions one might 
expect learning to occur. Some authors have argued, for instance, that learning is more 
likely to occur when actors are in a new and/or uncertain environment (Checkel, 2001; 
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Levy, 1994). Hence, learning is more likely in periods of crisis or structural change 
because, in these situations, individuals are 'cognitively motivated to analyze new 
information' (Checkel, 2001: 562). Learning is also more likely from perceived failure 
than from success (Haas, 1990: 45; Levy: 1994: 305). If objectives have been achieved, 
actors will not be motivated to change or reassess their previous beliefs, to learn from 
new information or from past experience. Therefore, success often leads to continuity, 
not to change. Finally, learning is more likely to occur when the interactions take place 
in less politicised settings, such as meetings of experts (CFSP working groups) than 
when interactions take place at high-level politicised settings (like the European Council 
or the Council of Ministers). In less politicised settings, actors are more willing to 
reassess their prior beliefs when confronted with new information (Checkel, 2001). Also 
at this level, informal contacts and communicative practices are more frequent, setting 
the ground for learning. 
The concept of bounded rationality introduced earlier means that learning can play a 
crucial role in the context of CFSP. For example, actors can obtain new information 
related to their policy goals as well as information about other actors' preferences 
during informal and formal negotiations. Confronted with new information, actors may 
reassess their beliefs and, as a result, may change a) their strategies as they consider the 
new strategy to be more conducive to the achievement of prior preferences; or, b) their 
preferences since they consider that the new goals will 'better' satisfy their basic or 
fundamental interests. Thus, one can distinguish between simple and complex learning 
(Stein, 1994: 171; Levy, 1994: 286). Complex learning - leading to a change in beliefs 
about the policy goals or to a re-definition of interests - seems less likely to occur than 
simple learning, especially when it involves changes in fundamental interests. Simple 
learning will often be associated with incremental change, whereas a change in policy 
goals and fundamental preferences might lead to innovation. 
For learning to occur, there must be a change in individual beliefs as a consequence of 
the observation and interpretation of experience. Moreover, for learning to have an 
impact on policy it needs to be transferred from the individual to the organisation and 
become institutionalised. For this reason, it is important to distinguish between 
individual and organisational learning. According to Ernest Haas (1990: 26), when we 
say that an international organisation learns', it is 'a shorthand way to say that the 
actors representing states and members of the secretariat, working together in the 
6h. 
- 
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organisation in the search for solutions to problems on the agenda, have agreed on a 
new way of conceptualizing the problems'. It is not the whole organisation that learns 
but 'clusters of bureaucratic units within governments and organizations'. 
Organisational learning stems from previous individual learning, but it does not proceed 
in the same way. Organisations do not learn as individuals do. Organisational leaming 
requires a consensus among the members of that body (either bureaucrats or national 
representatives from the Member States) because different lessons may be drawn from 
47 the same event (the end of the Cold War, Bosnian war, Kosovo war). In the case of 
negotiations among Member States such as in the CFSP domain, the institutionalisation 
of leaming will be constrained by the voting procedures as it will depend on the ability 
to achieve consensus among the Member States under the unanimity rule. 
Institutional routines, organisational culture, problems of internal communication or 
rotation levels might also interfere with learning. For example, high rotation levels 
mean that individual learning does not remain in the organisation once individuals have 
left. Further, even in those cases where organisational learning takes place it might not 
lead to a policy change (i. e. it might not be institutionalised) due to a lack of resources 
or institutional turf battles. In other words, learning can help to increase coherence and 
effectiveness by processing new information, however, it might be limited in this 
respect by the institutional constraints under which it operates, namely the turnover of 
personnel, institutional memory (see below), bargaining conflicts and decentralisation 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). 
For the purpose of this research, it is interesting to trace the channels of learning, and, 
in particular, the links between the implementation and the decision-making level or 
how learning on the ground is institutionalised and incorporated into new decisions. 
The empirical research will illustrate how policy outcomes feedback into the policy- 
making system in the form of policy lessons, fostering institutional change. First, one 
can distinguish between learning from one's own experiences (learning by doing) and 
learning from others (Levitt and March, 1988). In the former, processes of learning at 
47 For instance, David Owen (1995: 34) referred to different lessons being drawn by different people 
concerning the break-up of Yugoslavia. For some the failure of the EU over Yugoslavia was 'an 
indictment of the whole concept of European unity, a powerful refutation of the arguments for a single 
foreign policy [ ... ]; for others, the experience [ ... ] heightened their demands for an integrated European 
defence capability and foreign policy for a United States of Europe. Many see in the ambivalence of US 
positions over former Yugoslavia the necessity for an independent West European defence organization; 
for others, it only strengthens the case for greater cohesion and solidarity within NATO'. 
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the EU level may result from an evaluation of the EU's own experience, such as crisis 
management exercises (CME) or crisis management operations. In the latter, the EU 
learns from the information gathered about the experiences of other international actors 
(UN, NATO, Member States). 
Second, CFSP institutions provide mechanisms that facilitate learning. For instance, 
the establishment of specific EU institutions like the Policy Unit provide EU officials 
and Member States' representatives with information about policy consequences. By 
the same token, during formal and informal negotiations, the Member States' 
representatives to CFSP institutions such as the PSC or the Council working groups 
have the opportunity to increase their knowledge about a specific issue thanks to the 
information provided by other Member States representatives and EU actors (the 
Commission or the Council Secretariat). Confronted with this new information 
48 Member States' diplomats might be induced to re-assess their prior beliefs. In this 
way, learning from new information can lead to a change in prior beliefs or the 
development of new ones. 
As regards the implementation process, new information that might prompt leaming 
processes is channelled by several EU institutions (the Joint Situation Centre or the 
Policy Unit) or some CFSP institutions set in specific geographical areas like the 
EUSRs or the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). Usually, learning on the ground 
would be incorporated into the Mission's Reviews (EUSRs or ESDP Mission Reviews) 
or into the Lesson IdentifliedlLessons Learned reports (ESDP missions). Changes to 
current missions are decided at the PSC and approved by the GAERC taking into 
consideration these reports (see Chapter 6). In this way, learning becomes 
institutionalised. An important element to sustain learning both at the individual and at 
the organisational level is memory. The lessons of the experience have to be 
maintained and accumulated. That can be done informally, being incorporated into the 
routines of the organisation (Levitt and March, 1988,327) or it can be done by a 
specialised body in charge of gathering lessons learned and keeping the institutional 
memory. Of interest will be to investigate whether such a recording system exits within 
the CFSP and if so, what its impact on policy has been. 
48 According to the online survey, 64.3% of respondents affirmed that they had changed their prior beliefs 
regarding EU foreign policy as a result of their participation in the working group/committee (see On-line 
Survey, Appendix 1). 
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2.3.4. Socialisation 
An institutionalist approach also allows for the taking into account of the impact of 
interactions among foreign policy-makers within CFSP institutions and how such 
interactions might lead to socialisation. Socialisation has been broadly conceived in the 
literature as a force shaping 'the practices, perceptions and interests of policy makers, 
including any possible redefinition of self-interest' (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 7-8) 
or a 'process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of 
thinking, feeling and acting' (Johnston, 2001: 493). From this viewpoint, interactions 
within CFSP institutions would have a 'deep' impact shaping not only actors' 
behaviours, but also their preferences and identities, leading to an internalisation of 
rules and norms (i. e. they would become taken for granted by actors). 
However, recent work on socialisation (see International Organization, issue Fall 2005) 
has distinguished between socialisation and internalisation of norms. Socialisation, 
understood as the adoption of the rules of a given group, may lead to the internalisation 
of norms, but sometimes, particularly in the short term, it may well not involve such an 
effect. Thus, in the aforementioned volume of International Organization three 
different mechanisms for socialisation were identified: role playing, normative suasion 
and strategic calculation (see Checkel, 2005). According to the first one, actors 
internalise the norms and follow the group's rules because that is what is socially 
expected from them, without really reflecting on the intrinsic value of these norms. 
They just imitate what other actors do. By contrast, normative suasion implies that 
actors have internalised the norms and they follow them because they are the 'right 
thing to do'. According to the third mechanism, strategic calculation, actors adopt the 
group's practices because of social or material incentives. No internalisation would 
have taken place in the latter case. 
The approach followed in this thesis builds on this literature. While this thesis will 
tentatively examine the impact that socialisation within CFSP institutions has had on 
national representatives, a thorough examination of the much broader issue of 
internalisation is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some intrinsic 
characteristics of the CFSP domain might suggest that socialisation has mainly followed 
the third mechanism, strategic calculation. High rotation levels and the often narrow 
margin of manoeuvre of national diplomats in Brussels are mechanisms established by 
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the capitals in order to prevent them from 'going native'. Even if internalisation of 
norms is not ruled out in the long term, what it is often observed in the case of national 
representatives dealing with CFSP is that they adopt practices, such as consensus- 
building or the reflex co-ordination because of strategic reasons (see Chapter 3). First, 
the long term perspective of CFSP negotiations means that complying with the rules of 
the group may result from a rational cost-benefit calculation. For instance, 
compromising on an issue today might help to achieve another issue of major 
importance in future negotiations. Furthermore, since frequent and repetitive contacts 
take place amongst the same individuals, national representatives have an incentive to 
maintain their reputation and credibility within the group by following its rules. 'Social 
influence' can also explain that socialisation as compliance with the group's practices is 
6rewarded with social and psychological markers from a reference group with which the 
actor believes it shares some level of identification' (Johnston, 2001: 494). It is from 
this perspective that socialisation will be considered in this thesis. The following section 
draws on the factors outlined above and highlights the main assumptions resulting from 
the application of such a theoretical framework to CFSP. 
2.4. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO CFSP. 
Using HI of the type discussed above, this research intends to describe how the process 
of CFSP institutionalisation has taken place and how it has affected CFSP coherence 
and effectiveness. In order to do so, it draws on the work of M. E. Smith (2004). Smith 
distinguishes different stages of institutionalisation of European Foreign and Security 
Policy: 
1. EPC as an intergovernmental forum. 
2. Development of information-sharing. 
3. Development of norins (firstly, informal norms, later on, formal norms 
and rules). 
4. Establishment of formal organisations 
S. Development of a governance system since the Maastricht Treaty. 
In this way, Smith identifies different stages of institutionalisation leading to a clearer 
definition of policy goals and agent's behaviours through norms and practices, and 
eventually leading to the establishment of a system of governance (Smith, M. E., 2004: 
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39). Each of the aforementioned stages represents a higher degree of 
institutionalisation and is a consequence of the development of specific institutional 
elements. Smith's work on CFSP institutionalisation also suggests two further things. 
First, even if the EPC departed from an intergovernmental, informal, decentralised 
process, and was controlled by the Member States, repeated interactions and contacts, 
the sharing of information and the development of some (informal first, formal later) 
bodies to co-ordinate the activities have promoted higher levels of cooperation, beyond 
the initial willingness of the Member States. Second, institutions have also facilitated a 
process of socialisation and the emergence of a 'we-feeling' among CFSP policy- 
makers. In Smith's (2004: 39) words, 
Through this process of institutionalisation, relations among EU states have 
progressed from the narrow instrumental rationality characterized by 
intergovemmentalism to a more collective or social rationality characterized 
by legitimate procedures of governance and corresponding changes in their 
domestic politics. 
According to Smith, CFSP institutionalisation has helped promote greater levels of 
cooperation among the Member States. However, he does not advance any conclusion 
about how this process can affect effectiveness or coherence. The objective of this 
thesis is to verify whether or not a correlation between greater levels of 
institutionalisation and greater levels of effectiveness and coherence can be established. 
The hypothesis advanced here would be that greater levels of institutionalisation will 
lead to greater levels of coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP. 
Figure 2.2. Hypothesis 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CFSP institutionalisation 
process 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Cohercnce 
Effectiveness 
The CFSP institutionalisation process will therefore be the explaining factor, and the 
levels of CFSP coherence and effectiveness the outcome this thesis seeks to explain. 
The hypothesis will be tested by analysing the case of CFSP activities in BiH during 
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the period 1991-2006. The first stage in the empirical research will be to deter-mine, 
according to the categories fixed in Chapter 1, the degree of coherence and 
effectiveness of CFSP activities. Having established this, the thesis will aim to explain 
coherence and effectiveness according to the degree of CFSP institutionalisation (and 
the dynamics bolstered by it). The focus will be on the policy (CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness) and the polity (CFSP institutions), although the politics (the decision- 
making process) will be also taken into account in the analysis when determining 
whether CFSP institutions, by affecting the decision-making mode (e. g. facilitating 
consensus-building and information-sharing), have also increased levels of coherence 
and effectiveness. The empirical research will also seek to verify some assumptions 
that follow from this initial hypothesis: 
Assumption 1: CFSP institutions have a direct impact on levels of coherence and 
effectiveness. The creation of new bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and informal 
practices increase coherence and effectiveness. New institutions have improved the 
decision-making process by facilitating information gathering and information sharing, 
co-ordination and monitoring of EU policies. By contrast, a weak degree of 
institutionalisation might explain problems of ineffectiveness and incoherence. 
Assumption 2: Learning from its own and from others' experiences constitutes an 
important factor increasing coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP. It has served, for 
instance, to correct some unintended consequences. Learning may be facilitated by the 
institutional setting and thus can serve as an example of the indirect impact of 
institutions. 
Assumption 3: By means of facilitating communicative practices and socialisation 
processes, CFSP institutions have an indirect impact on levels of coherence and 
effectiveness, e. g. facilitating the emergence of a common understanding and increased 
convergence of Member States' interests regarding the EU's policy towards BiH. 
Assumption 4: Path dependency can be expected to maintain the status quo or even 
reduce coherence and effectiveness. Path dependency constitutes another example of the 
indirect impact of the institutional setting on coherence and effectiveness. In CFSP, 
path dependency usually leads to imitation of past policies. Because of the limited time 
of response, difficulties in achieving an agreement and the resources that have been 
invested in past initiatives, decisions often follow past models. This explains why CFSP 
decision-makers prefer to imitate and to introduce incremental changes than to innovate. 
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This leads to sub-optimal institutions maintaining the status quo or even reducing levels 
of coherence and effectiveness. Processes of path dependency can explain why, in spite 
of higher degrees of institutionalisation, coherence and effectiveness have remained 
stable or decreased in some cases. 
A particular challenge when analysing coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP will be 
how to account for different dynamics at the decision-making and implementation 
levels. A HI approach is well suited to explain dynamics at the decision-making level, 
in particular, the institutionalisation path, the weight of previous decisions (leading to 
incremental change and/or imitation of past policies) and the existing constraints on the 
choices of Member States. It is argued here that HI might also be useful in explaining 
implementation. Thus, policy implementation will be highly dependent on the particular 
institutional setting that has been previously established - e. g. the pillarisation of EU 
external policies will affect policy implementation. One could also expect to see the 
impact of unintended consequences and path dependency on the ground. Moreover, 
learning can link both the implementation and the decision-making process, operating 
as a feedback mechanism by changing the parameters of action for the future. 
Finally, even though this research focuses on endogenous factors considered relevant 
in explaining collective decision-making and implementation, CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness is admittedly affected by exogenous factors (intervening variables). In 
other words, the deployment of the CFSP does not take place in an international and 
domestic vacuum. Other factors should be taken into account in an analysis of 
coherence and effectiveness, and in particular, when explaining them at the 
implementation phase. One could mention, inter alia, the intervention of other 
international actors (US, NATO, High Representative in BiH) and domestic variables 
such as the economic and political context in which CFSP policies are implemented. 
While this thesis does not neglect the impact of these external factors, due to limits of 
time and space, an in-depth analysis does not seem feasible. However, when possible, 
some references will be made in order to clarify the impact of these intervening 
variables on coherence and effectiveness. 
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2.5. CONCLUSION 
Analyses of the CFSP have often led to divergent conclusions, depending on which 
factor has been privileged in the relevant theoretical framework. Three causal factors - 
interests, institutions and identities - constitute the core of different theoretical 
approaches to European integration, yet, invariably one of these factors has been 
prioritised over the rest neglecting the value of incorporating other factors into the final 
explanation. Intergovernmental and other materialist and rationalist approaches have 
failed to provide a persuasive account of certain dynamics behind the CFSP 
development, overlooking the influence of institutional and identity factors. For their 
part, sociological approaches have underestimated the role of agency (or Member State 
input) in the formulation of the CFSP. 
An approach drawing on HI assumptions could offer a better understanding of how 
'institutions matter', how they affect policies, interests and identities over time. The 
analytical framework introduced takes institutions as a starting point, but it does not 
neglect the importance of the other two factors (or I's) in the explanation of CFSP 
dynamics. More importantly, it adopts what seems to be a more appropriate 
conceptualisation of the three I's. From this point of view, interests are conceived not as 
fixed, but as evolving during actors' interactions, and infortned both by material and 
ideational factors. In the same vein, identities are based on common norms and values, 
the result of a process of social construction. Most significantly, this perspective allows 
for a broad conception of institutions, including bureaucratic organisations, formal rules 
and practices. This theoretical framework is an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the development of CFSP, with the institutionalisation process being the 
main explanatory variable. 
A diachronic perspective, i. e. one analysing patterns unfolding over time, highlights the 
importance of those institutional factors which prevent Member States from having total 
control over CFSP development. National interests are affected by processes of path 
dependency that reduce the range of possibilities for legitimate action. A HI approach, 
however, does not exclude the possibility of change, usually facilitated by leaming or 
critical junctures; but argues that incremental change, rather than innovative or 
fundamental change, will be most likely to occur. As a result of the boundaries of 
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rationality, unintended consequences should also be expected, although learning 
processes might play an important role in correcting them. Processes of socialisation 
within CFSP institutions can also facilitate convergence of Member States positions, 
while hard bargaining seems less likely in this context. Building on the theoretical 
model outlined above, this thesis argues that the CFSP institutionalisation process is an 
important explanatory variable regarding the levels of CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness. The following chapter applies the theoretical framework outlined above 
to explore the evolution of the CFSP in the period post-Maastricht. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The CFSP institutionalisation process 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and explain the main dynamics and outcomes 
related to the process of CFSP institutionalisation during the period 1991-2006, thus 
taking in the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. It provides an account of the 
increasing institutionalisation of the CFSP during this period focusing on bureaucratic 
organisations, formal rules and informal practices. Moreover, it is argued in this chapter 
that a HI approach can explain both higher levels of institutionalisation and the 
increasing Brusselisation of the CFSP. 
CFSP literature has usually focused either on the institutionalisation of the EU's foreign 
and security policy in earlier periods (see Nuttall, 1992,2000; Smith, M. E., 2004) or 
has analysed it formally from the perspective of organisations and legal procedures 
(Cameron, 1999; Nugent, 2003). By contrast, this chapter is concerned with two things. 
First, while acknowledging that institutionalisation started before the signing of the 
TEU, namely with the establishment of the EPC, this chapter primarily deals with the 
period post-Maastricht. Needless to say, this choice is due to time and length 
constraints, but also to the fact that CFSP (formally launched with the Maastricht 
Treaty) constitutes a new substantial phase in the development of cooperation in foreign 
policy. As many authors have pointed out, the establishment of the CFSP brought a 'sea 
change' in EU external action (Nuttall, 2000: 271) and put in place a system of 
governance without government (Allen, 1998; Smith, M. E., 2004). 
Secondly, (and as noted in the previous chapter) here the concept of institution is taken 
to have a far broader meaning encompassing both formal and informal institutions. 
Informal practices and working habits among foreign POlicy-makers are taken into 
account, even when they have not been (yet) incorporated into the Treaties. The thesis is 
also not restricted to analysis of the 'grand bargains' among the Member States at the 
IGCs, as is the case with most rationalist analyses (Moravcsik, 1993). While such 
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package deals arc undoubtedly significant, in line %%ith a III approach, special attention 
is paid to long-term and inforrnal processes of institutional development. 49 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section proposes some indicators to 
opcrationalisc the analysis of CFSP institutional isation. The second section then 
describes the process of CFSP institutional isation - distinguishing between bureaucratic 
organisations, formal rules and informal practices - and discusses how increasing levels 
of institutional isation have affected overall CFSP coherence and effectiveness. 11c final 
section examines this process of institutional isation through the lenses of Ill, setting the 
context for the empirical cases that %%ill be analysed in Chapters 4, S and 6. 
3.2. OPERATIONALISM CFSP INSTITUTIONALISATION. 
This section will operationalise ways of accounting for changes in CFSP institutions. 
However, it is first worth distinguishing between the different types of CFSP 
institutions identified in this study - bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and 
informal practices - and making reference to several quantitative and qualitative 
indicators in order to measure different degrees of institutionalisation. In line with 
chapter 2, it is argued that the institutional isation process can be better grasped by 
analysing the creation and development of these three separate (formal and informal) 
components of the CFSP institutional matrix over time. 
a. ) CFSPbu"aucraticorganisatio= 
Bureaucratic organisations or agencies are conceived as a type of institution. By 
organisation, is meant '[rlclativcly stable groups of officials bound by a common 
purpose, which often extends to concrete entities with headquarters, staffs, budgets, 
internal procedures, and other resources that can shape policies or norms' (Keohane, 
cited in M. E. Smith, 2004: 46). This definition refers to clusters of 
bureaucrats/diplomats, but also to the 'rules of the game' in which they are embedded. 
As North (1990: 5) suggests, one must try to conceptually separate 'the analysis of the 
underlying rules from the strategy of the players'. This thesis, therefore, is more 
concerned with the compctcnccs, resources and policy instruments of these 
organisations, and less with the individuals working within them. While individuals (the 
49 For a similar position, see Forster and Wallace 2000: 489; Smith, M. E., 2004. 
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idiosyncratic element) will have an impact on the functioning of an organisation, at the 
same time, the organisation itself has a separate existence (and thus a separate impact) 
and will continue to operate once a given individual has left the organisation. In the 
CFSP context, analysis of bureaucratic organisations takes account of all the different 
bodies that have been created within the second pillar. Examples include the PSC, the 
HR and the Policy Unit. As for levels of institutionalisation, the argument here is that 
higher levels can be identified by two factors: 1. when there is an increase in the number 
of CFSP bureaucratic and political bodies and/or an increase in their competencies; and 
2. when there is a higher involvement of communitarian bodies in this pillar. 
b. ) CFSPformal rules 
CFSP institutions also include formal rules that govern and structure the relationships 
among actors (bureaucratic organisations, Member States representatives) within the 
institutional matrix or governance system. The concept of formal rules is explicitly 
limited to procedural rules incorporated in official documents (Treaties and official 
Council decisions). It is not understood here to refer to substantive rules such as respect 
for human rights, democracy or multilateralism (Title V, TEU). Formal rules refer 
instead to the procedures that regulate CFSP decision-making and implementation 
(ordering interactions and allocating competences). They establish agenda-setting 
powers, and the legislative and executive competences of different CFSP actors. Higher 
levels of institutionalisation are achieved by the creation of new instruments and 
procedures for decision-making and implementation. 
c. ) CFSPpractices 
Practices refer to informal procedural rules within a specific institutional matrix. This 
set of rules is characterised by its intersubjective nature, i. e. these practices are the 
product of interactions among individuals within the CFSP domain - regardless of the 
fact that they might have been incorporated into official documents prior to or after their 
emergence. They are recognised by actors as structuring their mutual relationships, even 
if not always respected as such. Thus, a violation of a practice does not deny its 
existence. In such a situation, one would have to look at whether or not actors justify the 
violation of the practice or try to persuade others to respect those practices. 50 When it 
comes to informal practices among national diplomats, CFSP practices like reflex co- 
'0 in other words, the existence of a practice can be tracked down not only by analysing actors' 
behaviours, but also their discursive practices. 
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ordination, consensus-building and domaines r6servds can be identified. To ascertain 
different degrees of institutionalisation one will have to consider how far these CFSP 
practices have been enacted by national officials. 
Quantitative data can be used to measure levels of consultation and communication 
amongst officials working on CFSP issues. For example, one could use data about the 
number of COREU messages, a number which has grown in the last years. According to 
Cameron (1999: 37), COREU messages increased from 15,432 in 1992 to 20,721 in 
1995 and 24,680 in 1998. However, one has to be aware that this increase in the number 
of COREU might be due in part to the 1995 enlargement and the broadening of the 
geographical and thematic scope of the CFSP. Furthermore, there is no reliable data for 
the last few years and the rapid expansion in the use of the mobile and electronic e-mail 
makes it much more difficult to document communications among foreign policy- 
makcrs. 
The number of meetings at the CFSP level, i. e. the number of days in session for 
relevant committees, might also be taken as a quantitative indicator. However, this is 
also problematic since the frequency of meetings and the creation of new ad hoc 
Council working groups might depend on external developments and not on the 
increasing institutionalisation of these practices. Furthermore, later reforms of the 
Council of the EU to prepare for the 2004 enlargement have led to a reduction in the 
number of preparatory bodies, among them working groups, and has therefore reduced 
the number of meetings at this level (European Council, 1999). For this reason, 
qualitative data will be mainly used in order to confirm higher degrees of sharing 
information, consensus-building and a decrease of the domaines rdservds. Qualitative 
data is obtained from in-depth interviews conducted with national representatives and 
EU officials (Appendix II). These are, in turn, complemented by quantitative data from 
an on-line survey conducted among national representatives to the CFSP Council 
working groups (Appendix I). 
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3.3. TRACKING THE CFSP INSTITUTIONALISATION PROCESS 
3.3.1. CFSP bureaucratic organisations 
Creation and increase in the competencies of CFSP bureaucratic andpolitical bodies. 
This section describes the main bureaucratic organisations and bodies that have been 
created since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to deal with CFSP activities. This 
includes not only bodies formally established in the Treaties, but also those which have 
been established by Council decisions, and only later formalised in the treaties. This 
section also reviews substantive changes in the roles and competencies of these bodies. 
At the same time, it considers how this process has affected CFSP coherence and 
effectiveness. 
As far as the CFSP machinery was concerned, the Maastricht Treaty was more of a 
rationalisation and clarification of the policy-making process than a revolution (Smith, 
M. E., 2004: 176; see also Forster and Wallace, 2000: 473). The TEU did not involve the 
creation of new bodies and structures, but maintained the main bodies already 
formalised by the SEA. However, the TEU entailed a much clearer delimitation of their 
competencies, and in particular, their integration within a single institutional 
framework. Both aspects were to improve overall CFSP coherence. For example, the 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers under the EPC was incorporated into the General Affairs 
Council, while the EPC Secretariat was integrated into the Council Secretariat. The 
Political Committee (PoCo) continued assisting the Council to prepare its meetings, 
now in co-ordination with COREPER, and the EPC working groups were merged with 
their communitarian counterparts. The European Correspondents maintained their role 
of liaison between capitals. The Presidency was to represent the Union, chairing 
meetings and assuring the implementation of decisions, together with the Commission. 
External representation was a task of the Presidency, assisted by the Troika and the 
Commission through its external delegations. As regards defence, the TEU did not 
establish a common defence policy - although this possibility was not excluded for the 
future - and at that time no common defence bodies were contemplated. Only a 
compromise could be reached to declare the WEU both the 'European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance' and the 'defence arm of the EU' (Declaration on Western European 
Union, ToM). Moreover, it was decided that its Secretariat would move from London to 
Brussels and a small military planning cell would be established. 
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The ToM (Art. J. 4.6) envisaged a new IGC to review the performance of the reforms in 
particular in the area of the CFSP as an in-built mechanism for institutionalisation. The 
late ratification of the treaty gave just two years (from November 1993 to the start of the 
IGC in March 1996) for the CFSP to be tested; and the results were not very 
satisfactory. Although the establishment of a single institutional framework and the 
incorporation of the EPC within the Council Secretariat were to improve CFSP 
wherewithal and coherence, problems of co-ordination among EC and CFSP bodies 
remained (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 181), and the Union remained cacophonous to 
external parties. 
To solve problems of visibility and continuity, the Amsterdam Treaty created the post of 
the HR. Yet this figure, a senior official reporting to the Council and Presidency, was 
still considered by some as inadequate to solve problems of EU visibility and 
representation (Duke, 1999b: 24; Everts, 2002: 7), since it did not rationalise EU 
external representation, but increased the number of actors claiming to represent the EU. 
More positively, the nomination of a high profile figure such as Javier Solana, ex- 
NATO Secretary-General, helped establish its reputation and a certain field of 
manoeuvre for the new post. For many observers, the HR has been seen to increase the 
effectiveness of the CFSP, as shown, for instance, by his mediation during the crisis in 
the Former Yugosalv Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001 (Everts, 2002: 4; see 
also Nugent 2003: 428) and, defacto, it has not damaged coherence. 
At the same time, Art. 18.5 (TEU) established the possibility for the Council to appoint 
$a special representative' with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. Acting 
under the authority and operational direction of the SG/HR, the EUSR was expected to 
be the principal bridge between Brussels and the actors in the field. The role of the 
EUSRs was to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU external action, playing 
6a crucial role in the EU's aim to become a more active, a more coherent and a more 
capable actor' (Council Secretariat, 2005). In those cases where the EU has deployed 
ESDP mission the EUSR operates as primus inter pares and ensures co-ordination of 
the different EU bodies on the ground. With the incorporation of this instrument into the 
Treaty, better co-ordination than in the past between the special representatives and the 
Commission's Delegations was also to be expected (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). In 
practice, this has not always been the case. Recent decisions such as the 'double- 
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hatting' of the Head of the Commission Delegation and the EUSR in FYROM are 
intended to fix such problems (Interviews 26,28,32). 
Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the HR was to be supported by the Policy Unit with staff 
drawn from all the Member States, the Commission and the WEU Secretariat .51 The 
Policy Unit was proposed as an instrument to improve and speed up the Union's 
response to crises and international conflicts providing comprehensive, relevant and 
timely information. In this way, it would increase coherence (Duke, 1999b: 23) and also 
effectiveness (Cameron, 1999: 100). In practice, its role has hinged on the will of the 
Member States to collaborate in providing the necessary information and its 
effectiveness has been impaired by the limited amount of resources and staff allocated 
to it (Everts, 2002). On the plus side, under the authority of the HR, the Police Unit has 
managed to provide relevant information to support CFSP policy-making in general (see 
section 3.4). 
The Presidency, the HR and the Commission would constitute the new Troika in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, replacing the old Troika system composed of the past, current 
and future Presidencies. 52 The new Troika was to ensure more horizontal coherence 
between communitarian and CFSP policies, and vertical coherence, between the Union 
and the Member States policies since two of its members were to be permanent (Duke, 
1999: 24). However, the current situation is still unsatisfactory in terms of coherence 
(the endless problem of 'who speaks for Europe? ') leading to new proposals during the 
constitutional debate (see below). 
As far as defence provisions are concerned, although there were plans at the Amsterdam 
summit to merge the WEU into the EU, Britain and the neutral countries blocked them. 
All that could be agreed was an unspecified commitment to 'enhance cooperation' 
between the two organisations, that EU members not part of the WEU could participate 
in some WEU activities, and that a merging of the WEU into the EU was hypothetically 
possible, 'should the European Council so decide' (Art. 17, TEU). The role of the WEU 
in the emergence of an EU security capacity in actuality continued to be insignificant. 
51 Currently, it is composed of 25-30 seconded officials from the Member States and Commission 
officials. 
52 Following a decision adopted at the Seville European Council of June 2002, co-ordination of the 
agenda between the past, current and future Presidencies is also maintained through annual strategic 
programmes in order to ensure consistency of the EU policies. 
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After the St. Malo summit, new bodies were created to put flesh onto the new bones of 
the ESDP. These included the PSC, the EUMC, the EUMS and a Joint Situation Centre 
(Cameron, 1999: 79-80). The political control and strategic direction of the EU crisis 
management operations would be carried out by the Council as appropriate, including 
its Defence Ministers. The creation of ESDP bodies has improved the EU's operational 
capabilities and has allowed for the implementation of civilian and military crisis 
management operations. This has increased the international impact of the EU, although 
there are still some problems of coherence (among EU bodies in Brussels and on the 
ground) and effectiveness (lack of capabilities, procedures still-in-the-making and 
cooperation with NATO). The institutionalisation of ESDP has continued with the 
creation of a European Defence Agency in July 2004 53 and the setting up of a Civ/Mil 
Cell within the EUMS that should serve as a basis for an EU Operational Centre. 54 
The draft of the Constitutional Treaty (2004) foresaw the creation of new CFSP bodies. 
The most important was the figure of the EU Foreign Minister (EUFM). The EUFM 
would chair the Foreign Affairs Council, with a shared initiative right and would also be 
both the President of the Foreign Affairs Council (the rotating Presidency would 
disappear for external affairs) and the Vice-President of the Commission. It was widely 
assumed that, if adopted, this figure would increase the (horizontal) coherence of EU 
external policies (Duke, 2004; Allen, 2004). To support the EUFM's activities, a 
European External Action Service was also foreseen. The creation of an EU diplomatic 
service would allow for the efficient use of resources, and would promote a better 
division of labour between the Commission and the Member States in certain parts of 
the world. Nevertheless, as some experienced observers have noted, the capacity of the 
new EUFM to improve coherence and effectiveness of EU external action would still 
depend on the resources allocated to him/her and on how the External Action Service 
would take shape (Duke, 2004; Hill, 2003a; Allen, 2004). It is also worth noting that the 
new post of the President of the European Council would have responsibility 'to ensure 
the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the common foreign and 
security policy', without prejudice to the competencies of the EUFM (Art 1-21). 
53 The European Defence Agency is tasked to develop EU defence capabilities, in the area of researchý 
acquisition and armaments in order to improve the interoperability and rationalise the defence 
expenditure of the Member States. 
54 The Civ/Mil Cell was set up within the Council Secretariat's structures in June 2005. The Cell has two 
main functions. it will assume the strategic and conceptual Planning of EU's civilian and military 
operations and should also serve to develop the EU's Operational Centre, i. e. a headquarter to run an EU 
military operation in the event that there is no EU Member state acting as the leading-nation and the 
operation is carried out without resorting to Berlin Plus. 
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Therefore, co-ordination between these two posts (and with the President of the 
Commission) would be required to maintain a coherent voice in the world (Duke, 2003). 
To date (March 2007), the Constitutional Treaty has not yet been adopted. Even though 
there is a broad consensus about the need to improve EU external representation along 
these lines - the fact that the Member States agreed on these reforms can be said to 
support this claim-, the question now is how to proceed if the Constitutional Treaty is 
finally abandoned. Cherry-picking from the Treaty or informal reforms via Council 
decisions could be a way out, but would lack democratic legitimacy, which was what 
the Treaty was essentially intended to bring. 
Increasing involvement of communitarian bodies (Commission, European 
Parliament, European Court of Justice). 55 
Since the 1981 London Report, the Commission has been 'fully associated' with work 
in the foreign policy field. The SEA gave it a formal right of attendance to all 
EPC/CFSP meetings and, at Maastricht, it also gained the right (although shared with 
the Member States) to refer foreign policy proposals to the Council. The Commission is 
also in charge of the execution of the budget. Nevertheless, in 1996, Allen (1996: 294- 
95) noted that the Commission had so far made rare use of its competences, particularly 
regarding the initiation of policies. Its influence has been higher when the CFSP has 
required the use of EC instruments (for example, sanctions) and specialised information 
(Nugent, 2003: 429). One national diplomat argued that '[t]he Commission is like any 
other Member State, it is important but it is not omnipotent as sometimes seems to be 
the case in Pillar I issues' (Interview 38). Its role is much stronger in those committees 
that also have a communitarian component, for example, those dealing with 
enlargement, neighbourhood policy or development. 56 In the last few years, the 
Commission has sought to informally advance its competencies in the field of civilian 
conflict prevention and conflict management (Interviews 39,40,46), albeit seemingly 
more as a reaction to the Council Secretariat's active engagement in civilian crisis 
35 For a detail analysis of the role of these three supranational organisations during the pre-Maastricht 
period, see M. E. Smith, 2004: 132-34; 154-66; 170-75. 
46 For example, 50% of the national representatives in COWEB declared that they consulted the most the 
Commission (33% the Presidency and 16.7% the Council Secretariat) whereas in the case of 
representatives from CIVCOM and PMG, 57.1% consulted the most the Council Secretariat, 42.9% the 
Presidency and none the Commission (On-line survey, Appendix 1). 
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management than as a purposive policy on the part of the Commission. 57 One national 
diplomat (Interview 38) summarised the current role of the Commission as follows: 
The Commission has a special role in CFSP and a difficult one because 
they administer the money for CFSP operations. The Commission also 
has its own ambitions in CFSP. And its ambitions and interests are not 
always completely aligned with the ambitions of the Council, including 
the Council Secretariat. 
The treaties of Amsterdam and Nice have not essentially modified the role of the 
Commission in the CFSP. The draft of the Constitutional Treaty, meanwhile, has fused 
defacto the two posts of the HR and the Commissioner for External Relations, with the 
consequences that this change may result in if the Constitutional Treaty finally comes 
into force (see above). For example, the Commission as a body could loose its previous 
(shared) right of initiative in CFSP that will pass onto the new EUFM. 
Regarding the European Parliament, the TEU reinforced its role, asserting that the views 
of the European Parliament had to be 'duly taken into consideration' by the Council and 
that the Presidency should 'consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and 
basic choices' of CFSP (Art. J. 7, ToM). By the same token, the European Parliament 
was to be regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission on CFSP issues. 
The European Parliament may ask questions or make recommendations to the Council 
and hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the CFSP. The Amsterdam 
Treaty also increased the power of the European Parliament as a result of the inclusion 
of operational expenditure (except military operations) within the EC budget. With the 
Constitutional Treaty, the European Parliament maintains basically the same 
competencies in CFSP. Finally, it should be noted that the Member States have been 
very careful to prevent any extension of the competencies of the European Court of 
Justice to the CFSP pillar. 
To sum up, this section shows an increasing institutionalisation of CFSP that can be 
observed in the mushrooming of bureaucratic and Political organisations paralleled by 
37 The Commission is in charge of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and has supported the establishment of 
a Conflict Prevention Network, an EU Analysis and Evaluation Centre and a Community Co-ordination 
Mechanism. 
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an increase in their competencies over the years (see Figures 3.1,3.2 and 3.3). In the 
case of communitarian bodies, their competencies have not significantly changed since 
Maastricht, although they have sought to increase their role informally. Thus, the 
institutionalisation of the CFSP has not led to its communitarisation as a 
neofunctionalist theory might have expected. Rather, it has maintained its mixed 
intergovernmental and supranational elements, together with an increasing 
Brusselisation of this policy (see section 3.4). In sum, the CFSP institutionalisation 
process has taken place in an incremental way, adapting existing institutions and/or 
introducing new institutions, but without altering the fundamentals of the institutional 
matrix that was formalised in Maastricht. 
Looking at the increasing institutionalisation of bureaucratic organisations, some 
aspects are worth highlighting here. First, the institutional setting has had a definite 
impact on coherence and effectiveness. According to 92.9% of respondents, 
CFSP/ESDP coherence and effectiveness have increased since 1991 (On-line Survey, 
Appendix 1). In this respect, several respondents pointed to the creation of several 
bureaucratic organisations such as the PSC, the HR and the EUSRs, as well as the 
development of ESDP, as factors increasing the coherence and effectiveness of the 
CFSP (On-line Survey, Appendix 1). Thus, 60.7% of respondents considered that the 
establishment of the HR had increased coherence and effectiveness, the same 
percentage thought the same about the PSC and 57.1% about the Policy Unit. When 
asked about which institutional reforms would increase coherence and effectiveness, 
most pointed to the creation of new bodies/organisations: 85.7% referred to the EUFM, 
60.7% to the External Action Service and 32.1% to the European Defence Agency. 
However, other factors such as changes in formal rules were also noted. 53.6% believed 
the EU should be endowed with legal personality and 46.4% that enhanced cooperation 
for ESDP should be adopted (On-line Survey, Appendix I). 
When institutions have been perceived to be dysfunctional, pressures for institutional 
reform have mounted. Hence CFSP institutionalisation has been incremental in nature 
with learning from past experiences geared to making the existing CFSP structures 
work better. Thus, changes to the troika system were intended to reduce perceived 
problems of a lack of visibility and effectiveness in EU external representation. The 
creation of the HR has also helped in this respect; but there is still room for 
improvement, given that coherence and effectiveness have not reached optimal levels. 
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With the Constitutional Treaty, the introduction of a EUFM and a President of the 
Council. as well as the abolition of the rotating presidency in CFSP constitute other 
attempts to solve these problems, although they have yet to be implemented. 
In conclusion, the creation of new bureaucratic organisations does not automatically 
solve problems of incoherence or ineffectiveness despite being one of the original 
objectives of the reform. This might be the result of unanticipated consequences and 
problems of institutional adaptation and inertia. Moreover, the reforms themselves may 
also just be ill-designed. As M. E. Smith (2004: 47) pointed out, 'the involvement of 
organisations is not necessarily always efficient in terms of achieving desired outcomes. 
Bureaucracies can actually complicate or even prevent optimal decision-making, these 
pathologies may then lead to additional institutional reforms. ' Indeed, growing 
institutionalisation can actually reduce coherence and eft'ectiveness in the short term, 
although informal arrangements. adaptation and subsequent institutional rellorms might 
help overcome these problems in the mediurn and long term. In these cases, not only 
intergovernmental engineering at the lGCs, but also day-to-day learning can play all 
important role in institutional reform. This thesis airns to identify In which cases CFS13 
institutionalisation has actually reduced coherence and eftlectiveness and whether or not 
this path has been corrected and which strategies have been 1`61lowed. The analysis of 
the CFSP activities in BiH will illustrate these arguments with empirical examples such 
as the problems suff'ered by the EU Administration in Mostar, tile Stability Pact or tile 
J-. 1(J Police 
Mission in BiH (see Chapters 4,5,6). 
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3.3.2. CFSP formal rules 
The reform of instruments andproceduresfor decision-making and implementation. 
The decision-making process was not significantly changed with the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, although, as noted above, the CFSP policy process was slightly 
clarified regarding which competencies were assigned to each body: agenda-setting to 
the European Council; shared initiative for the Member States and the Commission in 
day-to-day CFSP decision-making; and the role of external representation and 
implementation of CFSP to be ftilfilled by the Presidency, assisted by the Commission. 
In addition, the Council of Ministers and the Commission were charged with ensuring 
the unity, coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. 
The decision-making procedures were enhanced with the creation of two new 
instruments: common positions and joint actions, to be added to the traditional political 
declarations and dimarches existing under the EPC. These instruments entailed a 
significant change, putting a greater emphasis on generating policy outcomes, although 
a confusion between different instruments was still evident in the first few years 
following the Maastricht Treaty (Winn and Lord, 2001: 67). The Maastricht Treaty also 
established some provisions for the use of financial resources of the EC in CFSP 
activities. Article J. 11 (ToM) distinguished between 'administrative' and 'operational' 
expenditure, providing a clearer procedure to finance actions. However, problems 
regarding Member State contributions remained, affecting the overall effectiveness of 
the CFSP (Allen, 1996: 228). 
An important innovation was the introduction of the possibility of using QMV to adopt 
joint actions. Although the initial decision for a CFSP action had to be unanimous, 
subsequent decisions regarding the delimitation of means, duration, and procedures for 
implementation or financing could be subject to QMV (except in the case of defence 
issues). In fact, to date, the use of QMV has been very limited in CFSP, but its symbolic 
effects are not to be underestimated. As one CFSP participant commented, majority 
voting 'is designed to create habits of thinking, it has no legal effect, but in practice that 
might be very much like a consensus procedure' (Tonra cited in Glarbo, 1999: 649). 
The Amsterdam Treaty extended the use of QMV as the norm for implementing 
common positions and joint actions already adopted by the Council. QMV could also be 
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used when adopting decisions on the basis of a common strategy, adopted by unanimity 
by the European Council (Art. 23, TEU). Yet it would not apply to military decisions. 
This formal extension of majority voting was however accompanied by the proviso that 
no vote could be taken if a Member State 'for important and stated reasons of national 
policy' declared its opposition to the adoption of a decision by QMV (Art. 23, TEU). 
However, it is worth noting that, in this case, the Member State affected would have to 
justify its position at the European Council. At the same time, the Amsterdam Treaty 
introduced the possibility of constructive abstention, providing a basis for overcoming 
potential situations of impasse without undermining the principle of sovereignty. 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a new instrument, the common strategies, 'to be 
implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in 
common' (Art. 13, TEU). Decided by unanimity, common strategies were an attempt to 
increase coherence and effectiveness of EU external action because they not only 
covered CFSP issues, but also EC activities in a geographical area (Duke, 1999). To 
date, three common strategies, on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region have 
been concluded. These have put particular emphasis on mechanisms for ensuring 
coherence, mechanisms which seem to have worked out relatively well. However their 
effectiveness has been limited because of the ambiguity of their objectives - to allow 
for the conciliation of Member States' interests - and the lack of resources at their 
disposal. In response to the report of the HR on common strategies (European Council, 
2000b), the GAC adopted new guidelines for Common Strategies in February 2001 
(GAC, 2001), but no further use of common strategies has been made following this. 
The Constitutional Treaty would have adopted a more pragmatic view, replacing 
common strategies and joint actions by so-called 'European decisions' that 'commit 
Member States to follow the agreed EU policy' (Art. 39, Constitutional Treaty). 
Changes in funding procedures were also agreed in Amsterdam as a consequence of the 
difficulties encountered in funding past CFSP joint actions. Giving legal character to a 
previous agreement reached between the Council and the European Parliament, Article 
28 charged administrative expenditure and non-military operational expenditure to the 
EC budget, leaving operations with military or defence implications to be funded by 
those states which have not exercised their right of constructive abstention. Following 
from the need for a permanent financing mechanism for military operations, in 2003 the 
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Member States agreed on the so-called ATHENA mechanism which provides a single set 
of rules and procedures for common costs of military missions. 
The Nice Treaty introduced the possibility of enhanced cooperation for the 
implementation of joint actions and common positions that do not have military or 
defence implications. But in the Constitutional Treaty, the decision-making rules within 
the CFSP remain strongly intergovernmentalist. QMV is only foreseen for 
implementing decisions, for the appointment of special representatives and when 
adopting a decision on the initiative of the EUFM further to a request from the 
European Council. Nonetheless, Member States may use the so-called 'passarelle- 
clause' to decide by consensus in which matters QMV can be introduced (except in 
defence). Despite its limitations, the Constitutional Treaty, if approved, would represent 
an improvement by increasing flexibility in ESDP since it allows for the possibility of 
establishing permanent structured cooperation among a group of countries 'whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria' (Art. 1-41) and enhanced cooperation in CFSP. 
The flexibility options introduced in the Constitutional Treaty could increase 
effectiveness of the EU in handling international crises, although risks of fragmentation 
and lack of transparency remain. 
it is still contentious whether QMV will increase CFSP effectiveness, facilitating 
proactive and timely policies instead of reactive and slow ones, and it is not possible to 
comment on this in practice because so far CFSP remains mainly subject to unanimity. 
Besides, it is a well-known fact that Member States are reluctant to submit a decision to 
a vote (even in the first pillar) and that they prefer to reach decisions by consensus, even 
if this results in a delay (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 259-320). However, QMV 
can have an impact on which action is preferred. Karen Smith (2003: 198) has argued 
that the EU privileges positive measures (trade and assistance agreements) over 
negative ones (sanctions), because the first category involves QMV, whereas sanctions 
have to be decided by unanimity. What is clear from Table 3.1 is that the number of 
CFSP legal acts (i. e. the formal CFSP outcome) has increased in recent years, following 
the introduction of new decision-making procedures. Whereas declarations remain an 
important instrument to convey to third parties the EU position, this increase has been 
particularly evident in the case of operational decisions Ooint actions), especially in the 
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field of' civilian and military crisis management, requiring implementation by the 
Member States or by the F. 1 1. 
'rable 3.1: Number of EPC/CFSP decisions (1986-2004) 
1986 1987 1990 1994 1997 1998 1999 2000 12001 2002 2003 2004 
Declarations 54 633 115 110 123 141 123 184 1 186 200 143 141 
Common 8 1 3) 22 35 33 20 23 24 23) 
Positions I 
. Joint 14 15 20 20 21 19 2 3) 34 30 
Actions 2 
Common 2 1 - - - - 
S tep tra 'ieS3 
Deciiions 4 - 5 6 - 3 5 
Conclusion - 2 3 15 9 
of 
international 
agreements 
TOTAL 54 63 115 132 151 183 1 180 244 233 249 219 207 
introduced in Maastricht (Art. 15, TEU) oil CFSP institutional aspects 
2 introduced in Maastricht (Art. 14, TIJJ) according to Art. 24, TFIU 
'introduced in Amsterdam (Art. 13, TEU) 
SOUrcc: Data from 1986 to 2001 froin Wessels, 2002: 19. 
For the years 2002-2004 omi calCUlations based upon the Annual Reports of' the Activities of 
the EC/EU. See tile List. for ChSP Legul AcIs 1993-2005: 
littp: H%v%N, w. coiisilitiiii. eiii-opii-eii/ticdocs/ciiisLJpload/Cl-'Sil ACTFS JURI MQUES 2()()-5. pdf 
3.3.3. CFSP practices 
Mis section examines practices at work at the CFSP level aniong national officials. As 
mentioned in section 33.2, CFSP practices consist of collective rules that guide the 
behaviour of actors. Socialisation processes facilitate the adoption ofthese practices by 
actors participating it, CFSP 1 list I tutions. It is also worth mentioning that some ofthese 
practices such as consensus-building are not exclusive ofCFSP policy-making. but can 
be found in other FU policy areas (see t1or example, Lewis, 2005). The fact that there 
are no enforceable mechanisms in this Field and that unanimity is the rule. however, 
makes their existence even more significant 1 "I CFSP- The practices that will be 
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examined in this section are reflex co-ordination, consensus-building and domaines 
rdserv6s (see also pp. 86-87 above). Other practices have been documented in the 
literature such as the obligation to justify national positions (Winn and Lord, 2001: 27), 
confidentiality and the prohibition of hard-bargaining (Smith, M. E., 2004: 122-124); or 
mentioned by the interviewees, inter alia, ensuring vertical and horizontal consistency 
(Interviews 26,27,47) and respect for 'agreed' language (interview 33). 58 However, 
due to constraints of space, the latter are left out of the analysis. It should be noted that, 
in this case, the institutionalisation of CFSP practices refers not so much to the 
introduction of new practices, as to changes affecting practices at work since the 1970s 
as a result of the increase in policy-makers' interactions and socialisation. These 
changes can be summarised as an increase in the co-ordination reflex and consensus- 
building practices and a decrease in the domaines r6serv6s over the years. 
To examine CFSP practices, one must operate at the level of individual officials and 
foreign policy-makers. They are the ones who participate in and are affected by 
interactions (contacts with other policy-makers, exchanges of information) and, as a 
result, can be the object of changes in identities, role perceptions and modes of 
behaviour. As M. E. Smith (2004: 91) points out, the fact that the EPC became 
institutionalised in a formal body composed of lower-level diplomats and technical 
experts instead of senior officials, meant that cooperation among this 'epistemic 
community' was easier to achieve. Other features of CFSP representatives should be 
mentioned here. First, CFSP national representatives are diplomats, instead of national 
civil servants as is the case in other EU policy areas. Second, the diplomatic culture in 
which they are trained, although variable from country to country, often emphasises the 
need for empathy and mutual understanding in order to facilitate negotiations. However, 
levels of rotation are usually higher among national diplomats (particularly at the level 
of the working group) than in the case of civil servants attending Community meetings 
and this might prevent processes of socialisation (see Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). 59 
5' Winn and Lord describe this practice as 'attentiveness to precedent' (2001: 28). 
59 According to the On-line survey, only 14.3 % of national representatives have attended that 
group/committee for more than 3 years. 
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The literature on the development of the EPC/CFSP has documented the existence of 
several procedural norms followed by policy-makers 60 and the emergence of a so-called 
esprit de corps (Beyers, 2005, Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 1992,2000; Tonra, 
2001, Smith, M. E., 2004; Winn and Lord, 2001). According to Glarbo (1999), Otto von 
der Gablentz was the first to launch a detailed analysis of EPC socialisation. He noted 
that diplomats developed a special 'code of conduct' for undertaking common foreign 
policy in the absence of formal rules in EPC and distinguished several features in these 
interactions, notably 'a commitment to informal decision-making and a consistently 
communitarian tone of negotiation where, as a general rule, fait accomplis are rarely 
launched by single diplomacies, even if national interest is felt to be salient' (in Glarbo, 
1999: 646-647). 
The later development of CFSP institutions, and in particular, the Brusselisation of 
CFSP might have facilitated socialisation processes, by bringing together diplomats to 
regular, permanent and highly institutionalised consultations (Tonra, 2000: 158). 
According to Glarbo (1999: 646), '[t]he vital effect of these institutions is simply that 
they provide stable arenas and temporal rhythms to social interaction between diplomats 
from different national diplomacies. As such, institutions in themselves hold a latent 
promise of social integration'. However, Nuttall (2000: 273) has argued that 
socialisation would be more difficult with the increase in the number of participants and 
with the 'Brusselisation' of CFSP. For example, the Maastricht Treaty eliminated the 
hosting role of the Presidency and hence, the entertainment activities that took place in 
the national capitals and that had facilitated socialisation so far. According to Nuttall, 'it 
was certainly the case that expertise in entertaining facilitated personal contacts and 
fostered the club atmosphere'; hence Nuttall feared that the legalisation and 
bureaucratization of the CFSP that would most likely follow the implementation of the 
TEU would make the CFSP no longer the kingdom of diplomats and would erode the 
'esprit de corps'. However, as will be shown below, the procedural norms inaugurated 
with the EPC still remain in an enlarged EU of 25 members. In this connection, one can 
mention the following CFSP practices: 
60 According to M. E. Smith (2004: 121), these practices developed in a very pragmatic way, having being 
formalised only when they proved their usefulness. 
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-A consultation or co-ordination reflex 
Initially, a process known as the 'co-ordination reflex' developed between the national 
diplomats involved in EPC. This was noted in the Copenhagen Report, approved in 
1973. According to the document, the habit of working together had become 'a reflex of 
co-ordination [ ... ] which has profoundly affected the relations of the Member States 
between each other and with third countries' (as quoted in Allen and Wallace, 1982: 
26). As Nuttall (1992: 312) observed: '[t]he [ ... ] great success claimed for Political 
Cooperation is the phenomenon of socialisation. This is an automatic reflex of 
consultation brought by-frequent personal contacts with opposite members from other 
Member States'. This practice is today a well-known fact in CFSP cooperation. 
The co-ordination reflex refers to a process of sharing information with the rest of 
Member States before a decision has been taken (Smith, M. E., 2004: 122; Winn and 
Lord, 2001: 26). According to the on-line survey, 89.3% of the respondents stated that 
they had consulted other national delegations prior to formal meetings always or most 
of the time (On-line survey, Appendix 1)61 and several interviewees pointed to the 
importance of informal exchanges to facilitate compromise (Interviews 27,29,41,47). 
The co-ordination reflex is perceptible in the development of communicative practices 
among CFSP officials. Informal consultations prior to the meeting are part of every-day 
work of the representatives to facilitate consensus. By contrast, in those very rare cases 
where informal contacts are not so intense, cooperation and consensus are harder to 
achieve. For instance, one national representative (Interview 3) stated: 
Because we meet in COTRA [Transatlantic Relations Working Group] so 
rarely, we look at each other, but we keep our construction of Member 
States separated from the others. This psychological or symbolical element 
is probably very important in our work, in our games for the EU foreign 
policy-making. But in the case of COTRA, we remain separated, we do look 
at each other, but suspiciously, you don't even find the mood for 
cooperation. 
Communicative practices take place through formal channels, such as the COREU 
network or official mailing lists. Nonetheless, a large bulk of information-sharing is 
6153.6% affirmed that they consulted with other delegations many times per week, 32.1% once per week, 
10.7% once per month and 3.6% less than once per month (On-line survey, Appendix 1). 
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informal. The representatives remain in close contact through e-mails, mobile phones 
and frequent meetings that often occur in the corridors and over lunch. The importance 
of communicative practices is pointed out by several authors (Glarbo, 1999; Smith, 
M. E., 2004). For instance, Schutz (in Glarbo, 1999: 639) states that 'before EPC, 
respective diplomacies belonged to each other's Mitwelts, i. e. their "world of 
contemporaries", characterized by a simultaneous and an equal presence in time, but 
also by a permanent spatial "separation" and thus no regularized interaction'. This 
clearly demonstrates the importance of institutionalised interactions and communicative 
practices as mechanisms facilitating officials' socialisation. 
Consultations might take place bilaterally, in a group formation or in the format of 
$confessionals' with the Presidency. During these informal negotiations, national 
representatives inform other colleagues about their positions, in particular 'red lines', or 
exchange other types of information that may help the decision-making process. They 
also undertake informal negotiations in order to achieve a compromise before the 
meeting. As a result, 'many issues appear "pre-cooked" in the agenda, especially the 
sensitive ones' (On-line Survey, Appendix I). In some Council working groups, so- 
called 'like-minded' groups, based on similar interests on certain issues, have been 
established in order to prepare their common line of action beforehand (Interviews 28, 
62 38,44). 
As a result of the increase of these communicative practices among national 
representatives, EU Member States no longer feel threatened by sharing information 
with their European colleagues. On the contrary, they have multiplied their mutual 
exchanges. According to the online survey, 'similarity of values and norms' constitutes 
the first criteria that national representatives take into account when sharing information 
with other colleagues, while security interests, geographical proximity or the size of the 
country were considered less important (On-line Survey, Appendix I). Some of them 
admit they even share selected sensitive information with their counterparts, in 
particular if it helps reach a compromise (Interview 41). Such infon-nation includes 
circulating national instructions, security assessments or other political information at a 
strategic level (On-line Survey, Appendix 1). 
62 On some occasions, these like-minded groups are very structured, like in the case of the working group 
on Western Balkans. In other cases, these groups vary depending on the issue for discussion (for example, 
CIVCOM or the working group on Eastern Europe). 
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This co-ordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others' views into account 
when formulating national positions (Winn and Lord, 2001: 27). It might help to 
develop common understanding among national representatives and so, in other words, 
foster consensus-building. According to Ben Tonra (2001: 261), many foreign policy- 
makers and CFSP officials acknowledge the fact that it has become a natural 'reflex' to 
take into consideration what is acceptable for their European partners, rather than 
simply what the national position, based on national interest would be. The co- 
ordination reflex would appear therefore as a habit, a naturally done thing, in contrast 
with rational calculations to pursue self-interested preferences. However, the interviews 
supported the argument that national representatives are self-reflective when adopting 
these procedural rules and that the co-ordination reflex is seen by the diplomats as a 
way to increase their chances in the negotiations and to prevent being marginalised. 
According to one practitioner (Interview 47), 'obviously one cannot ignore the positions 
of twenty four other countries and also the Commission when formulating a statement - 
this is a starting point to avoid being left in isolation. ' 
-A consensus-buiIding practice 
Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP literature is the 
consensus-building practice when it comes to the adoption of decisions, by contrast to 
hard-bargaining or confrontational methods (Lewis, 2005; Tonra, 2001; Smith, M. E., 
2004). As noted before, CFSP is subject to intergovernmental bargaining with states, 
apart from a few exceptions, retaining their veto powers. A national representative 
(Interview 40) compared this with Pillar I in the following way: 
I was before in the MFA, dealing with Pillar I issues, where negotiations are 
much tougher and you are more prepared to lose something. But in CFSP 
you can always say no. And if you are really serious about your no, nobody 
can stop you from blocking it. But this is rarely seen. 
Interestingly enough, Member States do not- generally make use of their veto power 
during negotiations; on the contrary, there is a general practice to 'keep everyone on- 
board' and to achieve consensus. According to one official, 'the most important thing is 
the readiness of everybody to contribute to a solution' and another mentioned 'there is a 
very strong impulse to reach a compromise' (Interviews 26,41). Member States' 
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diplomats try to generate a broad agreement regarding the decision, so no Member State 
is excluded (in decisions by QMV) or auto-excluded (resorting to constructive 
abstention). The objective is to avoid the isolation of any Member State in the decision- 
making process, and to avoid taking any decision that could damage significantly or in a 
persistent way the interests of a single country or group of countries (Laffan, 2001: 
716). This is a two-way process because not only will the majority try to integrate the 
minority, but also the potentially isolated will try to find supporters, instead of behaving 
unilaterally, 'especially if you are a country of small or medium size' (Interview 45). 
That is why CFSP policies are not the exclusive result of lowest common denominator 
decisions. 
One of the main driving forces in day-to-day CFSP practice is the search for agreement 
within the group. As stated by a diplomat (Interview 27), 'there is always a pressure to 
get an agreement, if you don't get a result, you have nothing. ' According to the on-line 
survey, 96.4% of the respondents stated that consensus-building, rather than hard- 
bargaining is the predominant behaviour in CFSP negotiations (On-line Survey, 
Appendix I). The national representatives often have a common interest in producing 
results at the end of the day, i. e. to be effective (Interviews 26,27,41). Thus, it is 
common that at the final stages of a long meeting there is significant pressure stemming 
from the group and the Presidency to reach agreement and not leave unsolved problems 
to be passed on to a higher political level. Final agreement can adopt different forms: a 
consensus formula accepted by all the Member States; a compromise formula or false 
compromise (different readings of the same document for different Member States); or 
even a formula listing all the different options (Interview 41). 
Despite often expressed doubts whether the esprit de corps would continue with 
enlargement, a majority of the interviewees claimed that the co-ordination reflex and the 
consensus-building practices still remain. According to participants (Interviews 26,29, 
33,38,40,45,46), the recent enlargement to 25 has actually increased the importance 
of these infonnal practices; informal exchanges of information have increased and more 
is done outside the formal meetings in order to reach consensus (see Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2007). 
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- Domaines riservis 
Cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy has been guided by another 
principle: the existence of domaines privies or issues that cannot be submitted to 
discussion and interference from the rest of the Member States. These areas have 
traditionally included security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status or 
neutrality) and special relationships (like the US-UK relationship). For example, a 
member of a group dealing with transatlantic relations pointed out that any politically 
'hot' matters in EU-US relations, such as Iraq, were always kept out of the discussions 
(On-line Survey, Appendix I). Other examples of debarred issues include: in the 
Western Balkans Working Group, issues previously discussed by the Peace 
Implementation Council (BiH) or the Contact Group (Kosovo); broader cooperation 
between EU-NATO (in the EUMC Working Group); agreement on money laundering 
with Switzerland (in the EFTA Working Group); Ukrainian EU membership (in the 
Eastern Europe Working Group), institutional matters; borders and bilateral issues of 
the EU Member States (On-line Survey, Appendix 1; Interview 28). Nevertheless, since 
the establishment of the CFSP, a contraction in the number of areas considered as 
domaines reservis can be noted, allowing for a higher inclusion of these issues in CFSP 
discussions (Manners and Whitman, 2000; Smith, M. E., 2004: 123; 194). According to 
the on-line survey, for instance, 50% affirmed that there were no sensitive issues 
excluded from the discussions (On-line Survey, Appendix 1), which shows that, unlike 
the EPC, the CFSP domain is gradually understood as involving all aspects of foreign 
and security policy. 
In sum, there is plentiful evidence of actors' socialisation, i. e. adopting shared practices 
and rules of behaviour as a consequence of their involvement in CFSP cooperation (see 
also Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 2000; Tonra, 2001). As well as the 
consultation or coordination reflex, consensus-building practices and domaines 
r6servds, Lewis (2002) also notes another feature that can be attributed to national 
officials. He talks of the 'Janus-like nature of COREPER officials who share a sense of 
responsibility in the collective decision-making process and the search for 'fair' 
solutions, which is in addition to representing national interests' (2002: 30). This 
process of divided-loyalties is also documented by Nuttall (1992: 23) in the case of 
European Correspondents and Political Directors (2000: 272). According to Nuttall, 
'this feeling of solidarity was only rarely the product of a cold calculation of reciprocal 
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interest. It stemmed rather from the process of socialisation, the feeling of belonging to 
a club'. Michael E. Smith (2004: 223, footnote 26) also observed the same 'loyalty 
problem' in the case of the CFSP counsellors. However, it seems that processes of 
socialisation have not implied a full transfer of loyalties from the national to the 
European level against neo-functionalist expectations. According to the online survey 
(Appendix 1), when national diplomats were asked about 'the degree of allegiance they 
feel to', the average rank (from I to 4) was of 3.6 to their own national governments, 
2.8 to the European Union and 2.4 to the CFSP group in which they participate. This 
data shows that national representatives still feel a strong loyalty to the national level in 
comparison to the EU or CFSP institutions. Yet it also shows how national and 
European identities are not mutually exclusive, but complementary to each other. 
Moreover, these interactions among national diplomats can lead to a redefinition of 
interests. As observed by Hill and Wallace (1996: 11), 
A certain socialisation within these transgovernmental groups, working with 
each other on specific issues on which they share professional expertise and 
professional pride, has led 'national interests' to be subtly redefined, and 
more vigorously contested among different ministries. The result is that 
there is more confusion than ever about whose interests are being served in 
any given situation, not least because the idea of the collective interest has 
been no more successfully elevated to the Europe level than has the concept 
of identity. 
Even though these processes of redefinition of interests do not constitute the main core 
of this study, research shows that it is increasingly difficult to talk about national 
positions without acknowledging the impact of interactions in Brussels and how 
national representatives find themselves in contact with new information that might lead 
to a redefinition of national positions. As one diplomat (Interview 41) admitted: 'this is 
the first lesson that you learn when you come to Brussels: the toughest negotiations take 
place between the capital and Brussels'. The representatives emphasize the difference 
between the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those in the capital, which 
occasionally leads to discussion over the instructions or convincing the capital that the 
instructions should be changed for the sake of the state's (and representative's) 
credibility within the group. It is not uncommon for national representatives to argue 
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that the national position is not 'quite in tune with the negotiating atmosphere here in 
Brussels' (Interview 27). In this way, national diplomats are able to use their expertise 
and institutional position to influence not only the CFSP negotiations in Brussels, but 
also the definition of national positions. If this is case, it would be interesting to analyse 
how interactions in Brussels have affected national positions towards BiH, and whether 
or not this has increased the overall coherence and effectiveness of the EU's policies in 
this case (see Chapters 4,5 and 6). 
To conclude, this section has demonstrated that the levels of institutionalisation of 
CFSP have increased over time, in terms of bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and 
informal practices. This has had an impact on levels of coherence and effectiveness, 
helping in some instances by increasing operational capacities, clarifying competences 
and facilitating information-sharing and consensus-building among the Member States. 
The perception among policy-makers, for instance, is that this institutionalisation 
process has increased CFSP coherence and effectiveness. Nonetheless, one can argue 
that the impact of institutionalisation has been uneven across policy areas and levels of 
coherence and effectiveness are still suboptimal, something which explains new 
attempts at institutionalisation with the Constitutional Treaty. The next section intends 
to explain why this has been the case, by analysing the process of institutionalisation, 
with particular attention to path dependent processes, unintended consequences and 
learning. 
3.4. A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF CFSP 
INSTITUTIONALISATION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a HI approach is based on the premise that prior 
institutional structures limit available future options and lead one to expect resistance to 
change owing to institutional legacies. This is particularly true if one looks at CFSP 
development having in mind prior institutional developments under the EPC. The 
particular path of institutionalisation described in this section resulted from particular 
choices made by the Member States when establishing the EPC, something that led to 
the development and institutionalisation of particular CFSP organisations, rules and 
practices. However, it is not the intention here to look at the origins and functioning of 
the EPC in detail (on this see Allen and Wallace, 1982; Nuttall, 1992; Smith, M. E., 
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2004). Rather, the aim of the sections below is to identify some patterns in EPC 
institutionalisation that determined the subsequent institutional development of the 
CFSP. 
As regards the place of the Member States in an account of CFSP institutionalisation, a 
HI approach does not neglect the importance of Member States' preferences in 
determining early forms of cooperation; however, it does emphasize the importance of 
institutional legacies and the pervasive effect of initial choices on subsequent decisions. 
What is more, although the Member States remain the 'master of the treaties', their 
capacity to shape political outcomes in between IGCs might be undermined by the 
autonomous activity of other institutions. In Wessels' words, 
The 'choice for Europe' (Moravcsik, 1999) is no longer an option to be 
taken or refused freely by national leaders at whatever occasion; the 
scope of national autonomy gets more limited and the range of options 
becomes more EU oriented with each treaty amendment (Wessels, 2002: 
29). 
Finally, a HI approach should not be conceived as static. It does not exclude the 
possibility of change that might occur as a result of learning or critical junctures, 
although it might take the form of incremental rather than fundamental change of the 
institutional matrix. Adopting a fine-grained approach as the one suggested in Chapter 
2, one can distinguish between stability at the level of the CFSP institutional matrix (a 
decision-making system of a hybrid nature between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism) and change at the level of individual institutions. Whereas the CFSP 
matrix has remained essentially stable in the last few years, individual institutions have 
experienced changes (for example, alteration to the Commission's competencies) and 
new institutions have been created (HR, PSC, EUMS). 
Before moving to the discussion of CFSP institutonalisation, the concept of 
Brusselisation, a theme which pervades the main argument of this section, needs to be 
introduced. According to Dave Allen (1998: 54), Brusselisation involves a physical 
move of the CFSP governance system to Brussels or, in other words, 'a gradual transfer, 
in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from the national 
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capitals to Brussels'. As such, the concept has to be distinguished from socialisation, 
which refers instead to a behavioural and cognitive process (see Chapter 2). However, 
Brusselisation does not exclude socialisation, and might even facilitate it. Moreover, it 
is argued here that the process of CFSP institutionalisation and Brusselisation have run 
parallel, that is nearly all new CFSP bureaucratic organisations have been established in 
Brussels, being then accompanied by additional formal procedures to regulate the 
competences of these new organisations and by an intensification of informal practices 
amongst Brussels-based policy-makers. 
Not only does the concept of Brusselisation refer to the location of CFSP institutions, 
but it also refers to their sui generis nature. The CFSP governance system has arguably 
followed a particular path of institutionalisation. It follows neither a strict community 
method nor a pure intergovernmental one, but instead conforms to a hybrid model that 
combines elements of both (Ohrgaard, 2004: 30; White, 2004: 56). Although Member 
States are still powerful actors in the CFSP, supranational elements such as the 
involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament, or the possible resort to 
QMV also need to be taken into account. Furthermore, it can be argued that the Member 
States are not fully in control of this Brusselisation process as it will be shown later. The 
following sections will try to shed light on which processes may have facilitated which 
institutionalisation and the role path dependency, unintended consequences and leaming 
have played in determining the current CFSP institutional setting towards a more 
Brusselised CFSP. 
Looking back to the origins: the institutionalisation of the EPC 
The establishment of the EPC was the result, among other things, of the disagreement 
between two views concerning European foreign policy. On the one side, were those 
such as France and the UK who wanted an intergovernmental system of co-ordination 
of Member States' foreign policies that would allow Europe to make its voice heard on 
the international scene, but without implying a communitarisation of national foreign 
policies. On the other side, were those countries (Italy and certain smaller Member 
States) who wanted foreign policy co-ordination to be incorporated into the EC 
framework (Smith, M. E., 2004: 65). Eventually, under French pressure, the first view 
prevailed. However, no Member State could have predicted at that time the progressive 
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development of the EPC and later the CFSP. For those who sought to maintain an 
informal and pure intergovernmental procedure, the institutionalisation of the EPC in 
the SEA, and later the TEU, implied a significant move away from their original idea. 
For those who wanted a supranational system firmly on the hands of the Commission 
and accountable to the European Parliament, later developments fell short of 
expectations, but were still better than the original form of cooperation established with 
the EPC. This result points to the fact that, contrary to intergovernmental accounts, the 
Member States do not tightly control the institutionalisation of CFSP, but unexpected 
consequences might occur. In the same vein, the Brusselisation process took place 'by 
default more than design' (Allen, 1998: 48). 
it is argued here that the need to increase both coherence and effectiveness helps explain 
the development of European foreign policy cooperation towards Brusselisation. Thus, 
the Member States found themselves trying to square the circle of generating a more 
coherent and effective foreign policy, but keeping it away from the Commission's 
competencies; or, in other words, to conciliate an autonomous foreign policy with the 
wish for the EU to play a role as an effective global power. The Brusselisation process 
was thus an unintended consequence of the tension between EPC and EC policies. The 
EPC was established in the first place to prevent national foreign policies from colliding 
with EC policies (Smith, M. E., 2004: 71,136). However, once established, the 
Brusselisation of the EPC resulted from the need to ensure a more coherent approach in 
external relations, which required increasing co-ordination with the Commission, and 
even making use of communitarian instruments to implement the EPC (Allen, 1998: 49- 
50). Rather than following the logic of communitarising foreign policy, new provisions 
and new Brussels-based bodies would try to ensure coherence between Community and 
CFSP policies (see below). 
The Member States also realised that acting together was more effective than acting 
alone and that the EU external action machinery should be strengthened in order to be 
able to play a stronger role on the international scene. The Member States, through the 
rotating Presidency, were not capable of running the EPC on their own, especially when 
it was held by the smaller Member States. Even those countries that favoured an 
intergovernmental system of foreign policy cooperation did acknowledge the need to 
establish better structures for decision-making and implementation, a need that was 
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particularly felt during international crises. However, the Member States were not ready 
to transfer these competencies to the Commission irrespective of the heavy cost to the 
Presidency. In other words, 'Member States [wanted] to pool their sovereignty on 
foreign policy in order to generate efficient outcomes, but they [were] not prepared to 
relinquish that sovereignty' (Reiderman, 2004: 71). The only solution was to create 
some permanent bodies but under the firm control of the Member States (i. e. within the 
Council's structures). 
A major breakthrough: the establishment of a permanent secretariat 
With the SEA, it was acknowledged that both the Commission and the Council should 
ensure coherence of the external relations. The incorporation of the Commission into 
the EPC (the Commission was to be 'fully associated') was not among the original 
intentions of the 'masters of the Treaties', but resulted from the need to ensure 
consistency between EC and EPC policies. On the other hand, the SEA only gave a 
legal character to a practice that had taken place since the 1970s. 63 Moreover, even 
though the Member States tried hard to keep EPC away from Brussels (perceived as the 
domain of the Commission), 64 the SEA confirmed that the EPC working groups would 
take place in Brussels and that a permanent EPC Secretariat would be created within the 
Council Secretariat. The PoCo and the Foreign Ministers meetings would still take place 
in the state holding the Presidency, although the SEA opened the possibility of 
discussing EPC matters during GAC meetings. In any case, EPC and Community 
activities were kept strictly separated from each other. For instance, the EPC Secretariat 
was separated from the rest of the Council Secretariat 'by doors with special locks on 
them' (Allen, 1998: 50). 
The establishment of the EPC Secretariat was one of the main elements in the SEA. As 
mentioned above, the Member States learnt 'by doing', that the EPC system required a 
permanent body to support its day-to-day work. However, for 17 years the EPC did not 
63 In the Luxembourg Report (1970), the Commission was invited to make known its views and in the 
London Report (198 1) it was fully associated with EPC. 
6' The physical site of the EPC Secretariat had been a subject of heated debate among the Member States 
since the establishment of the EPC. Some Member States (mainly, the Benelux and Italy) argued for the 
secretariat to be established in Brussels, but this was opposed by France and the UK, since it could risk a 
scommunitarisation' of EPC. Instead, France pushed for the Secretariat to be based in Paris, something 
rejected by those Member States which wanted a progressive incorporation of the EPC into the 
Community structures (Smith, M. E., 2004: 166). 
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have a permanent secretariat, and every six months the EPC's limited machinery and 
archives had to move from one capital to the next Presidency capital. The precedent of 
the EPC Secretariat can be found on the Troika system. The London Report (1981) 
established the Troika composed of the present, previous and subsequent Presidency in 
order to maintain EPC consistency. To support the task of the current Presidency, the 
London Report, formalising a previous practice, foresaw a limited administrative 
structure consisting of one official of the past and the future Presidency, being at the 
disposal of the Presidency at the helm (Smith, M. E., 2004: 166). This incremental 
development made the establishment of the EPC Secretariat at the SEA easier, which 
was based upon 'an extended troika', staffed with 17 officials, mostly officials from the 
previous, current and following Presidency, plus an archivist, administrative and 
communication staff and a Head of Secretariat (Tonra, 2000: 153). 
With the establishment of a single institutional framework, the EPC Secretariat was 
merged with the Council Secretariat. Since it was the only permanent body within the 
Council structures, the Council Secretariat soon became an important body maintaining 
the 'institutional memory'. Nowadays, the Council Secretariat still serves the purposes 
for which it was created in the 1980s: logistical support for the Council meetings, record 
keeper and provision of legal advice. The second function is crucial, since Council 
officials, when drafting documents for Council meetings, try to identify 'problems, 
possible solutions and the respective degrees of support which exist for various options 
for going forward' (Westlake and Galloway, 2004: 149). This function best exemplifies 
the trust placed on officials of the Council Secretariat by national representatives. The 
Council Secretariat also supports the Presidency by writing drafts, although this support 
varies from one Presidency to the next, with small Member States being more 
dependent on the Secretariat. 65 By doing this, Nuttall (2000: 253) has argued, the 
Council Secretariat is 'assuming in practice the right of initiative without any formal 
change to its status'. 
The Council Secretariat has also developed additional 'new' roles, of a more political 
nature: 'from being a more active negotiation "manager", to acting as a political 
counsellor to the presidency, a "good offices" mediator, a political secretariat for the 
secretary-general/high representative, as well as assuming an executive role in planning 
"' one national diplomat acknowledged that 'you always look at what the Council Secretariat is saying 
because they are often better informed than the Member States' (Interview 28). 
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and organising military and civilian crisis management operations' (Westlake and 
Galloway, 2004: 149). Some of these are particularly relevant in the case of the CFSP. 
The Council Secretariat can help to identify points of disagreement among the parties 
and possible 'ways out'. It might do so by drafting the documents for the meetings, 
which should be seen by all the parties as a legitimate basis for discussion, including 
different concerns, but also possible solutions. Thus, the Council Secretariat can help to 
build consensus and speed up negotiations, supporting also the role of the Presidency. 
The Council Secretariat also supports the HR in his political task, and in lower levels 
(for example, in Council working groups), often intervenes to present papers under the 
authority of the HR. The Council Secretariat's influence is also amplified by the fact 
that the Member States second high-ranking officials to it. 66 Yet, the most important 
development in the last few years is the extension of its role in ESDP to carry out 
planning and executive functions. The creation of the EUMS and the establishment of a 
Civ/Mil Cell have increased the operational capacities of the Council Secretariat in the 
field of military and civilian crisis management. 67 The need to undertake these new 
tasks has however imposed some strains on the Secretariat's structures, which were not 
originally designed for this type of task and has required the recruitment of a further 
battery of officials from the Member States (seconded national experts) to cover these 
functions. It has also led to the creation of a Police Unit within DGE to plan and launch 
police and other civilian crisis management operations. In the case of civilian crisis 
management, these developments have created some clashes with the Commission and 
even with the Member States, which feel that they are no longer in the driving seat 
(Interviews 29 and 42). They have also resulted in increasing tensions between different 
bureaucratic cultures (old administrative secretariat/new operational secretariat; 
civilian/military personnel) coexisting within the Council Secretariat (Christiansen, 
2001: 756). 
The development of the Council Secretariat over the years can be seen as an example of 
unintended consequences. Once created, institutions take on a life of their own - acting 
66 For instance, Robert Cooper, a well-known British diplomat is now the Political Director of DG E and 
he clearly influenced the drafting of the European Security Strategy. 
67 Commenting on the role of the EUMS, one official also acknowledged its facilitating role in the 
decision-making process. He argued that when preparing documents for the EUMC or PSC, he would 
shape the document 'into one which I think is potentially flyable' and added: 'because we sit very close to 
these guys and we sit in all the committees, we pick up fairly quickly the political nuances and the issues 
that arc running' (Interview 30). 
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sometimes independently in ways not intended by the Member States that created them. 
The potential of the Council Secretariat to act in this way was, in fact, already envisaged 
in the 'Three Wise Men' report (1979). This noted that the Council Secretariat 
'possesses a knowledge of procedures, an overall view of the machinery, and an 
opportunity for neutral assessment of other States' attitudes which even the largest 
national administration cannot match' (quoted in Westlake and Galloway, 2004: 150). 
To the discontent of many Member States, the Council Secretariat has become a crucial 
behind-the-scenes actor that has developed a role in the CFSP beyond what was initially 
foreseen. Commenting on its role, one national representative mentioned that 'the 
Presidency depends very much on the Secretariat [ ... ] The Council Secretariat produces 
papers for the Presidency, but you should be very careful about what is on the papers' 
(Interview 40). According to another national official (Interview 38) 
The Council Secretariat does not have any formal power; they are only the 
secretariat of the Council... But it is also true that the Council Secretariat is 
taking upon itself a more dominant role, taking advantage of the rotating 
Presidency because they have a permanent structure. They are more and 
more speaking as an autonomous independent actor in line with some other 
Member States. 
The Maastricht Treaty and the single institutionalframework 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the pillar structure was formalised under one single 
institutional framework and new Brussels-based bodies such as the CFSP Counsellors 
were to be set up in order to ensure consistency between Community and CFSP 
policies. The single institutional framework meant that from then onwards the EPC 
Meetings of Foreign Affairs took place together with the EC Council meetings (GAC). 
Moreover, COREPER (based in Brussels) would also discuss EPC activities when 
preparing Council meetings. For its part, the PoCo (still based in the MFAs) would 
report to the Council through COREPER. This caused heated rivalry among the two 
bodies that was only eased with a gentleman's agreement. 68 However, the competition 
68 Turf-battles and divergences of administrative cultures were a significant obstacle for consistency 
between these two bodies. A 'gentleman's agreement' was reached in May 1992 by which the COREPER 
would only introduce amendments to the PoCo conclusions on institutional, financial and EC matters, but 
not on political issues, before submitting to the Council. It was not established as a modus operandi until 
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remained for quite some time. Before the Amsterdam Treaty had entered into force, at a 
time when Brusselisation was still weak, Peterson (1998: 8) described the CFSP in these 
terms: 
What does remain pillar II 'turf is jealously guarded by foreign ministries. 
EU Political Directors are based in national capitals, have direct lines to 
their Foreign Ministers and thus usually have ample opportunity to 
circumvent COREPER. In a majority of EU Member States, the Political 
Director is officially a superior of its Permanent Representative. 
However, over time COREPER increased its role on foreign policy issues, among other 
things because it was based in Brussels and could maintain a closer link with the 
working groups, not possible in the case of PoCo (Nuttall, 2000: 274). Thus, although 
the single institutional framework aimed to ensure consistency among EC and CFSP 
pillars, that was not the case during its initial years. Apart from the problems between 
COREPER and PoCo, there were also problems regarding the merging of the Council 
working groups. These problems were due, to a great extent, to the organisational 
culture of the WAS where economic and political affairs had been traditionally 
separated. The separation between EC and EPC fitted very well in that context. 
Therefore, in those cases where the EPC and the EC working groups were merged, it 
was difficult to determine who would be attending and chairing those meetings (the 
Brussels representatives or the officials from the capitals). In spite of the single 
institutional framework, the practice during several years was to separate CFSP from 
EC items in the agenda, having a different chair depending on which issues were 
discussed. Even on some occasions, CFSP meetings took place separately. Thus, 
institutional legacies, unintended consequences and organisational culture limited de 
facto the implementation of legal provisions. 
Nevertheless, gradually the merging has led to the Brusselisation of the CFSP decision- 
making process. There has been a progressive move of the national representatives to 
Brussels. Representatives in the CFSP working groups are increasingly diplomats based 
at the Permanent Representations in Brussels, whereas the number of 'capital 
January 1996 (Nuttall, 2000: 246-248). On these problems, see also, Allen, (1998: 50-53), Duke, (2005: 
11) and Peterson, (1998: 8). 
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formations' meetings 69 has decreased to an average of twice per PresidenCY. 70 In 
addition, the change has not only affected the composition, but also the role of the 
working groups which have become much more 'legislative' (drafting joint actions, 
common positions, and action plans) and focusing on operational issues. Instead, the 
few 'capital formation' meetings that still take place in Brussels review the overall 
policy and raise specific issues, but no formal negotiations take place during the 
meetings. 
The Treaty ofAnuterdam: advancing Brusselisation. 
According to Allen: '[t]he Amsterdam Treaty appeared to represent continuity more 
than change in that it continued - perhaps accelerated - the process of "Brusselisation"' 
(1998: 57). This supports the argument that the EPC/CFSP institutional matrix has 
remained stable, in spite of the layering/conversion of individual institutions. As noted 
above (pp. 89-90), the more important innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty were the 
creation of the HR and the Policy Unit, two more steps towards the Brusselisation of 
CFSP. The creation of the Special Representatives was also a way to 'Brusselise' the 
EU's shuttle diplomacy and to formalise a practice that had already taken place defacto 
during the Yugoslavian wars (see Chapter 4 and 6). 
To a great extent, these institutional reforms stemmed from the impact of exogenous 
factors, and most notably, EU failure over the Yugoslav wars. As mentioned earlier (see 
Chapter 2), external events may make learning (changes in fundamental beliefs or 
strategies) easier. In the case of the CFSP, external crises served to put CFSP 
institutions to the test and often led policy-makers to realise the need for change 
(learning from failure). In this specific case, and having in mind the problems during the 
Balkan conflicts, the reforms agreed at Amsterdam led to the creation of several new 
instruments. These new instruments, for their part, developed a role of their own, far 
from the one that was initially envisaged by the Member States. 
69 This was the traditional composition of the EPC working groups, involving directors from the MFAs, 
who would travel to the capital of the Presidency or to Brussels (since the signing of the SEA). 70 However, it very much depends on the Council Working Group. For example, COWEB (Western 
Balkans) meets three or four times per Presidency, whereas COTRA (Transatlantic Relations) meet very 
rarely, not even once per Presidency. 
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The failure over Yugoslavia underlined the need for a permanent external representation 
instead of the six-monthly rotating Presidency (see contributions in Pappas and 
Vanhoonacker, 1996). However, as it often happens, even if everyone learnt the lesson, 
this learning was translated into very different proposals. Following from the EU's 
failure, and trying to exploit the TEU provisions, the new President of the Commission 
Jacques Santer attempted to give a stronger role to the Commission by appointing four 
Commissioners in charge of external relations, co-ordinated by himself (Peterson 1998: 
71 6-7). In response to this move, the French proposed the creation of a Mr PESC or 
High Representative (Buchet de Neuilly, 2000: 13-20). Some Member States, which 
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were at the outset opposed to the French initiative (mainly, Belgium and Italy), finally 
agreed with it, although for different reasons. For the supranationalist camp, the HR 
could only be conceived as a new 'Commission for the CFSP' (Interview 49). This new 
institution was justified in their eyes because the Commission had proven unable to take 
leadership of the EU's external relations in the last few years. For other Member States 
such as France and the UK, the nomination of a HR, as agreed in the IGC, increased the 
role of the Member States in Brussels, by placing this institution firmly within the 
Council's structures (the HR would be also the Secretary General of the Council), hence 
much more easily manageable than the Commission. 
Nowadays, the HR has become a powerful actor in CFSP beyond that foreseen by the 
Member States who wanted to limit this figure to an administrative assistant to the 
Presidency. This shows the problems for the Member States in controlling the 
implementation of decisions agreed in the IGC (Buchet de Neuilly, 2002). It could be 
argued, however, that by nominating a high profile person like Solana, they allowed for 
this to happen. In general, the HR is trusted by the Member States and there has been a 
willingness to provide the post with resources. Currently, the HR can draw on the 
resources of the Policy Unit, EUMS, Situation Centre, DG-E and the EU Special 
Representatives. Usually, perceived as less dangerous than the Commission in the field 
of foreign affairs, the Member States have entrusted the HR with significant mediating 
missions such as in the case of the Balkans, Ukraine or Iran. 
71 According to Cameron (1998: 68), the Commission had also proposed to solve the problems of 
coherence, visibility and continuity by reinforcing the Commission/Presidency tandem. 
7' Some Member States saw in this proposal the danger of large Member States' dominance of CFSP 
(Forster and Wallace, 2000: 482). 
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However, it is evident that the HR has his own ambitions, not always in tune which 
those of the Member States. Although the office does not formally have the right of 
initiative, the HR can informally influence agenda setting by intervening in the debates 
and proposing policy papers. To some extent, the attempt to balance the power of the 
Commission in the communitarian sphere by building a strong actor in the CFSP area 
has produced the unforeseen result of creating a 'Commission IF (Buchet de Neuilly, 
2002: 28). According to one national diplomat: 'sometimes we are too concentrated on 
the Commission [ ... ], but we 
do not realise that we have created an instrument that is 
playing its own game, the High Representative, and [the same can be said about] the 
Policy Unit' (Interview 29). Yet, the main problems have arisen between the HR and 
the Commission. According to Claire Piana (2002: 221), '[t]he Commission is very 
sensitive concerning any potential loss of competency in external relations and the 
emergence of this new political actor, who is still trying to find its place in the 
institutional game, worries it'. 
The creation of the Policy Unit was also in response to the shortcomings apparent 
during the Yugoslav conflict (Van der Broek, 1996: 26). It was felt that the EU did not 
have a clear policy and failed to prevent the outbreak of the war. Thus, the idea of a 
Policy Unit was strongly supported during the 1996 IGC. According to Cameron, some 
of the arguments in favour of the Policy Unit were that it would provide a common 
European assessment of foreign and security policy, an early warning function and 
produce option papers for the Presidency and GAC (1999: 100). The Policy Unit 
officials are seconded by the Member States and thus, can turn to their original MFAs to 
gather information that can be later used in the CFSP decision-making process. 
Since its establishment, the Policy Unit has become a significant actor by drafting CFSP 
policy papers for the Council in areas of particular interest of the HR such as the 
Western Balkans, the Middle East or Eastern Europe; areas where the Policy Unit is 
also integrated into the DG-E. For instance, Policy Unit officials attend the PSC 
meetings to brief on potential crises, in this way playing an important 'early warning' 
function (Duke, 2005: 28-29). The members of the Policy Unit have vast expertise in 
CFSP issues and their contribution is highly valued by the Member States, in particular 
the smaller ones. In this way, the Policy Unit might have a defacto agenda-setting 
power. Because it is composed of seconded national officials and not EU officials, the 
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role of these officials is a sensitive one, although they have become gradually socialised 
in the CFSP modus operandi, especially in those areas where the Policy Unit works side 
by side with DG-E. A (British) Policy Unit official defined the Policy Unit as 'an 
intergovernmental body', but described his job as 'building consensus among the 
Member States' (Interview 54). The Policy Unit serves as a link between the MFAs and 
Brussels. It keeps the HR informed and also transmits information from the ongoing 
CFSP negotiations to the MFAs (de-briefing), smoothing the decision-making process 
and helping to forge compromise. 
A new peak in the Brusselisation process: the institutionalisation of the ESDP 
As regards ESDP, developments took place informally (as opposed to the institutional 
changes agreed during the IGCs). The Kosovo crisis (1998-1999) is often seen as a 
critical juncture in the development of an autonomous EU defence policy (Interviews 
49,52,53) . 
73 The Franco-British summit at St Malo (1998) kicked off the process of 
building an autonomous EU military capacity, but maintaining the commitment to 
NATO. At the Cologne European Council (June 1999), it was decided to formally 
establish, within the CFSP pillar some EU security structures. At the Laeken Council, in 
December 2001, the ESDP was declared operational. 
Even though one could explain these developments by following a purely 
intergovernmental approach, and especially by focusing on the interests of the Big 
Three, there are some interesting elements here that cannot be explained from that 
perspective. Without going into detail about the causal factors that led to the 
establishment of ESDP (see Howorth, 2004), the decision at St. Malo has to be 
explained by taking into account long-term positions regarding European defence and 
security policies that had crystallized around the EPC/CFSP, and therefore, HI seems 
particularly helpful to understand these developments. With the London Report, the 
possibility of discussing issues bearing on the political aspects of security was foreseen. 
The SEA allowed for cooperation on the political and economic aspects of security 
(Smith, M. E., 2004: 153). The Maastricht Treaty stated as one of the EU's objectives 
'the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive 
73 Even though it had its origins in the policies of Milosevic during the 1980s, the crisis in Kosovo 
escalated in spring 1998 when the Serb troops suppressed brutally a demonstration of Kosovar Albanians 
in Pristina. NATO's Operation Allied Force took place in March 1999. 
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framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence' 
(Art. J. 4.1, TEU), entrusting the VVEU with this task. The Amsterdam Treaty, by 
incorporating the Petersberg tasks, reflected the operational ambitions of the EU. These 
developments paved the way for the incorporation of a security dimension in the 
integration project; but of course, they alone do not explain the move from the WEU to 
an autonomous EU defence and security policy. 
To explain this we have to look at the changes in the British policy on these issues (the 
main brake on EU defence policy hitherto) and why the UK finally accepted the 
development of an autonomous ESDP after having vetoed it for so long. What one can 
see is that leaming played a crucial role. First, the Bosnian experience served as a 
trigger for a change in the strategy of the British elites in the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). According to Howorth 
(2004: 217), 
Bosnia offered two linked lessons. First, as had in any case become 
abundantly clear from the burden-sharing debates on Capitol Hill, Uncle 
Sam's cavalry was no longer available on request to manage minor 
European security crises. Second, Franco-British cooperation on the ground 
in the Balkans had brought home to military planners in both countries that 
the shift within Europe from deterrence to intervention was forcing London 
and Paris into one another's arms. 
Officials in the MoD and FCO (i. e. 'epistemic communities') were the ones behind the 
change in the Blair government's policy by putting forward new strategic thinking in 
which the EU would play a more important role in European security (Howorth, 2004; 
Reynolds, 2007: 61). But another event led Tony Blair to modify his policy. Prior to the 
elections and also during the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty, Blair maintained 
practically the same position as the Major government concerning this issue, arguing 
that NATO should remain the main defence organisation in the continent (Latawski and 
Smith, 2003: 127-128). However, the Kosovo crisis and the poor prospects of the 
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Europeans responding to this crisis motivated Blair to take a different stance on the 
EU's security and defence PoliCY. 74 Howorth (2004: 221) notes that 
When Blair was first properly briefed, in mid-1998, on Europe's seriously 
defective capacity to react to a hypothetical crisis in Kosovo, he was 
appalled. Europe, he concluded, simply had to turn its attention to defence. 
The rest followed Pbrtschach, St Malo, Cologne, Helsinki and Nice 
Nonetheless, in this case, one can only talk about simple leaming or a change in 
strategies, more than complex learning or a change in fundamental beliefs. Blair and his 
advisors did not change their standpoint about NATO and about the role it should play 
in European security. They believed that NATO should not be weakened by the 
development of the EU's security and defence capabilities. On the contrary, this 
development should strengthen and complement the Alliance. The fact that it was only a 
change of strategy also explains some of the problems in agreeing on a clear common 
policy at the EU level, especially with France. Ambiguity has surrounded the 
development of the ESDP since then and there is still no agreement on the end state 
goal. 
Later developments in Kosovo created a window of opportunity to consolidate and 
justify what had been agreed at St. Malo. Most of the institutional design was done in 
the corridors of the MoDs of the Big Three - although the Nordic countries were also 
very active in advancing the civilian component of the ESDP - and only then approved 
by the European Council. For instance, most of the institutional engineering took place 
during the German Presidency that led to the Cologne European Council. For its part, 
the PSC and the Headline Goal (that led to the set up of the RRF) were British 
proposals. 
74 By contrast, Latawski and Smith argue that other factors such as trying to maintain leadership and 
influence in Europe, at a time when the UK had opted for self-exclusion from the curo. According to 
them, in this context, the Kosovo crisis provided the 'backdrop' for the change in the British policy, but 
1[g]iven the other, political pressures on the Blair government it is highly likely that the Pbrtschach/St 
Malo initiatives would have been developed anyway' (2003: 133). However, they acknowledge that the 
Kosovo crisis provided 'an important part of the "atmospherics"', highlighted the lack of military 
capabilities of Europe and showed that the development of a European force would not weakened NATO 
(Eurocorps took over the KFOR HQ in December 1999), easing the US approval for the development of 
the ESDP- 
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As in the early years of the EPC, the new bodies created to manage the ESDP were first 
established outside the treaties and only later incorporated into the Nice Treaty (and the 
Constitutional Treaty). For instance, an interim PSC was established as early as March 
2000, just three months after the decision to do so at the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999. Clearly the creation of a Brussels-based committee to deal with 'all 
aspects of the CFSP/ESDP' was intended to represent a significant improvement over 
its predecessor, the somewhat peripatetic PoCo. The PSC responsibilities were further 
specified in a Council decision in January 2001 (Council of the EU, 2001 a), at the same 
time as the EUMC and the EUMS were established (Council of the EU, 2001b). For its 
part, CIVCOM was established much earlier by a Council decision of 22 June 2000 
(Council of the EU, 2000a). Finally, the Iraq war can also be considered as a critical 
juncture for the institutional development of the ESDP. Although not without problems, 
it has served as a window of opportunity and led to the launch of the European Defence 
Agency and the establishment of the Civ/Mil Cell, adding new impetus to the 
Brusselisation of the ESDP. 
With the establishment of the ESDP, and its increasing Brusselisation, the decision- 
making process has shifted from the capitals to Brussels. Indeed the creation of a 
permanent committee in Brussels and the gradual displacement of the Political Directors 
(based in the national capitals) as the gatekeepers of the CFSP/ESDP decision-making 
process best exemplifies the move to a more 'Brusselised' and operational CFSP/ESDP 
(see Duke, 2005). The ESDP structures created in Brussels are also taking over the 
planning and day-to-day implementation of the ESDP operations, especially in the area 
of civilian crisis management, and with the establishment of a future EU autonomous 
operational Centre within the Council Secretariat, the EU will be able to run 
independent military operations. 75 There has also been a growing tendency on the part 
of the Council Secretariat to expand its area of competencies to areas traditionally 
managed by the Commission such as institutional building (through police or rule of 
law operations) or disaster management. 
In sum, the path inaugurated with the SEA and the TEU towards the enhancement of the 
institutions located in Brussels has been reinforced in recent years. This process might 
have reduced the direct control of the Member States over CFSP decision-making 
75 To date, it relies on NATO SHAPE Headquarters in Mons or five national headquarters (Britain, 
France, Gennany, Greece and Italy). 
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process by shifting the structures to Brussels; however, it does seem to have 
substantially increased the role of the Commission or the European Parliament in the 
CFSP. In other words, this institutionalisation process has led to an increasing 
Brusselisation, rather than a communitarisation of the CFSP. The institutionalisation of 
CFSP has altered the competencies of specific institutions, created new institutions on 
top of existing ones and maintained the path towards Brusselisation over the years. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms that the levels of institutionalisation of 
CFSP have increased over time. The institutionalisation of the CFSP/ESDP has resulted 
from several factors: external events (the end of the Cold War, the Yugoslavian wars, 
the Iraq war) and internal events (the IGCs and enlargements) that have served as 
windows of opportunity. Several CFSP institutions such as the Council Secretariat and 
the HR have also developed in an unforeseen way and acquired a life of their own, 
extending its informal role beyond the scope agreed by the Member States at the IGCs. 
Actors have introduced incremental changes following from leaming processes to 
remedy previous mistakes and policy failures. However, institutional path-dependency 
(sunk costs, uncertainty and veto points) have constrained the scope for reform. Overall 
change has been incremental, not innovative. In other words, it has led to the 
modification of existing institutions or the introduction of new ones, but this has not 
altered the fundamentals of the institutional matrix: a mixed system of supranationalism 
and intergovernmentalism, characterised by an increasing Brusselisation. 
Another general conclusion shared by many academics and observers that can be 
inferred from the above account is that CFSP institutions have had an impact on CFSP 
outcomes in terms of coherence and effectiveness (see On-line Survey, Appendix 1). 
Moreover, most experts agree that the subsequent reforms of the Treaties have enhanced 
CFSP capabilities and structures, increasing coherence and effectiveness, even if 
maintaining their intergovernmental nature and its non-EC status (Nugent, 2003: 416; 
Smith, M. E., 2004: 190). Further, the development of common practices has facilitated 
consensus-building and a convergence of views among national representatives which 
might, in the long term, produce a redefinition of Member States' interests. 
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Some remarks are noteworthy here about the Brusselisation process that has been 
described in section 3.4. Firstly, it has to be noted that Brusselisation does not equal 
CFSP institutionalisation. It only amounts to a particular aspect of the latter: the 
creation of new Brussels-based bureaucratic organisations and the physical move of the 
policy-making competencies from the national capitals to Brussels, and it can also be 
seen as facilitating the development of CFSP practices. Second, the Brusselisation 
process has developed 'by default rather than design' (Allen 1998: 58). As we have 
seen, this process resulted from concerns about coherence and effectiveness amongst 
the Member States, but how it developed in practice was more the result of unintended 
consequences and institutional legacies than a previously agreed plan. 
This chapter has also shown the importance of looking beyond the formal roles given by 
the Treaties, and the benefits of looking at the actual implementation process in order to 
assess the performance of CFSP institutions (Piana, 2002: 220). The role played by the 
HR, his team (Council Secretariat and Policy Unit) and the ESDP bodies, including the 
PSC, has grown in the last years, especially with the launching of the first ESDP 
missions. The process of Brusselisation has also increased the EU's capabilities to 
autonomously plan and implement foreign policy decisions, and therefore, it has 
increased the potential to carry out a more effective foreign policy. However, its impact 
on coherence does not seem so straightforward since it has increased the number of 
actors and competition with the Commission services. 
Besides, even though Brusselisation does not imply socialisation per se, we can argue 
here that it has led to higher levels of socialisation of national representatives and EU 
officials. Another question is to what extent this physical relocation of national foreign 
policies has led to changes in Member States' interests. Finally, and linked with the last 
point, the Brusselisation process has not eliminated the national foreign policy 
structures, although it has however exerted an important impact upon, and 
'Europeanised'g the MFAs (Manners and Whitman, 2000; Smith, M. E., 2004). Thus, 
even though not initially foreseen, the Member States had to adjust the functioning and 
structures of their MFAs to the working procedures of the new bodies established in 
Brussels such as the PSC (see, for instance, Allen and Oliver, 2004: 21). A detailed 
analysis of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The following chapters constitute a step further in the application of the theoretical 
framework, by examining CFSP activities in BiH during the period 1991-2006 in-depth. 
The aim is to test whether there is a correlation between higher levels of CFSP 
institutionalisation, as shown in this chapter, and the levels of coherence and 
effectiveness achieved by CFSP activities in BiH. The empirical chapters will track the 
direct and indirect impact of bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and informal 
practices on levels of coherence and effectiveness. Processes of path dependency, 
unintended consequences, learning and socialisation are expected to explain why the 
CFSP reached which levels of coherence and effectiveness. 
128 
CHAPTER 4 
Coherence and effectiveness of EPC/CFSP activities in BiH 
(1991-1995): Struggling for peace 
The idea that Yugoslavia would be the test 
case of a more unified Europe and of new 
security institutions in the EC or CSCE arose 
before those institutions were well in place. 
Yugoslavia was to serve as a vehicle to 
create those institutions and force that unity, 
not as its beneficiary 
Woodward, 1995: 162 
4.1. INTRODUCTION: EU EXTERNAL ACTION IN BIH (1991-1995) 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the search for a negotiated solution that could stop the 
bloody conflict in former Yugoslavia was considered by both European and international 
observers to be the first test for the embryonic CFSP. However, for most of the duration 
of the conflict, the EU was forced to resort to the weak foreign policy machinery of the 
EPC. In other words, institutionalisation was still low. The Bosnian war, more than any 
other event, showed not just the institutional limitations of the EPC, but also the 
difficulties of a multi-national organisation agreeing and implementing a common 
policy. This chapter and the following two track the impact of institutions, interests and 
identities on CFSP coherence and effectiveness. Regarding institutions specifically, it 
considers the development of bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and practices. The 
analysis of the empirical evidence has been distributed across three periods, each covered 
by a separate chapter. These periods correspond to different stages of engagement by the 
EU in BiH from a preventive approach based on diplomatic and civilian instruments 
(Chapter 4), to a stronger economic power approach (Chapter 5) to finally, a 
comprehensive and robust approach, including the deployment of the first ESDP 
missions (Chapter 6). 
The present chapter analyses EPC/CFSP activities in three case studies: the EC Peace 
Conference, the non-decision about military intervention and the EU Administration in 
Mostar. Both the decision-making and the implementation phases are explored, except in 
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the case of the non-decision about military intervention where the implementation phase 
is, by definition, absent. At the decision-making level, the analysis will look at policy 
formulation and negotiation, as well as at whether the mandate, instruments and 
resources set up at this stage were appropriate to ensure a coherent and effective 
implementation. At the implementation phase, the aim will be to gauge how coherent a 
CFSP initiative was and to what extent the CFSP objectives were achieved. The aim of 
this chapter, as well as of chapters 5 and 6, is first to establish for each case study the 
degrees of coherence and effectiveness reached by CFSP activities, and second to 
determine which factors explain this, looking in particular at the impact of CFSP 
institutionalisation. 
Before moving to the case studies, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the 
EC/EU's activities in BiH during this period (1991-1995) in order to better understand 
the EU's response. The war broke out at a time when the EC's attention was absorbed by 
other events: the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gulf 
War and the negotiations surrounding the TEU. In this context, the geostrategic role that 
the Federation of Yugoslavia had played during the Cold War became less important for 
the major powers (Woodward, 1995: 150; Holbrooke, 1998: 26). The two parallel IGCs 
opening in December 1990 were intended to negotiate a monetary union (EMU) and a 
political union to better deal with these challenges. But not only was the EC in a process 
of redesign; other international security institutions (NATO, CSCE, UN) were also 
adapting their structures to the new post-Cold War environment. For its part, the US, 
trying to find its own place in the international arena and with its attention turned to the 
events in Iraq and the Soviet Union, was keen to hand the baton to the EC leaders. Some 
American policy-makers considered that the time had arrived for the Europeans to 
assume their responsibility in upholding security in the continent (Almond, 1994: 236; 
Hoolbrooke, 1998: 28). However, within this context of international re-alignment, the 
response of the Western powers and institutions to the crisis in Yugoslavia was 
considered by many 'too little, too late' (Woodward, 1995: 147; Buchan, 1993: 69-70) or 
the 'greatest collective failure' (Holbrooke, 1998: 21). 
From the beginning of the crisis, many European leaders echoed Jacques Poos in arguing 
that the 'hour of Europe' had come and that events in Yugoslavia should be managed and 
solved by the EC. In this vein, Jacques Delors, the President of the European 
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Commission, declared: '[w]e do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will 
have enough respect not to interfere in ours' (cited in Zielonka, 1998a: 36). His statement 
summarised the high expectations about the development of a common European foreign 
policy - expectations which made subsequent failure even more evident and painful. 
According to some authors, however, the EC lacked the capacity to act appropriately. 
The traditional instruments of the EC as a civilian power (economic assistance, prospects 
of association and membership) were brought to the table too late when the crisis in 
former Yugoslavia was irreversible (Woodward, 1995). For instance, the EC was still in 
the process of negotiating a series of economic agreements with the Yugoslav Prime 
Minister, Ante Markovid, in the spring and summer of 1991, while de facto the 
Federation had already collapsed under Slovene and Croat pressure on 23 June 1991. 
Deficient information about the situation in the Federation and an excess of confidence 
in its own power of attraction could explain this initial reaction of the EC (Vetschera and 
Smutek-Riemer, 1994; Interview 53). 
During the following months the EC adopted a high profile, leading the international 
response to the conflict. On 28 June 1991 the European Council decided to send the 
Troika to mediate in the conflict that had just flared up in Slovenia. The EC negotiators 
achieved the ceasefire which ended the war in Slovenia on 7 July 1991, the Brioni 
Agreement. 76 The EC also sent its first ever monitoring mission (ECMM) to observe the 
cease-fire between the Slovenian and the Yugoslav Federal Army. In August 1991, the 
Dutch Presidency sent the first EC special representative to negotiate with the parties on 
the ground, Ambassador Henri Wijnaendts, who was succeeded by Ambassador Jose 
Cutileiro when Portugal took over the Presidency. At the same time, the EC adopted 
diplomatic and economic sanctions intended to force the parties to a negotiated solution 
both in Slovenia and Croatia. 77 However, the issue of recognition hampered the EC 
Peace Conference that opened in September 1991. The inability to agree on a common 
position concerning the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (see section 4.2. ) and the 
lack of military instruments to back up their threats or even support the ECMM (see 
76 The Brioni Agreement should not be overestimated. It was reached because it fitted Milo§evid's interests 
very well (Little and Silber, 1995: 164). After the failure of the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) in Slovenia, 
and taking into account that there were no Serb minorities in that country, the attention of Milo§evid 
moved to Croatia, where a significant Serb minority lived in the Krajina region. While the EC negotiators 
and the international community were still celebrating the conclusion of the Brioni Agreement, the JNA 
troops were heading for Croatia (Almond, 1994: 236). 
77 On 5 July 1991, the Member States agreed on an embargo on all military material and threatened to 
suspend the EC's aid to the Yugoslav republics. 
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section 4.3. ) showed the limitations of EPC. The final EU attempt to prevent the war in 
BiH failed at the London Conference on 26-27 August 1992. 
As the conflict intensified, the EC was progressively marginalised by the intervention of 
other international actors, primarily the UN. The EC continued to play an important role 
in the diplomatic efforts, the implementation of sanctions and the provision of 
humanitarian aid, but its activities were increasingly carried out within the framework of 
the UN. A new International Conference on former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was launched in 
September 1992 in Geneva under the auspices of the UN and the EC, represented by 
Cyrus Vance and David Owen, respectively. A regime of sanctions was also approved by 
subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions. 78 The EC/EU committed itself to assist in 
their implementation and it was also an important actor in the provision of humanitarian 
aid from the beginning of the conflict (Tonra, 2001: 235), while the Member States 
supplied the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with troops. 79 
With the creation of the Contact Group (April 1994), the voice of the EU as a body was 
barely heard, especially after the end of the German Presidency (December 1994), 
causing bitterness among some Member States (Neville-Jones, 1996/1997: 46; Owen, 
1995: 278-279). 80 It ought to be noted, however, that efforts were made to keep some 
illusion of EU involvement: David Owen, the ICFY Co-Chairmen 'appointed' three 
experts from the UK, France and Germany to the Contact Group, briefed the Twelve, and 
then issued a Coreu de facto establishing the Contact Group (Owen, 1995: 279). From 
then onwards, the US and the Contact Group led the international effort in BiH, at a time 
when a growing consensus was emerging favouring military intervention by NATO. At 
Dayton, although the EU nominally co-hosted the talks and the new EU's Co-Chairman 
of the ICFY, Carl Bilt, was invited to participate in the negotiation, the European 
delegation was virtually sidelined, with the US running the show (Neville-Jones, 
1996/1997: 48). Notwithstanding these limitations, in the last period of the conflict, the 
EU was able to deploy an innovative operation with the Administration of Mostar (see 
78 Among others, UNSCR 757 (1992) of 30 May, imposing comprehensive sanctions on the FRY and the 
UNSCR 777 (1992) and 821 (1993) recommending the suspension of the FRY membership in the UN and 
the ECOSOC. 
79 out of a total of 25,000 UNPROFOR troops, France provided 6,000 troops, the UK 2,400, Denmark 
1,200, The Netherlands 1,030, Spain 1,000, and Belgium 800 (Edwards, 1997, endnote 55). 
"' The small Member States were hostile to the Contact Group initiative, but also Germany, until it was 
included, and Italy because it was left out. 
132 
section 4.4) and also played a major role after the Peace Agreement by assisting post- 
conflict reconstruction (see Chapter 5). 
In sum, the role of the EC was quite intense during the first stage of the conflict, but it 
was progressively marginalised by other international actors such as the UN and in 
particular, the US, and the Contact Group. Nevertheless, this was the first time that the 
EC/EU had engaged in crisis management, putting in place innovative policy instruments 
like a monitoring mission, a peace conference, the Administration of Mostar, and special 
representatives to negotiate the cease-fires and peace agreements .81 The EU played a 
significant role in the provision of humanitarian aid and imposing sanctions that were 
later supported by other international actors. The next section analyses in more detail one 
of these initiatives: the EC Peace Conference. The aim is to determine whether there is a 
correlation between levels of coherence and effectiveness and the degree of EPC 
institutionalisation. With the organisation of the Peace Conference, the EC demonstrated 
its willingness to play a strong role in putting the conflict to an end. It was the first time 
that the EC had embarked upon such a diplomatic venture. However, early optimism 
would soon lead to frustration as the warring parties kept breaking successive cease-fires. 
4.2. THE EC PEACE CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE 
ISSUE OF RECOGNITION AND THE PRELUDE TO THE WAR 
The EC Peace Conference on Fortner Yugoslavia opened in The Hague on 7 September 
1991, following an EPC Declaration of 3 September. The leaders of the six republics and 
the Yugoslav Federation were invited to the conference. Lord Carrington was appointed 
as the EC's negotiator. 
82 The aim of the EC Conference was to stop a conflict that 
threatened to spread across the whole of Yugoslavia and to find a peaceful lasting 
solution. By participating in the Conference, the parties subscribed to several principles 
including the unacceptability of the use of force, the unacceptability of any change of 
borders by force and respect for human and minority rights (Hill and Smith, 2000: 364). 
At the opening session, it was agreed to create an Arbitration Commission, presided over 
" It was also at the EC that a Committee was first set to investigate the atrocities during the Bosnian war 
in January 1993. The works of this Committee led to the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Ginsberg, 2001: 69). 
82 Peter Carrington, a former British Foreign Secretary, was known as the man that negotiated the 1979 
accords that ended the civil war in Zimbabwe. According to Almond (1994: 246), the choice of Lord 
Carrington was not very neutral as it was perceived both by the German and French more as a British 
envoy than an EC envoy. 
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by Robert Badinter, to advise the disputing parties on a solution in line with international 
law. 
From the beginning, the EC Peace Conference did not generate enough support among 
its participants. It was continuously hampered by Serb attacks on Croatian objectives, as 
well as by a boycott on the part of the Slovenian and Croatian governments. After five 
failed cease-fires and a fact-finding tour by Lord Carrington, on 7 October, the parties 
agreed on some principles for future negotiations. These included, inter alia, the creation 
of a loose alliance of sovereign republics and adequate arrangements for the protection of 
the rights of minorities, including the possibility of a special status for certain areas. 
Based on these principles, on 18 October, Lord Carrington presented a peace plan 
proposal based on an association of independent republics sharing certain central 
institutions (a council of ministers, a court of justice and a joint parliamentary body) and 
cooperating in economic and foreign policy, a model inspired by the EC's own 
institutional arrangements. The plan maintained the borders between the republics, 
therefore not including Serbia's demands for an independent status of Serb minorities in 
Croatia, although it set provisions for the protection of minority rights. 
However, the Serbian opposition to Carrington's plan prevented a successful outcome of 
the Conference. The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milogevid, opposed the concession of the 
same rights to minorities within Serbia (i. e. Kosovo) that he claimed for Serb minorities 
in other republics. Serbia was then given a deadline, expiring on 5 November, to agree to 
the peace plan or face trade and diplomatic sanctions. On 8 November, the EC 
announced sanctions against Serbia involving the immediate termination of the EC- 
Yugoslavia trade and cooperation agreement. The EC also asked the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) to establish appropriate measures to effectively monitor the arms 
embargo against Yugoslavia and asked for additional measures such as an oil embargo. 
In contrast, those republics accepting the agreement were offered new aid packages (Hill 
and Smith, 2000: 365). 
The Serbian rejection of the Carrington plan as well as the continuing violence in Croatia 
halted the peace process. Although the Peace Conference continued over the following 
months - Carrington only resigned in August 1992" - these factors, together with the 
" Another British fonner Secretary, David Owen, took Carrington's place. 
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EC's recognition of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, reduced the chances for an 
overall settlement in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Increasingly the attention of the 
international community moved from Croatia to BiH. 
4.2.1. Between unity and independence: the search for a coherent policy 
The Conference aimed at reaching a peaceful solution acceptable to all parties. 
According to the principles set down in the EPC Declarations of 3 September and 19 
September 1991 (Hill and Smith, 2000: 364), the EC Peace Conference was coherent 
with other attempts and initiatives that the EC had launched to stop the conflict, 
including several economic and diplomatic sanctions, the mediation of the Troika and the 
dispatch of the ECMM. However, the initiative did not establish appropriate co- 
ordinating mechanisms to ensure vertical coherence - i. e. that the Member States could 
reach a unitary position represented by Lord Carrington - and did not prevent the 
Member States from negotiating at other parallel forums such as formal and informal 
meetings among the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, and bilateral negotiations with the 
parties involved in the conflict. This state of affairs was due, in part, to the lack of a 
permanent body that could speak for the Twelve (Lord Carrington only had a temporary 
and weak mandate), the lack of resources dedicated to the Conference and the fact that 
the Presidency was held during this period by three small Member States (Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands and Portugal). Although an EPC Secretariat was officially established 
with the SEA, it lacked the wherewithal to play a significant role during the Conference 
and the UK had to supply a small secretariat to the EC for the duration of the conferences 
on Yugoslavia (Gow, 1996: 87). The creation of this ad hoc secretariat was an innovative 
formula since it set up a standing structure to support the peace negotiations, instead of a 
rotating one dependent on each Presidency; however, it was not an optimal solution and 
could not rally the Member States in support of a common position. 
For its part, the Commission was not represented at the EC Peace Conference in spite of 
the economic dimension of the crisis. Even though in the first stages of the crisis the 
Commission was involved in several diplomatic initiatives, with the worsening of the 
conflict in Croatia and later in BiH, it was relegated to providing humanitarian aid. The 
involvement of the Commission in dealing with the conflict could only take place when 
the EC Council asked the Commission to propose new economic measures and sanctions 
(see below) since at that time it did not have a formal role in the Troika. In sum, only 
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minimal coherence was achieved at the decision-making level because no specific 
mechanisms were established in order to fully co-ordinate the communitarian and the 
Member States' policies with the negotiations that were taking place at The Hague 
During the implementation phase, and in spite of the lack of appropriate arrangements, 
horizontal and institutional coherence were in evidence. Communitarian and EPC 
instruments, acted in unison. The Commission advised on new economic measures to be 
taken against Serbia as required by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve and the EPC 
Decision of II November established several restrictive measures in order to pressure 
Serbia to agree to the Carrington Plan. Vertical incoherence, meanwhile, jeopardised the 
implementation of the Conference. The EC could not prevent unilateral moves from its 
Member States, which constituted the main obstacle to coherent EC action and, for 
instance, some observers noted problems with the implementation of the embargoes on 
Serbia. 84 But certainly the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and Germany's 
'Alleingang', constitute the most remarkable example of vertical incoherence. 
The EC policy line during the first stage of the conflict reflected its commitment to the 
unity of Yugoslavia. On 26 March, the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve declared that: 'a 
united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself in the new 
Europe' (Hill and Smith, 2000: 362). Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer, Presidents of 
the Commission and the Council respectively, visited Belgrade on 29-30 May and made 
conditional the association agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia on the unity of the 
country (Woodward, 1995: 160). In June, an EC statement on Yugoslavia again 
emphasized the Community's willingness to retain its relationship with a united 
Yugoslavia (Kintis, 1997: 149). On 23 June, the EC Foreign Ministers met at 
Luxembourg and decided not to recognize any unilateral declaration of independence 
from Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, during this period, the policy of the EC was quite 
coherent, with the clear objective of maintaining a united Federation. 
However, the images of war in Slovenia and, in particular, in Croatia, had a great impact 
on public opinion within some Member States. Domestic pressures were particularly felt 
in Germany and from the beginning of July, German leaders supported Slovenian and 
Croatian independence. When the Peace Conference opened, the majority of the Member 
84 Mark Almond mentions in this respect the lack of compliance by Greece (1994: 245). 
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States were against an early recognition of these two republics and warned that a 
unilateral recognition by Germany would be counterproductive to the peace talks (The 
Guardian, 1991a). While the EC Conference and the Carrington Plan were intended to 
maintain Yugoslav unity in the form of a loose federation, the recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia meant that this plan would not have any lever on these two republics and 
would undermine EC's neutrality in Serbia's eyes. For this reason, several Member 
States criticised the German position, including the UK, France, and The Netherlands 
(Interview 53). In spite of these warnings, repeated failures in the negotiations increased 
German demands for recognition, subsequently joined by Denmark and Italy. 
On 8 October 1991, the Badinter Commission declared that Yugoslavia was legally in 
the process of dissolution and that the federal institutions no longer existed. This 
endorsed the republics' right to take unilateral measures for secession and therefore, 
seemingly vindicated German arguments. After the Badinter Commission's report, 
recognition of the republics was not completely ruled out by other Member States, but it 
was considered only within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement for 
Yugoslavia with guarantees for minorities. That was particularly the position of France, 
whereas the UK was more concerned about the possibility that recognition would make 
more likely international military intervention, something strongly opposed by John 
Major's government. 
The recognition of the Yugoslav republics was discussed at the EPC meeting on 15-16 
December. While the list of conditions was not difficult to agree following from the 
recommendation of the Arbitration Commission; the difficult issue was the date of 
recognition, with Germany pressing for recognition as soon as possible. An intricate 
compromise was reached to avoid an embarrassing split, days after the Maastricht 
summit. When German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared to his 
colleagues in Brussels that his country would announce recognition of Croatia before 
Christmas, the other EC Foreign Ministers tried to produce a decision that could keep a 
semblance of unity. In the final text, the Member States agreed to recognize those 
republics that had applied for recognition before 23 December and that met the criteria 
established by the Badinter Commission, but they would not 'implement' the recognition 
until 15 January 1992. 
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Germany respected the first compromise: under pressure from its partners, Bonn agreed 
to postpone implementation of its decision for a month. However, after the meeting, the 
German Chancellor repeated his willingness to recognize Slovenia and Croatia before 
Christmas, disregarding whatever the conclusion of the Badinter Commission. On 23 
December Germany recognized the two republics, although, as agreed, the decision was 
not officially implemented until 15 January. In January, the Badinter Commission 
expressed its concerns about the respect of minority rights in Croatia, and recommended 
the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia. In the case of BiH, recognition was made 
85 conditional on the organisation of a referendum for independence. On 15 January, the 
Member States, taking no notice of the Badinter Commission's advice, recognised 
Slovenia and Croatia. 86 
In summary, the policies of some Member States were out of kilter with the discussions 
that were taking place at The Hague Conference. Therefore, at the implementation level, 
vertical coherence can be judged to be negligible. Even though national idiosyncrasies 
can explain a great deal of these problems of coherence (Dover, 2005: 3 10), it is also 
worth mentioning the lack of intelligence capabilities at the EC's level. The dissolution 
of the Yugoslav Federation was a reality in the spring 1991; yet, the EC did not seem to 
have received these signals or it had not drawn the necessary policy lessons from them. 87 
It was not until October that the Member States, advised by the Badinter Commission, 
recognised the possibility of Yugoslavia's dissolution. However, by the time the EC had 
changed its strategy and proposed a confederation, it was too late. Yet, not only the EC 
had to modify its position over Yugoslavia's status (from supporting the continuation of 
a single state to recognition of the breakaway republics), but the fact that Germany 
publicly adopted a different position to the majority of the Member States, undermined 
the EC's credibility as a mediator. This lack of a coherent approach, in turn, impacted on 
the effectiveness of the EC's policy, as shall now be discussed. 
" The referendum was held on 29 February-30 March 1992. Muslim and Croats voted yes (99.7%); Serbs 
boycotted en masse the referendum. The EC recognized Bosnia a month later after some hesitations among 
the Member States and under pressure of the US. 
"" The main obstacle to Macedonia's recognition was Greece's opposition. Greece objected to the use of 
the name, historically associated with Greece. 
37 According to one senior diplomat, 'the Member States did not realise at that time what was the situation 
in Yugoslavia. They had decided to maintain stability at any price' (Interview 49) and another diplomat 
acknowledged that it was 'an absolute failure of intelligence' and that 'some countries were deliberately 
ignoring the information' (Interview 53). 
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4.2.2. Effectiveness: looking at the objectives, mandate and instruments 
When measuring the effectiveness of the EC Peace Conference, CFSP objectives, as 
defined in the Maastricht Treaty, are utilised as criteria to evaluate EU foreign and 
security policy (see Chapter 1). It could be argued, however, that because the Maastricht 
Treaty did not enter into force until November 1993, it is not possible to apply these 
objectives during the period pre-Maastricht. Notwithstanding this argument, it is worth 
noting that CFSP objectives had already been incorporated in several EPC documents 
and in the SEA. 88 Therefore, it seems appropriate to refer to these objectives when 
measuring effectiveness during this period. Even though the crisis in Yugoslavia was 
not considered as a vital threat to the EU's 'fundamental interests and independence of 
the Union' or to 'the security of the Union and its Member States' (Article J. 1.2, 
TOM), 89 the decision to establish a Peace Conference to reach a negotiated and lasting 
peace agreement can be seen as a means to achieve peace and stability in the territory of 
former Yugoslavia, in line with another CFSP objective: 'to preserve peace and 
strengthen international security' (Article J. 1.2, ToM). 
The fact that the EC did not have a clear policy regarding the right to self-determination 
and recognition at that time (Almond, 1994: 237-240; Woodward, 1995: 153) resulted, 
nevertheless, in a very ambiguous mandate. According to Woodward (1995: 179), the 
corollary of such a mandate was that 'the EC remained ambiguous about its political 
objective and competing political principles, inconsistent in its declarations as a result of 
internal conflict, and unwilling to commit military forces'. 
Furthermore, the means that the EC Conference had at its disposal to pressure for a 
peaceful settlement - economic and diplomatic tools, including the recognition of the 
republics - were rather limited since, at this stage, the EC did not possess any 
instruments for crisis management. In other words, 'the Yugoslav conflict [ ... I 
highlighted the mismatch between the EU's declared foreign policy objectives and the 
means available to achieve those objectives' (Cameron, 1999: 32). Against this 
backdrop, the effectiveness of the Peace Conference was partial at the decision-making 
88 The SEA stated in its Preamble the following objectives: 'to display the principles of democracy and 
compliance with the law and with human rights to which they [the Member States] attached, so that 
together that may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security'. See 
also European Council (1974). 
89 However, it has to be mentioned that the crisis had a significant impact in terms of the refugee crisis 
and economic instability, especially for the neighbouring countries (Italy and Greece). 
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level, i. e. there was a collective decision according to CFSP objectives, but it came into 
being without establishing an appropriate mandate or instruments to achieve these 
objectives. 
4.2.3 implementing the mandate: the effectiveness of a civilian power 
The implementation of the EC Peace Conference aimed at achieving a peace agreement 
among the six republics; yet it was prevented by several factors. Obviously, the main 
obstacle for a negotiated solution at the EC Peace Conference in The Hague was the 
opposition of Serbia to the Carrington Plan. Nonetheless, the internal divisions among 
the EC Member States about the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the lack 
of will to intervene with troops in the conflict also contributed to undermining the EC's 
negotiating strategy. Serbia was confident that the Europeans would never deploy 
military troops to stop the conflict; hence they did not feel pressured to reach a 
negotiated agreement. The Serbian government used the EC negotiations to gain some 
time to pursue its strategy of military aggression and ethnic cleansing, 'giving the 
impression of participating in the modalities of peace negotiations without seriously 
committing to them' (Ginsberg, 2001: 65). Serbia was reassured by European officials' 
declarations, in particular, the British who repeatedly rejected military intervention. 
Threats of sanctions and diplomatic recognition were the only instruments that the EC 
could use to exert pressure. In the first case, economic incentives and sanctions were 
utilised too late (Buchan, 1993: 68-69), and some Member States failed to apply the 
arms embargo. Moreover, one could argue that in the context of ethnic conflict, these 
economic instruments were insufficient to bring the parties to a compromise. This view 
was already clear at the opening of the Conference: 
In the absence of will among the EC governments to send armed troops to 
enforce a cease-fire in Yugoslavia, the Community has discovered that its 
clout as the world's leading commercial power and its attraction as a zone of 
prosperity are not enough to overcome the violent historical animosities 
there (The Washington Post, 199 1). 
As far as the 'recognition weapon' is concerned, the divergences among the Member 
States showed that the EC did not have a clear policy on self-determination, undermined 
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its credibility at the negotiating table and wrecked the EC Conference (Carrington cited 
in Almond, 1994: 41). With its decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, the EC also 
lost its last chance to play an impartial role in mediation, losing its neutrality in the eyes 
of Serbia. Thus, a resumption of the EC Peace Conference on 9 January was not possible 
because of the increasing suspicions of Serbia. A statement by the Federal Government 
of Yugoslavia stated that the conference 'showed very soon that the good services, which 
the Yugoslav side accepted with hope and confidence, turned into a biased approach to 
the secessionist republics' (United Press International, 1992). The EC's decision to 
recognise the breakaway republics also came in for a lot of criticism from the US and the 
UN, both of whom considered that the move risked spreading the conflict to other 
republics and in particular to the multi-ethnic BiH. The same concerns were voiced by 
the Bosnian and Macedonian republics (The Guardian, 1991b). Yet, as some authors 
have pointed out, the EC's recognition did not initiate the conflict in BiH, although it 
might have speeded up the outbreak of the war. But in reality it was just a matter of time, 
since preparations for the war were already ongoing in the summer of 1991 (Ginsberg 
2001: 81). 
Following from this, the effectiveness of the implementation of the EC Conference can 
be judged as marginal. In other words, there was an EC purposive action, according to 
CFSP objectives (achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict), but the Conference 
only had a very limited impact on the ex-Yugoslav republics and did not reach its 
expected outcome. 
4.2.4. Final evaluation 
In the context of a redefinition of European security institutions after the end of the Cold 
War, there were high expectations about what the EC/EU could do. This led the EC to 
engage intensively in the first stages of the crisis. David Owen described this period as 
creating 'an air of unreal expectation about the EC's early involvement' (in Tonra, 2001: 
226). The EC tried to exhaust all the EC and EPC instruments at its disposal during this 
period from economic carrots (offering aid and an association agreement), economic 
sanctions (oil embargo, arms embargo, suspension of trade agreements and assistance), 
diplomatic sanctions (withdrawal of Member States' Ambassadors), 'good offices' in the 
peace talks, sending an EC monitoring mission, and finally, convening the EC Peace 
Conference. Commenting on the latter, Van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, said: 
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'[t]he Twelve had tried to go to the limits of their imaginative thinking to endeavour to 
save the peace in Yugoslavia' (in Kintis, 1997: 15 1). 
In spite of the high expectations, institutional deficiencies meant that the EC punched 
well below its weight during the negotiations. According to one of the interviewees, the 
unfortunate declaration of Jacques Poos raised expectations that the EU could not fulfil 
with the instruments available (Interview 52). Among those deficiencies, one can 
mention inappropriate intelligence and analysis capabilities and the lack of strong 
diplomatic machinery to support the negotiations. Commenting on how the EC dealt with 
the crisis in Yugoslavia, Jacques Delors affirmed that 'the lesson to be learned here is 
that strategic planning and analysis capabilities are needed at the European level' (cited 
in Edwards, 1997: 190-191). 
Even though many policy-makers realised the need for reform, the institutionalisation of 
the lessons learned would not take place until the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. The 
Maastricht Treaty, in process of negotiation when the conflict erupted, reinforced the 
foreign policy machinery of the EU by merging the EPC Secretariat with the Secretariat 
General of the Council. Yet, it has to be noted that the Yugoslav crisis was not so 
instrumental in this reform, and that other factors were more influential, such as 
alleviating the burden on the rotating Presidency (see Chapter 3). By contrast, leaming 
from the failure during the Bosnian war would be more important prompting reforms in 
the Amsterdam Treaty. The latter strengthened EU analysis capabilities with the creation 
of the Policy Unit and would create a permanent position to improve EU external 
representation with the establishment of the figure of the High Representative. 
Further, one of the main criticisms of the EC Peace Conference was the lack of 
instruments to compel the belligerents to an agreement (Interview 52). This feature was 
common, though, to other international organisations including the UN, which convened 
(together with the EQ, the ICFY with similar ill-fortune. Lacking any coercive 
instrument, apart from economic sanctions, the EC's leverage on the parties was quite 
limited. Yet, one could argue with Nuttall (1994: 17) that even if lacking these 
instruments, the EC's effectiveness would have been higher had it acted sooner and had 
it maintained a unified position from the beginning. 
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Institutional weaknesses may also explain problems of co-ordination between the 
different national positions regarding the Peace Conference. Although the EPC had put 
in place a 'co-ordination reflex' (Nuttall, 1992: 312), meetings among national 
representatives, consultations and the sharing of information through COREU were still 
limited. For example, the EPC expert group discussing former Yugoslavia met only once 
every two or three weeks in spite of the urgency of the situation (Interview 53). Arguably 
socialisation among EPC officials at that time was less intensive since meetings took 
place less often and they were attended by officials from the MFAs and not from the 
Permanent Representations. In these conditions, it was difficult to forge consensus. 
Closer contacts among national representatives and the creation of a permanent body 
could have facilitated the co-ordination process among different national positions. For 
instance, an experienced observer commented about the recognition issue: 
neither the other Member States nor the Community as a body had an 
adequate understanding of the historical antecedents of the respective Greek 
and German positions [ ... ] Member States arrived at EPC meetings with 
their national policies, dictated by national attitudes, ready made. There was 
no independent capacity of analysis and briefing within EPC, which would 
have made for a better understanding of the positions of individual countries 
and possibly a greater readiness to accommodate their positions (Nuttall, 
1994: 19). 
Yet for all its limitations, what seems clear is that 'the EC shaped the interests and 
preferences of its member states' (Lucarelli, 2000: 121). First, indicative of the impact of 
EC institutions and the value attached to them is the fact that the first reflex of the 
Member States was to resort to the EC to intervene in the first stages of the conflict. 
Second, as Sonia Lucarelli has shown in her analysis of the recognition issue, Germany 
could have taken a decision recognising Slovenia and Croatia much earlier; however, 
because of the importance that Germany attached to the integration project, it decided to 
wait and negotiate at the EC Council between the 15-16 of December, where a 
compromise was agreed. In the case of the UK and France, when accepting German 
demands for recognition, they also took into consideration the need to maintain a 
common position, just after the Maastricht Treaty had been agreed. For example, 
Douglas Hurd mentioned that the compromise was 'achieved not without difficulty,, but 
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that the alternative of disagreement would have been 'deeply damaging' to the EC (The 
Press Association, 1991b). What seems clear is the preference of the Member States to 
achieve consensus at any price. According to Ginsberg (2001: 80), 'the EC members 
opposed to recognition at the time sacrificed their national positions for the fagade of EC 
foreign policy unity'. Moreover, the fact that the Member States complained about 
Germany's attitude can also serve as a proof of the significance of this consensus- 
building practice and that to a great extent it was more important for the EU leaders to do 
something collectively than the substance of the decision itself (Jorgensen, 1993: 86). As 
Tonra (2003: 742-743) put it, rationalistic accounts 
cannot understand what makes so many policy-makers labour so long and so 
hard for what can only be seen as so little [ ... I Policy-makers devote 
themselves to this task, not only to contribute to a resolution of a particular 
crisis, but also to see themselves acting, as they believe they must, 
collectively. 
In sum, the examination of this case has shown how deficiencies in institutions had an 
impact on CFSP coherence and effectiveness, as well as how institutions can be 
instrumental in facilitating cooperation and consensus-building among the Member 
States. The next section analyses the debate on military intervention that took place 
during the second half of 1991 and that continued during the course of the war in BiH. 
4.3. THE NON-DECISION ON MILITARY INTERVENTION. 
This case study is a very distinct one since it involves a non-decision. A balanced and 
comprehensive analysis of CFSP coherence and effectiveness requires that both 
decisions and non-decisions are taken into account. According to Christopher Hill (2003: 
107), one can distinguish three types of non-decisions: 
a Type 1: there is a collective decision 'not to act, to do nothing, despite 
considerable temptation, and possibly both the need and pressure to act'. 
N Type 2: avoiding taking a decision (i. e. deciding not to decide) or the failure to 
act, which can be deliberate, but is often the result of failure in the decision-making 
machinery. 
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M Type 3: a non-decision can also refer to issues that are excluded from the agenda. 
Simply, some issues become unthinkable as a question for decision. According to 
Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641), one could expect this type of non-decision 'when the 
dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among 
groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain 
grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions'. 
Up until September 1991, one could identify a non-decision of the first type: a decision 
by the EC not to act. The Member States actually discussed the issue of military force, 
but having failed to agree on a particular option, decided not to intervene militarily and 
this was stated in an official declaration. The issue was discussed again in subsequent 
meetings, but there was no collective decision. This was a non-decision of the second 
type. Finally, there was a case of a non-decision of the third type: the issue of a possible 
EC military intervention disappeared from the EC's agenda and moved to the UN and 
NATO's agendas. Needless to say, this section will only analyse the decision-making 
phase given that the implementation phase is absent in this instance. Before doing this, a 
chronological account of the events is presented below. 
As early as July 1991, some Member States, most notably France, had called on the EC 
and the WEU to send some kind of peacekeeping contingent to Yugoslavia as an attempt 
to force a cease-fire between Serbia and Croatia. The first proposal for military 
intervention by the WEU was brought to the table by the French Foreign Minister, 
Roland Dumas on 29 July. This would be one of many French initiatives aimed at giving 
an operational role to the WEU (Lucarelli, 2000: 171). The Dutch, then holding the EU 
Presidency, used the possibility of military intervention as a threat to bring the parties to 
a negotiated solution. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek warned the parties 
that if they did not stop the fighting 'then probably further appeals will be launched in 
favour of sending something like a peace force to the country, probably through WEUI 
(Edwards, 1997: 185). The WEU Council met in London on 7 August at France's request 
to consider a possible WEU role in supervising a ceasefire. However, for the time being, 
this proposal was opposed by a majority of Member States, in particular the UK, 90 but 
also by Germany as well as the Nordic and neutral countries. 
90 The British view was summarised by the words of Sir Oliver Wright, former British ambassador to 
Bonn: I[i]t would be madness to send unwelcome troops into a dreadful quagmire' (as quoted in Kintis, 
1997: 150). 
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Nonetheless, the violence in Croatia exposed the limits of the EC monitors on the ground 
and the need for an armed force to support their mandate. A proposal to this end was put 
forward by the Dutch at an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in The Hague on 
19 September. According to the Dutch Foreign Minister, the type of force proposed 
would be 'a peace-keeping force of lightly-armed troops like, for example, the UN 
forces' (The Press Association, 1991a). With the alarming news coming from Croatia, 
more Member States were in favour of a peacekeeping force. France, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Belgium espoused the idea of an intervention force but the Portuguese 
were more cautious. The Germans supported the initiative, but expressed their reluctance 
to send troops in line with their Constitution's provisions. Although there were different 
views about what type of force should be dispatched, it seemed clear to all the Member 
States that troops would only be sent to maintain and not to enforce peace. In the same 
vein, the WEU Secretary-General, Willem Van Eekelen stressed that 'whatever we are 
sending is not a force which would engage in military action against any of the military 
parties' (AFP, 1991 a). However, any proposal involving the WEU was strongly opposed 
by the British who were deeply concerned that the distinction between peacekeeping and 
peacemaking could become blurred and that WEU forces could be drawn into combat. 
In the end, no agreement was achieved. Apart from British opposition, all Member States 
agreed that any deployment would require the agreement of the warring parties and a 
durable ceasefire, conditions that had yet to be met. In spite of this, they decided to 
create, on the initiative of the French, an ad hoc working group to examine ways of 
ensuring better protection of the ECMM. According to the final EPC declaration of 19 
September: 
It is their [the Twelve's] understanding that no military intervention is 
contemplated and that, before a reinforced monitor mission were 
established, a cease-fire would have to be agreed with a prospect of holding 
and that all Yugoslav parties would have expressed their agreement (in Hill 
and Smith, 2000: 364) 
The options prepared by the committee of WEU experts were discussed at a WEU 
meeting on 30 September, followed by an EPC meeting. The WEU experts presented 
four options: 
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1) Logistic support for EC monitors, which might require 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. 
2) Escort and protection of monitors by armed military forces (5,000 to 6,000 personnel). 
3) A lightly armed peacekeeping force of military personnel (4,500 to 5,000 soldiers) 
backed up by a logistical contingent (3,000 to 5,000) to police the ceasefire and to 
support of the civilian monitors. 
4) A full-scale peacekeeping exercise requiring 20,000 peacekeeping forces plus 10,000 
additional support personnel to control the implementation of the ceasefire agreed upon 
by all Yugoslav parties. 
However, once again, there was no agreement among the Member States (AFP, 1991b). 
While France was supportive of a full-scale operation (IPS, 1991 a), the British expressed 
their concern that options three and four might provoke an extension of the conflict 
(Financial Times, 1991b), with everyone aware that any of the options would require the 
participation of UK troops. Failing to get an agreement, and to avoid criticisms of 
inaction, the German Foreign Minister Genscher, who chaired the WEU meeting, 
declared that any decision on whether to send military personnel to Yugoslavia would 
depend on a request from Lord Carrington for new measures to strengthen the ceasefire 
mission (AFP, 1991b; Europe Information Service, 1991). The truth was that British 
opposition was too strong to be overcome and neither the WEU Council nor the EPC 
meeting that followed could reach agreement on intervention. 
This issue reappeared in the following months in the agenda of the EC at the request of 
France, amidst increasing violence in BiH. At a meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers on 
2 May 1992, the French proposed strengthening the EC's involvement in Yugoslavia, 
including the deployment of troops from the WEU. Roland Dumas proposed 'a step-by- 
step process' starting with the dispatch of a mission to evaluate the situation in Bosnia, 
and continuing with the sending of a lightly-armed force of 'a few hundred men'. This 
force would be in charge of protecting UN buildings and high officials involved in the 
peace process, but it could grow into 'a fully-fledged peacekeeping force' separate from 
the UN one (The Independent, 1992). This proposal was again blocked by the UK. The 
same debate about a possible WEU intervention was held over the re-opening of the 
Sarajevo airport to allow for the distribution of humanitarian aid. The British position 
remained unchanged. John Major stressed the military risk involved and compared 
'Sarajevo's geographical position with the isolated and doomed French military garrison 
at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in the 1950s' (The Guardian, 1992). However, the Member 
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States agreed to support an UN intervention if needed (European Council, 1992). On 28 
June, after the Lisbon Council, President Mitterrand flew to Sarajevo. As a result of his 
visit, the Serbs agreed to hand over the airport to the UN. However, by not informing his 
colleagues at the European Council, it damaged the unity of the EC's policy. 
When the discussions on a WEU force failed, the debate moved to the UN where the 
details of the WEU contingency plans were forwarded (Edwards, 1997: 187), while the 
EC concentrated on the negotiation of a peace settlement through different initiatives 
(Vance-Owen Plan and Owen-Stontelberg Plan). On 12 November 1991, through its 
permanent members, the Twelve asked the UNSC to consider a peacekeeping force to 
Croatia which led to the creation of UNPROFOR. The EC Member States supported UN 
resolutions to send peacekeeping forces and were the biggest contributors to 
UNPROFOR. 91 They also participated in the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 
establishing 'no fly zones' and 'safe areas' (Hill and Smith, 2000: 367). When the 
situation deteriorated as a result of the Serbian atrocities in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and 
Gora2de, they supported NATO strikes against Serbian positions. Hence, during this 
stage of the crisis, the European countries had 'a coherent collective policy towards BiH' 
(Interview 52), albeit one outside the EC's framework. 
For its part, even if limited, the WEU saw a certain revival during the conflict. From 
August 1992, the WEU participated in the monitoring of the Adriatic (Operation Sharp 
Guard) in cooperation with NATO. From April 1993, the WEU was in charge of 
enforcing the arms and trade embargo in the Danube River and provided a police force 
for the Bosnian city of Mostar from 1994 to 1996 (see section 4.4). According to Gordon 
(1997/1998: 90), the WEU was charged with these operations 'more as a way of giving 
the WEU some sort of a role - in the name of European "identity" - than because the 
WEU was best equipped for the job'. Without doubt, the role played in the Yugoslavian 
conflict encouraged the idea that its operational capabilities should be strengthened. With 
this objective, new bodies such as a Situation Centre, a Satellite Centre and an Institute 
for Security Studies were created. The Petersberg tasks adopted on 19 June 1992 by the 
VvTU Ministerial Council in Bonn widened the operational spectrum of the WEU. These 
9' See note 79 above. 
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reforms, which aimed to turn the WEU into the defence component of the EU, set the 
basis for the development of ESDp. 92 
4.3.1. Disagreements about Europe's security architecture 
The coherence of this non-decision on military intervention was mainly affected by 
internal divergences among the Member States about the appropriateness of the use of 
force as well as about which organisation should carry out a given intervention. The last 
point refers to the role of different military organisations (NATO, WEU) on the 
continent; and even, the role of the EC in the world, since the traditional image of the 
EC as a civilian power was still strong in the political discourse. The lack of national 
interests at stake in Yugoslavia can explain why the Member States could not agree on a 
military operation there (Rupp, 1998: 160), but it cannot explain why some of them did 
propose this initiative within the EC context. In the case of France, it called for the 
dispatch of a European armed force on the argument of a new 'right to intervene, i. e. 
the view that humanitarian concerns could justify the use of armed force across national 
borders to prevent massacres. But interestingly one of the main reasons behind the 
French initiative was based on its institutional preferences. While most of the new 
institutional design of the CFSP had been agreed upon in the spring 1991, the question 
of what the role of the WEU should be was still open then. 93 Hence France, convinced 
that the EC should develop autonomous defence capabilities, saw the Yugoslav crisis as 
a perfect opportunity to encourage the revival of the WEU (Buchan, 1993: 68; Lucarelli, 
2000). It was very much about 'symbolism', even though the French knew that this 
initiative could never be successful (Interview 52). 
The French position was not generally supported. Germany, whose Constitution did not 
allow it to participate in any military operation outside the NATO area, endorsed French 
proposals after some hesitations, but tried to raise the issue of a peacekeeping force in 
other fora like the CSCE (The Times, 1991). For its part, the Dutch government called 
for a credible military threat and participated in both the WEU and NATO operations in 
92 Furthermore, the Gulf and Yugoslav wars prompted some changes in the NATO doctrine and 
organisation. Among them, the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces allowed for an increasing role 
for the Europeans and the development of a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. 93 On II October, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl published a joint letter suggesting that the 
CFSP should include all of the issues concerning security and defence and that the Union's decisions in 
this regard should be implemented by the WEU, without undermining NATO commitments, a proposal 
that was later accepted by their counterparts and backed by the US at the Rome Atlantic Council held on 
7 and 8 November 1991 (Nuttall, 2000: 172-173). 
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Yugoslavia. Other non-VVEU members opposed a military intervention or were more 
suspicious of it. The position of the Irish was that the use of force should be a last resort 
instrument, carried out only by the UN (not the EC or NATO), and only when other 
measures (economic/diplomatic) had failed. Denmark was also very cautious about the 
use of force to stop the conflict, although it contributed afterwards to the UNPROFOR 
mission with a tank company (Tonra, 2001: 236-7). 
The risks of getting bogged down in Yugoslavia's civil war and the large-scale of the 
operation were some of the arguments used by the British to oppose sending in a 
peacekeeping force. 94 Arguments based on their experience in Northern Ireland were 
voiced on several occasions (Gow, 1996: 89). Douglas Hurd also repeated that there 
was 'no sense' in sending a peace-keeping force to Yugoslavia without a ceasefire (IPS, 
199 1 a). He stressed that Europe could not intervene in Yugoslavia either diplomatically 
or militarily without the full agreement of all parties concerned (United Press 
International, 1991) and warned that 'it is very much easier to put troops into this with a 
great deal of excitement than to get them out' (The Xinhua General Overseas News 
Service, 1991b). Apart from these general concerns about the use of force, the British 
government had particular arguments against an operation led by the WEU (Jorgensen, 
1993: 87). The UK argued that NATO should remain the key security organisation in 
Europe and could not agree to any action that might endanger the traditional role of the 
US in Europe. Therefore, the UK opposed to any military intervention by the WEU that 
could set a precedent, at a time (autumn 199 1) when these issues were still to be agreed 
in the Maastricht Treaty. 
These divergences among the Member States prevented the EC from playing a stronger 
role during the conflict. The debate about military intervention continued during the 
following years, but it moved from the EC to other forums. The problems involved in 
agreeing a common position among the Member States explain why, in this case, only 
negligible coherence was achieved. A non-decision could have been perfectly coherent 
if this was an agreed strategy amongst Member States, but that was not the case 
concerning the EC's military intervention in Yugoslavia. 
94 According to Brendan Simms to understand the British position, one has to take into account the 
Gprofoundly conservative philosophical realism of its practitioners' (2003: 6). This led British foreign 
policy-makers to prefer the status quo and to acknowledge the limitations of British power. James Gow 
(1996: 97) similarly described the UK's attitude to the use of force during the Bosnian war as 
6pusillanimous realism'. 
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4.3.2. Assessing effectiveness or the 'lack of will' 
As a result of the lack of agreement, the Member States could only issue an official 
declaration that excluded military intervention in September 1991. Although there was a 
collective decision in this regard, and even when the Member States agreed on the 
medium term objectives (promotion of peace and stability in the region in accordance to 
the CFSP objectives), there was no agreement on the short term objectives (monitoring 
mission, limited military intervention or full-scale intervention) and even less on the 
institutions that should carry out the implementation of these objectives (WEU, NATO 
or UN). For this reason, we can argue that in this case, it only achieved marginal 
effectiveness. In later stages (October 1991-June 1992), the Member States could not 
even agree on an EPC collective decision, which reduced effectiveness to negligible. 
The argument raised by several authors that the EU was not effective because it did not 
have military instruments is however more controversial and at least needs qualifying 
(Cameron, 1999; Gordon 1997/1998; Kintis, 1999; Interview 52). It is interesting to 
examine several aspects regarding a potential military intervention carried out by the 
WEU. Firstly, even if the Member States had agreed on a military intervention, it would 
have required the agreement of all the parties and a ceasefire along with the conditions 
set in the EPC declaration of 19 September (see above); yet, at the time, no ceasefire 
was in place. As far as the agreement of the parties is concerned, it is doubtful that the 
Serbians would have accepted an EC intervention since they were very suspicious of 
German intentions (The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 199 1 a). 
Even if the Member States had agreed on the WEU's intervention, it is not clear 
whether they had the means to carry out a full-scale operation without the support of the 
US or NATO (Dover, 2005: 302; Gow , 1996: 95; Interviews 49; 52). One British 
representative at that body recalled that the WEU 'didn't have the military wherewithal 
to compete with the sort of force structures and arrangements which NATO had at its 
disposal. The WEU was [ ... ] essentially a political organization. It wanted to flex 
military muscle which frankly it didn't possess' (as quoted in Simms, 2003: 101). 
According to Rupp, the European powers were not able to intervene militarily in 
Yugoslavia since 'only the United States maintained the airlift and sealift capabilities 
necessary to maintain two or three hundred thousand troops in the Balkans' (1998: 17 1). 
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And Yugoslav Army analysts concurred that the EC countries could not have intervened 
militarily through the WEU without the support of the US (Kintis, 1999: 284) 
Finally, to earn the support of all EC members, an operation in Yugoslavia would have 
required the authorisation of the UNSC, something particularly difficult because of the 
opposition of Russia during the first stages of the conflict to any kind of intervention 
against Serbian forces. Hence the need for legitimacy regarding a military intervention 
implied extra burden to achieve an effective CFSP. As Nicole Gnesotto has pointed out, 
the fact that an EC military intervention would have required the authorisation from the 
UNSC, 'reduced the autonomy of the Twelve, insofar as policy then became dependent 
on the agreement of the United States, Russia, and China' (in Edwards, 1997: 191). 
in any case, the lack of military capabilities affected the effectiveness of the EU not so 
much because the EU could have actually used these capabilities to stop the war - many 
authors have questioned the effectiveness of military force during the Bosnian conflict, 
in particular air-strikes and the costs of deploying ground troops 95 -, but because had the 
EU had military capabilities to threaten the use of force at an early stage of the crisis 
(1991), this might have contained the Serbian expansionist ambitions. Instead EC 
diplomatic actions not backed up by military threats were not credible: '[i]t was goodwill 
without the will to power' (Kintis, 1999: 284). 
4.3.3. Final evaluation 
The problems encountered regarding the dispatch of an armed forced to former 
yugoslavia have been surnmarised succinctly by Nuttall as follows: 'there was neither a 
force to send nor consensus to send it' (1994: 22). Firstly, although the EC had been 
mediating since the first stages of the conflict, the means at its disposal were limited to 
economic and diplomatic tools. Military capabilities were under the control of the 
individual Member States. The EC as such did not have any military capabilities and 
could only act through the WEU, which was composed of nine of the twelve Member 
States. 
95 According to Edwards: 'it is difficult to be certain that a speedier and more forceful intervention at the 
beginning would have been sanctioned either by the international community or by Europe's own public, 
or would even necessarily have been successful' (1997: 192-3). See also Piening, 1997: 63 
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The role of the VVEU as the defence arm of the EU was only formalised with the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty a couple of months later, but these provisions would not enter 
into force until November 1993, i. e. when the conflict in BiH was well advanced. In spite 
of the operations carried out by the WEU during the Yugoslav conflict (see above) and 
the new treaty provisions (Art. J. 4, ToM. ), the role of the WEU would remain vague and 
weak, showing the limitations of institutional design and the incremental (instead of 
optimal) pace of institutional reform. The new CFSP established in the TEU extended the 
EU foreign policy domain to 'include all questions related to security of the Union, 
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to 
a common defence' (Art. J. 4.1., ToM). However, any question regarding defence issues 
had to be decided by unanimity. In other words, although the TEU gave a role to the 
WEU as the EU's defence arm, it did not establish specific provisions about how it could 
play that role, but was actually dependent on the agreement among the Member States. In 
this respect, the lessons from the Yugoslav conflict were not appropriately incorporated, 
among other reasons, because the treaty provisions had been almost agreed before the 
summer 1991 and the debate about military intervention only took place later on. Neither 
did the Amsterdam Treaty bring a 'sea change', although it introduced the Pctersberg 
tasks and mentioned the possibility of merging the WEU with the EU, arguably, reforms 
that were motivated by the failure in BiH (WEU Assembly, 2004). Institutional legacies 
and path dependency can explain why no other alternative/innovative model was sought. 
The cost of establishing new arrangements (including learning and co-ordinating effects) 
concurred with the unanimity procedures that required consensus among the Member 
States, something virtually non-existent at that time. In this situation, the default option, 
maintaining the existing defence arrangements, was retained. As expected from a HI 
approach, institutions became 'sticky'. 
Other lessons were learrit from the war in BiH concerning European security and 
defence policy, supporting the argument presented in Chapter 2 that learning is more 
likely to occur in situations of crisis/failure. One of the main elements of discord during 
the Bosnian war was the disagreement over which should be the main security 
organisation in Europe. Whereas some countries, most notably France, supported the 
idea of an autonomous European defence capability, other countries, and in particular 
the UK, would not support any initiative that threatened to damage NATO's role in the 
continent. However, the conflict in Yugoslavia would have an impact on these 
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positions, producing if not a change in preferences (complex leaming), at least a change 
in strategies (simple leaming) in some instances. Firstly, US policies towards Bosnia, by 
supporting 'lift and strike' and denying diplomatic backup to the Vance-Owen Peace 
Plan, created a certain frustration among its European allies, especially the UK. For 
example, Sir Dudley Smith, President at that time of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, 
suggested that the US decision proved just how much Europe needed 'to be autonomous 
where intelligence gathering, satellite reconnaissance and logistics support' were 
concerned (as quoted in Kintis, 1997: 16 1). 
These transatlantic tensions thus confirmed the need for an autonomous defence 
capability and hence reaffirmed French beliefs. According to the French Foreign 
Minister, Alain Juppd: 'The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond 
NATO and American guarantees' (Simms, 2003: 111). Therefore, from the beginning 
France asked for a strong role of the WEU as a symbol of a nascent autonomous 
European defence capability. However, confronted by the realities of the war and the 
failure of the peace process, France modified its strategy and would progressively adopt 
a position closer to that of the US, supporting the enforcement of the 'no-fly zone' by 
NATO. The conflict in BiH also facilitated a certain reintegration of France, NATO's 
enfant terrible, into the Alliance's structures. For the first time in almost three decades, 
the Defence Minister Francois Ldotard attended a ministerial meeting of the Alliance in 
September 1994 (Lepick, 1996: 85). The war in Bosnia also served to bring France back 
to NATO's integrated military command structures with French officers seconded to 
the operational level Headquarters for contingency planning from 1995 (Simms, 2003: 
112). 
Another important element that would later facilitate the Franco-British initiative on a 
common European defence was the cooperation on the ground experienced during the 
Bosnian war. According to Douglas Hurd: 'the experience in Bosnia brought service 
cooperation between the British and the French to a new post-war high' (as quoted by 
Simms, 2003: 111). The Bosnian conflict also raised the issue of German military 
intervention outside the NATO area. In 1994, the Constitutional Court allowed the 
Federal Republic to take part in military operations beyond the country's borders (Calid, 
1996). But even before this decision, German AWACs participated in the surveillance 
of 'no fly zones' in BiH, since the German Constitutional Court in a decision of April 
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1993 considered such participation compatible with the German Constitution. Thus, the 
Bosnian war served as a testing ground, a leaming-by-doing experience for later 
developments in the European security and defence policy. 
The next section offers another example of 'leaming by doing': the EU Administration 
in Mostar (EUAM). In November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. A 
major breakthrough was the possibility of the Council deciding on joint actions (Art. 
J. 3, ToM), a new CFSP instrument that increased the operational impact of EU external 
action, along with the possibility of resorting to the EC budget in order to fund CFSP 
expenditure. The EUAM was one of the first CFSP Joint Actions decided by the EU 
and, without doubt, the biggest up to that point in terms of funding and personnel. 96 The 
EUAM also served to test cooperation between the EU and the WEU, since it was the 
first full involvement of the WEU in an EU joint action (Edwards, 1997: 185). 
4.4. THE EU ADMINISTRATION OF MOSTAR. 
The idea of supporting the administration of Mostar, a city that had suffered the heaviest 
fights between the Muslim and Croats, was launched in October 1993 in the context of 
the negotiations of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. According to that peace plan, 
Sarajevo would be under UN administration and Mostar under that of the EU. At a 
meeting in Luxembourg on 4 October 1993, the EC's Foreign Ministers discussed the 
issue and called on the WEU to examine the support it might provide for the 
organisation of a police force in Mostar under EC Administration. 
97 The next day, the 
WEU Council created a working group to consider the practical problems involved in 
this operation (AFP, 1993). 
The EC's proposal was accepted by all parties, but it was made dependent on the 
signing of the Washington Agreement between Croats and Muslims. As soon as the 
agreement was signed (March 1994), the EU sent an Advance Party to study the 
situation on the ground and to prepare the deployment of the EUAM. The Joint Action 
96 The first Joint Action ever adopted by the Council of the EU was also on BiH, the Joint Action on 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council of the EU, 1993). 
97 However, it is worth noting that this request was made without reference to Art. J. 4.2 (ToM); instead 
the operation was organised on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and the 
wEU (Missiroli, 1999). 
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of 16 May 1994 provided support for the administration with the aim of reunifying the 
city and restoring its basic infrastructure (Council of the EU, 1994). A WEU police 
force was also envisaged to maintain public order and to establish a joint Muslim-Croat 
police force. The EUAM commenced its operations on 23 July 1994, once the city had 
been demilitarised, with a mandate of two years. The EUAM was composed of 150 
technical experts and 40 administrators, plus the WEU police force contingent. 
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 5 July 1994 in Geneva, by the EU and 
the WEU Member States and the parties involved in the conflict. 98 It was the first step 
in the process of establishing a multi-ethnic city that could serve as 'a model for other 
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Presidency. of the EU, 1994b). However, from the 
beginning, the Administration suffered from obstructionism by the Croat side, who 
wanted to maintain a city divided along ethnic lines. For instance, on 11 September, 
there was a failed assassination attempt against Hans Koschnick, the EU Administrator, 
when an anti-tank rocket fired by Croat extremists destroyed his room at EUAM 
headquarters. 
One of the main objectives of the EUAM was to establish an Interim Statute for the city 
administration. During the negotiations, the EU Administrator proposed the idea of 
establishing a unified 'central zone' administered by a joint city administration, a 
proposal that was accepted by the Muslims, but strongly rejected by the Croats. When 
on 7 February 1996 Koschnick issued a decree with his plan, the Croats responded with 
a riot and an infuriated crowd trapped the EU Administrator in his car, threatening to 
lynch him (AFP, 1996a). The EU Presidency called for an emergency meeting in Rome 
with all the parties. The EU's cave-in to Croat pressure resulted in the Rome Agreement 
signed on 18 February 1996. This agreement reduced the size of the central zone, 
against Koschnick's proposal. The European Council also decided to extend the 
mandate until 31 December 1996 as requested by the parties provided that the elections 
were successful (European Council, 1996a). 
98 According to Edwards (1997: 185), the fact that the EU did not have legal personality created some 
problems in launching the mission. The solution was a Memorandum of Understanding, involving the 
Member States, within the framework of the EU, and the Commission. 
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The Rome agreement considerably damaged the EU Administrator's image among the 
parties (ICG, 2000: 9). He resigned a month later and was succeeded by Ricardo Pdrez 
Casado until the end of the EUAM's mandate on 22 July 1996. The latter was 
responsible for the organisation of the municipal elections held on 30 June. The 
coalition including the Muslim party SDA won the election by a narrow percentage, 
however the Croat party HDZ rejected the official results and asked for the elections to 
be nullified, arguing that there had been irregularities. The EU supported the results of 
the elections and pressured the Croat side to accept them, fearing that a Croat rejection 
could jeopardize the upcoming Bosnian elections due on September. The EU also put 
pressure on the Zagreb authorities to force the HDZ to accept the results (Council of the 
EU, 1996c). Moreover, the EUAM issued a threat to withdraw its personnel and 
assistance if the Croats did not end their boycott of the elections. Following this 
diplomatic pressure, on 6 August, the Croats accepted an agreement regarding the city 
council composition. 
From 23 July 1996, the EU appointed an EU Special Envoy to Mostar, Sir Martin 
Garrod. He was in charge of co-ordinating the phasing-out of the EUAM, the transfer of 
authority to the new city administration and the reintegration of Mostar into the overall 
Dayton structures. Obstacles to freedom of movement and practices of ethnic cleansing 
continued to be a reality, especially on the West side of the city (European Council, 
1996b). On 31 December the EUAM put an end to its presence in Mostar. 
4.4.1. Coherence: designing a new organisational matrix 
This was the first time that the EU engaged in civilian administration and not 
surprisingly, the EU did not have appropriate arrangements for the planning or day-to. 
day management of these kinds of operations. During the planning phase, internal co- 
ordination was inadequate, mainly due to the fact that the Presidency, at that time 
Greece, was overloaded. Before drafting the Joint Action, the Council sent a three- 
person Advance Party or fact-finding mission to Mostar in mid-April to prepare for the 
arrival of the Administrator and to report on the situation on the ground. The Advance 
Party submitted 28 reports to the Presidency. Some of them requested advice or 
approval from the Presidency; however, none of these responses were provided (Court 
of Auditors, 1996: 6). 
157 
It is also worth analysing the internal managing structures foreseen by the Joint Action 
to see whether they were appropriate to ensure coherence (see Figure 4.1 ). According to 
the Joint Action 'the Presidency, assisted by an advisory Working Party composed of 
representatives of the Member States and in association with the Commission, shall 
issue guidelines, determine what measures are needed to meet those requirements and 
decide to release the amounts necessary to finance them' (Council of the EU, 1994). 
The Council Secretariat would perform a purely administrative function supporting the 
Presidency and the Working Party. These arrangements however did not promote a 
coherent policy since the six-month rotating Presidency did not provide continuity in 
the management of this initiative (see below). To ensure institutional and horizontal 
coherence, the Commission had one representative in the Council Working Party and 
two staff seconded to the EUAM to ensure institutional coherence. However, despite the 
fact that the Commission was in charge of administering the EC budget of the mission, 
the EU Administrator had no obligation to report to the Commission, only to the 
Presidency. 
Figure 4.1. Bureaucratic institutions in the chain of command of EUAM 
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The funding of the Joint Action also raised some tensions with the European 
Parliament. " One problem arose because there was no formal Council mechanism in 
99 The initial budget of the EUAM was up to Euro 32 million to be used to finance the initial 
establishment of the operation. These monies were charged to a previous Joint Action issued on 8 November 1993 to support the convoying of humanitarian aid in BiH (Council of the EU, 1994). The 
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place to ensure that adequate funding was provided for the fact-finding mission. For this 
reason, the Council decided to finance the Advance Party with loans from the ECMM 
and from the German Federal Budget. The loans were then repaid with a payment from 
the Council administrative budget. The Council classified the expenses of the Advance 
Party as administrative expenses under the terms of Article J. II of the TEU. However, 
the decision of declaring this expenditure administrative was criticized by the European 
Parliament who asked the Council to better define what administrative and operational 
expenditure were. According to a previous gentlemen's agreement between the Council 
and the European Parliament, only operational expenditure had to be submitted to the 
European Parliament oversight. Hence the latter feared that the Council could use the 
strategy of declaring other expenditure as 'administrative' to escape from its control 
(Monar, 1997b: 37). These battles over the Mostar Joint Action financing led to 
subsequent reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty. Because of these shortcomings in the 
design and financing of the Joint Action - which would consequently affect the 
implementation of the EUAM - coherence can be deemed minimal at this stage. 
4.4.2. Putting Maastricht to work 
As mentioned before, at the time of the launching of the EUAM, there was no 
permanent EU body in charge of the day-to-day implementation of crisis management 
operations. For this reason, the management of the EUAM fell under the responsibility 
of the Presidency, assisted by an advisory Working Party. The lack of a standing 
structure contributed to the fact that on some occasions it was unclear to the people on 
the ground which body or individual within the Council was responsible for overall co- 
ordination. According to a Special Report of the Court of Auditors: 
The six-monthly rotation in the Council Presidency is, unfortunately, ill- 
adapted to the need for continuity in management of a Joint Action such as 
Mostar. The personnel responsible for the ultimate decisions and their 
execution change every six months, and, as is normal with the functioning 
of the Presidency of the Council, the apparatus shifts from one Member 
State capital to another as the Presidency rotates. The ad hoc Working Party 
total budget for the period July 1994 to July 1996 was Euro 144 million, to which it has to be added the 
salaries and per them of the national experts, police officers and the Commission officials paid by their 
countries of origin or the Commission respectively (Court of Auditors, 1996: 7). 
159 
also has not provided a suitable permanent structure for the overall 
supervision of the Joint Action (Court of Auditors, 1996: 9). 
As a result of these deficient arrangements, people on the ground lacked strategic 
direction from Brussels. For example, regarding one of the main documents negotiated 
on the ground, the EUAM Strategy Document, the Administrator did not receive any 
comment from the decision-making bodies in the Council (Court of Auditors, 1996: 9). 
Besides, the Member States in Brussels decided on the appointment of the EUAM staff 
without consulting the EU Administrator-Head of Mission, and the arrival of the staff 
was not well co-ordinated with the Advance Party (Court of Auditors, 1996: 6). 
Regarding the selection method, the Special Report of the Court of Auditors (1996: 9) 
also mentioned that it was more a question of assigning posts to Member States 
candidates than selecting the appropriate ones. 
For its part, inter-pillar co-ordination can be said to have worked well (Winn and Lord, 
2001: 102). Because of the nature of the projects carried out by the EUAM 
(reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance), in practice, the role of the 
Commission during the agenda-setting and implementation was very important. 
According to Winn and Lord (2001: 96-97), the experts from the Commission (DG IA) 
were instrumental in the design of the Joint Action and in later reforms during the 
implementation phase, advising national representatives in the Advisory Working Party 
and officials in the EUAM. The role of the Commission was also crucial in the 
disbursement of funds from the Community pillar to implement the projects of the 
EUAM. 
From the account above, it seems that the main problems affecting coherence during the 
implementation phase refer to the deficient internal structures for managing and co- 
ordinating these types of operations, that resulted in problems of (internal) coherence. 
The overall coherence of the EUAM at the implementation level was thus minimal. 
Although the Member States agreed on the main goal and on the mandate and there 
were no contradictory objectives among the different levels (Brussels/Mostar) and 
between the Council and the Commission policies, the above co-ordination problems 
affecting the decision-making process prevented synergies among the activities of the 
different actors involved in implementation. As pointed to in the Special Report, it was 
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4more a matter of chance than a consequence of the procedure adopted that the team has 
managed to work well together' (Court of Auditors, 1996: 12). 
4.4.3. Coming down to earth: adjusting EUAM's objectives 
The main objective established in the Memorandum of Understanding was to create 
conditions for the unification of the city of Mostar (see Winn and Lord, 2001: 82). The 
main criteria set in the EUAM strategy document to achieve this included: 
(a) a population willing to live under a common set of rules; 
(b) a central municipal authority acceptable to the population; 
(c) a common legal framework and guaranteed rights for all citizens; 
(d) a common public service, tax system, and police force; 
(e) freedom of movement for all citizens residing in the city (Reichel, 2000: 5). 
In the case of the VVEU police force, the main task was 'to monitor the demilitarization 
of Mostar with UNPROFOR, to restore and to maintain public order with local police 
forces, and to establish and train a unified police force in Mostar (UPFM), capable of 
carrying on after the final departure of the EUAM and the WEU Police force' (Court of 
Auditors, 1996: 14). 
These goals were consistent with the CFSP long-term objective to promote peace and 
stability (Article J. 1.2, ToM) and with the EU's medium term objective to contribute to 
a peaceful solution to the conflict (European Council, 1995). Nevertheless, several 
reasons prevented the EU from achieving significant effectiveness at the decision- 
making level and explain why effectiveness was only partial. First, regarding the 
EUAM's mandate, its objectives were too broad for a two-year mission, especially 
taking into account the context of ethnic cleansing and fighting that had ravaged the city 
months before. Second, another weakness of the mandate was that the instruments 
foreseen to implement EUAM objectives can be judged insufficient. The EUAM did not 
have the back up of its own military force, but was dependent on the support of 
UNPROFOR first, and IFOR later. The only leverage that the EUAM had was the 
possibility to withdraw the economic assistance granted for the reconstruction of the 
city - not a very powerful one when the vital interests of the warring parties were at 
stake. 
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4.4.4. Implementing the mandate in a hostile environment 
Within Council structures, the Advisory Working Party on the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Joint Action was in charge of preparing work for the Presidency. The Special Report of 
the Court of Auditors pointed to the fact that decisions were usually delayed because the 
national representatives had to consult with their capitals and could not cope with the 
day-to-day management of the operation (Court of Auditors, 1996: 8). The limited room 
for manoeuvre from their capitals, the lack of experience on these issues and the fact 
that they had to attend other working parties may explain the problems which affected 
the implementation of the EUAM. 
As far as the mandate is concerned, its objectives were not quantified (there was not a 
benchmarking system) and therefore, it is difficult to determine to what extent they 
were fulfilled. In the first months, the work of the EUAM concentrated on the 
reactivation of the local economy and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure (bridges, 
houses, public schools and hospitals), activities more suitable for an EC initiative than a 
CFSP one. There was significant progress on the achievement of these objectives (Court 
of Auditors, 1996: 3; Reichel, 2000: 23-32). However, some of the projects had not 
been implemented by the end of 1995, and others (like the reconstruction of Mostar's 
hospital) were awaiting compliance by the Croats regarding free access for all citizens 
(Reichel, 2000: 25). 
The main problems, however, concerned the achievement of the EUAM's political 
objectives. At the end of its mandate, the city was still divided, in spite of the fact that a 
Mayor had been elected for a single municipal council. Freedom of movement was 
severely restricted with complaints from the Muslim side. The lack of a unified police 
force prevented freedom of movement and refugee return to the Croatian side of the 
city. In December 1996, the assessment of the European Council was as follows: 
The European Council is satisfied that the primary objective of the EU 
Administration of Mostar - ensuring the establishment of a basis for a 
functioning unified local administration in the town - has now been met 
[ ... ] However, many problems persist 
in Mostar, including continuing 
expulsions, harassment, intimidation and the influence of organised crime, 
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and some local parties continue to obstruct political progress (European 
Council, 1996b). 
One of the main reasons for the lack of success was the obstructionism from the Croat 
side which continued over the next years (ICG, 2000). Hans Koschnick noted in 1995: 
'the Herzegovinian Croats have been quickly learning to sign agreements but not to 
respect them' (in ICG, 2000: footnote 3). These problems might have been reduced had 
the Member States had the will required to pressure the parties to respect their 
commitments. As early as 1995, in a report to the Council, Koschnick pointed out that 
'it is obvious that notably our political aim - the single, self-sustaining and multiethnic 
administration of Mostar - will not be achieved without the forceful assistance of our 
governments' (ICG, 2000: 5). The Member States failed to back Koschnick when the 
Croats rejected his project of Interim Statute and when he was attacked by a furious 
mob. The Rome Agreement, where the Council of the EU accepted Croat demands, 
undermined the credibility of the EU Administrator and served as an example of 
incoherence between the different political levels managing the mission. Unhappy with 
the lack of support from the Member States, he resigned. According to an EUAM 
official, 
The EU said loud and clear that it supported his plan and then changed it 
[the plan]. The Croats won [ ... ] Koschnick has no more leverage over the 
Croats now [ ... ] It means that a 
few hundred criminals can attack the 
European administrator and 10 days later they get what they want' (AFP, 
1996b). 
The reactions to the Croat boycott of the municipal elections in June 1996 were, 
however, more consistent, including cooperation with other international partners 
(mainly, the US) to pressure the government in Zagreb and a EUAM ultimatum. This 
strategy forced the HDZ to accept the results of the elections. 
The financing of the operation also affected its effectiveness. Apart from the internal 
inter-institutional quarrels (see above), there were some problems and delays with the 
contributions from the Member States that affected the implementation of the operation 
on the ground. From the initial 32 million euros, 15 million was financed from the EC 
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budget and 17 million from the Member States, on a GNP basis. Yet, by 31 December 
1994,4.9 million (around 15 % of the EUAM budget), was still unpaid by France and 
the UK (Court of Auditors, 1996: 9). Interestingly, these two countries had opposed the 
communitarization of the CFSP budget at Maastricht. Due to these problems, the 1995 
budget for the EUAM, set at 80 million euros, was entirely financed from the EC 
budget: 20 million from the 1994 outstanding budget and 60 million from the 1995 
budget (Monar, 1997b: 46). 
For its part, of the around 200 officers that were supposed to compose the WEU Police 
Force (WEUPOL), only 15 had arrived in Mostar in September 1994 (AFP, 1994). This 
delay in deployment impaired the effectiveness of the mission, requiring support from 
UNPROFOR. According to Reichel (2000: 15), the WEU never provided the entire 
contingent of police officers envisaged, and only 163 officers were deployed in Mostar. 
Commenting on the lack of resources, the International Police Commissioner Col. Jan 
Meijvogel said 'I am not able to drive in a car that only exists on paper' (Reichel, 2000: 
15). 
The WEUPOL was to advise and train the Croat and Muslim police forces with the aim 
of establishing a Unified Police Force in Mostar. Yet, the opposition of the parties 
prevented the implementation of this mandate. From the beginning, the police from 
West Mostar opposed the creation of mixed police units and by August 1995, the 
Administrator acknowledged that there were still two separate police forces (ICG, 2000: 
footnote 6). Phase one of the WEUPOL mandate included the establishment of a joint 
operations centre, improvements in police communications, and joint patrolling between 
WEUPOL and the police forces of East and West Mostar on the demarcation line 
between both parts of the city. This phase was completed in March 1995 (Court of 
Auditors, 1996: 3). Following an agreement of 18 September 1995, Phase two foresaw 
the establishment of a joint headquarter, the beginning ofjoint patrols between East and 
West Mostar and WEUPOL, and a gradual process aiming at the creation of the United 
Police Force. Only after the Rome Agreement, was a joint police force created to patrol 
the central zone and joint patrols started on I March 1996 (AFP, 1996a). In August 
1996, the WEUPOL put forward a plan to create the United Police Force composed of 
380 officers (AFP, 1996b). The WEUPOL contingent assisted the EU Special Envoy 
until the transfer of powers to the local authorities on 15 October 1996. 
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Following from the previous account, the effectiveness of the EUAM can be judged as 
partial. An important number of the EUAM objectives were achieved, but there were 
still some that remained unfulfilled due to external factors (lack of cooperation from the 
warring factions) or internal ones (overambitious objectives, problems of internal co- 
ordination or problems with financial arrangements). 
4.4.5. Final evaluation 
The effectiveness of the EUAM, in comparison with previous initiatives, was high (see 
Table 4.1). It had a considerable impact on the ground, achieving part of its objectives. 
Yet, in spite of the changes introduced by the TEU, this section showed that there were 
still problems. Whereas the position among the Member States over Mostar was quite 
unified (Interview 49), the lack of appropriate decision-making structures within the 
Council caused delays and problems of co-ordination. As pointed out in the Special 
Report of the Court of Auditors (1996: 13), an operation of this type would have 
required a permanent body to oversee the day-to-day implementation of the operation 
and to provide a strategic direction from Brussels, as well as a special unit within the 
Council Secretariat or Commission to prepare the planning. Problems with the financing 
of the mission, meanwhile, were due to 1) turf battles between the Council and the 
European Parliament and 2) the lack of experience of the EU in crisis management. 
Finally, the deployment and implementation of the WEU police force also experienced 
some problems, although it would be a good leaming experience for this organisation 
and for the development of the EU civilian crisis management capabilities more 
generally (WEU Assembly, 2004). 
The analysis of this initiative also illustrates how policy learning was crucial during 
implementation. Programmes and budgets were adjusted in order to correct gaps 
between objectives and actual implementation, and to adapt to changing conditions on 
the ground. In this process of policy learning, networks of experts were crucial in 
devising new policies (Winn and Lord, 2001: 89,98-103). Experts and mid-level 
officials 'framed the policy for the higher levels to rubber stamp' (Winn and Lord, 
2001: 170). The first policy change took place with the preparation of a Strategy 
Document by the EU Administrator, turning the objectives of the Memorandum of 
Understanding into more limited and pragmatic ones. During the implementation of the 
mandate, changes had to be made to fit problems on the ground. Thus, after non- 
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compliance by the Croats, the EUAM suspended the completion of the project of the 
Bijeli Brijeg Hospital. Similarly, due to the delays suffered in implementation, the 
working plan of the WEU police force had to be adjusted accordingly. The 
implementation gaps can be explained because some of the assumptions upon which the 
EUAM was designed did not materialize, and in particular the assumption that 'the 
EUAM would progressively gain the confidence of the citizens and not be obstructed in 
achieving its aims and objectives by any of the parties' (Reichel, 2000: 5; Winn and 
Lord, 2001: 95). Learning thus served to correct unintended consequences that resulted 
from the limited knowledge available to policy-makers and the limits of their foresight 
and rationality. 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
The intervention of the EC in the conflict in former Yugoslavia has been seen 6as a way 
to redefine the EC's role within the changing international and European context', at a 
time when a new system for enhanced cooperation in foreign policy (CFSP) was in the 
process of being agreed (Lucarelli, 2000: 120). It was seen not only as a challenge for the 
EC - requiring an effective response to a conflict in its neighbourhood - but also as an 
opportunity to define the EC's role in the world and its relationship with other 
international organisations. However, when the Yugoslav conflict began, the only 
mechanism at the EU's disposal was the EPC, that is, a co-ordinating mechanism of 
foreign policy, and not a conflict prevention and crisis management policy per se. 
Military capabilities were still under the control of the individual Member States. 
According to Jacques Delors, then president of the Commission, 
The Community is like an adolescent facing the crisis of an adult [ ... ] It 
now only has the weapons of recognition and economic aid. If it were 10 
years older, it might be able to impose a military peace-keeping force (The 
Washington Post, 1991). 
Although the Member States tried to produce innovative solutions, the three cases 
presented above have shown some deficiencies of the EPC/CFSP institutions when 
dealing with the conflict in BiH that affected mainly effectiveness, but also coherence of 
the CFSP and that contributed to broaden the capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1993). 
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These problems were due to a large extent to the low degree of institutionalisation and 
Brusselisation of the EPC/CFSP. These institutional weaknesses, together with 
divergences between the Member State's interests may explain the inadequate response 
of the EC to the crisis and the degrees of coherence and effectiveness of the EPC/CFSP 
during this period (see Table 4.1). Moreover, the impact of external factors - in particular 
on the effectiveness of the EU's activities - cannot be forgotten. Some examples have 
been presented throughout this chapter such as obstruction from the warring parties 
during the EC Peace Conference and the implementation of the EUAM. 
Table 4.1. Degrees of coherence and effectiveness (1991-1995) 
DEGREES OF COHERENCE IN EPC/CFSP ACTIVITIES (1991-1995) 
EPC/CFSP EC Peace Non-decision EU 
initiative Conference on military Administration 
intervention of Mostar 
Decision- Minimal Negligible Minimal 
making 
Implementation Negligible N/A Minimal 
DEGREES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN EPC/CFSP ACTIVITIES 
EPC/CFSP EC Peace Non-decision EU 
initiative Conference on military Administration 
intervention of Mostar 
Decision- Partial Marginal/ Partial 
making Negligible 
Implementation Marginal N/A Partial 
As far as institutional deficiencies are concerned, the EC/EU lacked appropriate 
arrangements for external representation. The Troika system composed of the three 
Presidencies (past, current, future) did not seem an appropriate arrangement to deal with 
a crisis and to lead the negotiations with the parties (see section 4.2). This was 
particularly evident during the first period of the conflict when the Troika was composed 
of three small Member States (Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Portugal), whose 
influence and resources were limited (Tonra, 2001: 229). On the other hand, the EC/EU 
did not have a permanent body in charge of the planning and running of CFSP operations, 
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but these tasks were to be carried out by the six-month rotating Presidency, thus having a 
negative impact on effectiveness as shown by the example of the EUAM. Moreover, 
there was neither a permanent body with an exclusive right of initiative to put policy 
proposals on the agenda nor a policy planning unit to provide an informed analysis of the 
situation. The Council Secretariat had very limited resources and -would exclusively 
undertake administrative tasks for the time being. 
As expected from an institutionalist point of view, the low levels of institutionalisation 
before the signing of the TEU also meant lower opportunities for socialisation among 
national diplomats. In the case of the Political Directors and Foreign Ministers, contacts 
were limited to those taking place during meetings organised in the capital of the 
Member State holding the Presidency. In the case of the EPC working groups, meetings 
took place in Brussels, but national representatives were still based in the MFAs. 
Although the COREU network could and was used as a means to communicate with 
other colleagues, the fact that they were not permanently based in Brussels limited the 
impact of socialisation among them and thus made the search for compromise among 
different national positions more difficult. 
For some authors, one of the main drawbacks of the EC's intervention in BiH was the 
lack of military instruments, which was seen to highlight the need for an autonomous 
defence capability (Gordon, 1997/1998; Kintis: 1999; Piening: 1997). Had the Maastricht 
Treaty been in place in 1991, it is not clear, however, whether it would have significantly 
changed the EU's approach to the crisis. As mentioned in Chapter 3, CFSP did not imply 
a revolution in foreign and security policy, but built upon previous EPC institutions, 
preserving the existing institutional path. Even if the TEU introduced the possibility of a 
security and defence policy, no specific provision to enact this policy was foreseen; 
instead, the TEU served as a reminder of NATO's commitments for all its members. 
This operational limitation might be explained because at that time the image of the EU 
as a civilian power was still predominant among the EU Member States, thus 
highlighting the importance of the EU's international role and its impact upon the EU's 
foreign policy outPut-100 When the use of force was considered indispensable, the 
100 As declared in a Presidency's statement, the Member States agreed that &every attempt must continue at 
finding a solution through negotiations, ruling out a military solution and therefore the action plan of the 
European Union is the only basis still, for further negotiations' (Presidency of the EU, 1994a). 
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majority (as seen in the case of non-decision examined above) expressed their preference 
for another international organisation taking over this task, either NATO (UK, Germany, 
The Netherlands) or the UN (Nordic countries, Ireland) - the significant exception being 
France. The prevalence of this civilian power image meant that the Member States did 
not have problems with agreeing on humanitarian assistance, economic sanctions or 
diplomatic initiatives, all of them within the traditional realm of the EU. It was also easy 
to agree on the organisation of a peace conference or the EU's control of the civilian 
administration of Mostar but obstacles to agreeing on military intervention proved 
insuperable. While the EUAM focused mainly on reconstruction activities, and therefore 
did not imply new roles for the EU (Dover, 2005: 307), a military intervention involved 
high start-up costs, co-ordinating and learning effects (as actors had to establish new 
structures, learn how to implement this role and establish new co-ordinating 
arrangements), thus making innovation in EU policies difficult and reinforcing 
institutional legacies in the security policy domain. 
In conclusion, both a combination of institutional deficiencies and divergences in the 
Member State's preferences can explain the low degrees of coherence and effectiveness 
of the CFSP during this period. The Maastricht reforms prompted some improvements to 
CFSP effectiveness and coherence, but there were still manifest problems in terms of 
formal and informal rules and policy instruments at this stage of CFSP 
institutionalisation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Coherence and effectiveness of CFSP activities in BiH (1996- 
2000): An economic power without strategy 
The conflicts in the Balkans have 
demonstrated a tendency for the European 
Union to be little more than the paymaster of 
policies directed from the other side of the 
Atlantic [ ... ] the European Union cannot 
afford to be an economic giant but a political 
dwarf in its own part of the world 
Bildt, 1998: 388 
5.1. INTRODUCTION: EU EXTERNAL ACTION IN BIH (1996-2000) 
This chapter examines the post-conflict intervention of the EU in BiH. As the chapter 
will show, EU external action during this period was mainly economic and humanitarian 
in nature, with political and security initiatives avoided by the Member States, at least 
until the Kosovo crisis exposed the limitations of this approach. This first section 
explores in more detail the whole of EU external action. Section 5.2 moves on to a more 
specific analysis of coherence and effectiveness in relation to a non-decision by the 
Member States on the use of military and police instruments in BiH. This is followed by 
a discussion of the Stability Pact, which raises issues concerning the impact of path 
dependency and imitation on coherence and effectiveness. 
Despite the marginalisation suffered by the EU during the latter stages of the armed 
conflict, with the signing of the Dayton peace accords, the EU assumed responsibility for 
helping with the post-conflict reconstruction of the war-tom region. While negotiations 
were taking place at the US Air Base of Dayton, the EU was in the process of designing 
a strategy to rebuild BiH, a strategy first spelt out in the Council Conclusions of 30 
October 1995. Here, the EU Foreign Ministers agreed on several principles to lead the 
peace process and stated their view that, since the Union would be one of the major 
contributors to the peace process, the High Representative for BiH, should be a European 
and should report to the Union where necessary (GAC, 1995). 
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At the Madrid European Council, the EU expressed its commitment to contributing to the C, 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement by providing humanitarian 
aid and participating in reconstruction efforts (European Council, 1995), playing on its 
strengths as a civilian power, something that had proved impossible during the war. Carl 
Bildt, the new High Representative, was also appointed to co-ordinate the EU's 
involvement from Sarajevo. According to the Joint Action (Council of the EU, 1995), the 
EU would bear part of the expenditure of the establishment and running of the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR). The Joint Action also stated that the Presidency, in 
association with the Commission would represent the EU at the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC), the main decision-making body for the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. ' of 
Table 5.1.1991-2003 EC assistance to BiH (allocations in millions of Euros) 
1991- 
1994 
BOSNIA 
1 1995 
AND HE 
1 1996 
RZEGOV 
1 199-7 
INA 
1998 1 1999 1 2000 1 
Phave. OBNON'Aand (ARDS, ' 
2001 201 
0.21 0.65 229.77 211-16 1 190.50 1 118.36 1 90.30 1 105.23 71.90 63.00 
ECHO (humuit. -iri-. m issistance) 
1 0.. 45-03 142.45 105-00 87.95 1 58.90 1 0.40 0.75 1035.74 
Sgecific ictions 
70- 0 65.40 3990 15.00 1 30.90 1 3-96- 225.16 
Democracy & Hum. -in Rights 
0.70 4.80 4.80 1 1.80 0.80 1 0.60 0.80 2.30 
-1.00 
Babuce of payineuts support (1) 
Total EC 
495.47 
assistanc e 
44-', 4-' 
ý11-1 
29). 
- 
90 luý) 
II j(j 
SO. 00 
7ý 00 
74335.518 
(1) Figures refer to disbursement and include grants and loans 
Source: European Parliament, 2004a. 
Over the following years, EU activities in BiH concentrated on the economic recovery of 
the country, and the EU was the main donor of humanitarian aid and economic 
assistance. From 1996, BiH benefited from trade preferences and from the PHARE and 
'0' At the Peace implementation Conference held in London in December 1995, a Peace Implementation 
Council, comprising 55 states and international orgoanisations, was established in order to support the 
peace process in BiH. It was also 
decided to establish an executive body, the Steering Board, to provide 
the High Representative with political guidance in his/her mission. 
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OBNOVA programmes (see Table 5.1). Apart from the economic carrots, the EU also 
continued some initiatives that had been launched during the war, such as the ECMM or 
the Administration of Mostar. After the cessation of hostilities, the ECMM was in charge 
of monitoring the security situation in the region and providing comprehensive 
assistance to other organisations, in particular the OSCE in charge of the electoral 
process. In its meeting of May 1996, the Council also agreed to further assist with the 
organisation of the elections by sending a group of EC observers funded by the 
Community budget (Council of the EU, 1996b). In addition, problems affecting the 
implementation of the EUAM occupied the majority of the Foreign Ministers' meetings 
during 1996 (see chapter 4). 
In its Council Conclusions of 30 October 1995, the EU Foreign Ministers declared that 
clear economic and political conditionality should govern the EU's policy towards BiH 
and that it would be structured regionally. These two principles, that would go hand in 
hand, were developed in subsequent documents and would constitute the main pillars of 
the EU's policy towards the region. The regional approach was present from then on in 
all EU initiatives, from the Royaumont Process and the Regional Approach to the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. The objective was to encourage cooperation in the 
region and good neighbourly relations between these countries, providing a long-term 
structural solution to the conflicts in the Balkans. The Commission, similarly, favoured a 
regional approach, which meant that future cooperation agreements between countries in 
the region and the EC would be dependent on the readiness of each of them to cooperate 
with their neighbours and to fulfill other conditions such as respect for human rights 
(European Commission, 1996). In sum, the main contribution of the EU to peace 
resolution would be the use of its 'power of attraction' to support 'the process of 
stabilisation and economic renewal' through regional cooperation (GAC, 1996b). 
The first initiative within this wider context of regional cooperation was the Process of 
stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastem Europe, otherwise known as 
the Royaumont process, launched on 13 December 1995. Originally, this initiative was 
designed to complement the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, although 
afterwards the emphasis was placed on regional cooperation, in particular on 
democratisation and civil society (Council of the EU, 1998c). Its objectives were, 
however, too broad, limiting the potential effectiveness of the initiative. These were, 
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inter alia, 'to contribute to reducing the tensions arising from the conflict and preventing 
a resumption of hostilities [ ... ], contribute to restoring confidence and dialogue, and 
overcome ethnic divisions and hatred' (Council of the EU, 1998c). The first projects 
financed within this framework concentrated on promoting NGO co-ordination in the 
region, along with civil society and inter-parliamentary meetings, but according to an 
European Stability Initiative Report (ESI, 1999: 5), it was 'not clear what the 
contribution of the Royaumont Process consisted of. 
On 29 April 1997, based on a Commission strategy paper (European Commission, 
1997), the GAC adopted the Regional Approach establishing political and economic 
conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the countries of 
Southeastern Europe (Albania, BiH, Croatia, FYROM and the Federal Republic of 
yugoslavia). Even though conditions applied to all the countries in the same way, it was 
stated that 'each country will be judged on its own merits' (GAC, 1997). Conditionality 
continued to be at the core of the EU's relationships with the region. The regional 
approach adopted by the EU was designed to facilitate reintegration of BiH into the 
Balkan region and endorse the peace process. The development of closer relations 
between the countries of the region and the EU was made conditional upon 'full support 
for the Peace Agreement, including respect for Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
independent, democratic, multi-ethnic State with secure borders' (European Council, 
1996b). The regional approach was also used as an instrument to support integration of 
BiH into the European structures. The EU confirmed its European perspective by 
declaring 'that Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs in Europe' (Presidency of the EU, 
1998a) and reiterated 'the prospects for BiH's closer integration into Europe and the 
willingness of the EU to help the people of BiH build a modem country that could take 
its rightful place in the European family of nations' (Presidency of the EU, 1998b). 
However, the regional approach lacked a clear and purposive strategy. The EU gave no 
indication of what its long-term relationship with the region (and for that matter BiH) 
would be. It was not ready to offer the prospect of membership at a time when it was 
having difficulty in meeting the demands of potential new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe (Friis and Murphy, 2000). The EU also faced deep problems of trying to 
encourage regional cooperation among countries that had been at war with each other in 
the recent past. Furthermore, the EU did not occupy the primary position of leadership in 
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the region in that US intervention during the war had relegated it to a secondary role, 
limited to providing economic assistance under the umbrella of the LTN mission in BiH. 
The EU's role in the Balkans region would, however, start to change after the events in 
Kosovo. 
The conflict in Kosovo (1998-1999) made clear that without a clear offer of membership 
the EU's engagement in the region could not provide long-term stability to the Western 
Balkans. This suggested an increasing awareness of the fact that the problems in the 
Balkans directly affected the EU and thus drove home the point that the EU had a 
responsibility to promote stability in the region. In other words, 'Europeanising Bosnia 
and the Balkans' seemed more attractive than 'Balkanising Europe' (Wheeler, 2003: 5). 
With this in mind, the EU launched the Stability Pact (1999), an initiative of the German 
Presidency to develop a long-term strategy for the region, including the prospect of EU 
membership for the Balkan countries. In this spirit, the EU also decided to launch the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) (1999), which remains to date its main 
strategy for the region (see Chapter 6). 
Aside from its regional approach toward BiH, the EU has used other carrots and sticks 
during the period 1996-2000. For instance, economic incentives were very important in 
pressuring the Republika Srpska to comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement. For 
example, following a UNSC Resolution of March 1996, the EU suspended sanctions that 
were imposed during the war against those areas of BiH under the control of the Bosnian 
Serb forces in order to support economic recovery. Moreover, after the establishment of 
a new moderate Government in Republika Sprska headed by Milorad Dodik, in February 
1998, the EU agreed on a Joint Action to provide rapid short-term assistance to the new 
Government (Council of the EU, 1998a). 
Sanctions or the 'stick approach' were brought into play when economic incentives 
seemed not to work. On several occasions, the Commission and the Council 
representatives reminded Bosnian authorities that aid from the EU was dependent upon 
compliance with the terms of the peace accord, respect for human rights and full 
cooperation with the ICTY (see Presidency of the EU, 1997). The suspension of aid was 
one of the most frequent threats against the parties, but it was rarely used and remained 
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an instrument of last resort. 102 On a few occasions, the EU suspended economic aid to 
Republika. Srpska in protest at the refusal of the authorities there to arrest indicted war 
criminals, such as Radovan Karadzid or Ratko Mladi6 (The Guardian, 1997; see also 
Council of the EU, 1998a). On 15 September 1997, the EU defined a common position 
on restrictive measures to be taken against persons in BiH acting against the peace 
agreements (Council of the EU, 1997). Finally, even though the EU decided to lift the 
arms embargo to the countries of former Yugoslavia following LINSCR 1021, the 
Member States pledged 'a policy of moderation on the part of arms-exporting countries' 
and adopted a common position on arms exports to former Yugoslavia, maintaining the 
embargo towards BiH, Croatia and the FRY (Council of the EU, 1996a). 
Against this background, the following sections focus on two issues. Firstly, on a non- 
decision on military/police measures, which allows us to explore why the EU limited its 
involvement in BiH to 'soft' and low-level activities during 1996-1998. And second, on 
the origins, effectiveness and coherence of the Stability Pact, an initiative that was 
launched as a reaction to the recurrence of conflict in the Balkans and gave a boost to the 
EU's political involvement in the region. 
5.2. THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR: THE LACK OF EU POLITICAL 
ENGAGEMENT 
Drawing on the definition and categories of non-decision introduced in the previous 
chapter, it is argued here that one can identify a case of non-decision making regarding 
the lack of EU political engagement in BiH during the period 1996-1998. As illustrated 
in the previous section, the EU concentrated on economic activities, whereas CFSP 
activities (diplomatic, civilian administration, police or military operations) were ruled 
out, limiting the political influence of the Union in the overall peace process. European 
Parliament reports confirm the low level of engagement of the EU during this period and 
the paralysis of the CFSP. The European Parliament affirmed in its 1996 Report on 
CFSP that 'rather than breaking new ground, the purpose of the joint actions relating to 
former Yugoslavia was to continue the measures already adopted in 1995' (European 
Parliament, 1997: 8) and pointed out the lack of a bold strategy: '[w]hat is lacking is a 
wide-ranging common position to chart the general directions for Union policy over the 
102 On the problems regarding the application of conditionality in BiH, see Bildt, 1998: 242-243. 
175 
next two years' (European Parliament, 1997: 16). In another report, the European 
Parliament deplored 
the lack of ambition in defining an overall policy through a common 
position on the Balkans, which has meant that, despite its considerable 
financial contribution to the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the political impact of the EU has been very limited compared 
to that of the USA (European Parliament, 1998a: 8). 
The High Representative for Bill, Carl Bildt drew a similar conclusion in his memoirs 
(Bildt, 1998: 388). These criticisms came in spite of the aspirations of the EU to make 'a 
major contribution' to the peace process (Presidency of the EU, 1996). Since there was 
no official decision regarding a possible EU military or police mission, the question is 
whether this issue was on the EU agenda and was discussed among the Member States 
representatives and EU officials, or whether it was ruled out as a question for decision. 
In other words, did the Member States decide not to decide (type 2 non-decision) or were 
these issues simply not on the agenda (type 3 non-decision)? 
While limiting its contribution to 'the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace 
Agreement' (European Council, 1995), discussions on a possible role for the EU in the 
implementation of the military, police or political aspects of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement do not appear in the official documentation of the Council (GAC 
Conclusions and European Council Conclusions). Nevertheless, references to the latter 
can be found in the declarations of other EU institutions (the Commission or the 
European Parliament), the WEU Assembly, and in the informal discussions among the 
Member States which filtered out through the press. For example, after the signing of the 
Dayton Agreement, several actors (the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
WEU Assembly) called for a stronger EU role in the implementation of the Dayton 
agreement by contributing (through the WEU) to its military aspects - taking over from 
the NATO operation - or the police operation, i. e. taking over from the UN International 
Police Task Force (IPTF); yet, no decision was adopted by the Member States. Instead, 
the EU's 'major contribution' was limited to providing humanitarian aid, technical 
assistance, economic assistance to support the establishment of the OHR and other minor 
actions, such as providing support for the elections, organised under the aegis of the 
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OSCE. In other words, in this case, the Member States decided not to decide (type 2 non- 
decision), even though the issue was on the EU agenda. 
In relation to the potential EU military mission in BiH, the debate concentrated on the 
take-over from the NATO-led force by the WEU. This debate was especially lively in 
the first half of 1996 because of the uncertainty surrounding the retention of US troops 
on the ground. According to the Dayton Agreement, the NATO peace Implementation 
Force (IFOR) of 60.000 troops was to stay in the country for twelve months. On several 
occasions the US administration made clear that its troops would not stay in BiH a day 
longer, and the subject was a very sensitive one, with US Presidential elections due in 
November 1996. The European allies were however in favour of maintaining a military 
force, but one that involved US troops remaining in BiH. In this context, public 
discussions on a possible follow-on force were 'taboo' (The Guardian, 1996a) and 
'heresy in official circles' (The Independent, 1996a). No one wanted to mention this 
issue until the US elections had passed (The Observer, 1996). 
Nevertheless, to maintain stability on the ground, some kind of reassurance that there 
would be a successor to IFOR was required. From spring 1996, there were some 
suggestions to use the WEU, 'the military arm of the EU, to send a follow-on force to 
BiH (The Guardian, 1996a). It was argued that the WEU could launch an operation to 
test the CJTF, which would allow the WEU to make use of NATO's assets, even when 
the US did not participate in the operation (making the WEU 'separable' from NATO, 
but not 'separate). On 7 May 1996, Hans van den Broek, the External Relations 
Commissioner, called on the EU and the WEU to take over from IFOR when the mission 
would end to avoid a security vacuum (The Guardian, 1996b). However, the Member 
States disavowed these comments which were regarded as 'irresponsible' by the French 
Foreign Minister, Ilerve de Charette, a judgement supported by British diplomats. The 
German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, was reported to have telephoned the External 
Relations Commissioner to remind him of the European stand (The Guardian, 1996c). 
The reluctance of the Member States to discuss this issue at formal Council meetings 
was due to several reasons. Although the WEU had experienced a revival during the 
armed conflict in Bill, it was still seen by the majority of EU Member States as 
incapable of taking over the NATO mission. Jose Cutileiro, the then WEU Secretary- 
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General stated that 'the magnitude of the task [ ... ] is simply too big' (The Guardian, 
1996b). The WEU Assembly, however, was more committed to the eventuality of a 
WEU operation and reminded the EU Member States that 'Europeans should bear in 
mind, however, that in the not too distant future they will have to face their own 
responsibilities for security in European territory' (WEU Assembly, 1996). Nonetheless, 
it was also acknowledged that 
As regards the question of whether the Europeans would be able to assume 
their responsibilities in a purely European military operation after the end of 
the IFOR mission in December 1996, there is little cause for optimism [ ... ] 
A common European defence policy, which should be considered a logical 
consequence of the common foreign and security policy, is therefore still an 
objective for the future rather than a tangible reality (WEU Assembly, 
1996). 
Even though the French had always pushed for an autonomous European defence 
policy, in this instance they adopted a more pragmatic attitude and strongly supported 
the idea of 'in together, stay together, leave together', referring to the fact that US 
troops and European troops have gone to BiH together and would leave together (The 
Independent, 1996b). In the end, amid fears that violence might erupt when the pull-out 
of IFOR took place, NATO members decided to maintain a new force in BiH. In the 
autumn of 1996, the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers assessed the different 
security options and agreed that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the 
stability necessary for consolidating peace. The possibility of sending WEU troops was 
not even mentioned. The North Atlantic Council approved the launching of a 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) with an initial mandate of eighteen months and around 
32,000 troops. 
However, discussions concerning a possible European takeover continued in the 
following years, in particular when the end of the SFOR's mandate was approaching 
(June 1998), but the position of the Member States remained unchanged. Commenting 
on a possible follow-on force to SFOR, George Robertson, then British Defence 
Secretary, argued that 'it will have to be NATO-led, with NATO-led credibility, and 
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with all the major players sharing the risks on the ground' (in Winn and Lord, 2001: 
131). 
This issue was also discussed in academic literature (see for example, Cldment, 1998; 
Wilson, 1998). For instance, in their analysis of different post-SFOR alternatives, the 
contributors to the Cldment volume (1998) argued that the EU could assume the 
responsibilities in Bill, although there were still problems because of a lack of political 
will and problems with the implementation of the CJTF concept. 103 According to Marie- 
Janine Calid (1998: 11): 'only a minority seem to believe that it would be wise to 
establish a purely European post-SFOR (EFOR) as early as mid-1998, or that such a 
force would be likely to succeed'. In spite of this, she proposed three phases that would 
lead to a progressive reduction of the American troops and the 'Europeanization of the 
Bosnian peace operation in the long run' (Calid, 1998: 11). According to Jane Sharp 
(1998: 23-24), Europe had the capabilities to replace US components of SFOR and carry 
out an effective operation. The problem was the lack of political will to assume this task. 
Nicole Gnesotto (1998: 5) also agreed that 'no European country is ready to accept that 
Europe alone takes on Western intervention in Bosnia'. European troops on the ground 
and a NATOIUS reaction force outside the theatre would probably have replicated what 
happened during the conflict and it would have never been accepted by the Europeans. 
Apart from the fact that the US contribution was still considered crucial, there was an 
agreement that the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and 
the CJTF were still not ready to be tested on the ground, and particularly in such a 
complex situation as BiH. According to Gnesotto (1998: 5), from the EU's point of view, 
'1998 has the appearance of yet another missed opportunity'. 
As far as institutional actors are concerned, this time the request for a more proactive EU 
strategy came from the European Parliament, which recommended to the Council, the 
continuation of EU participation within a NATO operation, but co-ordinated by the 
WEU. In this way, the European Parliament wanted to improve 'the consistency, quality, 
impact and visibility' of the EU's engagement in BiH (European Parliament, 1998b). 
'0' The CJTF concept (multinational, multiservice, easily deployable forces) was adopted at the NATO Brussels summit in 1994. With the CJTF, upon decision of the North Atlantic Council, NATO assets 
were made available to the WEU, supporting the building of a European Security and Defence Identity. This would be the precedent of the Berlin Plus Agreements (see Chapter 6). 
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However, the Council seemed to have ignored this recommendation and again, no 
references to a possible WEU mission in BiH appeared in Council documentation. 
Another issue raised during this period was the launching of a European police mission 
to replace the existing UN one (IPTF). This possibility was mostly discussed at the WEU 
Assembly during the years 1996-1998, but it was never echoed by debates in the GAC. 
Already in October 1996, a WEU Report on the role ofEurope in BiH stated that 
there is a need for a European-run public security force which should be an 
armed body, more substantial in size and better equipped but with the same 
general mandate as the IPTF and able to implement it without the support of 
an IFOR successor force (WEU Assembly, 1996). 
On these grounds, the WEU Assembly recommended that the WEU Council establish a 
successor of the IPTF under WEU command and also a WEU mine-clearing operation 
in the country. Later, in its 1997 Report, the WEU Assembly suggested setting up an 
operation under WEU command to provide 'assistance' to the IPTF, and replace it later 
if need be (WEU Assembly, 1997). Arguably, in the light of its recent experience during 
the Yugoslav wars, and in particular, of the establishment of a WEU police force in 
Mostar and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, confidence 
was high regarding its ability to run police missions. The argument was that since the 
IPTF had greatly depended on IFOR and SFOR to implement its mandate, a reduced 
military force after June 1998 could hamper the mission's effectiveness. For this reason, 
it was suggested that 'the IPTF be strengthened by greater European involvement 
through the deployment of a substantial WEU police force' (WEU Assembly, 1997). 
This proposal seemed even more appropriate in autumn 1997 and the beginning of 
1998, when the possibility of creating a special police element to maintain public order 
was being discussed, to fill in the 'security gap' between SFOR and IPTF. The WEU 
Council did not agree on this mission, arguing that it was 'premature to elaborate on the 
question of the establishment of an SFOR successor force'. This answer however 
missed the point, since the WEU Assembly's recommendation only referred to a 
European armed police element and not to the taking over of SFOR as such. After the 
creation in 1998 of the Multinational Specialized Unit which included some non- 
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European countries as part of SFOR, this recommendation disappeared from subsequent 
WEU Assembly Reports. 
5.2.1. Assessing coherence and cffcctiveness 
When analysing coherence and effectiveness only the decision-making process will be 
examined here since no policy outcome was implemented. As shown in the previous 
section, there were no formal discussions in the GAC on a military deployment despite 
the fact that other actors (the Commission, the European Parliament and the WEU 
Assembly) had previously raised this possibility. According to the statements by 
different national representatives, the Member States opposed the EU's engagement in a 
military mission, police operation or through diplomatic activities other than the existing 
soft approach. As far as the Big Three are concerned, they agreed that the EU/WEU was 
not the appropriate organisation to undertake military tasks in BiH, and that any mission 
in the country needed the support of the US, and thus should be carried out by NATO. 
On this basis, it can be said that, there was minimal vertical coherence between the 
positions of the Member States. While they all agreed what the EU's role in this case 
should be (and this explains why these issues were not on the agenda of the Council), 
there was no collective decision as such stating what the EU's official position was. As 
for institutional coherence, here there was a contradiction between the Member States' 
position and the position of other EU institutions (the Commission and the European 
Parliament) and actors such as the WEU Assembly and for this reason, one could argue 
that in this case institutional coherence was negligible. 
Turning to effectiveness, even though the possibility to launch a military or police 
operation in BiH was not officially on the Council's agenda, other actors, notably the 
European Parliament and the WEU Assembly had requested action. The Commissioner 
for External Relations, moreover, had publicly expressed the view that the EU/WEU 
should take over the IFOR mission. These initiatives point to the fact that there was a 
situation which required the EU's attention. Yet, the Member States did not want to 
intervene, and what is more, did not officially want to discuss these issues: i. e. they 
decided not to decide. This constitutes an example of a lack of purposive collective 
action and therefore, it can be deemed as negligibly effective. The Member States' 
position resulted from the realisation that the EU did not have the capabilities necessary 
for an appropriate operation. In other words, this was an example of adjusting 
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expectations to existing capabilities. This strategy was at work during the post-war 
period and, in away, it (artificially) increased the effectiveness of the Union by lowering 
the objectives that the EU was supposed to achieve. That said, this remained a case of 
negligible effectiveness because of an absence of any collective action to be pursued. 
5.2.2. Final evaluation 
According to the categorisation established in the previous chapter, the issue of military 
deployment entailed a type 2 non-decision, i. e. an implicit refusal to decide on the part of 
the Member States. A stronger role for the EU as a political or even security actor in BiH 
was not on the official agenda of the EU Foreign Ministers even though it was part of the 
extant political debate about the EU's engagement in BiH. Institutional preferences and 
institutional limitations explain the Member States' reluctance to discuss these issues. 
For the time being, the Member States could only foresee a civilian role for the EU, 
while 'hard power' was reserved to NATO. Surprisingly, even France would support this 
assessment. 
The low profile of the CFSP during these years can also be linked to problems 
stemming from institutional deficiencies such as the lack of a single voice, a permanent 
body with the right of initiative, a planning unit and defence capabilities. The 
experiences of the Bosnian crisis did prompt some reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty 
such as a reinforcement of Council Secretariat structures and the inclusion of the 
Petersberg tasks. However, a further failure during the crisis in Kosovo was needed to 
move things forward, something that illustrates how learning processes are not always 
accompanied by the institutionalisation of the lessons learned, especially in a multi- 
national organisation such as the EU. 
From his experience as High Representative for BiH, having to report regularly to the 
GAC, Carl Bildt (1998: 387) mentioned that the co-ordinating process and policy- 
making machinery in Brussels had improved since the war with the establishment in 
1996-1997 of an extensive network of committees involved in the decision-making 
process, Yet despite this improvement, and even when it was easier for the EU to reach a 
common position, the main weakness of the EU related to its capacity to implement 
policy compared to the US. lie added: 
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I often wished that there were a strong European Union apparatus in 
Brussels, planning policy, offering resources, ready for initiatives, vAth 
which I could have coopcrated in order to complement and balance the 
strong pressures of the US machinery in Washington (Bildt, 1998: 388). 
During the period 1996-1998, CFSP policy machinery was still in the making, 
especially when compared with the Community committee network. In the area of 
external relations, the merging of the working groups that should have followed the 
signing of the Maastricht agreement did not occur. CFSP issues were still dealt with by 
'capital formation' working groups composed of representatives coming regularly from 
the MFAs to the meetings in Brussels; whereas the representatives to the Council 
working parties, based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels, focused on 
community and economic matters. According to one practitioner, the former did not 
produce many decisions and the meetings served mainly to generate a common analysis, 
not substantive policies. Instead, the work of the latter, had a bigger impact and it was a 
key aspect of the EU's policy at that time (Interview 52). 
The EU's policy in BiH also lacked visibility and a political dimension. The absence of 
clear leadership helps explain these shortcomings. In the context of the transition 
between the Delors and Santer Commissions, the Commission was 'a weak institution' 
and 'very shy to take some leadership' (Interview 49). At the same time, the 
Commissioner in charge of External Relations, Van den Broek, had a very radical 
position on some issues, particularly on former Yugoslavia, a position which was too 
distant from the preferences of the Member States. Because of this, the Commission 
isolated itself and could not play a role as primus inter pares; it did not represent a 
medium position that could bring the Member States together around a common policy 
According to one interviewee, before the creation of the post of HR, 'we did not have a 
person capable to present a common view a position reflecting the common feeling 
among the Member States' (Interview 49). 
Finally, as regards the development of a European security and defence policy, this 
period still witnessed hesitation amongst the Member States between an autonomous 
European defence or one under the umbrella of NATO (i. e. the US); between an 
institutional ised mechanism (either in the form of an autonomous WEU operation or 
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through the CJTF) or an ad hoc coalition of the willing (as seen during the crisis in 
Albania in 1997). 104 These discussions went beyond crisis management in BiH. The 
issues at stake were the development of the EU as an autonomous security actor and the 
nature of the transatlantic relationship. The events in Kosovo and the St. Malo summit of 
1998 were to change the direction of these debates. Thus, at an informal meeting of the 
EU defence ministers in November 1998, the then British Defence Secretary, George 
Robertson, noted that 'Europe had reached a "defining moment" for defence policy and 
that Bosnia and Kosovo had raised the question of "when we press the button for action, 
is it connected to a system and a capability that can deliver? "' (quoted in Duke, 1999a). 
For Aggestam, (2004b: 244), the events in Yugoslavia could be seen as a 'formative 
experience' and opened the 'discursive space for the reasoning of new rules of action'. 
The next section turns to the analysis of the Stability Pact, a policy consequence of the 
crisis in Kosovo. 
5.3. THE STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE. 
Following the crisis in Kosovo that broke out in spring 1998, a growing consensus that 
something had to be done to break the cycle of conflict in the region emerged among EU 
leaders (Busek, 2004: 1). The crisis in Kosovo meant that the EU had failed once more 
to prevent a war in the Balkans. Once again it was confronted by a humanitarian and 
refugee crisis in its neighbourhood and, as experienced during the Bosnian war, the US 
had taken the leadership in the military and political arena. In this state of affairs, and 
immediately after the beginning of the NATO bombings in March 1999, the German 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Joschka Fischer suggested that the EU should take 
responsibility for bringing stability to the Balkans. The idea was to launch a long-term 
strategy promoting regional cooperation as a way to prevent conflict in the region, and to 
offer the perspective of EU membership. 10' The Council Conclusions of 26 April 1999 
affirmed that: '[t1he stability pact will give all countries in the Balkans region a concrete 
perspective of stability and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures' and in the case of 
104 In April 1997, Operation Alba, a coalition of the willing under Italian command was deployed in 
Albania to prevent an escalation of the conflict and a civil war in the country. 
'05 According to His and Murphy, the initial reception to this offer by the Political Directors was not too 
positive. The initiative was very ambiguous and it included the prospect of membership, something never 
discussed until then within this forum (2000: 771). 
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BiH noted that "Bosnia and Herzegovina too shared in the perspective of European 
integration in accordance with the EU's regional approach' (GAC, 1999a). 
Even if the Stability Pact could be primarily considered as a first pillar initiative given 
the focus of its activities (regional economic development, infrastructures, foreign 
investment), it was initially launched under the framework of the CFSP and, for this 
reason, it is examined here. Firstly, the EUs Foreign Ministers discussed the issue at 
the GAC; then, there was a common position adopted concerning the launch of the 
Stability Pact (GAC, 1999a) and finally, a Joint Action appointing the Special Co- 
ordinator and covering its financial costs was agreed upon (GAC, 1999b). The Stability 
Pact was adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999 and officially launched at the Sarajevo 
Conference on 30 July 1999 by 28 states and the main international organisations 
involved in the region, as well as different regional initiatives (Stability Pact, 1999). It 
was the first time that such a multilateral initiative was organised to deal with the 
complex situation in the Balkans. Although the EU launched the initiative, it was agreed 
that the Stability Pact would be formally placed under the auspices of the OSCE. 
To date, the main body for discussion of the Stability Pact has been the Regional Table 
which includes all the governments and international organisations participating in the 
initiative. The Stability Pact is chaired by a Special Co-ordinator and supported by a 
small office with staff seconded by the participating governments and international 
organisations. The first Special Co-ordinator was Bodo Hombach, followed in 2002 by 
Erhard Busek (Council of the EU, 2001c). The Office of the Special Co-ordinator plays 
a role of political co-ordination of the Stability Pact activities; however, it does not have 
the staff and resources to manage the projects itself, instead the main role of the Office 
is to put donors and beneficiaries in contact. However, the co-ordination, monitoring 
and evaluation of the projects is very limited given the lack of resources of the Office. 
In spite of this, the Special Co-ordinator plays an important role of mediation and good 
offices, as was the case, for example, during the negotiations between Romania and 
Bulgaria on the construction of a new Danube bridge (ESI, 200 1: 10). 
The first phase of the Stability Pact focused on the launch of a Quick Start Package 
aimed at raising international funding to undertake urgent tasks - most of them 
infrastructure projects (see ESI, 2001). Also during this first phase, the political aim of 
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the Stability Pact was to prompt a political change in FRY and to bring a new 
democratic FRY into the Stability Pact, which was achieved at the end of 2000 after the 
fall of Milosevic. Once the first phase was completed, the activities of the Stability Pact 
were re-focused, concentrating on narrower initiatives in specific sectors such as 
energy, cross border issues or organised crime and corruption (ESI, 2001: 11). 
Institution-building projects also have had a greater significance in the second phase. At 
the time of writing (March 2007), discussions are being held to transform the Stability 
Pact into a new framework for cooperation, the Regional Cooperation Council, 
effectively led by the countries from the Southeastern European region. " 
5.3.1. Reacting to the crisis: bad times for coherence 
Looking at the decision-making phase, as Nis and Murphy (2000: 768-771) have 
suggested, confronted by the crisis in Kosovo, the EU was urged to take immediate 
action. However, there was limited time to design a coherent strategy and to think about 
how this initiative would fit together with other EU and international initiatives in the 
Western Balkans. The unnecessary multiplicity of initiatives and bureaucratic structures 
was criticised by the former Commission President Jacques Santer in a letter to the 
Heads of State and Government of 16 July 1999. He argued that the proliferation of 
initiatives undermined the clarity and visibility of EU policies. He also pointed out that 
there was no transparency regarding the financial arrangements and that the EU should 
co-ordinate the different initiatives, for example, incorporating the work of the 
Royaumont Process within the Stability Pact (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 777). Following 
some of his recommendations, the Member States decided that the Common Strategy 
for the Western Balkans that was in the process of being drafted was no longer 
required. 107 However, the existing regional initiatives were not merged. 
Regarding horizontal coherence, i. e. coherence with other EU policies in the region, in 
principle, there was no contradiction between the Stability Pact's objectives and other 
initiatives launched in the Western Balkans, in particular the Royaumont Process and 
the SAP. Having said that, it should be noted that there was no 'added value' coming 
from the Stability Pact. In other words, there were no synergies between this initiative 
106 For more on the current activities of the Stability Pact, see www. stabilitypact. org 107 The Conclusions of the Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998, urged for the 'preparation of the first Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean Region and the Western Balkans' (European Council, 1998). 
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and others, and that is why, in this case, only minimal coherence was achieved. This 
reflected a lack of co-ordination and the overlapping aims of the different initiatives, in 
particular, between the Stability Pact and the Royaumont Process. In both cases, the 
objective was to promote good neighbourly relations through regional dialogue, 
confidence building measures, regional cooperation and economic reconstruction. 
However, in spite of the commonalities between the two initiatives, the Royaumont 
Process was not integrated into the Stability Pact, in part because of institutional 
legacies and the lack of an overall strategy for the region, and in part because of conflict 
of interests between the Member States. 108 
Relations between the Stability Pact and the SAP were, in principle, meant to be 
complementary. According to the Cologne document of June 1999, aspirants to EU 
membership would be evaluated on, inter alia, their contribution to achieving 'the 
objectives of the Stability Pact, in particular progress in developing regional 
cooperation' (ICG, 2001: 247). The SAP, meanwhile, aimed to establish the basis for a 
contractual relationship between the EU and the individual countries of the Western 
Balkans, but also placed considerable emphasis on regional cooperation. Therefore, one 
of the conditions to start membership negotiations is a 'proven readiness to promote 
good neighbourly relations' and regional cooperation has been included in the 
individual Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 109 as one of the criteria to 
determine readiness for integration into the EU; however, no mention has been made 
about how this commitment relates to the process launched within the Stability Pact. " 0 
In sum, during the initial period, one can note only minimal coherence at decision- 
making level. 
53.2. Squaring the circle: implementing the regional approach 
Problems in its design affected the implementation of the Stability Pact, especially 
regarding co-ordination with other regional initiatives. With the creation of the Stability 
Pact, the Royaumont Process concentrated on exchange and cooperation between the 
'08 Greece proposed that the then Special Co-ordinator of the Royaumont Process, Panagiotis 
Rourneliotis, become the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact which would defacto merge the two initiatives. However, Germany had its own candidate, Bodo Hombach. An informal deal was achieved at 
the Rio Conference, where Greece accepted the German candidate in exchange for the European Agency 
for Reconstruction being based in Thessaloniki (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 776). 09 For example, in the SAA with Croatia, it appears in Title III: Regional Cooperation. 10 Besides, in spite of the declared regional dimension of the SAP, only 10 per cent of the CARDS 
assistance goes to regional projects (Triantaphyllous, 2003: 71). 
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Parliaments of the region, carrying out some projects within the Stability Pact structures 
(Parliamentary Cooperation Taskforce); yet, its independent role was never clear. The 
Royaumont process has only recently been dismantled and its projects incorporated into 
the Stability Pact. 
To ensure institutional coherence, the Commission was included as a signatory of the 
Stability Pact, and participated in the Regional Table. In practice, the Stability Pact has 
been complementary to the initiatives of the Commission in the Western Balkans and 
contacts between the Office of the Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact and the 
Commission have been frequent. Thanks to the high degree of flexibility and low level 
of politicization of the former, it can launch initiatives that the Commission can take 
over later. "' However, because of problems in design, for some Balkan countries, it has 
been difficult to pursue the regional approach advocated by the Stability Pact and the 
individual approach of the SAP at once, regional cooperation being the looser in this 
game. This has resulted not only from the way the Stability Pact and the SAP were 
presented, but also from the particular circumstances of the region. The Western Balkan 
countries are still suspicious that regional cooperation might serve as a Trojan horse for 
reconstituting a new Yugoslavian project and that it could lead to the loss of recently 
achieved sovereignty. Furthermore, there is a broad view in the region that if the 
Balkans are treated as a group, progress would move forward at the pace of the slowest 
country, hindering and even stopping the whole process of integration. Finally, given 
the limited resources of these countries, for many of them, investing in regional 
cooperation means sacrificing the resources required to support the process of reform 
prior to EU membership. Due to these difliculties, horizontal coherence has only been 
minimal. 
However, after learning the consequences of this fragmented approach to the 
Balkans 112 , the need for co-ordination and complementarity between the Stability Pact 
and the rest of the EU initiatives has been made more explicit in official documents and 
speeches in recent years, trying to correct unintended consequences. Although the 
emphasis has been placed on the SAP as the main approach towards the region, 'the 
The negotiation of a Regional Energy Market serves as an example. 
Several reports (ESI, 2001; ICG, 2001), the letter from Jacques Santer, as well as a joint report Patten- Solana (Secretary General/Iligh Representative and Commission, 2000a) pointed out these problems, leading to some amendments in the EIJ's policy. 
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regional dimension' added by the Stability Pact has recurrently been brought to the fore 
(see Secretary General/Ifigh Representative and Commission, 2000a), making it more 
explicit to the potential candidates that regional cooperation is one of the criteria that 
will be taken into account when evaluating progress towards membership. 
5.3.3. Aiming too high? 
At the decision-making level, the effectiveness of the Stability Pact has been partial. 
Even though there was a purposive action (an agreement to act), and a collective 
decision according to CFSP objectives, these did not clearly establish how the 
objectives would be achieved, how the Stability Pact would be financed and how it 
related to other EU initiatives. The main problem being that the objectives of the 
Stability Pact are too broad: establishing long-term stability; fostering democratization 
and civil society; preserving ethnic diversity, protecting human rights and minorities; 
creating dynamic market economies; improving the infrastructure, health, and 
education; and combating crime and corruption (Stability Pact, 1999). 
In this connection, there are no clear deadlines, no benchmarks for the target countries 
to adopt the reforms, and not enough resources (both financial and human) to support 
their implementation. To some extent, the roots of these problems can be found at the 
time of the establishment of the Stability Pact. At that juncture, there was (1) a lack of 
agreement among its members about how the Stability Pact should achieve its 
objectives; (2) an excess of expectations about what the Stability Pact was and about 
what it could deliver, both among the international donors and the Southeastern 
European countries themselves. In short, there was no clear strategy for the Western 
Balkan region. For most of the participants, the Stability Pact 
seems to have generated more frustration than satisfaction. The high-profile 
launch in Sarajevo in 1999 encouraged a misconception in the region that 
the Pact would serve as second Marshall Plan [ ... ] In fact, the Pact was not 
provided with independent funds [ ... ] The Pact will never become more 
cffcctive than its participants [ ... ] allow it to be. It depends on their financial 
resources, know-how and political commitment (ICG, 2001: 242). 
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5.3.4. How effective has the Stability Pact been in implementing its mandate? 
The problems mentioned at the decision-mak-ing level have, of course, affected the 
implementation of the Stability Pact. A more operational agenda (establishing 
benchmarks and deadlines) and more staff and resources for the selection, monitoring 
and evaluation of projects would have increased the effectiveness of the implementation 
of Stability Pact projects. As a result of these deficiencies, the effectiveness of its 
implementation has been partial, achieving only some of the stated objectives. For 
example, it has been successful in the areas of energy, investment, and free trade (ICG, 
2001: 243); but there has not been comparable progress regarding corruption, organised 
crime and issues related to the promotion of democracy. For instance, initiatives like the 
promotion of free trade agreements 113 and the harmonisation of the energy sector have 
been quite successful. Still, the Stability Pact does not involve the conditionality and 
enforcement mechanisms open to the EU or other international financial institutions, 
something which has limited its effectiveness in the implementation of projects. ' 14 
The Stability Pact has initiated regional initiatives on some of the most urgent problems 
for the region, including, the Anti-Corruption Initiative, and the Anti-Organised Crime 
Initiative. Other important initiatives have focused on cross border policies, migration, 
the return of refugees, and human trafficking. These regional initiatives, while 
promoting regional cooperation have not involved a regional treaty. This approach has 
the advantage of flexibility and low cost. However, to work it requires a strong 
commitment from the participants, because there are no formal obligations, and over 
time, the power of attraction diminishes as it assumes the appearance of just another 
top-level bureaucratic process. Furthermore, these regional initiatives overlap with 
others launched in the same areas by the Commission, the Council of Europe, the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation forum, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, and 
the World Bank. It is true that the Stability Pact has helped to establish contact among 
officials from the region to consult and co-ordinate on different issues. However, the 
impact on the ground, on the real harmonization of these sectors is still limited because 
1" In 15 months after the Stability Pact was initiated, 21 bilateral free trade agreements between seven 
countries were negotiated, creating a tariff free market of 55 million consumers (Bendiek, 2004). 114 Conditionality was, in factý incorporated into the Stability Pact, but not firm criteria or deadlines were 
set up: 'speedy and measurable progress' towards Euro-Atlantic integration was made dependent upon 
respect for 'the objectives of democracy. respect for human rights, economic and social development and 
enhanced security' (Stability Pact, 1999) 
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of obstacles at the local level. On the other hand, the 'ownership' dimension that was 
expected from the Stability Pact is still lacking. 
It seems difficult to isolate the effectiveness of the Stability Pact, since most of its 
initiatives are also part of the SAP and other donors' projects. The question then is: are 
the countries implementing a specific reform because of the process taking place at the 
Stability Pact or because of the membership carrot offered by the SAP? What seems 
clear is the fact that the objectives of the Stability Pact were and still are valid and 
appropriate. The question is whether or not it had the instruments and resources to 
achieve these objectives, or in other words, could it match rhetoric with reality, words 
with actions? Unfortunately, the answer is negative. Even after the change of orientation 
at the end of 2000, the Stability Pact has not been able to deliver what was expected 
when it was launched in the summer of 1999. Announced as the 'Marshall Plan' for 
Southeastern Europe, it is not clear today what the real impact and added value of this 
initiative have been. According to one report: 'there is no evidence that the total value 
of aid to the region has increased as a result of the Stability Pact, or that the portion of 
assistance which now comes within the auspices of the Stability Pact is more effective 
as a result' (ESI, 2001: 12-13). 
5.3.5. Final evaluation 
The Kosovo crisis marked a point of no-return in EU policy, a critical juncture that 
explains not only the developments in the EU's security and defence policy, but also the 
decision to offer the perspective of membership to the Balkan region. Having said that, 
Member States' interests are also crucial in explaining why such a decision was 
adopted. For example, the Stability Pact was mainly supported by a core group of 
countries: Germany, Austria, Greece, and Italy because of their specific interests in 
Southeast European stability and security (Bendiek, 2004: 15). 
However, material interests (economic impact and the refugee crisis) cannot explain this 
decision alone. The role of the German Presidency in framing the issue as a question of 
credibility and responsibility of the EU as an international actor should also be taken 
into account (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 769). Even if some Member States were not 
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particularly keen on the initiative, '" they were compelled to support it. The German 
Presidency presented the issue in such a way that to oppose the initiative would 
contradict the self-understanding of the EU as a promoter of democracy and peace (the 
presumed constitutive values of the Union). As stated by Chancellor Schr6der: 'it is 
unacceptable for the European Union to do nothing when human rights are being 
trampled upon only an hour's jet flight away' (quoted in His and Murphy, 2000: 769). 
Reference to EU common values as a means of persuasion worked reasonably well in 
this case highlighting how identity (and not only material) factors can be used 
strategically by policy entrepreneurs to mobilise action (Sedelmeier, 2004: 132-133; 
Schimmelfennig, 2001). This example also shows how institutions (in this case, the EU 
Presidency) can be instrumental in promoting a specific initiative. 
Path dependence helps to explain why the Member States decided to propose the 
Stability Pact and why it assumed a particular institutional design (Friis and Murphy, 
2000). The limited time that the Member States had to react to the crisis in Kosovo 
explains why they decided to imitate rather than engage in the design of a more 
innovative plan. The costs of establishing a wholly new institution from scratch would 
have outweighed the benefits of doing so. This was not the first time that the idea of a 
'stability pact' had been suggested within the EU context. The Plan Balladur for Central 
and Eastern Europe adopted in 1995 and a similar initiative for BiH proposed by Hubert 
Wdrine can be seen as antecedents. When the Kosovo conflict erupted, and given the 
limited time of response, EU leaders decided to resort to earlier initiatives. Hence the 
initiative closely followed the model set up at the Helsinki process and modelled as the 
CSCE. As in the case of the CSCE, the Stability Pact was set up not as an international 
organisation, but an intergovernmental forum for dialogue. There is no foundational 
treaty or charter, only the political declarations signed at Cologne and Sarajevo. Three 
Working Tables, similar to the 'three baskets' system of the CSCE, were established on 
democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and 
cooperation; and security issues. Those past models, in particular, the CSCE, were 
perceived as highly effective and legitimate by European policy-makers, which explains 
why actors opted for these models, rather than elaborating new ones. The preferred 
strategy, then, was one of imitation, something which clearly shows the impact of path 
dependency in CFSP. Moreover, without reflecting on the actual needs of the Balkan 
113 Some Member States such as France feared that the Stability Pact could result in obligations for the 
EU, having to deal with another round of enlargement (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 773). 
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region, EU leaders decided to launch an initiative, which added little to existing 
international engagement in the region. The only innovative element was the 
perspective of membership, but without any specific commitment that could bind the 
EU. 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
During the 1996-2000 period, the EU adopted a civilian power approach, primarily 
based on economic tools. This long-term and 'softer' (economically focused) approach 
sharply contrasted with the 'tougher', short-term military intervention, led by the US. 
CFSP adopted a low profile, EU activities were increasingly channelled through 
Community instruments and the EU's policy was characterised by a certain degree of 
continuity with the war period up to 1995. In other words, the CFSP lacked an 
imaginative and proactive policy. The analysis above concluded that only low levels of 
coherence and effectiveness were reached during this period (see Table 5.1. ) 
Table 5.2. Degrees of coherence and effectiveness (1996-2000) 
DEGREES OF COHERENCE IN CFSP ACTIVITIES 
CFSP 
initiative 
Non-decision 
(1996-1998) 
Stability Pact 
Decision-malcing Negligible Nffiýal 
Implementation N/A Minimal 
DEGREES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN CFSP ACTIVITIES 
CFSP initiative Non-decision 
(1996-1998 
Stability Pact 
Decision-malcing Negligible Partial 
Implementation N/A Partial 
The non-decision on the use of military instruments, illustrates not only the limitations of 
CFSP institutions, but also a degree of resignation on the part of the Member States to 
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the EU's role as an 'economic giant', but a 'political dwarf, a sort of self-imposed 
operational paralysis. Even countries such as France, which traditionally supported the 
building of autonomous defence capacities for the EU, gave in to this and opposed any 
moves by other actors to increase the role of the EU in BiH. The fact that the EU limited 
itself to economic activities had a negative impact in its image and visibility. Even 
though the EU was the biggest contributor in terms of humanitarian aid and economic 
assistance (PHARE, OBNOVA) and individual European nations were the biggest 
providers of troops on the ground via SFOR, in the mind of the local media and 
populations the US was still seen as the lead actor in the peace process (Cldmet, 1998: 
3). 
Only the events in Kosovo seemed to provide the necessary stimulus to change the EU's 
approach towards BiH and the Western Balkans in general, by opening up the accession 
perspective. Yet, the element of 'emergency' behind the Stability Pact might explain 
why imitation, instead of innovation was the selected strategy at the time and hence 
some of the problems that it experienced afterwards, in particular, problems of 
compatibility with other EU initiatives. Although the Stability Pact was meant to 
increase the coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP in BiH, problems of design, 
resources and strategy limited its impact in practice. 
The crisis in Kosovo would also serve as a reminder of the limitations of the EU's power 
in its own neighbourhood, and facilitated changes in the EU's self-image as a civilian 
power. The EU could not continue to 'wait and see' whether the Americans would come 
and save the day once again in its neighbourhood. From then on, EU policy-makers 
would admit the need to develop military capabilities as an additional instrument in the 
EU's toolbox. This critical juncture would be a crucial factor behind the Franco-British 
agreement at St. Malo (see Chapter 3). However, it would still take time before the 
operational capabilities of the EU would reach maturity. In this respect, as the following 
chapter will illustrate, BiH would again become a crucial testing ground for CFSP/EDSP 
capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Coherence and effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP activities in BiH 
(2001-2006): putting ESDP into action 
The security of Europe depends on stability 
in the Balkans. They are also a test case for 
Europe's enhanced Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Nowhere more than in the 
Balkans is the EU expected to deliver 
Solana, 2001 
. 
6.1. INTRODUCTION: EU EXTERNAL ACTION IN BIH (2001-2006) 
This chapter examines CFSP activities in BiH from 2001 to 2006. During this time, the 
strategy of the EU was still based on two approaches: regional cooperation and 
conditionality. Hence, this period shows certain continuity with the previous one. 
However, two main elements were added to the EU's strategy in this latter phase. First, 
the EU put the offer of membership clearly on the table at the Thessaloniki Council in 
2003. Second, the EU evolved from a civilian power to a more muscular and 
multidimensional one, resorting to military instruments in order to promote its values 
and objectives. As a result, in BiH 'the EU is seen more and more as a political player, 
rather than just an economic player' (Interview 5). 
During this third period, the EU has assumed a position of leadership in BiH, taking 
over from the UN and NATO operations in the country, symbolising the 
Europeanisation of both the agenda and the external presence in BiH (Chandler, 2005a). 
Two main factors explain the initiatives recently launched by the EU in BiH. First, the 
EU's engagement has been the result of a 'guilty conscience': having failed to stop the 
bloody conflict that ravaged the country between 1992 and 1995, the EU felt a 
responsibility to promote peace and stability and to bring BiH closer to the European 
perspective. Second, BiH became a testing ground for the new capabilities developed 
under the ESDP. As one Member State representative has put it, 'BiH is a kind of 
hangover for EU politicians [ ... ], but it has also become a laboratory for the EU to test 
new instruments, and for our co-ordination and effectiveness' (Interview 33). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the main trends in EU 
external action during this period, the chapter analyses the coherence and effectiveness 
of three CFSP initiatives: the establishment of the post of EU Special Representative 
(section 6.2); the launch of the first ever civilian crisis management operation, the EU 
Police Mission (section 6.3); and the deployment of what constitutes the largest EU-led 
military contingent, the EUFOR Althea operation (section 6.4). The analysis should 
serve to assess the performance of CFSP decision-making and implementation 
structures and the impact of growing CFSP institutionalisation and Brusselisation on 
levels of coherence and effectiveness. 
The prospect of future membership for the Western Balkans, endorsed by the European 
Council in Feira in June 2000, was reconfirmed by the European Council in 
Thessaloniki in June 2003 (European Council, 2003a) and more recently in Salzburg 
(Council of the EU, 2006b). The criteria and the process were established following the 
strategy used in past accessions in Central and Eastern Europe: conditionality and the 
tregatta principle', i. e. each country proceeds towards membership on its own merits 
and at its own speed. In addition to the political, economic and institutional criteria 
established at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the SAP added five further 
specific criteria: full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, 
the creation of real opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return, 
and a visible commitment to regional cooperation (European Commission, 2003: 5). 
Those countries complying with the relevant criteria would be offered a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (SAA) that mirrored the European Agreements, but were 
tailored to the particular conditions of the Balkan region. From October 2004, the 
Western Balkan countries would be the responsibility of DG Enlargement, and no 
longer of DG External Relations, which denotes that BiH 'is no longer a matter of 
classical foreign policy, but it is all about enlargement' (Interview 29). 
With the introduction of the SAP, further preferential trade concessions were adopted 
for BiH, as well as, from 2001, more economic assistance under the new CARDS 
programme. The 'membership carrot' was intended to promote internal changes in BiH, 
propelling the country from stabilisation to association and eventually to integration. 
The medium term objective was the signature of an SAA, as an initial (albeit distant) 
step toward membership. In this connection, successive EU documents identified 
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reforms that the country was required to carry out to bring it closer to EU standards. 116 
The agreement on police reform signed on 5 October 2005 allowed for the start of the 
SAA negotiations (European Commission, 2005; GAERC, 2005a), marking a new 
phase in the construction of a self-sustaining state in BiH. The signing of the SAA (due 
by the end of 2007) should lead to the phasing out of the structures that were established 
at Dayton, favouring local ownership instead. Thus, at its meeting on 23 June 2006, the 
PIC Steering Board declared that 'it was in the interest of all for BiH to take full 
responsibility for its own affairs' and recommended that the OHR begin preparations to 
close its offices by 30 June 2007 (PIC, 2006), a decision recently postponed for June 
2008 due to delays in the implementation of reform projects and the security situation in 
the region (PIC, 2007). 
The process of stabilisation of BiH has run parallel to an increase in the levels of 
Brusselisation of the CFSP in recent years. The institutions set up in Brussels - the HR, 
the Policy Unit and the Police Unit among others - have contributed to the better design 
and implementation of activities in BiH. For instance, the role of the HR has increased 
the visibility of the EU in BiH. On several occasions, the HR has issued public 
statements or contacted Bosnian authorities to express his concern or dissatisfaction 
about political developments in BiH as a way to press for reforms (Interview 24). ' 17 The 
HR is also in the chain of command of the EUSR and EUPM, linking de facto the 
implementation and the decision-making levels. He receives information from the 
different CFSP bodies in the country (with the EUSR being the main point of contact), 
and reports to the PSC. The Policy Unit assists the HR in gathering information and 
helping in policy design and some its staff have been seconded to support the EUSR in 
BiH. For its part, the EUMM constitutes one of the main sources of information about 
the political and security developments in BiH, and supports policy-making in Brussels 
(interview 23). 
An upward degree of institutionalisation has also been evident in the launch of new 
ventures in BiH, namely the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR Althea. These activities have 
116 In March 2000, the Commission issued a Road Map, indicating eighteen basic steps for reform. 
According to the Commission's evaluation, these steps were 'substantially completed' in September 
2002. A second phase started with the Feasibility Study published in November 2003 that set out sixteen 
areas in which the country had to make significant progress. Successive European Partnerships (2004 and 
2006) have identified other short and medium term reforms. 
117 This has been the case during the negotiations on the police reform (Interviews 14,15,24). See also 
Dnevni Avaz (2006). 
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not been limited to economic and civilian initiatives. The main lesson from the Bosnian 
conflict was that if the EU wanted to be a credible and effective actor in its 
neighbourhood, it needed to be able to back up its diplomacy with the possibility of 
using military instruments (European Council, 2003b; Interviews 42,49; On-line 
Survey, Appendix I). From the Cologne European Council (1999), the use of military 
force has been included in the EU 'toolbox', and it has been considered a necessary 
development in order to achieve an effective external action. EUPM and EUFOR Althea 
constitute the best examples of the new security capabilities developed by the EU. 
Finally, the export of EU internal security or the externalisation of JHA (Rees, 2005) has 
been another factor behind the deployment of ESDP instruments in BiH. The fact that 
transnational organised crime has become a subject of concern at the EU level, being 
identified as a key security threat in the European Security Strategy (see European 
Council, 2003b), explains the emphasis the EU has placed on its anti-organised crime 
policies, particularly in its own neighbourghood. Since the Balkans are considered by EU 
policy-makers as the first line of defence of the EU borders, ESDP policies towards the 
region have placed the fight against organised crime and security sector reform among 
their top priorities as the analysis of EUPM and EUFOR will illustrate. 
In the summer of 2004, with a view to preparing the deployment of EUFOR, the 
European Council approved a Comprehensive policyfor BiH (European Council, 2004). 
With this document, the EU selected BiH as one of the initial priorities for 
implementation of the European Security Strategy. The objective was 'to ensure that the 
EU has a comprehensive approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on a clear EU 
policy and modalities to pursue that policy in a coherent manner' (European Council, 
2004). The document mentioned among the Union's objectives, the full implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the SAP, with the aim of integrating BiH within the 
EU. Overall objectives were phrased as follows: 
0 Short term objectives: continued progress in the implementation of the Peace 
Agreement, and the opening of negotiations on an SAA (which requires progress 
on issues such as maintaining deterrence and security, police reform and defence 
reform and the strengthening of state capacity). 
m Medium term objectives: the completion of the OHR's Mission 
Implementation Plan and the signing of an SAA. 
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n Long term objectives: a stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic BiH, 
cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards EU 
membership. 
The document includes a long section on coherence, acknowledging the difficulties in 
BiH 'given the magnitude of the EU's involvement' in the country. For this reason, 
different arrangements both in Brussels and in Sarajevo are suggested in order to ensure 
a coherent and effective policy. In the following sections, three initiatives launched by 
the EU during this period are analysed in terms of their coherence and effectiveness. 
This should allow determining to what extent the above mentioned objectives have been 
achieved and how the co-ordinating arrangements have worked in practice. 
Furthermore, the chapter tracks the causal impact of the institutionalisation process on 
degrees of effectiveness and coherence, including path dependency, learning, 
unintended consequences and socialisation processes. 
6.2. THE APPOINTMENT OF AN EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
The practice of sending EU envoys to conflict zones was institutionalised in the 
Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 18, TEU), and has since become common practice. 1' 8 With the 
development of the ESDP, a further responsibility has been added to the traditional roles 
played by the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) in political representation, 
mediation and political co-ordination (Council Secretariat, 2005): the exercise of 
political direction of the ESDP operations. The EUSRs are the lynchpin in a two-way 
information flow: they report to the HR and the PSC in Brussels about progress on the 
ground and convey the political directions coming from the PSC to the Heads of 
Mission in the field. The first time that the EUSR assumed this responsibility was in 
BiH. Having agreed to the launching of the first ESDP operation in the country, the 
EUSR was to play a co-ordinating role and be in the chain of command of the new 
operation (Council of the EU, 2002a and 2002b). The same logic applied to subsequent 
cases (FYROM, DR Congo, Georgia, etc). 
By the end 2006, the EU had eleven EUSRs concerned with: Central Asia, South Caucasus, Bill, 
FYROM, Sudan, Moldova, Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, Great Lakes, the Stability Pact and 
an EU Representative to the Kosovo future status process. The EU has appointed three Personal 
Representatives (on non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Human Right and the 
Montenegro referendum) and there is also an EU Counter-tefforism Co-ordinator. 
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On 18 February 2002, the GAC agreed that the next High Representative in BiH should 
also be the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2002b). Paddy Ashdown took up his duties as 
EUSR and on the same day, 3 June 2002, he became the High Representative. He took 
charge of this position against the background of the EU's poor perfon-nance during the 
war. At that time, the EC nominated a series of special representatives to mediate 
among the warring parties. But both Lord Carrington and David Owen failed to 
implement their missions and the memories of this failure were still present in the minds 
of the Bosnian population. By nominating a EUSR, the EU sent a strong and 'clear 
signal' about the EU's commitment to the country, reaffirming its willingness to support 
the integration of BiH into the European mainstream (Council of the EU, 2002b). There 
was a common interest among the EU Member States in playing a stronger role in BiH, 
particularly among those not represented at the PIC (Interview 47). The EUSR was also 
proof of the EU's growing assertiveness as an international power in its own 
neighbourhood. 
The EUSR position has been financed out of the CFSP budget (Council of the EU, 
2004a). Member States have also contributed through seconding some of the EUSR's 
staff members. These 'double hatted' staff have, however, only arrived in the last three 
years and their numbers have been relatively small, especially by comparison to those 
of the OHR. 119 As of 2005, the EUSR had five people at its disposal: a political 
reporting co-ordinator, a spokesperson, a political adviser and a pol-mil adviser, plus a 
contact person in Brussels linking with the office of the HR and the PSC. With the 
appointment of the new EUSR Christian Schwarz-S chilling on 30 January 2006 
(Council of the EU, 2006a), the EUSR has been reinforced with a pol-mil adviser, a 
police reform adviser, two prosecutors, a border expert, and a fraud and special finance 
adviser (Interview 42,46). This decision was adopted with a view to the disbandment of 
the OHR structures and the strengthening of the anti-organised crime capabilities of the 
EUSR. Nevertheless, it seems that further staff and budget provision will be required to 
support his/her mandate if the EUSR is to take over the leading role of the OHR in the 
country. At the time of writing, it is still not clear what the overall responsibilities of the 
EUSR will be, whether simply co-ordinating the work of EU bodies in the country, or 
119 In January 2007, the OHR had 250 staff (ICG, 2007: footnote 198). 
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undertaking a role, closer to that of the OHR, including the use of the Bonn Powers, 120 
with a view to leading BiH on a path towards EU membership (ICG, 2007; Interview 
21). It seems that among the specific tasks the new EUSR will have to perform are: 
supporting the implementation of police restructuring, constitutional reform, the fight 
against organised crime and cooperation with the ICTY (EUSR/OHR, 2006a). 
Another issue currently being discussed is the possibility of merging the posts of the 
Head of the Commission Delegation and the EUSR, following the example of FYROM 
in 2005 (Interviews 26,27). Given the unusual role of the OHR in BiH, however, there 
is no obvious model that the EU can really build upon. Moreover, such a reform runs 
the risk of creating new tensions between the Council and the Commission in their 
battle for influence over EU external action. The Commission, even though 
acknowledging the need for a stronger political figure in BiH, fears that the creation of a 
Council-led EUSR will reduce the influence of its Delegation and it does not accept the 
nomination of a Head of Delegation that has not been put forward by the Commission 
(Interview 32). In the last Joint Report by the HR and the Commission presented to the 
Council (EUSR/OHR, 2006a), only co-location of the EUSR and the Commission 
Delegation premises was foreseen. 
6.2.1. Who co-ordinates the EU family? 
The appointment of a EUSR was aimed at increasing the coherence of EU activities in 
BiH. The EUSR's mandate was regulated in the Joint Action 2002/21 I/CFSP, and later 
repealed by Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP in order to incorporate his/her role regarding 
EUFOR Althea (Council of the EU, 2004a). The latter also introduced some 
modifications seeking to improve co-ordination arrangements on the ground and 
between Brussels and Sarajevo in line with the Comprehensive Policy for BiH. The 
Joint Action of 30th January 2006 appointing the new EUSR, Christian Schwarz- 
Schilling, slightly modified the mandate in accordance with the new adjusted role of the 
EU police mission and to prepare for the phasing out of the OHR (Council of the EU, 
2006). 121 
120 The PIC Conference in Bonn in December 1997 strengthened the mandate of the High Representative 
by granting him the power of removing from office public officials who fail to comply with the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, and imposing laws when Bosnian legislative bodies failed to do so. 
121 Schwarz-Schilling's mandate has been extended until 30 June 2007 (Council of the EU, 2007). 
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According to the Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP, the main tasks of the EUSR were to 
promote overall EU political co-ordination in BiH, as well as to maintain an overview 
of the whole range of activities in the field of the Rule of Law (Council of the EU, 
2004a). The EUSR was also to be in charge of assuring coherence of ESDP activities in 
the country and have authority to give direction as necessary to the Head of EUPM and 
to offer political guidance to the EUFOR Commander as necessary. The EUSR was also 
meant to ensure that the EU speaks with one voice to the public and media (Council of 
the EU, 2004b). In addition, Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP incorporated a new duty to co- 
ordinate EU activities in the fight against organised crime (Council of the EU, 2006a). 
Joint Actions (Council of the EU, 2004a; 2006a) have also indicated different 
mechanisms to ensure horizontal, institutional and vertical coherence. These include, 
briefings to EU Heads of Mission, Member States' missions and the Commission 
Delegation, as well as facilitating regular meetings of all EU actors on the ground. 
Specifically, the Joint Actions stated that the EUSR would provide advice and take part 
in local co-ordination vis-d-vis Community activities and the JHA Pillar. In sum, at the 
decision-making level, coherence can be judged considerable, because of the existence 
of clear provisions intended to increase the synergies between different EU bodies, as 
well as between Union and Member States' policies. 
Following from these Joint Action provisions, different mechanisms have been 
established in the field and have ensured considerable coherence in implementation. 
The EUSR role regarding co-ordination of CFSP/ESDP policies has worked well so far, 
especially with EUFOR. There has been fluent and excellent communication between 
the EUFOR Commanders and the EUSR (Interviews 7,8,14,15,35). Although the 
EUSR is not within EUFOR chain of command, he has offered political advice to 
EUFOR regarding organised crime, ICTY indictees and the EUFOR's six-month 
review. In the case of EUPM, the EUSR is in its chain of command and this has helped 
co-ordination. The EUSR, for instance, has been instrumental in the agreement reached 
by EUPM and EUFOR on the fight against organised crime (see below) (Interview 30, 
38). However, several interviewees pointed out that the missions of the EUSR and 
EUPM should have been more integrated (merging the political, legal and media 
departments) to avoid duplication of functions and a divergence of voices and as a way 
of saving money (Interviews 5,14,15,21). After some discussion in Sarajevo, this 
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recommendation was incorporated into the EUPM Review sent to the PSC in September 
2005 in order to decide on the future of the police mission (Interview 14,21,24). The 
issue was discussed in Brussels and initially rejected by CIVCOM because it was seen 
by many Member States as a strategy of the outgoing EUSR to reward friends before 
leaving (Interview 45,48). Eventually, it was decided that any changes would be 
negotiated between the new EUPM Head of Mission and the new EUSR, who in the 
spring of 2006 agreed to a few small-scale reforms, instead of the wholesale 
reorganisation of the legal, political and media departments that had been 
recommended. This example shows, therefore, how the institutionalisation of lessons 
learned can be obstructed by political process. 
Coherence between the EUSR and the Cornmunity policies has been achieved through 
dialogue between the EUSR and the Commission Delegation on the ground. Although 
not always easy, it has improved substantially, especially in recent years. 122 There has 
been constant consultation on CARDS priorities and the EUSR has given input on 
Feasibility Study priorities, for example, regarding police reform (Interview 14). 
Nonetheless, it has to be noted that their mutual styles are very different. Whereas the 
Commission Delegation has used a largely persuasive approach, trying to promote local 
ownership of the reforms, the High Representative/EUSR has scope for a more 
interventionist style with the possibility of resorting to the Bonn powers. However, it is 
worth noting that the former EUSR, Paddy Ashdown, decided not to use these powers 
to impose EU priorities in the country (Interviews 15,24,32). The new EUSR, 
Schwarz-Schilling, similarly, has been committed to 'maintaining a hands-off approach' 
(EUFOR Forum Online, 2006; ICG, 2007). 
Horizontal and institutional co-ordination also takes place at the EU's Head of Missions 
meetings held fortnightly in Sarajevo. These meetings are chaired by the EUSR and 
attended by the Head of Mission of the Commission Delegation, EUFOR, EUPM, 
EUMM and the EU Presidency. Furthermore, co-ordination between EU and other 
international agencies is facilitated by a Board of Principals' meetings. This body meets 
once a week in Sarajevo and is chaired by the EUSR. Its permanent members are the 
122 According to one interviewee, 'sometimes [co-ordination] is more difficult between the Council and 
the Commission in Brussels than [it is] on the ground. That maybe [is] due to personalities because the 
Commission Delegation's Ambassador and Paddy Ashdown get along very well. I am not saying that the 
initial positions are always the same, but they arrived to a common line, for example regarding police 
restructuring. There have been frictions, but not major problems' (Interview 15). 
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OHR, EUFOR, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the European Commission. As far as 
vertical coherence is concerned, the EUSR has established a weekly meeting with the 
ambassadors of the EU Member States. This meeting is not chaired by the EUSR, but 
by the EU Presidency. The EUSR only attends the meeting once a month, at the 
breakfast meeting with the ambassadors of the Member States. 123 Some Member States, 
in particular, small ones, have expressed their discontent at what they consider to be 
second-class treatment when compared to the PIC Steering Board (Interview 21). This 
body, which also meets weekly, is chaired by the High Representative who personally 
informs the attendees about the latest political developments. Therefore, these 
ambassadors (France, Germany, UK, Italy and the EU Presidency) receive more 
information than the rest of the EU ambassadors (Interview 15). Finally, to ensure 
coherence and co-ordination the EUSR office regularly sends Coreus through the 
CORTESY network to all EU Member States and it has also launched the first 
dedicated EUSR website. 124 
The EUSR is also meant to facilitate co-ordination between CFSP structures in Brussels 
and Sarajevo (Interview 14,15,24,48). However, this has not always been the case due 
to a compartmentalisation of the Council Secretariat into several Directorates-General 
(see Figure 6.1). The EUSRs are managed by relevant geographical desks, with BiH 
falling under the Directorate-General VI in charge of Western Balkans, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. DG VI is also in charge of the EUMM. For its part, EUPM is the 
responsibility of DG IX (Civilian Crisis Management). Finally, the politico-military 
aspects of the EUFOR operation are dealt with by DG VIII (Defence aspects), 
supported by the EUMS. This institutional division makes it difficult for the EUSR to 
communicate and to co-ordinate the overall strategy for BiH across bodies. 
123 He may also contact the EU ambassadors in an informal basis or when he is due to take an important 
decision. 
124 The website can be accessed at: http: //www. eusrbih. org/ 
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Figure 6.1. Brussels' based bodies involved in the management of EU activities in BiH and 
their links with EU agencies on the ground. 
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6.2.2. The EUSR's effectiveness: objectives and resources. 
As seen in the previous section, one of the EUSR's aims is to co-ordinate EU agencies 
in BiH, something that has been a marked success. Apart from this general objective: Cl 
The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the Policy objectives of the EU in 
BiH. These centre around continued progress in the implementation of the 
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POLITICAL LEVEL 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
accordance with the Office of the High Representative's Mission 
Implementation Plan, and in the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(Council of the EU, 2004a; Council of the EU, 2006a). 
Following from this, one can summarise the objectives of the EUSR as follows: to 
create a stable, peaceful and self-sustaining multi-ethnic BiH and to get the country 
irreversibly on the path towards EU integration. In order to achieve these objectives, the 
EUSR has been charged with tasks such as offering the EU's advice to mediate in the 
political process, to promote overall EU political co-ordination, in particular regarding 
the rule of law, to offer advice to EUFOR and to be in the chain of command of EUPM. 
These objectives are according to CFSP short, medium and long term objectives (see 
European Council, 2004). The EUSR has not however been given sufficient resources 
to achieve these objectives or at least to become a credible actor in its own right 
(Interviews 14,15,21,24). Part of the explanation here is that the mandate of the EUSR 
for BiH was designed following the model of other EUSRs, and so did not take into 
account the unusual responsibilities of the position. For this reason, effectiveness at the 
decision-making level is only partial. Currently, the credibility of the EUSR to mediate 
and to promote reforms largely comes from his position and resources as High 
Representative. Later reforms (Council of the EU, 2006a) and others under discussion 
(EUSR/OHR, 2006a), are intended to tackle these deficiencies. 
6.2.3. Implementing the mandate: in the shadow of the OHR. 
To ascertain how effective the EUSR has been in achieving these objectives is not easy 
for several reasons. As in the case of other EU activities in the country, effectiveness is 
difficult to determine because of the complex range of actors involved, which makes it 
hard to isolate the 'EU effect'. 125 In the case of the EUSF, it is even more problematic 
to analyse due to the fact that the EUSR and the High Representative are the same 
person and it is not always easy to distinguish which impacts are due to the use of the 
Bonn powers and which to the 'membership carrot'. 126 However, it can be argued that 
(the possibility of becoming an EU member has been one of the most significant 
125 In the words of a BiH official: 'I can't clearly cut a line between the intervention of the EU and other 
international organisations' (Interview 22). 
126 Regarding Paddy Ashdown, one EUSR official affirmed that he was still primarily devoted to his role 
High Representative and only marginally to that of EUSR. Interview 14, also Interviews 21,5 1. 
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leverages' mobilised by the HR/EUSR to pressure local authorities to comply with EU 
criteria (Interview 15). For this reason 'Brussels magnetism' has started to replace the 
Bonn powers (Interview 24; also 5). 
Thus, if one analyses the effectiveness of the EUSR in pressuring local authorities to 
adopt the reforms required by the Feasibility Study to start negotiations on an SAA, the 
results have been quite positive overall, with a partial to considerable degree of 
effectiveness. Considerable effectiveness has been achieved in the sphere of defence 
reform, where an agreement between the entities was reached in July 2005. Thus, in the 
NATO summit in Riga in November 2006, BiH was invited to join the NATO 
Partnership for Peace. Partial to considerable effectiveness can also be noted regarding 
institutional capacity building, especially in the areas of rule of law although there is 
still some room for improvement here (ICG, 2007). Finally, after intense pressure from 
the HR/EUSR and the Commission Delegation, an agreement on police reform was 
achieved in October 2005. However, at the time of writing, the implementation of the 
political agreement had not been agreed by Bosnian political parties (ICG, 2007). 
6.2.4. Final evaluation 
As discussed above, the establishment of the EUSR does not constitute an innovation in 
the EU's policy, but finds a precedent in the practice of appointing EU special envoys. 
However, in this case, the institutionalisation of this practice represents a huge step in 
the EU's involvement in BiH. From the shuttle diplomacy that characterised the EU's 
policy during the first period (1991-1995), the EU has moved to having a continuous 
presence on the ground. As expected from an institutionalist perspective, this has 
facilitated constant communication between Brussels and Sarajevo and has allowed for 
political monitoring, early warning and problem-solving diplomacy on a daily basis. 
According to EU officials, the EUSR has improved the coherence of the EU in BiH, 
among EU bodies and Member States, helping to convey a clear, single message to the 
Bosnian authorities (Interviews 7,14,15,24). 
However, coherence on the ground has been impeded by the limited resources at the 
EUSR's disposal and the number of actors involved, the latter, clearly, an unintended 
consequence of the EU's increasing engagement in BiH. Resource limitations have also 
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affected the EUSR's effectiveness, although strong personality and the backing of the 
OHR's power has partly compensated for these deficiencies (Interview 14). The 
complexity of decision-making structures in Brussels coupled with complex chains of 
command has, similarly, obstructed co-ordination on the ground. Even though the 
EUSR has been instrumental in promoting increased integration of EU missions in 
theatre, problems remain. Problems of co-ordination between civilian and military 
instruments have already prompted some reforms in the Council Secretariat (see below) 
and Javier Solana has also suggested the need for a reform of Council Secretariat 
structures (Secretary General/High Representative, 2005). 
Analysis of the EUSR's role also provides evidence of the EU learning by doing. The 
original Joint Action appointing the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2002b) has been 
amended on several occasions to incorporate new tasks. This has led to an increase in 
funding, a reinforcement of co-ordinating mechanisms in line with the Comprehensive 
Policyfor BiH and other alterations in line with the deployment of ESDP missions in 
the country. These changes highlight the importance of policy learning and incremental 
change in the structures of the EUSR that have facilitated regular adaptation of its 
instruments and policy goals. Furthermore, the EUSR has had to submit a 
comprehensive mandate implementation report to the PSC before the end of its 
mandate, that has served as a basis for any decision on renewal, amendment or 
termination (Council of the EU 2002b; 2006a). In this way, the EU has established an 
in-built mechanism able to adjust to changes on the ground or to new CFSP/ESDP 
developments. 
6.3 EU POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (EUPM) 127 
The launching of EUPM made the EU's commitment to develop autonomous civilian 
crisis management capabilities operational. It was the Union's first ever crisis 
management operation within the framework of the ESDP. Demonstrating the 
credibility of commitments laid down at the Helsinki Council (1999) and further 
developed at Feira (2000) and G6tenborg (2001) was consequently of some importance. 
At the Feira Council, the EU Member States identified four priority areas in civilian 
127 This section focuses on the coherence and effectiveness of the first mandate of the EUPM (2003- 
2005). References to the second mandate (2006-2007) are only made to exemplify leaming processes. 
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crisis management (policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) 
and made a commitment to provide 5,000 police personnel by 2003. Even though 
civilian crisis management has developed in the shadow of the EU's military 
capabilities, progress in this area has been rapid. Of the institutional structures set at 
Helsinki, CIVCOM was the first body to become operational and of the fifteen ESDP 
missions launched so far, eleven have been civilian in nature. 
EUPM officially began on I January 2003 with a three year mandate (Council of the 
EU, 2002a). 128 The operation was staffed by around 500 police experts from the 25 
Member States and from 9 non-Member States (see Table 6.1). However, the 
participation of non-Member States introduced financial and legal difficulties that 
required individual ad hoc arrangements being negotiated with each contributing state. 
Although the financing of the mission was agreed among the Member States without 
too much trouble, in 2003 problems arose concerning operational costs because the 
approval of the European Parliament was required to increase the CFSP budget. In 
November 2003, the European Parliament finally agreed to an increase of C17,5 million. 
The compromise formula used - one part covered by the participating states for the per 
diems of their seconded personnel and the other by the Community budget for the 
operational costs - was later used for other civilian crisis management operations 
(Hansen, 2006: 18). 
129 The mission was also endorsed by UNSCR 1396 of 5 March 2002 and was launched following an 
invitation by the host state, BiH. 
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Table 6.1: EUPM - Participating personnel by country' 29 
WEEKLY ESTABLISHMENT OF EUPM PERSONNEL BY COUNTRIES 
- MEMBER STATES 
19-Aug-2005 Current EUPM Establishment 
i EUPM Current 
NTRY 
Police officers 
ým 
International Civilians total 
COU 
Contracte7d Seconded Seconded ontracted 
Aistria 5 2 7 
Beclin, Ij 'I 3 2 5 
Cy3rus 6 6 
Czech Reojo! ic Fýeoj 'Ic 7 
Denmark 12 12 
Estonia ,a 2 2 
nd Fin and 
i 
6 3 2 11 
nc Fra 63 2 65 
rM Gerrnan 55 1 4 60 
Greece 9 9 
Hungary 5 5 
; reland 3 6 10 
Ital 13 6 19 
. L3tV1a 4 4 
bommil I ithuania 2 2 
Lu)KemL)uro 2 2 
Malta 2 2 
r. ptMp. r1nn. ds 30 1 2 33 
Po and 11 11 
Panug, a, ( u 7 1 8 
S ova, ia S 0%'a' 
g 
6 6 
S ovenia ' 0ý'en 3 3 
S pa ii n 15 5 20 
e 
ý 
, S . %, ed ,,. Veden 12 12 
r4- Ki -g. -ori 44 5 3 52 
Sub-totall 327 10 35 373 
WEEKLY ESTABLISHMENT OF EUPM PERSONNEL BY 
COUNTRIES -THIRD STATES 
19-Aug-2005 Current EUPM Establishment 
COUNTRY Police 
International Civilians 
, 
EILIPM 
officers Seconded contracted Current total 
51 garia 3 2 5 
Canada 7 
1 
7 
Iceland 1 1 
Norway 6 2 8 
Romania 9 9 
Russia 3 3 
SWL-erland 4 4 
Turkey 9 3 12 
Ukraine 4 1 5 
Sub-total 1 46 2 6 54 
TOTALS: 374 1 12 41 427 
1 53 
Source: EUPM website, www. eupm. o!: g [last update 27 May 20051. 
129 In the new EUPM launched in January 2006, the total number of personnel is 2W: 168 from the 
Member States and 32 from third countries (www. eupm-org, last access 5 January 2007). 
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6.3.1. Addressing the challenge of coherence 
The planning of EUPM allows for a closer examination of EU decision-making 
procedures. The planning of a police mission is done by several bodies in Brussels (see 
Figure 6.1). The first draft planning, and subsequent documents, are elaborated by DG- 
IX (and particularly, the Police Unit) within the Council Secretariat, in conjunction with 
the Planning Team. It then goes through the intergovernmental committees in the 
Council, composed of the representatives of the Member States. The Council committee 
in charge of police missions, CIVCOM, discusses the main aspects of the operation. 
Before being approved by the Council, all the documents necessary to launch a mission 
(Joint Action, Concept of Operations, Operational Plan) are forwarded to the PSC and 
COREPER II. Not surprisingly, this cumbersome decision-making process has been 
criticised for slowing down the launching of civilian crisis management operations, 
including EUPM (Interview 48). EUPM was also affected by the lack of personnel 
available for the planning of these types of missions with only 7-8 people co-located in 
DG-IX (Hansen, 2006: 18). In spite of these problems, EUPM constituted a huge step 
forward compared to previous crisis management operations such as the EUAM. In this 
case, as a result of the Brusselisation process undergone by the CFSP, a standing 
structure - even if a relatively small one - was in place to plan and run the operation. 
However, some national representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the large 
room of manoeuvre that the Council Secretariat enjoyed in planning and running the 
police mission in BiH, and especially when determining the composition of the police 
force (Interviews 39,42,45). This fact supports the observation made in Chapter 3 that 
the Council Secretariat has developed a role beyond what was intended by the principals 
(i. e. the Member States). 
In terms of vertical coherence, there were no major divergences among the Member 
States9 positions. EU Member States that had been looking for a 'benign' environment 
in which to test ESDP capabilities, saw BiH as the best opportunity to do so. Even 
though the OSCE had previously expressed its desire to take over from the UN 
Implementation Police Task Force (IPTF), the EU's proposal was finally accepted by 
the PIC and the Bosnian authorities (Hansen, 2006: 18). Only the issue of the type of 
mandate (executive or non-executive) 
130 raised some controversy, but in the end, 
130 In executive missions, international police officers with enforcement powers are deployed on the 
ground and participate in police operations to substitute/support the local Police forces. Non-executive 
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following the advice of the IPTF and the Planning Team, a non-executive mission was 
preferred. 
The relevant Joint Action (Council of the EU, 2002a) established a clear chain of 
command in order to ensure internal coherence: PSC, advised by CIVCOM, has 
exercised political control and strategic direction of the mission. In the field, the Police 
Commissioner is in command and reports to the HR through the EUSR. Horizontal 
coherence with EUFOR Althea was to be facilitated by a co-ordination cell, as well as 
the EU Head of Mission's meetings chaired by the EUSR. Co-ordination with the 
Commission at the decision-making level was facilitated by the fact that the 
Commission attends CIVCOM and PSC meetings. According to the Joint Action, 
EUPM aimed to support the Rule of Law dimension of the EU's policies in the country 
together with Community projects in this area managed by the Commission (Council of 
the EU, 2002a). In sum, the different co-ordination arrangements established in Brussels 
and Sarajevo ensured considerable coherence at this level. 
6.3.2. Coherence at the implementation level: learning by doing 
According to several EUPM officials, problems of internal co-ordination and 
communication in Sarajevo have affected the mission implementation. 'Problems with 
the leadership of the mission' and 'problems with personalities' were repeatedly raised 
by EUPM officials (Interview 3,9,15,36,48). 13 1 According to some EUPM officials, 
the former Head of Mission Kevin Carty did not listen to lower levels, did not 
communicate with them and undertook independent initiatives without consultation 
(Interviews 3,9,36). An EUPM official described internal co-ordination in the 
following terms: 'it is appalling, dreadful [ ... ] It is far too hierarchical, far too military, 
very old fashion, the communication is dreadful. Most of this is because of personalities, 
or "the" personality to be clearer' (Interview 9). These problems appear to be 
idiosyncratic, rather than organisational for they have not been so acute with either the 
first Head of Mission (Sven Frederiksen) or the third (Vicenzo Coppola) (Interviews 3, 
5 1). Problems of leadership not only affected the overall effectiveness of the mission, 
police missions such as the EUPM do not have an operational role, but are limited to specific tasks such 
as monitoring, advising, training and mentoring, and have limited enforcement powers. 
131 The first Police Commander/Head of Mission was Sven Frederiksen. Kevin Carty was designated 
police Commissioner after the sudden death of Frederiksen in February 2004. From January 2006, the 
Head of Mission of the new EUPM has been Vicenzo Coppola. 
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but they had another consequence: a loss of EU credibility and influence among local 
authorities who realised that there was no clear policy line coming from EUPM 
Headquarters. 
As regards horizontal coherence, coordination with the Commission has been facilitated 
by an informal Joint Co-ordination Group. Moreover, a small CARDS team has been 
co-located at the EUPM Headquarters. Although horizontal co-ordination with the 
Commission has worked fairly well (Interview No. 50,5 1), some difficulties are worth 
noting. The lack of appropriate funding procedures caused some troubles to EUPM, 
which had to apply for CARDS funding in order to launch new projects or seek funding 
through the Member State's embassies (Interviews 2,50). Other problems were of a 
institutional nature. As mentioned by Hansen (2004: 181), missions in the field of 
policing can be considered a cross-pillar instrument, but they are conceived from a 
different perspective according to which pillar is involved: for the first pillar (EC), they 
are a long-term tool to support development projects; for the second pillar (CFSP), 
police missions are considered a short term instrument of security; for the third pillar 
(JHA), police missions are a preventive instrument to fight organised crime and secure 
EU borders. Police operations like EUPM are designed by the Council structures to 
tackle the urgent needs of police forces, whereas the Commission designs its own long 
term institution-building projects which do not always follow the same logic (Interview 
5,50). Therefore, the main challenge relates to co-ordination between the first and the 
s. econd pillar, and particularly, between the Council Secretariat and the Commission 
(Gourlay, 2004). In this specific case, EUPM officials complained that there was not 
always full cooperation in harmonising the projects 
launched by the Commission and 
EUPM (Interview 2,50). For instance, there were problems due to the duplication of 
advisors to some Bosnian institutions, with one co-located police officer coming 
from 
EUPM and one advisor from the Commission's twinning projects (Interviews 36,50). 
Co-ordination with the EU military operation, EUFOR Althea, has been an even more 
problematic exercise. The deployment of 
EUFOR involved a new challenge for the EU: 
thi need for enhanced co-ordination between the military and the civilian elements of 
the ESDP. In theory, the mandates of the two missions did not clash. Whereas, the 
EUPM's mandate aimed at long-term capacity-building of the police forces, EUFOR 
focused on short term deterrence. The first had a non-executive mandate (monitor, 
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mentor and inspect); the latter an executive one with enforcement tools to be used if 
appropriate. In spite of this, during the first year of EUFOR's mandate, there were some 
tensions between the two missions as a result of the existence of some grey areas 
between the EUPM and EUFOR's mandates, especially regarding the fight against 
organised crime. 
EUPM supported institution-building projects as the most effective way to tackle 
organised crime. To this end, it provided expert advice and monitored the creation and 
strengthening of various institutions (the Ministry of Security, State Border Service, 
Interpol) to increase the local capabilities in the fight against organised crime. EUFOR's 
role in the fight against organised crime was rather different. Having being identified as 
one of the supporting tasks of EUFOR's mandate, then EUFOR Commander, General 
Leakey expressed his personal commitment to play a significant role regarding this issue 
(The Times Online, 2004; Interview 6,13,25,44). Once EUFOR took over from SFOR, 
several operations were launched to support local law enforcement agencies in fighting 
illegal activities such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal logging. 
Although EUFOR officials stressed that these operations were not meant to usurp local 
efforts (Interviews 6,7,8,25,37), this assertive approach generated some criticism 
amongst EUPM and other EU officials for exceeding its mandate (Interviews 3,5,9,12, 
15,21,36). 
This tension between the two operations showed Brussels' difficulty in designing a 
comprehensive civilian and military approach to crisis management. However, efforts 
were made to improve co-ordination on the ground as the different actors realised the 
need for better arrangements. In September 2005, EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR 
representatives agreed on Seven Principles 
for co-ordination (EUPM, EUFOR and 
EUSR, 2005). According to this document, EUPM was to take the lead in the policing, 
while EUFOR would provide operational support for these operations, all under the 
political co-ordination of the EUSR. This agreement was 
developed further in the 
Operational Guidelines adopted on II May 2006 that specified new 'adjusted roles' for 
EUPM and EUFOR. EUFOR will only support local efforts when the capacity does not 
exist within existing Bosnian police forces, or when local police lack confidence to 
carry out their duties. Nonetheless, this support would still require endorsement by the 
EUPM (Interview 5 1). 
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As a result of some of the problems encountered at the implementation level, coherence 
has been negligible in this case. Problems were mainly due to the EU's fragmented 
presence in the country, problems of inter-pillar and intra-pillar co-ordination and in 
some specific cases, the impact of personality. 
6.3.3. A reafistic task ahead? 
EUPM operated as the leading organisation in the field of police reform, as part of the 
programme of rule of law reform launched by the OHR/EUSR - the objective being to 
create independent, professional and sustainable police forces. 132 This objective was 
therefore in accordance with the EU's objectives in the country, supporting the Mission 
implementation Plan of the High Representative and the SAP. The aim of EUPM was 
'to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with 
best European and international practice' (Council of the EU, 2002a). 
The question is whether EUPM's mandate was realistic and whether it had been 
endowed with appropriate instruments to achieve it. Regarding the first issue, the 
mandate was too vague. The Joint Action stated that EUPM will 'mentor, monitor and 
inspect', according to 'best European and international practice', but without any 
guidelines that could help in, the implementation of these criteria. Secondly, EUPM was 
a strengthening mission with the objective of educating, instructing, assisting, 
monitoring and advising local police. That is, EUPM pursued long term, structural 
reform aimed at producing a change in the police structures (Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2005: 8). It was not just about providing quick relief to a crisis situation, 
but strengthening institutions, capacity-building and the sustainability of the Bosnian 
police forces. The need for a long-term approach was acknowledged by EUPM 
officials, as well as the difficulties of achieving its objectives within a short three-year 
mandate. One official recognised that Jilt is very easy to create structures and 
institutions, but you also have to change the mindset and that takes time. The more you 
go on to the substance and the cultures, the more it takes time' (Interview 12). 
Commenting on EUPM objectives, some officials pointed to the fact that the mandate 
was too broad: 'bringing the Bosnian police standards to the European ones in three 
years was unrealistic' (Interview 48). 
132 To implement its mandate,. the EUPM co-located police officers, in around 30 monitoring units, at the 
medium and senior level, supported by two mobile inspection teams, operating around the country. 
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As far as the instruments are concerned, EUPM's main strategy was based on a 
management approach consisting of 'monitoring, mentoring and inspecting managerial 
and operational capacities of the BiH police' (Council of the EU, 2002a). This means 
that EUPM had to implement its mandate through advice and mentorship, trying to 
persuade BiH police officers that the identified reforms were the ones to be followed. 
Obviously, this choice entailed some problems in terms of effectiveness as there were 
no consequences when the locals did not comply with what had been advised by EUPM 
officials. Even if conditionality from other EU projects could and was linked" 33 it only 
had a limited impact, as proven by the police reform. 134 By contrast to the IPTF, the 
EUPM was not an executive operation and it did not have enforcement tools. The only 
person who could remove non-compliant individual officers was the High 
Representative at the recommendation of the Head of the Mission. EUPM only resorted 
to this procedure a couple of times, and the High Representative was, according to some 
interviewees, very reluctant to remove police officers (Interviews 36,48). Against this 
backdrop, the effectiveness of EUPM at the decision-making level can be deemed 
partial: there was a collective decision, according to CFSP objectives, but the mandate 
and the instruments were not appropriate. 
6.3.4. Progress in the implementation of EUPM's mandate 
EUPM did have a benchmarking system, but it was only established after a year and a 
half of the operation. According to this benchmarking system, 70-75% of programmes 
had been achieved by the end of its mandate (Interview 36). Yet, the benchmarking 
system was not a good one. In the words of one official, 'what it does is to measure 
progress, but it does not tell you about quality' (Interview 48; also 38). 
135 The long-term 
approach of EUPM also meant that it was difficult to evaluate its effectiveness on the 
ground given that the expected results would take time to materialise (Interview 15). In 
spite of this, one can identify several successes during the period 2003-2005: 
There was some progress regarding institution and capacity-building with the 
establishment of a Ministry of Security at the state level, the strengthening of the 
------------ 
The EUPM made clear at the Police Steering Board meetings the links between required reforms and 
assistance from the EU (interview 2). 
134 For months, the Bosnian authorities failed to achieve an agreement on police reform, in spite of the 
? ressures from the EUPM, the Commission and the HR/EUSR. 
3'5 One EUPM official also noted that according to this evaluation system, the SBS dogs, project was 
almost implemented, apart from the fact that it did not have dogs (Interview 48). 
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State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the State Border Service (SBS) 
and other state-level agencies. EUPM helped in drafting and implementing laws, the 
recruitment of personnel, and the provision of financial and other expert advice on 
police matters. 
It also managed to create an understanding of the necessity of intelligence in fighting 
crime, and a culture of exchanging intelligence among law enforcement agencies. 
There were also some successes in trying to improve cooperation in the field among 
state and entity institutions, 136 and even with other agencies from the Balkan region. 
EUPM tried to strengthen local ownership of reforms with the establishment of a 
Police Steering Board at the level of the Police Commissioner/Director of Police, 
where projects of reform were discussed and agreed upon. EUPM also advised on the 
creation of Project Implementation Boards that were set up throughout BiH to 
develop projects at a local level. 
The EUPM thematic programmes aimed at improving the operational capacities and 
effectiveness of the local police forces. The programmes focused on the restructuring of 
the crime departments; increasing cooperation between the police and the rule of law 
agencies; improving the capabilities in the area of crime prevention, crime reporting, 
witness protection and investigation; strengthening the control of external borders; 
enhancing the accountability of the police; and providing training to improve the 
administrative capacities of the Bosnian police. Training was also provided to improve 
the skills of the local police in managing budgets. Some progress was achieved, but 
most projects were hampered by a lack of resources and structural problems. 
In dealing with the reform of the Bosnian police forces, EUPM encountered several 
problems stemming from difficult local circumstances. According to Osland, the EU 
may learn some hard lessons regarding resources, mandate etc, connected to the 
institutional establishment of the EUPM. Nevertheless, it is the legacy of the war in Bill 
that represents the greatest obstacle to the success of the EUPM' (2004: 553). These 
legacies include organised crime, corruption, and hardline nationalism. EUPM activities 
took place in the context of an ethnically-fragmented country with an unsettled political 
situation and a fragile economy. Several EUPM officials and national representatives in 
136 The Dayton Agreement created two entities within a state: the Republika Srspka (of Serbian majority) 
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat-Muslim). 
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Brussels pointed to local circumstances to explain some of the problems experienced by 
EUPM. For instance, in spite of EUPM's efforts to promote an ethnically-balanced 
police force and to integrate minorities, this had limited success owing to minorities' 
reluctance to operate outside their ethnic area (Interviews 3,9). The fragmentation of 
the Bosnian police forces (due to the complex constitutional set up of the country) also 
hindered efforts at reforms (Interviews 2,12,50) as did a lack of financial resources, a 
politicisation of projects and corruption among politicians and police officers 
(Interviews 2,3,9,12,36,48,50). 
Another issue refers to the implementation of the EUPM's non-executive (soft') 
mandate. Although most of the EUPM officials, as well as officials in Brussels agreed 
that an executive mandate would not have been appropriate for this specific operation 
(Interviews 2,12,34), they argued that EUPM could have been 'tougher' in applying its 
existing mandate, in particular, the inspecting component. As one interviewee put it, 
'the inspecting component has been utilised only in the last few months and I think that 
has been a real failure [ ... ] Had it been from the very beginning we would have been 
able to see more progress' (Interview 36). The inspection power and the possibility to 
remove non-compliant police officers would have increased the capacity of EUPM to 
get reforms through. 
EUPM officials also voiced concerns relating to the ambiguity of their mandate on 
several occasions (Interviews 2,3,21,48). It was very difficult to detennine what was 
meant by 'monitor, mentor and inspect' on the ground; what was the 'best European 
practice'; and how to develop programmatic objectives into operational projects, 
especially when most of police officers of the first contingent were former IPTF 
officers and were not used to a non-executive mandate (Interviews 2,3,21,48). It took 
some time and a lot of discussion during the first months of the operation to clarify 
these issues, and this limited the effectiveness of the mission, although, presumably, 
'teething troubles' of this sort were inevitable. In the case of the 'European standards', 
given the difficulty of defining common standards among the contributing countries, 
resolution was found in assigning particular programmes to different countries. 137 
137 For example, German police officers concentrated on border management and on support of the SBS 
(interview 48). 
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Another problem experienced by EUPM concerned personnel. At the beginning of the 
operation some Member States did not provide sufficient committed personnel, and 
some positions remained unfilled for lengthy periods of time. Rotation levels were also 
quite high, affecting the performance of the mission (Interview 9). Further, while the 
first contingent of personnel was highly qualified, later participants did not maintain the 
same quality (Interviews 2,12). Sometimes the officers recruited were not the most 
suitable f6r a specific position or did not have sufficient English language skills 
(Interviews 9,12,15,36,48). EUPM officials also agreed that this type of mission 
(management at medium and senior levels) would require more civilian experts or 
police experts with high qualifications and experience in the management of projects 
instead of police officers (Interviews 2,3,9,12,15,21,34,36). 
The effectiveness of the EUPM mission was only partial in implementation due mainly 
to three factors. First, because of the nature of the reforms supported by EUPM (long 
term capacity building projects), a three year mandate was unrealistic. Second, the 
inexperience and still-in-the-making EU civilian crisis management capabilities caused 
many troubles regarding personnel, planning and mandate. Third, the local 
circumstances in which the projects had to be implemented also jeopardised EUPM 
effectiveness. 
6.3.5. Final evaluation 
To a certain extent, some of the pitfalls of EUPM were due to the fact that it was the 
first EU mission of its kind: the EU, therefore, lacked both experience and the 
appropriate capabilities. Problems with planning (lack of staff in DG IX), co-ordination 
(in particular, civ-mil co-ordination) and the ambiguous mandate can be explained in 
this way. This 'first mission' factor also introduced a certain degree of undue pressure 
because, from planning to implementation, the mission '[had to] be a success' 
(Interviews 15,37,45). Being the first civilian crisis management operation also meant 
it could set a precedent, a model for subsequent operations, and everyone (Member 
States and EU institutions) was wary of it. According to one member of the Planning 
Team, 'as a result, finding workable solutions for issues such as financing took on an 
extended significance' (Hansen, 2006: 18). Other police operations would follow the 
funding procedures established for the EUPM and similar criteria were set in their 
mandates - to establish sustainable policing arrangements [ ... I in accordance with best 
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European and international practice'. The shortcomings in EUPM personnel numbers, 
meanwhile, highlighted the difficulties of extracting resources already highly valued 
and sometimes in short supply within the Member States. Finally, the analysis of EUPM 
has underlined the impact of idiosyncratic factors like mission leadership, and the 
importance of the local context. 
The importance of learning cannot be underestimated here. In this case path dependency 
did not have a role since it was the first EU's mission of its kind. The EU at this 
juncture did not have a 'manual' for crisis management procedures. Therefore, it had to 
'learn by doing' in launching a police operation from scratch (Interviews 2,3,12,34, 
48,50). The mission's implementation provided the EU with a number of lessons that 
were later used for the improvement of follow-on EUPM and the EU crisis management 
capabilities more generally. The lessons learned were gathered through several EUPM 
Mission Reviews (see Figure 6.2), a Lessons Learned Report of the Planning of the 
mission (Council Secretariat and European Commission, 2003), Lessons ftom the first 
100 days of the mission (Council Secretariat, 2003a) and another Lessons Learned 
Report was produced at the end of EUPM's mandate in December 2005. 
Figure 6.2. EUPM mission review process 
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In spite of the existence of these formal procedures, it seems that informal processes of 
learning were more important in this case: oral briefings from EUSR officials, EUPM 
and EUFOR political advisers, and exchanges amongst DG IX staff and people on the 
ground during field visits. For example, during the preparations for the new EUPM 
mission launched in January 2006 (or EUPM-II), Council officials came to Sarajevo 
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(Interview 50,51) and the Police Commissioner and the EUSR briefed CIVCOM and 
PSC on several occasions. The importance of informal processes can be explained by 
the fact that the EU does not have a developed/centralised lessons-leamed system to 
process all the information gathered during the running of a mission (Interviews 30,34). 
According to Hansen (2006: 25), the planning for EU civilian operations, 'has been 
conducted largely by the same small group of staff and institutional memory is 
personified rather than formally recorded'. 
Despite these problems, the EUPM provided ample ground for learning. Firstly, the 
problems that were encountered during the implementation of the Joint Action led to 
some changes and adjustments. For example, in the summer of 2004, a more 
programmatic approach to implement the mandate and a benchmarking system was 
introduced to improve the effectiveness of the EUPM. According to a former member 
of the EUPM Planning Team: 
planning can never foresee perfectly the reality of the operational mission. It 
became clear almost instantly that some adjustments would be necessary, 
mainly an increase in key equipment - computers, mobile telephones and cars 
- and shifts in staffing, the strengthening and creation of additional units, etc. 
In addition, any organisation - mission or otherwise - has to engage in a 
constant review of its structures and functioning and EUPM made some 
significant changes in its second year in response to an altered environment, 
but also to correct inevitable misjudgements of the planning team (Hansen, 
2006: 19). 
Learning also led to changes being incorporated into the new mandate of EUPM agrced 
in November 2005 (Council of the EU, 2005a). EUPM-II (2006-2007) is a more 
targeted mission in terms of personnel and objectives. Its focus is on assisting police 
restructuring, providing technical advice and expertise, and supporting capacity- 
building of SIPA and the SBS (Council of the EU, 2005a). EUPM-II also has a stronger, 
more proactive role in the fight against organised crime, assisting the local authorities in 
planning and conducting investigations, following from the Seven Principles that were 
agreed among EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR (see above). 
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The new EUPM has also strengthened its inspecting component. One of the new 
strategic priorities has been to monitor the local police, looking at operations carried out 
by Bosnian police forces and the conduct of individual police officers. This mission has 
also responded to criticisms that EUPM had neglected the rule of law dimension in the 
fight against criminality (Interview 12). Even though EUPM-II is still a police mission, 
it thus also includes some rule of law experts to support its mandate. A Criminal Justice 
Interface Unit has been created to address problems regarding cooperation between the 
police and the prosecutorial authorities. Regarding the merging of the EUSR-EUPM 
departments, there has been some restructuring of the press and public information 
functions to the EUSR, but no merging has taken place. In the area of police 
restructuring, some EUPM staff have been co-located within the EUSR and further 
changes with the transition from the OHR to a EUSR-led mission are expected. 
Moreover, the new Operational Plan of the mission established detailed success 
indicators to assess progress in each of the areas covered by the mandate. 
The lessons learned gathered from this mission have also helped to improve the EU's 
crisis management capabilities and procedures. First, it has led to an expansion of the 
Police Unit (Hansen, 2006: 18). Problems with procurement and personnel, also 
identified in other civilian crisis management operations such as Proxima or EUJUST- 
Themis, have led to the launching of a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (Interviews 31,45). 
As far as the planning phase is concerned, some recent developments like the initiative 
of an EU Conceptfor Comprehensive Planning (GAERC, 2005b) and the creation of a 
Civ/Mil Cell within the Council Secretariat are meant to improve problems of civ-mil 
co-ordination (Interviews 23,34,37). However, officials suggest that further changes 
are required, including the reorganisation of the Council Secretariat and an increase in 
the financial resources devoted to civilian crisis operations (Interviews 38,39,45,46, 
48). The next section examines the coherence and effectiveness of the latest and most 
ambitious EU operation in BiH: EUFOR Althea. 
6.4 EUFOR ALTHEA 
In the aftennath of the rift between the 'Old' and the 'New Europe' over Iraq, the 
deployment of a large scale NATO-supported EU operation in BiH, was seen as a sign 
of appeasement by the two sides. BiH appeared as the best scenario to make two 
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different approaches compatible: those who wanted to develop a robust EU security and 
defence policy, if possible independent of the US; and those who wanted to demonstrate 
that resorting to Berlin Plus and to NATO was in the interest of the EU. BiH, as with 
FYROM before it, enabled the testing of the EU's capabilities in a 'controlled' 
environment. 
Operation EUFOR Althea 138 constitutes the largest EU-led military operation to date. In 
June 2004, NATO decided to end the SFOR mission and to hand over responsibility to 
an EU military operation. The reasons for this decision can be found in a combination 
of several factors. First, a general agreement from both Washington and the EU 
Member States that the security situation in BiH and in the Balkan region more broadly 
had improved considerably. Second, the fact that the US (and, by extension, NATO) 
had other priorities (Interviews 1,6,7,8,11). The 9/11 attacks and the 'war on terror' 
shifted American priorities to areas of the world such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, 
the launch of the first ESDP missions in 2003 - EUPM in BiH, Concordia and Proxima 
in FYROM and Artemis in DR Congo - convinced the US (and reassured the pro- 
Atlanticist Member States) that the EU possessed the necessary capabilities to gradually 
take the lead in ensuring security in the Balkans. Fourth, after the flasco of 
UNPROFOR (mainly a European force), this new force epitomised the EU's desire to 
rebuild its credibility in the region, as well as on the world stage, thus making it clear 
that ESDP was not simply a talking shop (Interviews 1,30,42). 139 Last, but by no 
means least, it was the last step in the process of Europeanisation of the international 
intervention in BiH. 
The Brussels European Council expressed the EU's readiness to take over from the 
NATO mission in BiH as early as December 2002 (European Council, 2002). One year 
later, and after the EU had successfully taken over the NATO operation in FYROM, 
preparations for EUFOR Althea started in Mons and Brussels (Interview 25). 1 lowever, 
the launch of the mission had to wait until NATO's official announcement at the 
Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004 that SFOR would be concluded (North Atlantic 
138 The EU chooses the names for its peacekeeping missions from classical mythology in order to avoid 
translation problems among its many languages. The operation in BiH is named after the Greek goddess 
of 'healing', as a metaphor for the healing/reconciliation among the peoples of Bill. 
139 The symbolism of the operation can be seen from the high number of contributors (34 countries). For 
many countries, in particular, EU Member States, participating in EUFOR is in itself important, even 
though they can only make small contributions (see Table 6.2. ). 
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Council, 2004). Soon thereafter, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 
July (Council of the EU, 2004b) and launched the EU Planning Team. In the autumn, 
the EU adopted a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and an Operation Plan (OPLAN). 
On 22 November 2004, the LTNSC adopted Resolution 1575 authorising the EU 
Member States to create EUFOR as a legal successor to SFOR, an operation in the 
framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The transfer of authority from SFOR to 
EUFOR took place on 2 December 2004. 
EUFOR took over the job with approximately 7,000 troops, the same number that 
SFOR had in December 2004. This similarity can be explained by the task EUFOR had 
to perform (to maintain a safe and secure environment), and because the Union wanted 
to reassure the Bosnian authorities and population that it was serious (Interviews 6,7,8, 
13,25,44). Essentially the same forces which contributed to SFOR were present in 
EUFOR (the soldiers just swapped their badges for the insignia of the European Union 
Force), but with the major difference that there were no US troops. 22 EU Member 
States 140 and 12 other non-EU Member States have contributed to EUFOR Althea 
(Table 6.2). 14 1 Non EU Member States participate in the Committee of Contributors and 
are regularly briefed about the progress of the operation, but they do not have a voice in 
EUFOR's decision-making structures. 
"" Three Member States do not participate in EUFOR: Malta, Cyprus and Denmark. In the case of the 
Mediterranean states, they do not take part in this ESDP operation because it is being carried out 
following Berlin Plus arrangements and, as these two states are not NATO PfP members, they are not 
allowed to take part in either the operation or in the discussions at the PSC. In the case of Denmark, it 
does not participate in ESDP operations according to the opting-out on defence issues agreed at the 
Treaty of Maastricht (Protocol 5, TEU). Denmark, as a member of NATO, is, however, allowed to be 
F14 resent at the PSC discussions. 
1 FYROM participates in EUFOR since July 2006 with 17 soldiers. 
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Table 6.2. EUFOR Althea troops 
EU MEMBER STATES TROOPS 
AUSTRIA 265 
n-EU MEMBER STA 
ALBANIA 70 
BELGIUM 48 
CZECH REPUBLIC 61 
ESTONIA 2 
FINLAND 158 
FRANCE 381 
GERMANY 1227 
GREECE 182 
HUNGARY 119 
IRELAND 45 
ITALY 1032 
LATVIA 3 
LITHUANIA I 
LUXEMBURG I 
THE NETHERLANDS 447 
POLAND 206 
PORTUGAL 167 
SLOVAKIA 4 
SLOVENIA 165 
SPAIN 538 
SWEDEN 81 
UNITED KINGDOM 669 
ARGENTINA 
BULGARIA 
CANADA 
CHILE 
MOROCCO 
NORWAY 
NEW ZEALAND 
ROMANIA 
SWITZERLAND 
TURKEY 
Sub Total non-EU 
192 
112 
24 
133 
3 
3 
110 
9 
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Source: EUFOR Althea website (www. euforbih. or, (, ), accessed on 7 April 2005.142 
An Integrated Police Unit (IPU) with executive powers was also created as part of' 
EUFOR. The IPU started its mission by taking over from its predecessor in SFOR, the 
Multinational Specialized Unit. It is under the control of the Force Commander and 
composed of troops from seven countries: Italy, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Romania, 
Turkey and The Netherlands. It combines the unique features of a military unit with the 
capabilities and experience of a police force. Therefore, it can perform a wide range of 
tasks from support to maintaining a safe and secure environment to conducting police- 
like investigations (EUFOR Forum Online, 2005a). To facilitate co-ordination with the 
civilian authorities and population, EUFOR has also established 46 Liaison and 
Observation Teams (LOTs) living in rented houses among the Bosnian population. 
142 In January 2007, the total number of' troops in EUFOR was of' 5,949 (see 
http: Hwww. cuforbih. org/organisation/0508 I 0-stren, -th. htm) 
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They are usually deployed at potential hot-spots and serve as an 'early-warning system. 
The LOT practice is based on the Civil-Military Cooperation Concept of SFOR, as well 
as on the experience of the EUMM. 
The running costs of this operation amount to C 71.7 million per annum (reference 
amount) and are administered by the ATHENA mechanism (involving contributions 
from Member States on a GDP basis). Personnel and other items are funded on a 'costs 
lie where they fall' basis. The mission is being carried out with recourse to NATO 
assets and capabilities, according to the Berlin Plus arrangements (see below). 
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6.4.1 Planning the mission 
The military aspects of the planning and management of the operation have been dealt 
with by the EU Cell in SHAPE (Mons), with around 20 staff, while the politico-military 
aspects have been under the responsibility of four national seconded experts in DG VIII 
(Pol-Mil Affairs) of the Council Secretariat, supported by the EUMS (see Figure 6.1). 
Input from the Commission and the European Parliament in the planning of the mission 
has been virtually nonexistent, a state of affairs heavily criticised by the latter 
(European Parliament, 2004b: 77). 
Some logistical problems affected the Planning Team: a lack of personnel, often sent to 
Sarajevo too late; a lack of expertise in strategic planning, and a lack of English 
language skills (Interview 8). A EUFOR official also mentioned that better consultation 
mechanisms with other civilian bodies (for example with EUPM and EUMM) at the 
planning stage would have prevented problems during the implementation of the 
operation (Interview 25). Planning was also complicated because NATO was already on 
the ground and a small contingent was to remain after the termination of the SFOR 
mission. SFOR's advice was, therefore, very important (Interview 7,25,30) and the 
EUMS staff involved in the early planning of operation Althea spent an enormous 
amount of time co-ordinating with the NATO Headquarter in Mons (Interview 30). 
143 The Berlin Plus arrangements were firstly agreed at the 1996 NATO's meeting in Berlin to make 
NATO assets available for a possible WEU operation. With the development of the ESDp, a series of 
formal agreements for EU-NATO cooperation were adopted between December 2002 and March 2003. 
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The Chief of the EU Planning Team admitted that 'the planning was frustrated because 
at times positions were not speedily taken in Brussels' (Interview 8; also 25). In this 
respect, two main disagreements amongst the Member States had to be surmounted. 
First, regarding the use of Berlin Plus agreements, and second, the establishment of the 
IPU. Even though all the Member States initially agreed on the use of Berlin Plus, there 
were some disagreements on the way the particular distribution of tasks and 
intelligence-sharing would take place, with the UK and France leading two opposing 
camps (Interview 13,25,30,44). Given that a final agreement on the distribution of 
tasks could not be reached at the political level (NAC-PSC), it was up to the 
Commanders in theatre to come up with the technical arrangements for cooperation 
(Interviews 7,13,25,35,44). 
The issue of the IPU was more delicate, and was linked to the specific role of EUPM 
and the role of the EU more broadly in the fight against organised crime. In this respect, 
some countries, in particular, the Nordic countries, opposed the use of any paramilitary 
police forces in EU operations. Other countries such as France and Spain, even though 
they did have paramilitary police forces, resisted their use within a military chain of 
command. Moreover, France and other Member States were initially very reluctant to 
take on the proactive role of EUFOR in the fight against organised crime because they 
did not want this supporting task to determine the size of the mission in the future 
(Interview 44). Italy, by contrast, was very keen on the establishment of this type of 
force within EUFOR (it was already the main contributor to the paramilitary force in 
SFOR) (Interviews 13,21,25,30,38,44). Due to the divergent views amongst the 
Member States, the final decision was to set up a paramilitary police contingent, but 
only consisting of forces from those few Member States willing to contribute to it. 
Furthermore, the composition and status of the IPU would be submitted to regular 
revision by the PSC. The resulting EUFOR was a very robust one with the same tasks as 
SFOR and an even tougher approach to organised crime. 144 
6.4.2. The hour of truth for EU-NATO cooperation 
The EU followed the 'Macedonian model' in BiH. There the EU took over from the 
NATO mission deployed in 2001 to monitor the security situation and to oversee the 
144 Thus, even if the pursuit of war criminals was at the beginning understood as an exclusive competency 
of NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo, in the current mandate of EUFOR it is included as a supporting task. 
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implementation of the reforms agreed in the Ohrid Peace Agreement. The Concordia 
Operation, the first ever EU military operation, was also the first one resorting to Berlin 
Plus arrangements and therefore this operation served as a 'test-case' for EU-NATO 
cooperation (WEU Assembly, 2005: 9). It was not until 17 March 2003 that a final 
agreement was reached regarding how to make Berlin Plus operational. The agreements 
allowed the Alliance to support EU-led military operations, including resort to NATO 
assets and capabilities (headquarters, IT facilities, access to NATO's planning 
capabilities and intelligence). These arrangements sought to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of capabilities between the two organisations, and in principle, were 
originally designed to support an EU mission where NATO was not engaged at all. The 
latter, however, was not the case in the EU operations undertaken in FYROM and BiH. 
This was especially problematic in BiH, where NATO had been camped for so many 
years, and the size of the operation was considerable (7,000 troops). Moreover, NATO 
would maintain a Headquarter to support defence reform, counter-terrorism and the 
detention of persons indicted for war crimes. Thus, negotiations were quite painful, but 
essential to ensure full co-ordination between EUFOR and the NATO Headquarters 
(interviews 7,8,13). At the decision-making level, working arrangements have been 
established to ensure co-ordination, with meetings between the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) and the EU bodies at the Ministers, ambassadors, and committee level. The 
EUFOR chain of command also allows for EU-NATO co-ordination at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels (see Figures 6.3). 
The same provisions ensure internal coherence and strategic direction from Brussels to 
Sarajevo (see Figure 6.4). The Joint Action establishes a clear chain of command with 
the aim of maintaining internal coherence. The political control of the operation lies 
with the Council, with the assistance of the HR. For more day-to-day management, the 
PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the operation. Regarding the 
operational command of the mission, and, in line with the Berlin Plus arrangements, 
NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), General John 
Reith, has been appointed as Operation Commander. The chain of command goes from 
the EU Operational Headquarters (EU OHQ) in SHAPE (Mons, Belgium) down to 
Naples where it has established an EU Command Element (EUCE). Both in Mons and 
Naples, the double-hatted posts guarantee the linkage between the EU and NATO. 
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Major General David Leakey was appointed in December 2004 as the first EU Force 
Commander at the EUFOR Headquarters at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo. 145 
Figure 6.3. Berlin Plus Agreements and EUFOR 
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Source: EUFOR Althea website (www. euforbih. org) [accessed 5 January 20071. 
As regards EU internal coherence, the Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP also has a specific 
section on the 'Coherence of EU response', where one is reminded of the responsibility 
of the Council to ensure the coherence of EU activities, and the responsibility of' the 
EUSR to promote overall EU political co-ordination in theatre (Council of' the EU, 
2004b). The Joint Action asks that the EUFOR Commander should take into 
consideration the EUSR local political advice, for instance, on issues like the IPU style 
capability. In this way, both the Council, from Brussels, and the EUSR, from Sarajevo, 
should ensure horizontal, institutional and vertical coherence. The Joint Action also 
states that the EU Force Commander shall liaise with the EUPM. Looking at the 
145 Major-General Gian Marco Chiarini took over as EUFOR Force Commander on 6 December 2(X)5 and 
Rear Admiral HansJochen Witthauer on 5 December 2006. 
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provisions that have been established in the Joint Action, as well as the arrangements 
with NATO at the decision-making level, coherence can be judged to be considerable. 
6.4.3. Implementing EUFOR or the real test for Berlin Plus 
Interviewees reported no major problems of internal coherence in implementation 
(Interviews 6,7,8,13,25,30). Established arrangements were able to prevent conflicts 
that may have arisen because of the overlapping mandates of the NATO and EUFOR 
operations (Interviews 8,25,30). Although the meetings between NAC and the PSC do 
not take place very often, the EUMC and the NATO Military Committee meet every 
month to discuss the progress of the EUFOR mission. However, these meetings have 
been described as insubstantial and they usually serve more as a political forum, 
especially for non-EU Member States such as Turkey (Interview 25). 
At the tactical level, different factors have ensured smooth cooperation between NATO 
and the EU. The fact that both organisations share the same installations at Camp 
Butmir as well as co-location at the operational level, has increased linkages and mutual 
support among them. All the interviewees from NATO and EUFOR Headquarters 
agreed that possible overlaps of competences between the EUFOR and NATO missions 
are not likely to occur as cooperation takes place on a daily basis. Cooperation also 
takes place in other areas. Currently, NATO provides logistical support, the 
Headquarters for the EUFOR mission (Camp Butmir) and support for secure 
communications (Interview 35). Contingency plans also exist for NATO to provide 
Over-The-Horizon Forces if required. 146 EUFOR has also provided support for the 
NATO operation in Kosovo, sending an IPU unit in 2005 (Interview 8,13). Despite the 
smooth transition, it was not until June 2005, a year into EUFOR's mandate, that the 
EU-NATO cooperation agreement was implemented and NATO handed intelligence it 
had gathered during the implementation of the SFOR operation over to EUFOR 
(Interviews 13,44). 
146 To ensure that these arrangements work when required, NATO and EUFOR have already carried out 
joint training exercises in BiH. From 24-28 January 2005, EUFOR and NATO troops conducted the 
Operational Rehearsal Level I to train for a possible crisis situation. NATO Strategic Reserve Forces and 
Operational Reserve Forces are capable of deploying at relatively short notice to reinforce EUFOR 
(Interview 13). 
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Figure 6.4. EUFOR Chain of Command 
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As regards institutional and horizontal coherence, as mentioned earlier, there has been 
good co-ordination between the EUSR and EUFOR, but that has not been the case with 
EUPM (see section 6.3). In sum, coherence at the implementation level has varied from 
minimal (with EUPM) to considerable (internal co-ordination, with NATO and the 
EUSR). 
6.4.4. 'We are serious about this force! 9147 
Together with other EU bodies in BiH, EUFOR Althea is designed to support BiH's 
path towards joining the EU, and in particular, the objectives of the SAP. More 
specifically, Althea's mandate consists of the implementation of ANNEX IA and 2 of 
the Peace Agreement, and pursues the following objectives: 
Key Military Tasks: 
* To maintain a robust military presence to deter recidivist elements from the 
former entity armed forces or other armed groups; to monitor and ensure 
compliance within military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement; and to 
prevent a resumption of violence. 
e to contribute to a safe and secure environment. 
to conduct informative operations in support of EU political objectives. 
to manage residual aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, such as airspace 
management, demining, ordnance disposal, weapons collection, etc. 
Key Supporting Tasks: 
e to provide support, in co-ordination with the EU and the International 
Community, to the OHR Mission Implementation Plan core tasks, in particular, 
regarding counterterrorism and organised crime. 
to assist in the defence reform and provide military and technical advice to Bill 
authorities as appropriate over security issues. 
to provide support to the ICTY, including detention of persons indicted for war 
crimes. 
to provide evacuation support, within means and capabilities, to International 
Community officials. 
147 Interview 
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EUFOR objectives are clearly defined in the Joint Action and subsequent documents 
elaborated by the EUFOR Headquarters (Interview 8) and they are in accordance with 
EU short (EU Comprehensive Policy for BiH), medium (SAP) and long term objectives 
(promotion of peace and stability in the region). EUFOR has also been provided with 
the means to achieve them (approximately 7,000 troops and the logistic support offered 
by the Berlin Plus arrangements). Therefore, the degree of effectiveness at the decision- 
making level is considerable. 
Every six months the PSC assesses how much progress has been achieved in EUFOR's 
objectives and forwards its recommendation to continue, terminate or adjust the 
operation (in terms of resources, mandate or personnel) to GAERC. Hence, in 
December 2006 the Council noted that the 'security situation in BiH has evolved 
enough' to permit a substantial reduction of EUFOR (GAERC, 2006), 48 and on 27 
February 2007, the PSC approved the new mission's Operational Plan. According to 
this document, EUFOR will retain 2,500 troops on the ground, backed up by Over-The- 
Horizon Forces if needed (GAERC, 2007). A multinational battalion will be based in 
Sarajevo and Liaison and Observation Teams will be dispersed throughout the country 
to maintain early warning in case of a worsening of the security situation. EUFOR's 
reconfiguration should take place by the end of May, but could be reversible in case of 
worsening of the local or regional security situation. Also, EU officials have been quick 
to reassure the Bosnian population that the mandate of the remaining EUFOR will be as 
robust as the previous one and that it will stay in the country as long as needed (Dnevni 
Avaz, 2006; EUSR/OHR, 2006b). 
6.4.5. EUFOR bares its teeth 
As noted above, EUFOR has to date performed the same functions as did SFOR 
regarding deterrence and other aspects of ANNEX IA and 2 of the Dayton Agreement. 
The conclusion so far is that EUFOR has been considerably effective in performing 
these tasks (WEU Assembly, 2005; Interviews 6,8,14,24,30,44). Although before its 
deployment there were some concerns among local authorities and the population about 
148 During the interviews in 2005, some factors were identified by EUFOR officials as having an impact 
on the duration of EUFOR's mandate (Interview 6,7,8,13,25). These included the dissolution of the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and the general elections in BiH in October 2006. Both took place 
in a peaceful way. The final status of Kosovo, expected for 2007, can still cause some instability in the 
region that may indirectly impact on Bil-l's security situation, forcing EUFOR to stay in for a longer 
period. 
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the EU undertaking this mission (Interview 6,7,15,24), an active public diplomacy 
exercise on the part of the EU, as well as, the actual performance of EUFOR on the 
ground have set aside those concerns (see Figure 6.5). EUFOR is undoubtedly 
contributing to a safer and more secure environment in BiH, just as SFOR did. 
As mentioned earlier (see section 6.3.2), EUFOR has had a very proactive role 
regarding the fight against organised crime. By tackling a problem that the local public 
is worried about, EUFOR's credibility has been increased among the local population 
and authorities (Interview 21). However, it has also raised criticisms among other EU 
officials that have led to subsequent changes in the EUFOR's operating procedures (see 
above). There are still some important challenges for EUFOR. One of them refers to the 
control and supervision of weapons that are stored throughout the country and that can 
be the object of smuggling activities. Several operations were launched in 2006 to 
tackle this issue (EUFOR Forum Online, 2006; Interview 35). De-mining also 
constitutes a threat to human security in the country, and, even though the main 
responsibility for this is local, EUFOR and other EU bodies are expected to support It. 
There is still room for improvement in this area. 
Figure 6.5. Public perceptions about EUFOR 
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Other problems are worth noting here even though they have not affected EUFOR's 
overall effectiveness. First, the problems with secure communications between EUFOR 
Headquarters and Brussels. As of December 2005, this had still not been solved 
(Interview 35). Another important issue was the multinational character of the 
operation, which meant not only that the contingent consisted of many different 
countries, but also that there was no framework nation leading the operation, as was the 
case with France in Concordia. Some officials have pointed out that this makes EUFOR 
more difficult to manage than other operations (Interviews 6,7,25,35). National 
caveats (domestic laws that limit the way in which a national contingent can contribute 
to international peacekeeping forces) have also affected the performance of the mission 
(Interviews 7,25,44) although in this respect, EUFOR is not very different from other 
international missions. The French troops, for instance, are not allowed to participate in 
crowd control operations, nor can they use dogs or bullets. The Dutch caveats are also 
significant in the fight against organized crime and corruption, and German troops are 
not allowed to use tear gas and need approval from the Bundestag for several types of 
operations. Some officials have also complained about the quality of forces provided 
(Interviews 13,25,44,45). Finally, the lack of personnel with English language skills 
has also been a problem during implementation (Interviews 8,35,44). 
6.4.6. Final evaluation 
So far, EUFOR constitutes the EU's enterprise that has achieved the highest degree of 
coherence and effectiveness in BiH. Several factors explain this result. In terms of 
coherence, EUFOR has benefited from institutional arrangements on the ground, and 
mainly the co-ordinating role exercised by the EUSR. Although there are still some 
problems when it comes to intra-pillar coherence or co-ordination between the civilian 
and military elements of the ESDP, some progress has been achieved in the last few 
months in this respect. In terms of effectiveness, EUFOR has been able to fulfil its 
mandate as expected for several reasons. First, for a mission of 7,000 experienced 
troops, BiH was an easy task (Interview 30). Second, EUFOR benefited from the 
experience gained from previous operations (Concordia) and from NATO's experience 
and advice during the planning phase. Moreover, cooperation between the EU and 
NATO worked well thanks to the institutional arrangements established at all levels, 
and the good working relationships between the two Force Commanders in theatre. In 
sum, institutional arrangements were adequate, the mandate realistic, the resources 
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appropriate for the operation and other factors (and conditions on the ground, 
personalities) were favourable. 
As regards the design of the mission, policy makers did not just follow past models, 
they also incorporated lessons learned from past missions and adapted the mission to the 
specific situation in BiH. EUFOR Althea was designed on the model of Operation 
Concordia but in such a way that path dependence did not have a negative impact on 
coherence and effectiveness. The 'Lessons Identified' from the Concordia operation 
were useful at the strategic/mil/pol levels (Brussels/SHAPE) vis-ti-vis intelligence- 
sharing arrangements, the use of NATO assets (communications and force reserves 
arrangements) and issues regarding the chain of command (e. g. whether or not to 
incorporate the NATO's Naples Headquarters) (Interview 25). At the tactical level, 
Concordia's lessons-learned were taken into account to design the structure of the 
Headquarters and the division of labour between EUFOR and the NATO Headquarters 
(interviews 8,25). 
Even if valuable, these lessons were not always transferable to the planning of EUFOR, 
especially at the tactical level (Interview 8). Hence, the operation also had to resort to 
leaming-by-doing. It was the first time that the EU had launched an operation of such a 
large scale (7,000 troops) under Berlin Plus arrangements, and many arrangements had 
to be designed as problems emerged, during the implementation phase. In this case, the 
informal transfer of lessons learned was as important, if not more so, than the formal 
one. Even though there was a document of Concordia's Lessons Identified, there was no 
time to go through this document in detail and at the operational level, many of the staff 
that planned EUFOR had already worked for Concordia, thus, operational routines were 
more important than formal procedures (Interviews 8,25). During the planning and the 
implementation phase, the transfer of operational procedures and practices from NATO 
was also of paramount importance. 
149 The fact that many officials in charge of EUFOR 
had previously taken part in NATO missions (including SFOR) or had been seconded to 
SHAPE cannot be underestimated. 
A Lessons Identified Report was produced for the EUFOR's Planning and since the 
launch of the mission regular Six Month Reviews have been submitted to the PSC (see 
149 For example, EUFOR's civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept or the 1PU built upon SFOR's 
ones. 
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Figure 6.6). The lessons learned system that was established in EUFOR owed 
significantly to the NATO one. 150 These mission reviews have played a crucial role in 
the process of policy learning and have identified necessary adjustments to the changing 
conditions on the ground, such as the current decision on the reduction of troops (see 
above). 
Figure 6.6. EUFOR's mission review process 
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In spite of the considerable effectiveness of EUFOR, some observers have identified 
problems-in-the-making in EU's defence capabilities that could affect future ESDP 
operations, particularly if tested in high-risk scenarios. For instance, although the 
Member States have committed themselves to achieve greater defence capabilities at the 
EU level, the investments in defence are still too small to achieve the headlines. 
150 EUFOR was the first operation where an evaluation of the ongoing operation took place (with 
Concordia the review only took place at the end of the operation) (Interview 13). 
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Problems relate not only to the amount of money spent, but also to the quality of what 
the EU Member States get in return, in terms of training of troops and equipment, 
especially if we compare it with the US (Biscop, 2004: 516-17). Experts have identified 
a number of shortfalls in ESDP, among them, problems of interoperability of forces, 
deployability (for example, the EU lacks an effective strategic air-lift), sustainability of 
deployed forces and strategic intelligence (Biscop, 2004; ICG, 2005a). Because of these 
deficiencies which refer not only to quantity, but in particular to quality, the EU would 
have difficulties in conducting a high-intensity operation (peace-making) for a sustained 
period (ICG, 2005a: 24). A European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), a new Headline 
Goal 2010 and the European Defence Agency have been set up in order to solve these 
problcms. 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
During the period 2001-2006, the CFSP has experienced a process of increased 
institutionalisation as a result of arrangements introduced in the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties. New bureaucratic initiatives such as the High Representative, the Policy Unit, 
the EUSRs, as well as new bodies accompanying the development of ESDP (PSC, 
CIVCOM, EUMC, EUMS, Police Unit) have started to work. The Petersberg tasks were 
also incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty and a new financing mechanism for 
military operations (ATHENA) was also agreed by the Member States. In sum, during 
this period there was an increase in the number of CFSP bureaucratic and political 
bodies and their related competencies; new instruments and procedures for decision- 
making and implementation were created; the scope and number of CFSP activities 
increased; and there was a higher, although still limited, involvement of the 
Commission in this pillar, by providing flanking missions and administrating the budgct 
for civilian crisis management operations - the role of the European Parliament was, 
however, much reduced, in particular, concerning military operations. 
The increasing CFSP institutionalisation has had a positive impact on the role and the 
levels of coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP as the cases of the EUSR, EUPM and 
EUFOR have shown (see Table 6.3). Nonetheless, there were still some problems as a 
result of the mushrooming of new bureaucratic bodies both in Brussels and in Sarajevo. 
Even though it has generally increased the capabilities and visibility of the EU (hence 
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its effectiveness), coherence seems particularly difficult to achieve. Thus, one could 
argue that coherence has decreased in the short term as a consequence of increasing 
institutionalisation, although in the medium term new mechanisms have been 
established at both levels to correct these problems (e. g. Seven Principles or a new 
Civ/Mil Cell). 
Table 6.3. Degrees of coherence and effectiveness (2001-2006) 
DEGREES OF COHERENCE IN CFSP/ESDP ACTIVITIES 
CFSP EUSR EUPM EUFOR 
initiative 
Decision-making Considerable Considerable Considerable 
Implementation Considerable Negligible Minimal/ 
I 1 1 Considerable 
DEGREES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN CFSP/ESDP ACTIVITIES 
CFSP 
initiative 
EUSR EUPM EUFOR 
Decision-making Partial Partial Considerable 
- Implementation Partial/ Partial Considerable 
I Co siderable 1 1 1 
The interviews conducted in Brussels also pointed at an intensification of practices of 
sharing-information and communication due to more regular contacts among CFSP 
officials during this period. Increasing levels of socialisation would have had a positive 
impact on coherence and effectiveness facilitating agreement on a common policy for 
BiH. With the Brusselisation of the CFSP, and the creation of permanent bodies in 
Brussels such as COWEB (Western Balkans working group) or CIVCOM, national 
officials attending these meetings are permanently based in Brussels and thus, it is 
easier for them to maintain frequent contacts than was previously the case (see Chapter 
4 and 5). This has had an impact on decision-shaping and Policy formulation. In the 
case of EU policy towards BiH, representatives in Brussels emphasized the Consensus 
atmosphere in COWEB, and also the efforts made by all sides to maintain this 
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atmosphere (Interviews 26,27,28,29,33,47). According to a national diplomat, in 
COWEB, 
there is no big divide between the Member States, which makes work easier. 
We have a general policy line and an economic agenda, and no one is against 
that. [ ... ] This 
is the biggest achievement [of EU external action] and not 
individual Member States looking at 'who is my best friend in the region' 
(Interview 26). 
Another added that 'the main elements of the EU policy towards the Balkans are shared 
by most of the countries. There is a large consensus on the main directions that we have 
to follow in the Balkans' (Interview 27). There are only some divergences regarding 
how to operationalize this policy, and in particular, regarding how to approach the issue 
of conditionality, with a division amongst the Member States between 'soft-liners' and 
'hard-liners' (Interviews 14,22,24,26,27,47). The three case studies presented above 
have also shown that even though there might be certain disagreements about the 
cooperative arrangements with NATO or the role of police forces in general, there is a 
broad consensus about the need to remain strongly engaged in BiH, if necessary by 
resorting to military instruments. 
To maintain consensus, the regular exchange of information with other Member States 
and the process of reporting back to their capitals are seen as crucial. Regarding the first 
one, because of the limited time during the formal meetings, informal contacts in 
Brussels help understand nuances in the positions of other Member States and even 
serve as a first step to try to achieve compromise, with the Presidency, the Commission 
and the Council Secretariat (depending on the issues) playing an important mediating 
role (Interviews 26,27,28). Meetings take place not only in the corridors, but also in 
other informal forums. As summarised by one representative: TOWEB is quite lively, 
we meet quite often in fon-nal meetings, but also informal ones, at events organised not 
only by COWEB members, but also Western Balkans countries missions to the EU or 
bilateral embassies' (Interview 33). Frequent contacts with other Member States and in 
particular with the Presidency facilitates mutual adjustments to Member States' 
positions and helps forge compromise. 
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Regarding the process of reporting back to their capitals, one Member State 
representative affirmed that 'before every important meeting I talk to my colleagues in 
the MFA and I let them know what is feasible, because it does not make too much sense 
to send me to die with an instruction which is completely off the point' (Interview 26). 
The latter shows to what extent national instructions are influenced by the interactions 
that take place in Brussels. In many cases, representatives in Brussels would not have 
detailed instructions, sometimes none at all, which makes the process of consensus- 
building easier (Interview 27,33). According to one diplomat 'I am very happy when I 
do not have instructions. Generally, when I received instructions, I am much more 
constrained in achieving a result. Sometimes, the instructions that you received they are 
not in line with the context here in Brussels' (Interview 27). To avoid these gaps 
between perceptions in the capitals and in Brussels regular contacts are essential. 
Member States representatives will report to their MFAs and try to influence them at an 
early stage, so they do not get ill-advised instructions (Interviews 26,27,28). In sum, 
common interests, socialisation among policy-makers and the emergence of a self- 
understanding of the EU as a regional power with a special responsibility in bringing 
stability to its neighbourhood, have facilitated convergence among EU positions during 
this last period. Arguably, 'national sensitivities' are still important, for instance, when 
it comes to issues such as conditionality or cooperation with NATO, but informal 
practices such as consensus-building and the co-ordination reflex are helpful in bringing 
national positions to a common EU stance. 
On the other hand, two issues demonstrate the existence of unintended consequences 
and that Member States cannot fully control the integration process and/or overturn past 
decisions. First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Council Secretariat has increased their 
role in CFSP/ESDP beyond what some Member States had foreseen in principle. For 
instance one national representative affirmed that in recent years the Council Secretariat 
has transformed its role from a mere secretariat to 'a policy defining institution', 
especially in the Western Balkans. According to him, the establishement of the figure of 
the HR and the Policy Unit help explained this development (Interview 26). The 
suspicions on the part of the Member States about the role played by the Council 
Secretariat in the case of EUPM is a case in point. The degree of expertise required in 
the planning and running of this type of operations, as well as the need for an 
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institutional memory to take stock of previous operations explains why the role of the 
Council Secretariat has become so significant in ESDP. 
Second, the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans is perceived by some national 
representatives as a process that has escaped the Member States' control, and that has 
'its own dynamic' (Interview 29). According to one national diplomat, 'nobody seems 
to be in the driving-seat, we [the Member States] lost control on certain things' and no 
Member State seems able to 'speak up' against the membership perspective for this 
region or 'to take the blame' for it (Interview 29). Such behaviour would break the 
unwritten rule to respect the acquis politique, and the 'agreed language'. As one 
national diplomat put it: 'you cannot say now I do not agree with the Thessaloniki 
agenda' (Interview 33). The enlargement discourse seems unchallenged and the 
consensus atmosphere remains within COWEB even after the accession of the Central 
and Eastern European countries (Interviews 27,33). This demonstrates the path 
dependent effects of discursive factors on Member States and how past policy 
discourses can limit their actual room of manoeuvre. As a result, Member States cannot 
fully control the integration process and/or overturn past decisions. 
Finally, this chapter has pointed to the role of leaming as a mechanism to improve 
CFSP coherence and effectiveness. It has shown numerous examples of leaming from 
past experiences, in particular, leaming from failure, but also leaming from others (e. g. 
NATO). Policy learning has led to the adjustment of the EUSR's mandate, it has been 
crucial in the design of a new mandate for the EUPM-11 or in establishing the 
operational procedures of EUFOR (drawing from NATO or the EU Member States). At 
the decision-making level, the lessons from BiH have also fostered some changes for 
instance with the development of a Conceptfor Comprehensive Planning or the creation 
of the Civ/Mil Cell (GAERC, 2005b). In sum, leaming from experiences in the field 
often feeds back to the decision-making level through different channels (e. g. mission 
reviews) and then becomes institutionalised, contributing at the same time to the process 
of CFSP institutionalisation. 
However, ad-hocism still prevails in the EU's crisis management activities as a result of 
the need for flexibility, but also the inexperience of the EU in this field. To some extent, 
this results from the fact that the EU does not have a developed/centralised lessons- 
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learned system to process all the information gathered during the running of a mission. 
There is no department/person within the Council Secretariat in charge of the Lessons 
Learned or Best Practices process. Some officials pointed to the need to establish 
appropriate mechanisms (e. g. a database) to compile the lessons learned from the 
planning and implementation of police operations, so it could be used for later 
operations and also as a proper system to allow for the exchange of lessons learned 
between the civilian and the military missions (Interviews 2,30,34). For its part, the 
workload of the Council Secretariat, PSC or CIVCOM makes it difficult to take stock of 
past missions (Interviews 30,34,48). As one EU official put it: 'The papers are there, 
the lessons are available, but no one bothers to read them, because they are rushing from 
one mission to the next' (Interview 48). Finally, the fragmentation of the Council 
Secretariat makes it difficult to exchange lessons, especially between the civilian and 
the military branches (Interview 34). In sum, a better system of lessons-learned is 
required if the EU wants to improve its still 'fresh' capabilities in order to Play a 
distinctive role in crisis management. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Towards a more coherent and effective CFSP? 
[We need to be] more active in pursuing our 
strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum 
of instruments for crisis management and conflict 
prevention at our disposal, including political, 
diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and 
development activities [ ... ] We need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention. 
European Security Strategy 
(Council of the EU, 2003b: 11, 
emphasis in the original) 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has examined the process of CFSP institutionalisation and its impact on 
levels of coherence and effectiveness over time, focusing in-depth on the case of CFSP 
aI ctivities in BiH. Its primary goal has been to determine whether a causal link exists 
between the increasing number of bureaucratic bodies, formal rules and informal 
practices, and the degrees of coherence and effectiveness reached by the CFSP in Bill. 
In this regard, the empirical case has provided mixed results. It has demonstrated the 
impact of the institutional setting on coherence and effectiveness, both at the decision. 
making and the implementation stages. In many cases, increasing levels of coherence 
and effectiveness have resulted from new institutional developments or improvements 
in existing ones. CFSP institutionalisation has also prompted other processes (path 
dependency, unintended consequences, learning and socialisation) that have affected 
coherence and effectiveness in different ways. Nonetheless, institutional isation has not 
resolved deficiencies in CFSP coherence and effectiveness; there are still problems with 
the institutionalisation of lessons learned; and the impact of socialisation processes 
remains limited. After summarising the content of the previous chapters, this concluding 
chapter reflects further on the strength of the theoretical framework and revisits some of 
the issues tackled in previous chapters. 
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The aim of Chapter I was to address terminological issues (the definition of EU's 
external action, coherence and effectiveness) and provided the conceptual tools to 
operationalise the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. It then moved to the 
political and academic debates surrounding these matters. How these problems were 
approached depended, inter alia, on the conceptualisation of EU external action and of 
the EU more broadly (as a state-like entity, an international organisation or sui generis), 
the components of the external action considered and the time-frame of the analysis. 
Three main factors were devised to explain problems of coherence and effectiveness: 
divergences among national interests, lack of appropriate institutions, and a lack of a 
shared identity at the EU level. Chapter 2 elaborated further on the three I's and how 
these have been conceptualised in the extant literature. The conclusion was that an 
institutional approach to CFSP is most appropriate in accounting for the mutual 
relationships between these three variables. This approach could also provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of CFSP coherence and effectiveness. In this respect, the 
merits of historical institutionalism by comparison with sociological and rationalist 
approaches, made it the most suitable approach. From this perspective, path 
dependency, unintended consequences, learning and socialisation processes were 
singled out for their potential explanatory power regarding the institutional isation 
process of the CFSP and its links with coherence and effectiveness. 
Chapter 3 moved one step further by applying this theoretical framework to the 
evolution of the CFSP. The chapter tracked down the levels of institutional isation. by 
looking at the number and competencies of bureaucratic organisations (including 
supranational institutions); the number of formal rules; and the breadth and expansion 
of informal practices among policy-makers. The conclusion from this account was that 
CFSP institutionalisation has been considerable and that it has generally boosted levels 
of coherence and effectiveness. The second part of the chapter looked more closely at 
the driving forces behind the process of institutionalisation of the CFSP and how path 
dependency, unintended consequences, learning and socialisation have put this process 
on track towards greater 'Brusselisation'. 
Chapter 4,5 and 6 constituted the final step in the process, going from the abstract, 
theoretical framework, to the particular empirical analysis of CFSP activities in BiH. 
These three chapters provided a detailed examination of eight CFSP initiatives and 
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offered substantial empirical evidence for claims made regarding levels of coherence and 
effectiveness and institutionalisation. During the first period from 1991 to 1995 (Chapter 
4), low degrees of EPC/CFSP coherence and effectiveness, as evidenced by the EC 
Peace Conference and the non-decision concerning military intervention, were seen as 
resulting from a combination of factors: lack of appropriate institutions and crisis 
management capabilities (including military capabilities), EU inexperience in managing 
international conflicts, a poor understanding of the situation in the Balkan region, an 
unwillingness of the Member States to get militarily involved in the conflict, and inflated 
expectations both from insiders and outsiders of what the EU could do in the situation. In 
spite of these limitations, one of the main contributions of the TEU was the possibility of 
launching joint actions and making use of Community funds to finance CFSP decisions. 
in this way, the CFSP became an operational and not merely a declaratory policy. 
Greater effectiveness of the CFSP in this respect was evident from the Mostar Joint 
Action of 1994. 
During the second period (1996-2000) (Chapter 5), CFSP was charactcriscd by a low 
level of activity, a continuation of past initiatives (such as the EC Monitoring Mission) 
and a secondary role in BiH in comparison with Community activities and the operations 
of international organisations such as the UN or NATO. The non-dccision analysed in 
this chapter best exemplifies the (self-imposed) paralysis of the CFSP during this period 
and the consensus among the Member States that the EU should not resort to the use of 
military instruments. Only the crisis in Kosovo in 1998-1999, because of its impact on 
the stability of the region, triggered some changes in the EU's approach towards Bill, 
and with it bolstered significant institutional developments (ESDP). In a time of crisis, 
the EU's response was the launch of the Stability Pact, but time and institutional 
constraints meant the initiative did not significantly improve levels of coherence and 
effectiveness. 
The last period examined in Chapter 6 illustrated the dynamic cngagemcnt of the EU in 
BiH since 2001 with the launch of several missions: the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR. The 
EUSR has clearly helped improve the coherence of the CFSP in Bill thanks to the 
establishment of numerous forums for co-ordination. The Position has also increased the 
visibility of CFSP activities, but only partially its cffcctivencss. It would still require 
more resources and staff to undertake the more important roles of exerting political 
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pressure and co-ordination in the country. As for EUPM, this first EU police mission 
suffered greatly from inexperience. Problems regarding personnel and logistics limited 
its effectiveness, and negligible coherence during the implementation phase owed much 
to 'idiosyncratic factors' (and rather less to inefficient institutional arrangements). 
Finally, EUFOR Althea has presented high levels of coherence and effectiveness. The 
mission was planned in coordination with NATO and SFOR Headquarters and it was 
deployed under the Berlin Plus arrangements. The agreed mandate established a clear 
chain of command and the double-hatted posts ensured a close working relationship with 
NATO. Taking over from SFOR, EUFOR has maintained the same levels of deterrence 
and has accomplished most of its mandate. In this way, it has served to foster EU 
credibility. What is revealing from this third period is the high degree of consensus 
among the Member States vis-ii-vis EU policy towards BiH, and more specifically the 
responsibility of the EU to uphold stability in the region. There is also an increasing 
consensus concerning the need to use (and combine) both civilian and military 
instruments to achieve this end. 
Box 7.1 Instruments/initiatives deployed in BiH in the framework of EPC/CFSP 
" EC Peace Conference (1991-1992) 
" Economic sanctions and arms embargoes (decided by a common 
position, implemented by Community methods) (1991-1998). 
" EC/EU Envoys (Lord Carrington, Lord Owen, Carl Bildt) (1991- 
1995) 
" EC/EU Monitoring Mission (1991-... ) 
" EU Administration in Mostar (1994-1996) 
" Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (1999-... ) 
" EU Special Representative in BiH (2002-... ) 
" EU Police Mission (2003-... ) 
" EU Military Force Althea (2004-... ) 
Chapters 4-6 also provided evidence of the developing CFSP institutionalisation process 
in BiH during the period under study (1991-2006). First, new bureaucratic bodies were 
added at the decision-making level to better deal with foreign Policy and civilian and 
military crisis management operations. In many instances these bodies were set up as a 
response to the difficulties encountered in dealing with the crises in BiH, and in the 
Western Balkans more generally. A comparison between the management bodies behind 
the EUAM (see Figure 4.1, Chapter 4) and those which were operative in 2001-2006 (see 
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Figure 6.1, Chapter 6) illustrates the growing institutionalisation and Brusselisation of 
the CFSP in relation with Bill. Furthermore, new specific bodies/organi sat, oils have 
been established in theatre. Box 7.1 provides a list with the EU initiatives/instrunlents 
deployed in the country throughout this period. 
The number of CFSP decisions and legal acts in relation to Bill has accordingly 
escalated, an indication of the FU's increasing engagement in the countrY and the 
CFSP/FSDP becoming operational (see Table 7.1). Finally, inflornial practices among 
Member States' representatives have also increased in recent years, facilitating 
consensus-building on the subject of the EU's policy towards 13111. The 2004 
enlargement to include ten new Member States has not affected this COIISCIISLIS and has 
even multiplied the level of contacts among national diplomats based in Brussels. 1il 
That said, because more people are now sitting around the table. the exchange of' 
information before formal meetings. the existence oflike-minded groups and the role of' 
the Presidency as a primus infer pares, have become crucial in order to ensure smooth 
decision-making. Socialisation has also been instrumental in facilitating consensus 
concerning the idea ot'a new international role for the FU in its neighbOUrIlood. 
Table 7.1.: Number of EPC/CFSP decisions on BiH* 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
I)cclarations 7 7 4 5 1 
Common 
positions 
2 2 2 5 
Joint 
Actions 
-2- 5 5 6 4 4 
TOTAL 2 6 13 15 10 11 
"' This evidence puts into question previous fears that enlargement to Central and Fastern Furope would 
increase the risks ot'deadlock (Gordon 1997/19W Nugent 2003: 503). 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 
Declarations 1 1 4 2 1) 0 1 
Common 
Positions 
I 1 2 5 2 5 
. Joint 
Actions 
3 4 6 7 9 9 5 
TOTAL -1; 
6 10 1 14 11 1 
Source: llttp: //w", ý%,. Collsiliuiii. cLiropa. CLI cins3 applications applications newRoom loadflook. a"j), 1111) 
73&LANG I &, crnsid 257 [last access 13 dccernber 20061 
The table also includes decisions targetim, the kkholc ofthe Western Balkan region such as the Stabilitý 
Pact or the FUMM. 
This concluding chapter summarlses the main findings ol'the thesis regarding levels ()I 
(T'SII coherence and effectiveness and by so doing it addresses the qLICStioll 01' %Olat 
explanatory power call be attributed to tile theoretical j'ralllc%%ork (historical 
institutionalism) and to the Cactors Introduced in Chapter 2 (i. e. path (1cpcndenc%, 
learning. unintended consequences and socialisation). file conclusion also reflects oil 
other issues raised by the analysisol'CFSP act"Ities In Bill as 1'()11()\%s: (I) the three 1"': 
('FSP Institutions. Member States' interests and the EV's international role (21) tile 
evolution of' FU external action. looking at tile gap bct\%ccn expcc(allOlls alld 
IlIStitLItiOllS and (3) certain dilemmas and broader normatkc implications regarding tile 
CFSP lIIStItLltIOl1aIiSatlOII process, coherence and clIcctivencss. 
7.2.111F, EVOLI TION 
First. some brief* rcmarks on concepti, 411 111d (IC11111HOM11 issues are in order. I lic coilcepts. 
of' C()Ilcrcilcc and ct'lectivericss Introduced In Chapter I have hccn usel'Lil In pro\ '(11,19 z' 
subtle evaluation ()I' CFSP performance by (list i riguishing dii'lerclit dcgrecs and 
dinicrisimis ()f these variabics in contrast to the More categorical judgements (if 
sUCCCSS/I, IilUrc that hak -c prolitcratco. 1 in the litcratUrc. h)r instaricc. 111c 11,11ijil I)cl-, ()(I ()I 
tlic l-. C F( 1*s inter\ crition ( N91-1 99ý). gcncrallý lahcIlcd 1-1 laso) inaflý 
ohscr\crs. actuallý L! i\cs rise to a more nuanced conclusion \%hen critical appraisal i is 
based on the terms employed in this flicsis. The activities carried mit during this pcrwd 
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exhibited different degrees of effectiveness, ranging from negligible to partial. 
Furthermore, the separate examination of the decision-making and implementation 
phases allowed for the identification of particular factors and their impact at each level 
(e. g. socialisation processes at the decision-making level; the role of implementing 
agents and local context during implementation). 
Applying these concepts to the case studies was, however, not without problems. The 
first difficulty related to the distinction between the decision-making and 
implementation phases. This distinction was never clear-cut and often proved 
challenging, especially since actors would operate on the two levels simultaneously. 
The different stages often overlapped with implementation sometimes feeding back into 
decision-making (e. g. through the lessons learned system) thereby turning policy- 
making into a circular rather than a linear process. While the case studies aimed to give 
an overall picture of degrees of coherence and effectiveness, the final assessment (e. g. 
whether effectiveness and coherence were considerable, partial minimal or negligibe) 
could only imperfectly take into account variations over time and across different 
dimensions. This was especially the case with coherence, where the final assessment 
had to account for different degrees across different categories (horizontal, vertical, 
institutional and internal coherence). 
Figure 7.1. CFSP COHERENCE IN BiH 
CFSP COHERENCE 
10 Decis ion-m A ing 0 Im pie me ntation 
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Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate graphically the degrees of coherence and effectiveness at 
the decision-making and implementation levels for the eight relevant policy initiatives. 
Whereas these graphs cannot capture the fine nuances that have been described in detail 
in the case studies, they do provide a snap-shot view of the evolution of CFSP 
coherence and effectiveness during the period 1991-2006, one that might be helpful in 
identifying main trends. 
Drawing on these findings, some general conclusions can be drawn concerning CFSP 
and EU external action. First, levels of coherence showed a steady improvement over 
time; the exception here being the problems encountered during the implementation of 
EUPM. Second, CFSP coherence at the decision-making level has mainly suffered from 
divergences amongst Member State interests and problems in reaching a collective 
decision at 12,15 or 25. Examples of this were the divergent positions on the diplomatic 
recognition of the Yugoslav republics and WEU-Ied military intervention, and the 
preference of some Member States for dealing with the crisis in alternative forums (the 
UN and the Contact Group). As a result, degrees of coherence were particularly low 
(negligible) during the first stage of the EC/EU's intervention in the Yugoslav conflict. 
Nonetheless, in those cases, when it seemed impossible to reach a common position, the 
Member States tried to close ranks and agree, at any price, in order to maintain at least 
the fagade of a collective position. This was the case regarding the decision on 15 
December 1991 concerning the recognition of the Yugoslav republics and the non- 
decision on military intervention. However, by then, the damage was already done and 
this not only impacted on CFSP coherence, but also constrained its effectiveness. In 
other words, divergences among Member States eroded EC's credibility and in so 
doing, limited its effectiveness in bringing a peaceful settlement to the conflict. 
The institutionalisation of CFSP that began with the Maastricht Treaty would have a 
mixed impact on CFSP coherence. The development of bureaucratic organisations and 
new formal rules improved some of the previous problems. New mechanisms on the 
ground (namely the EUSR) ensured better co-ordination. At the decision-making level, 
the Civ/Mil Cell, for instance, was designed to facilitate civil-military co-ordination 
within the Council Secretariat, and formal and informal meetings were intended to 
ensure co-ordination between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. However, 
CFSP institutionalisation - and particularly the creation of new bureaucratic bodies - 
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has had a perverse effect on coherence. For example, attempts to increase effectiveness 
by establishing new bodies (e. g. ESDP bodies within the Council Secretariat) have 
sometimes been counterproductive in that they have reduced coherence. The more 
institutionalisation and the more complex the institutional structure has become, the 
more difficult it is to co-ordinate and achieve coherence among different bodies. Even 
though informal communication practices can, to certain degree, overcome some of 
these problems, there is still room for improvement. Thus, the increasing 
bureaucratization and compartimentalisation of the CFSP has affected institutional and 
internal coherence. This has been a critical factor at the decision-making level (Chapter 
6). 
Furthermore, coherent external action has been difficult to achieve on the ground, not 
only because of the EU's fragmented presence, but also because different actors have 
arrived at different times. Thus, the EC Monitoring Mission (later the EUMM) was 
dispatched in July 1991 to observe the cease-fire in Slovenia and then deployed to other 
countries in the region, including BiH, to monitor human rights and other security. 
related issues. For its part, the Commission had maintained various activities in the 
country since the beginning of the war in 1992 with the provision of humanitarian aid 
and, later, technical assistance in the framework of the SAP. Later the ESDP 
instruments (EUPM and EUFOR) provided some flesh to the EU's engagement in the 
country. At the same time, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative 
in Bill, was also 
appointed as the EU Special Representative (EUSR). Over the years, the presence of the 
EU in BiH has increased, reflecting both the commitment of the EU to the stabilisation 
of BiH, and the development of the EU as a crisis management actor. 
However, this 
growing presence has created enormous challenges of coherence. 
This is mainly due to 
-the fact that there 
is no unified chain of command and there are still tensions between 
Community and Council instruments and between civilian and military ones. 
In this way, the CFSP institutionalisation process may have actually reduced levels of 
coherence in some cases (e. g. EUPM). In the medium and 
long term, learning by doing 
and learning from failure can correct the situation as actors come to realise the need for 
better mechanisms of co-ordination. As mentioned in section 6.3.2 above, the Seven 
principles agreed in Sarajevo fall into this pattern. The creation of the Civ/Mil Cell 
within the Council Secretariat, the new mechanisms established to guarantee 
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comprehensive planning and plans to restructure the Council Secretariat are other 
examples of the process of adjustment in the medium and long term as a result of 
perceived flaws in the short term. 
In terms of effectiveness, there has also been an improvement in CFSP initiatives. Yet, 
most CFSP activities have only attained partial effectiveness, with the exception of 
EUFOR. In this regard, two issues are of particular interest. First, when the EU Member 
States have been able to agree on a policy, i. e. when there was a collective and 
purposive action, the decision tended to be in accordance with the EU's putative short, 
medium and long term objectives, which explains why there are no examples of 
marginal effectiveness at the decision-making level. In the case of the non-decisions 
analysed in chapters 4 and 5, however, there were no collective decisions and therefore, 
only negligible effectiveness was achieved. 
Figure 7.2. CFSP EFFECTIVENESS IN BiH 
CFSP EFFECTIVENESS 
MDecision-making Nimplem-entation 
Second, it was often the case that there was agreement on the overall objectives, but not 
on the specific mandate and instruments to implement them. As a result, mandates were 
usually too broad and/or unrealistic and had to be adjusted during the implementation 
phase, where policy learning played a crucial role. Instruments were insufficient most of 
the time, i. e. CFSP lacked compliance mechanisms or inadequate personnel/financial 
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resources (EUAM, EUSR, EUPM). In some cases, these problems resulted from 
divergences in strategies (rather than in interests) amongst the EU Member States. For 
example, this was the case with the EUPM over the issue of deciding between an 
executive or a non-executive mandate; or in the case of EUFOR about the role of the IPU 
and organised crime. On other occasions the EU's operational inexperience explains the 
deficient mandates/instruments. In this regard, leaming by doing together with 
institutional development (the establishment of new CFSP bodies/instruments) has helped 
overcome many of these problems in subsequent operations. Thus, some of the problems 
that jeopardised the planning and implementation of the EUPM were addressed later and 
did not affect the civilian crisis management operations in Rafah or Iraq launched in 
2005. New bureaucratic organisations and formal and informal procedures have increased 
the capacity of response and have speeded up the decision-making process. Ilencc, 
overall CFSP effectiveness has been enhanced, especially when compared with carlicr 
initiatives, such as the EC Peace Conference. 
The main conclusions regarding the impact of the institutionalisation process in the case 
of BiH can be summarised by reference to the four assumptions that were laid down in 
Chapter 2. Regarding Assumption I( the direct impact of institutions on coherence and 
effectiveness), it has been argued that bureaucratic organisations such as the 1111, 
EUMS, CIVCOM, PSC or the Policy Unit have improved the decision-making process 
in the case of BiH, by facilitating information-gathering and information-sharing, co- 
ordination and monitoring of CFSP policies. New organisations such as the EUSR and 
the deployment of new military crisis management instruments (e. g. EUFOR) have also 
increased the EU's coherence and effectiveness. The same can be said for formal 
procedures regarding voting or financial arrangements that have been established during 
this period (see for instance, the introduction of Joint Actions and new financial 
procedures with the EUAM). In general, these institutions 
have increased the 
operational capabilities, speeded up the decision-making process and thus, increased 
coherence and effectiveness. They may have also slightly increased the Icarning 
capacity (organisational memory) of the EU thanks to the establishment of new 
techniques and procedures (Lessons Learned Reports and Mission Reviews), and the 
development of intelligence expertise within the Council Secretariat. 
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Learning has proven to be an important factor in enhancing the coherence and 
effectiveness of EU external action, and thus Assumption 2 (learning as a factor 
increasing coherence and effectiveness) seems to have been verified. Leaming has often 
resulted from the EU's own experiences or from new information provided by non-EU 
actors. Moreover, events external to the EU such as the Bosnian war and the Kosovo 
crisis made evident the weakness and problems of CFSP and this too served as a driving 
force for change. In many cases, the EU had to learn by doing since it was the first time 
that the EU launched these kinds of initiatives. This was the case with the EC Peace 
Conference, the EUAM, the EUPM, and EUFOR Althea, which showed the importance 
of BiH as a testing ground for EU capabilities. The EU did not have any experience in 
diplomatic mediation among warring parties; it did not have any preliminary doctrine or 
experience in transitional civilian administrations, in civilian crisis management and 
police missions; nor did it have any experience in the deployment of such a large 
military contingent under Berlin Plus. The EU had to learn how to solve problems as 
they came along. Furthermore, operational practices and knowledge were often 
transferred from other international organisations (mainly UN, OSCE and NATO) and 
individual EU Member States. For instance, in the case of EUFOR, leaming was the 
result of knowledge transfers through formal and informal contacts between the EU and 
NATO bodies (i. e. the meetings between the PSC and NAC), but also by individuals 
from the Member States participating in the planning and implementation of this 
operation (mainly, France, UK and Germany through their Defence Ministers). 
Learning usually led to incremental adjustment, rather than institutional innovation. 
This usually involved adjusting mandates to conditions on the ground, improving the 
quality and the amount of resources, and incremental changes to the institutional setting. 
Thu I s, learning can be seen to have been one of the main mechanisms of remedying 
institutional faults. However, learning has not always increased coherence and/or 
effectiveness. As mentioned above, incremental changes resulting from Icarning 
sometimes led to the creation of new structures that were added on top Of existing ones 
(e. g. creation of new committees or units within the Council structures) that hampered 
both coherence and effectiveness. 
Arguably, socialisation of EU policy-makers has also facilitated consensus-building and 
the growth of 'we-feeling', something that has also had an impact on EU policy towards 
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BiH (Assumption 3). The empirical record demonstrates that policy-making was not 
about hard-bargaining between Member States, and that interests %N, crc not defined in 
isolation in capitals, but rather within the context of negotiations taking place in 
Brussels. Even though there were still some divergences regarding strategies, the 
general tendency toward compromise increased the chances of achieving policy 
coherence. By facilitating socialisation processes, CFSP institutions in Brussels such as 
the Council working groups or the PSC have increased the con%, crgcncc of Member 
States interests regarding EU policy towards the Western Balkans and therefore, have 
enhanced vertical coherence. As for cffectivcncss, by increasing the information 
available to dccision-makcrs, the rcflcx co-ordination has had a positive impact on EU 
foreign policy-making. 
By contrast, the impact of path dependency on coherence and cffcctivcncss has bccn 
generally negative, confirming Assumption 4 (i. c. path dcpcndcncy can bc cxpcctcd to 
maintain the status quo or even sometimes reduce cohcrcncc and cffcctivcncss). Path 
dependency and uncertainty usually led to the imitation of past Policics. Bccausc of thc 
limited time of response, difficulties in achieving an agrccmcnt and thc rcsourccs that 
have already been invested in past initiatives (co-ordination and Icaming costs). 
6succcssful' decisions tcndcd to follow past models (%%-hcn they existed), which explains 
why CFSP dccision-mak-crs preferred imitation rather than innovation. In some cases, 
such as the Stability Pact analysed in Chapter 5, this led to non-functional institutions 
maintaining the status quo, which did not increase coherence and cffcctivcncss. Ile 
cost of dumping existing policies was also evident regarding the EU's security and 
defence architecture. The role of the WEU as the defence arm of the E U. even though a 
sub-optimal solution, %vas difficult to reverse because of the wcight of institutional 
legacies. Only a critical juncture such as the Kosovo crisis created the momentum to 
move things forward. 
In spitc of the institutional isation proccss, thcrc rcmain numcrous challcligcS to Cj-*Sl) 
cffcctivcncss and cohcrcncc. The dcvclopmcnt of ESDII capabilitics can bc sccn 11crC as 
a casc in point (scc Chaptcr 6). ESDP opcrations arc still the rcsult Ora timc-consurning 
proccss accompanying the planning and dcploymcnt of the opcration on flic ground. 
"is is largcly duc to the difficultics imposcd by both the political proccss - painrul 
ncgotiations at 25 and among the diffcrcnt EU institutions - and the rcccnt dc%, clopincrit 
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of ESDP capabilities. The complexity of the decision-making structures at the Council 
and the fragmentation of the Council Secretariat might compromise the EU's capacity 
of response given the 'crisis' nature of these operations. T"hcsc problems should be 
taken into account when it comes to tinkering with institutions. 71c EU still needs to 
streamline its structures and speed up its crisis management procedures to be able to 
respond in an cffective manner to international crises. Moreover, to overcome 
fragmentation on the ground, a bold and comprehensive strategy and the cstablishment 
of a single chain of command for the different EU bodies would bc desirable. Other 
problems regarding national caveats, personnel and the financing of ESDP operations 
cannot be solved only by means of institutional engineering, but will rcquirc a stronger 
commitment from the part of the Member States to provide the necessary resources to 
these operations. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that the hypothesis advanced 
in Chapter 2 (that higher levels of institutional isation have increased levels of coherence 
and cffectivencss) cannot be entirely vcrified. Even though institutional developments 
have increased the overall impact, crcdibility and cffccti%, cncss of tile EU in Bill, and 
the CFSP in general, some problems persist. In particular, greater institutionalisation, or 
in other words, the increasing complexity of the EUs institutional setting, has 
aggravated problems of horizontal and institutional coherence in the short tcrm. 
Moreover, these problcms have also affcctcd the cffectivcncss of missions on tile 
ground. Thus, in spite of increasing CFSP institutional isation, coherence and 
effectiveness of CFSP in Bill has only marginally increased. Finally, one ought not to 
forget the impact 'external' factors have had on colicrencc and cffcctivcncss 
independent of the degree of institutional isation. In this rcgard, the empirical analysis 
has pointed to the importance of local context and idiosyncratic clcmcnts such as 
personalities, as key intervening variables, particularly at the implcmcniation lc%, cl. 
7.3. CFSIl INSTITUTIONS, MEMBER STATES' INTE'RESTS, AND THE EUIS 
INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
nis thcsis has not only scrvcd to cxplorc issucs of cohcrcncc and cffccti%, cncss, but it 
has also hclpcd cxaminc the thrcc I's and thcir mutual rclationships. Firstly, rcgarding 
intcrcsts, the rcscarch has shown that Nlcmbcr Statcs' intcrcsts arc inrormcd not only by 
the dcsirc to maximizc sccurity and cconomic intcrcsts, but also by institutional 
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preferences, i. e. what the 'appropriate' institution to deal with a particular issue and by 
social factors (share collective values or norms) should be. For instance, during the first 
stages of the crisis in Yugoslavia, even when the Member States did not have vital 
economic and security interests at stake, they agreed to intervene and they did so 
primarily via the EC. In the case of the recognition of the brcakaway republics, it seems 
that institutional factors and the desire to maintain a collective position have mattcrcd 
more than geostrategic factors. 
The decisions on the Stability Pact and ESDP operations in Bill also demonstrated how 
institutional factors and shared values can be mobilised to gain the support of the 
Member States for an initiative. With regard to the latter, other organisations could have 
carried out these operations. For instance, there was no need for the EU to take over 
from NATO. A NATO operation could have stayed in the country for 2-3 years more, 
even without US troops on the ground. As for the police mission, a replacement mission 
led by the OSCE was suggested long before the EU decided to take over. Factors other 
than material, security-related considerations were thus important in this case. Two 
motivcs help account for the EUs decision to launch ESDP operations in Bif I. First, a 
desire on the part of the EU Member States to test and develop EU crisis management 
capabilities (i. e. its desire to strengthen the EU's global ro1c), and second, a shared 
responsibility towards the future of Bill, symboliscd by the prospect of RU 
membership. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, intcrcsts arc not fixcd, but arc subject to changc. Changes in 
the French and UK positions during the debate on diplomatic recognition at the end or 
1991 scrve as cxamplcs of this. Alterations in Nicmbcr States, positions also occurred 
with the Kosovo crisis, something that opened up the membership perspective for states 
in the Balkans and the possibility of an autonomous defence policy at the t:. U level. 
I lowcvcr, it is difficult to dctcrminc whether these changes in Nlcmbcr States, positions 
were only changes in strategies or %vhcthcr they reflected more fundamental preferences. 
In any case. it seems that participation in CFSII institutions might have prompted and 
reinforced these changes through socialisation processes. Rclatcd to this, rising levels or 
CFSP institutional isation have been a rcflcction or an emerging consensus among the 
Member States concerning the need to dcvclop EU's capabilities, but this 
institutional isation, in turn, has also facilitated consensus by increasing cooperation, 
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informal exchanges and socialisation processes. In other words, Member States (and, 
specifically, national policy-makers) have been involved in the shaping of the 
institutionalisation process, but they, in turn, have been shaped by this process. This 
illustrates the mutual relationship between interests and institutions, and bctwccn 
structure and agency. 
institutions have also been instrumental in the process of defining a new role or identity 
for the EU from a civilian power to a more muscular one, committed to the promotion 
of certain norms and resorting to military instruments when required - here rcfcffcd to 
as normative power. 152 Socialisation processes can be seen in this light as instrumcntally 
bringing the different positions of the Member States to a common stance and thcrcby 
endorsing this identity for the EU. The High Representative has also played a key role 
in bolstering these changes, for instance, with the drafting of the European Securit), 
Sirategy (European Council, 2003b). As regards the impact or this normative role on 
foreign policy, the EU's identity can be seen as a source of Mcmbcr States' interests 
and has arguably determined the limits of conceivable action by the EU. For example, 
the image (Le. identity) of the EU as a civilian power dctcnnincd the range of EU 
activities the Member States could agree upon during the first and second pcriod, 
The transformation of the EU's roic/idcntity from a civilian to a nonnative po%%, cr 
during the period under study (1991-2006) also demonstrates that cvcn though idcntitics 
tend to be 'sticky", they can also change. The role playcd by the r-. C/r-. U during thc 
whole of the first period was that of a civilian power, an actor on the intcrnational scene 
which exerts its influence by diplomatic and cconomic means rather than thc usc or 
military forcc (Duch6nc 1972,1973). This conccptualisation of the EC/EU had becii the 
prcdominant onc both in acadcmic and political circlcs, dctcrtnining to some went thc 
limits of 'possibic' EC/E-U actions. I lo%%, cvcr, civilian instrunicrits %%, crc not mobiliscd 
quickly enough at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict, and wcrc not sufficicnt to stop 
an ethnic war, as shown in Chapter 4. In spite or its limitations, the EU tricd to promote 
its own nonns and its o%%m modcl through peace negotiations, although not vcry 
successfully. For example, at the EC Peace Confcrcncc, the W proposcd a 
112 The term 'normative power- was coined by Ian Nlanncri (2002). Other Icrms rcfcff In& to the 
normative dimension of EU external action arc those of ethical Po%%cr- (Aggcstam. 200.1b) and 'civilising 
process' (Linklatcr, 2003). 
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confederation based on its own arrangements, i. e. a pre-Maastricht model (Buchan, 
1993: 75), but it was rejected by the Serbian government. 
The model of the EU as a civilian (particularly economic) power was also the dominant 
one during the second period. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
the EU assumed responsibility for helping Bill in post-conflict reconstruction. Tbrough 
various different initiatives (the Royaumont Process, the Regional Approach), the EU 
established political and economic conditionality in the Balkan region for the first timc. 
In other words, economic assistance was provided on condition that the rccipicnts 
respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. By so doing, the EU started to 
emphasize the normative aspect of its involvement in the Balkans. Anothcr 
characteristic aspect of this period was that Community activitics took prc-cmincncc 
over CFSP ones, with the Member States refusing to give the EU a strongcr rolc in thc 
implementation of the political, police or military aspccts of the Dayton Agrccmcnt. 
Yet, this regional approach lacked a clear and purposive stratcgy and the EU gavc no 
indication of what its long-term relationship with the rcgion would bc. 
The approach started to change after the events in Kosovo and the St. Malo summit 
(1998), when the UK and France agreed on the need to develop the EU's military 
capabilities. One of the main lessons of the conflicts in the Balkans was that CFSII, if it 
was ever to be worthy of its name, would have to deal with pcacck-ccping and peacc. 
management particularly in ncighbouring areas. As suggested by Aggcstani (2004b: 
245), the dealings of France, Germany and the UK in the wars in the Balkans (and onc 
could argue the same for other Nlcmbcr States) could be seen as 
a Icarning proccss that cvcntually rcsultcd in the manircstation orn Common 
rolc of Europc as an cthical po%%-cr -a rolc bascd, in the first instaticc on 
ideational and soft power, but with the instruments of hard power as a last 
resort. 
nc identity of the EU as a normative power will be that ora Union committed to norms 
- including Inter alia, the rule or law and respect ror human rights, democracy and 
multilatcralism -, still privileging civilian means, but ready to use military Instruments 
to promote those norms when necessary. licncc, such an EU's rolc/idcntity would 
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consist of both substantive and procedural norms, the former referring to what norms 
the EU should promote worldwide, and the latter to how, i. e. by which instruments, the 
EU should promote those norms. 
Nowadays, the normative dimension appears to have become an integral part of the 
discourse and the praxis of the EU and it can be traced through numerous official 
documents and speeches. 153 Thus the European Security Straleff cndorscd by the 
Member States affirmed that the EU 'should be ready to share in responsibility for 
global security and in building a better world' and, similarly, should be committed to 
contributing 'to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safcr and more 
united world' (European Council, 2003b: 1; 14). Thc objectives of EU cxtcmal action 
were then seen as 'restoring good government', 'fostcring democracy', 'establishing the 
rule of law and protecting human rights' and developing 'a stronger intcrnational 
society, well functioning international institutions and rule-bascd international ordcr, 
(European Council, 2003b: 6; 10; 9). For his part, Javier Solana (2002: 2) dcfincd the 
EUIs foreign policy in the following terms: "[o]ur common foreign policy cannot just be 
interests based. Protecting and promoting values, which arc part of our history and vcry 
dcar to the hearts of our citizens, must continue to be a priority. 
parallel military developments %kithin the EU would not challenge the building or a 
6civilising' powcr, given that these were seen as in the service or the arorcmcntioncd 
goals. What is more, given the reality of armed conflict, the dc%, clopmcnt of ESDII 
appeared to be a ncccssary requirement. In other words, military intervention might wcll 
be needed for the EU to act as a promoter of fundamental human rights and democracy. 
According to Javier Solana (2000b), the EU 
cannot continue to publicly espouse values and principles %%hilc calling on 
others to defend them [ ... I In the final analysis, as a last resort, after all 
possible instruments had been tried, the Union has to havc Ilic capacity to 
back up its policies by the use of military means. 
"' In the online survey, national representatives considered that the promotion or Eu's values %as almost 
as important as the promotion of security interests. Economic InIcrcsts came list in the evaluations (scc 
On-line Survey, Appendix 1). 
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EU activities in BiH best exemplify the way these arguments have been applied in 
practice. First, EU activities have aimed at promoting the Copenhagen criteria by 
offering membership as the prime incentive. As surnmarised by an EU official (Intcrvicw 
24): 
We have now a clear strategy that offers, on the one hand, the prospect or 
membership of the EU, and, on the other, the need to undertake the rcrorms 
that are necessary to join the EU. This is not just about technical reforms; 
there is also a commitment to the values that the EU embodies [... ) 
Membership is the most successful, the most cffcctivc tool ror entrenching 
democracy. 
Economic incentives and the membership perspective arc not yet sufficicnt to maintain 
stability in BiH and to keep the country on track to closer integration. For this reason, 
ESDP instruments, including a military operation, have been launched in the country to 
support the transition process and the rule of law. Obviously, one could argue that this is 
far from an altruistic enterprise, and security interests also motivate the EU particularly 
if Bill should again become unstable and a source of violence (E-uropcan Council, 2004; 
Interviews 22,24,33,34). Even so the normative dimension rcmains a strong 
motivation for EU engagement in Bill to the cxtcnt that one could arguc that its 
involvement in recent years has been key to facilitating two proccsscs: (1) flic 
integration of Bill into Euro-Atlantic structures and (2) the building or a new E. U 
idcntity as a regional normative power, whose influence relies on a combination or 
carrots and sticks, civilian and military instruments. Tlicsc two parallel proccsscs, Illat 
started to converge at some point at the end of the 1990s, arc currently two sidcs of thc 
samc coin. 
7.4. THE EVOLUTION OF EX EMERNAL ACTION: CLOSING THE, 
INSTITUTIONS-EXPECTATION GAP? 
The analysis of CFSP activities in Bill is also illustrative of the dcvclopIIIcnt of E-U 
external action more broadly. One issue is of particular interest here: ho%v the EU has 
responded to internal and external cxpcctationsldcmands by improving its institutional 
arrangements. In this regard, the Bosnian case best cxcniplifics the process oradjusting 
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internal expectations to capabilities, as well as improving both diplomatic and military 
capabilities to respond to external developments. Member States and EU institutional 
expectations are of utmost importance in this respect because they have a determining 
impact in the setting out of the short and medium term objectives that guide EU 
activities. The narrowing of the gap between objectives and institutional capabilities has 
helped to improve the effectiveness of EU external action, and in particular, the CFSP. 
At the beginning of the conflict, the gap between expectations of the role the EU should 
play and the actual means at its disposal - the so called 'capabilitics-cxpcctation gap' 
(Hill, 1993) - was difficult to close. Internal and external expectations were high, 
especially after the signing of the TEU and the establishment of the CFSP. According to 
Ginsberg, 'by trumpeting a new Common Foreign and Security Polity (CFSP) for the E-U 
in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU raised expectations for a collective diplomacy 
that exceeded the capabilities of its institutions, instruments and resources' (1999: 430). 
In other words, economic instruments and a wcak diplomatic machinery %%, crc not 
sufficient to put an end to a conflict as complex as the Bosnian one. The inability of tile 
EC/EU to bring a peaceful settlement to the conflict had the consequence or lowering 
internal and external expectations. The credibility of tile EC %%us highly damaged, 
particularly in the Balkan region. According to Gncsotto (1998: 15), the W's role during 
the war, the divisions and problems in agreeing a common line or action were "all 
notorious handicaps that detract[cd] from the deterrent power or tile European in Ific eyes 
of the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians'. Looking at how this affcctcd particular initiatives. 
after a first period of high but unfruitful involvement, during tile second flair or tile %var 
in Bill (1993-1995), the role of the EU diminished to becoinc almost inipcrccIllible. 
During the first half of the second period (1996-1998), one could argue that internal 
expectations and hcncc the EU's objectives were streamlined so a's to adjust 111cll, to its 
capabilities. In other words, the EU narrowed its cxpcctations-capability gap by Imcring 
its internal expectations, instead or increasing its capabilities. Furthmorc, it Scems that 
after the inability of the EC/E-U to stop the conflict in Yugoslavia, external cxpcctations 
had also decreased among the warring parties. Talking about widcr rcsponscs to tile 
Yugoslav crisis, Buchan (1993: 172) argued that '[Sluch ovcr-ambition discrcdit[cd] the 
Community in the eyes or the outside world, which is innately doubtrul about tile role of 
a multinational conglomcratc in an international system fashioned ror single nation 
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states'. The early experience in BiH was a 'baptism by fire' (Ginsberg, 200 1) that forced 
the EU to become more realistic about its limitations and to rcalise in which areas it 
could play the most significant role. In sum, expectations were adjusted to capabilitics 
almost across the board. 
During the last period (2001-2006), confidence, and hence expcctations, have incrcascd 
with the creation of new institutions and instruments at the EU lcvcl that allow the 
Union to undertake crisis management operations, including peace-enforccmcnt by 
resorting to military instruments. Today there is a willingness to use these instruments 
even by those Member States regarded as pro-Atlanticist or neutral. Therefore, it can bc 
argued that the development of expectations and capabilities run in parallcl, although 
, expectations are likely to increase rapidly with the successful implementation of the 
first ESDP opcrations. 
7.5. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND DILEMMAS RE-GARDING 
COHERENCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND THE CFSI' INSTITUTIONALISATION 
PROCESS 
This thesis has raised several normative questions that dcscrvc sonic consideration hcrc. 
First, one could wonder whether the highest levels Or CFSP colicrcncc and cfrcctivcncss 
are achievable or even desirable. Normative implications arc tlicrcforc incscapiblc. As 
regards coherence, one might well argue that absolute cohcrcncc would sccill impossible 
in anything other than a pure anarchy or dictatorship (Nuttall, 2005: 93). [. %, cll in tile 
most ccntraliscd systems problems or cohcrcncc arise not only because or raults in 
institutional design, but also because of organisational culturc, the boundaries of 
rationality, or turf battles bctwcen dcpartmcnts and units within a govcmiliclit or 
organisation (see, for instance, Allison and Zclikow, 1999). In the case or tile I: u, it 
seems that coherence would al%%-ays be imPerfcct so long as pillarisation rctilaills. 
Besides, as shown throughout this thesis, sometimes cffcctivcness has clashcd will, 
coherence. While, one could argue that on sonic occasions (e. g. dccisions on military 
intervention), the requirements for a unitary (colicrcnt) action have undcrmincd CI*Sl) 
cffcctivcncss and the credibility of the EU. I'lic nccd ror flexibility in the W (e. g. 
constructive abstention, enhanced cooperation) also makes it dirricult to achicvc 
coherence amongst all the Ntcmbcr States' Positions- Moreover, the nccd for nc%v 
instruments and/or units has put enormous pressures on the CFSP tonchicvc coliercticc. 
264 
Aid 
As regards effectiveness, implementation gaps as a result of the limits in the rational 
capabilities of policy-makers or because of external factors (local context, the impact of 
third parties) seem difficult to overcome. The question of cffcctivcncss, and in 
particular the fact that the EU has acquired military instnuncnts in order to bcttcr 
achieve its objectives also brings up other implications. The first is obvious and rcfcrs to 
the need for military instruments in order to be effective on the international stagc. Tbc 
limitations of the EU when dealing with the war in Bill might have pointed to this in tllc 
sense that the EU could have mobilised or at least threatened the warring partics with 
the use of force in order to stop the conflict at an earlier stage of the crisis. By contrast, 
only the combination of American diplomatic pressure together with NATO's bombings 
brought the warring parties to the negotiating table. The second normativc issuc has 
been raised by many authors (Smith, K. E., 2000; Manners, 2002; Stavridis, 2001) and 
relates to the question: does the EU need to bestow itself with military instrumcnts or 
should it concentrate on civilian matters? Arguably, the answcr to this qucstion will 
depend on what task and norms the EU should want to promote through its cxtcmal 
action. For only economic and developmental issues, civilian instrumcnts would appcar 
to be sufficicnt. For a broader set of objectives, such as thosc laid down in Articlc II or 
the TEU, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rulc of law, as 
well as maintaining peace and stability, civilian instrumcnts alonc arc insufficient and 
military ones may have to be utilised 
With the development of the ESDP and the EU's military instrunicrits, it sccms that this 
question has, in any case become superfluous although, in principle, these developments 
arc not irreversible. The emphasis now has been placed on the conditions under which 
the instruments that have been developed should be used, especially as tile H*U could 
engage in 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' (Art. 
17.2, TEU). Thus, one could advance several conditions that havc been, t1lus rar, 
respected by current ESDP operations. First, military force should be Uscd only as an 
instrument of last resort, when it is considered to be the only cffccti%*c means to achicvc 
or protect civilian ends, and when it is internationally legitimate (i. e., exercised under 
the mandate of a UNSC Resolution and with a broad international consensus). Looking 
at the operation launched in Bill, one could say that military instruments have been 
deployed there as a last resort (a 'green force' is still considered necessary by tile 
locals), with the authorisation of the UNSC and under a broad international consensus, 
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of which its troops composition (thirty four states) gives testimony. Other criteria 
mentioned by scholars such as democratic control and accountability (Lodge, 1993; 
Maull, 2000) however seem far from having materialised in EU practice. The limited 
role of the European Parliament during the planning and implementation of EUFOR 
seems especially worrying, since national parliaments are also being sidelined in this 
regard. As the EU develops into a full fledged international actor resorting to a broad 
range of instruments at its disposal, including military ones, this fault line in its 
institutionalisation process needs to be addressed. 
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9. APPENDICES 
Appendix I. - Council Working Groups On-line Survey 
2. Please select your nationality from the list below 
Austrian 107,1% (2) 
Belgian Me 7,1 % (2) 
British M 3,6% (1) 
Cypriot (0) 
Czech (0) 
Danish M 3,6% (1) 
Dutch 
Estonian M 3,6% (1) 
Finnish 11113,67(, (1) 
French Me 10,7% (3) 
German Me 7,1 1/( (2) 
Greek M 3,6% (1) 
Hungarian M 3,6% (1) 
Irish M 3,6% (1) 
Italian Me 7,1 11c (2) 
Latvian 
Lithuanian M 3,617( 
Luxembourg 
Maltese (0) 
Polish me 7,1 % (2) 
Portuguese Me 7,1(7(- (2) 
Slovakian (0) 
Slovenian me 7,1(7( (2) 
Spanish We 3,6% (1) 
Swedish me 7,1 (/( (2) 
TOTAL 28 100,0% 
3. Which is your working group/committee? 
Western Balkans (COWEB) 21,4% (6) 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) (0) 
Military Committee (EUMC) (0) 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis ýI 17,9% (5) Management (CIVCOM) 4n 
Political and Military Working Group 
(PMG) 41 =I 7,1 % (2) 
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Other: COCEN-COSEE, 
ENLARGEMENT M 3,6% (1) 
Other: COEST ýýe 32,1 % (9) 
Other: COMAG, COMEM, COMED, 
COMEPP M 3,6% (1) 
Other: COTRA, EFTA a 3,6% (1) 
Other: ENLARGEMENT M 3,6% (1) 
Other: EUMC WG 03,6% (1) 
Other: transatlantic relations (COTRA) M 3,6% (1) 
TOTAL 100,0% 28 
4. How many years have you been member of this working group/committee? 
Less than I year ýl 17,9% (5) 
More than I year 142,9% (12) 
More than 2 years 25,0% (7) 
More than 3 years 14,3% (4) 
TOTAL 100,0% 28 
5. From your experience, which one, from the list below, is the main obstacle for a 
coherent and effective CFSP/ESDP? 
Inappropriate institutions ý=i 25,01-/( (7) 
Divergence among Member States interests ýi 53,6% (15) 
Lack of a common identity ý1 17,91/( (5) 
6. Any other reason that you would like to add 
# Response 
I Inexperience 
I Institutional room for improvement (Extenal Action Service! ) 
1 Lack of a common identity 
1 Lack of commitment of the member states to the region 
I Lack of finance and quick procurement rules for civilian missions 
1 Limited financial support 
1 Poor description of goals 
1 Some member States are playing too much for their national external policy 
1 Too many EU instruments on the ground 
7. Do you think that coherence and effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP have increase(] or 
decreased since 1991? 
Increased 
92,91/( (20) 
Decreased (0) 
Remained constant M 3,6 (1) 
TOTAL 
96,4% 28 
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8. If you think coherence and effectiveness have increased, can you mention any 
reform that you believe have made possible increasing levels of coherence and 
effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP? (Please, specify) 
# Response 
I Adoption of the SAp, adoption of missions on the ground (EUMM, 
EUPM... 
I An increased role of the OHR/EUSR 
I Because of the growing experience on implementation Zý Zý 
1 Constitutional Treaty would have made a difference; EC Cologne, Nice, 41 
ESS 
I COPS; development of Commission's DG Relex and SEC; geographical C, 41 
cross pillar working groups 
1 Creation of PSC 
2 Creation of the SG/HR 
1 EU High Representative, launching of ESDP 
1 Experience 
1 Fusion of CFSP Working Groups 
1 Institution of Mr CFSP and, later on, all EUSR 
1 Institutional reforms- strong executive body Zý 
1 Mutual acceptance by Council bodies and Commission services to cooperate 
more and better in order to increase the EU interests and values, while 
respecting each other competencies. 
1 New adopted treaties since Maastricht, draft of the new treaty on the EU 
I PSC, HR 
1 Role of HR/SG 
1 St Maio, Nice, PSC, EUMC, principle of EU autonorny in ESDP operations 
1 The Cologne European Council 
9. Please can you indicate which of the following institutional settings have 
increased coherence and effectiveness of CFSP/ESI)I" 
The High Representative 60,71/( (17) C, 
A rotating Presidency M 7,1 % (2) 
The Policy Unit 57,1 'h (16) 
The Political and Security Committee 160,71/c (17) 
Constructive abstention M 7,1(7( (2) 
Common Strategies ý 21,4% (6) 
Unanimity as the rule in CFSP decisions ýý 21,4% (6) 
QMV forjoint actions 10,7% (3) 
Right of initiative for the Commission ýý 32,1 % (9) 
10. Which of the following reforms do you think would increase coherence and 
effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP 
An EU Foreign Minister 
85,717t -- --1 (14) 
Abolition of the rotating Presidency ýM 21,4"T (6) 
An EU Diplomatic Service 60,7r/( (17) 
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An EU Defence Agency 
An EU President 
QMV for all CFSP/ESDP decisions 
Increased role for the Commission 
Increased role for the European 
Parliament 
Enhanced cooperation in ESDP 
Permanent structured cooperation in 
ESDP 
Legal personality for the EU 
32,1% (9) 
17,9% (5) 
17,9% (5) 
ýý 25,0% (7) 
mi 7,1 % (2) 
ýl 46,4% (13) 
32,1 % (9) 
ý53,617c (15) 
11. Do you consult with other national delegations prior to formal meetings? 
Yes, always 17,9% (5) 
Yes, most of the time 71,4% (20) 
Yes, rarely 10,717c (3) 
Never (0) 
TOTAL 
100,0% 28 
12. If yes, how often your delegation consults with other delegations prior to the 
formal meetings? 
Many times per week 53,6% (15) 
Once per week ýýe 32,1 % (9) 
Once per month ý 10,7% (3) 
Less than once per month W 3,6% (1) 
TOTAL 
100,0% 28 
13. Which actor, from the following, do you consult the most? 
Commission dIIIIIIIIIIIIII 128,617( (8) 
Presidency 3 9,3 r1c, (11) 
Secretariat General e 32,1 (9) 
TOTAL 
100,0% -- 
28 
14. When participating in the Council working parties do you feel allegiance to 
(1=To a less extent; 4=To a great extent) 
Avcra,, e Rank 
1234 
Your own government (3,6) 
The group in which you participate (2,4) 
The European Union (2,8) 
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15. From the following criteria, could you indicate which one do you take into 
account in order to privilege communication with partners from other Member 
States? (I=To a less extent; 4=To a great extent) 
Average Rank 
1234 
Geographical proximity Zý 
(nei-hbourhood) 1 (2,7) 
Size of the country (2,5) 
Economic interests (2,4) 
Security interests (2,8) 
Similarity of values and norms (3,3) 
16. From your own experience, which of the following images is closer to the 
predominant behaviour in CFSP negotiations? 
Consensus-building-, trying to bring 
everyone 'on board', even if it means (2 7 
changes in the initial position of the 96,4% 
Member States. 
Hard bargaining, no possibility of Zý C, 
changes in the initial positions of the 013,6% C, 
Member States. 
TOTAL 100,0% 
1 28 
17. To get the support from other Member States to your proposals/posit ions, the 
most often used strategy is ... ? 
Persuasion referring to common EU 
values and norms 
V 71,414 (20) 
Questioning other national 
representatives' credibility and reputation M 3,61/( (1) 
within the group 
Using package deals (economic or Cý tý 17,97( (5) 
geopolitical deals) 
TOTAL 92,9% 
28 
18. According to your own experience, are there any sensitive issues that are 
excluded from discussions? 
Yes 
No 
TOTAL 
19. If yes, can you give any example? 
# 
46,414 (13) 
ýe 50,0% (14) 
96,4% 
11 28 
Response 
I Agreement on money laundering with Switzerland 
I Best examples when I dealt previously with Transatlantic Relations: the 
'hot' issues EUMS relations on Iraq were always kept out of the discussions 
1 Borders and some bilateral 'issues would not appeal- oil formal agenda hilt 
still be discussed 
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I Broader cooperation EU-NATO 
I Corruption, security 
I Institutional matters 
I Many issues appear 'pre-cooked' on the agenda, especially the sensitive 
ones 
I Russia 
I Some parts of very sensitive political discussions 
1 Staff 
I The European perspective for Western Balkans - from Thessaloniki summit 
this is taken for granted, in a broader sense the enlargement policy of the 
EU; the political issues on the transatlantic agenda - this is discussed in a z: 1 
smaller format meetings rather than in the EU Council meetings; the EU 
strategy towards Russia - like in case of the US each Member State has 
substantial interests towards Russia but divergences of national positions are 
much more considerable 
1 Ukrainian membership to the EU 
20. Do you share any sensitive information with other members of the working 
group/committee? 
Yes, always (0) 
Yes, most of the time 17,9% (5) 
Yes, rarely ýý= 46,4% (13) 
Never ýw 21,4% (6) 
TOTAL 
85,7% 28 
21. If yes, what sort of information do you share (economic, security ... )? 
# Response 
I About Italian interests and policies 
1 Both, but rarely 
1 Economic, security, political, etc. 
I More about circumstances behind the positions 
I National positions 
1 No 
I Oral information (meeting reports) 
2 Political 
1 Political lines 
1 Security assessment, political information on a strategic level 
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22. Did you change your prior beliefs regarding EU Foreign Policy as a result of 
your participation in the working group? 
No, it didn't affect my prior beliefs 1111111117,1 % (2) 
No, it reaffirmed my prior beliefs ýI 14,3% (4) 
Yes, it changed my prior beliefs (I've C, 
learnt something) 
64,317c (18) 
TOTAL 
23. Which objective should be given priority in EU's external action? (I =To a less 
extent; 3=To a great extent) 
Averace Rank 
2 
The promotion of EU's security 
interests 
The promotion of EU's economic 
interests 
The respect of human rights, democracy 
and rule of law 
24. Additional comments 
# Response 
11 have also been Portuguese delegate to other Groups, including PMG, and I Cý C, LI 
observe that almost all delegations become more familiar with 
defence/security and crises management issues and this often helps to reach 
a compromise. The fact the UE has already launched 15 or more 
Operations/Missions under ESDP is a good experience with lessons learned 
which facilitates the solutions to be reached whenever a new one needs to be 
launched. Procedures adopted are well satisfactory. General Council 
Secretariat has now appropriate structures in place and is performing better 
and better. The danger could come if it tries to get too much power and to 
follow in great extent the interest of one or few Member States. 
Cross-analysis: 
85,7% 
1 28 
(2,8) 
(2,4) 
(2,7) 
13. Which actor, from the following, do you consult the most (COWE, 11)? 
Commission 
Presidency 
Secretariat General 
TOTAL 
50,0'Z( 
33,3% 
16,7 (7c 
100,0% 
(3) 
6 
13. Which actor, from the following, do you consult the most (('IV('()M + PNIG)? 
Commission (0) 
Presidency 42,9% (3) 
Secretariat General 5 7,117( (4) 
TOTAL 7 100,0% 
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Appendix 11: List of Interviews 154 
EU Officials 
European Commission 
Interview, Delegation of the European Commission in BiH, Sarajevo, 17-03-2005. 
Interview, EC Liaison Office, EAR Building, Pristina, 31-05-2005. 
Interview, EC Liaison Office, EAR Building, Pristina, 31-05-2005. 
Interview, EC Liaison Office, EAR Building, Pristina, 31-05-2005. 
Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 28-11-2005. 
Interview, Delegation of the European Commission in BiH, Sarajevo, 19-05-2006. 
General Council Secretariat 
Interview, Council Secretariat, Pristina, 30-05-2005. 
Interview, Council Secretariat, EAR Building, Pristina, 31-05-2005. 
Interview, Council Secretariat, DG-E, Directorate VIII, Brussels, 21-04-2005. 
Interview, EU Military Staff, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 28-11-2005. 
Interview, Civ/Mil Cell, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 29-11-2005. 
Interview, Civ/Mil Cell, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 24-01-2006. 
Interview, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 13-09-06. 
EU Police Mission 
Interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 15-03-2005. 
Interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 15-03-2005. 
Interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 05-04-2005. 
interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 19-04-2005. 
Interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 06-12-2005. 
interview, London, 02-02-2006. 
Interview, EUPM Headquarters, Sarajevo, 19-05-2006. 
154 For reasons of confidentiality, neither the names nor the respective Positions of the intcrvicwccs are mentioned. 
304 
EUFORAlthea 
Interview, EUFOR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 04-04-2005. 
Interview, EUFOR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 04-04-2005. 
Interview, EUFOR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 04-04-2005. 
Interview, EU Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, 14-11-2005. 
Interview, EUFOR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 05-12-2005. 
EU Special RepresentativelOffice of the High Representative 
Interview, OHR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 18-04-2005. 
Interview, OHR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 25-04-2005. 
Interview, OHR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 03-05-2005. 
Interview, OHR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 09-06-2005. 
Interview, OHR Headquarters, Sarajevo, 28-07-2005. 
EU Monitoring Mission 
Interview, EU Monitoring Mission, Sarajevo, 14-06-2005. 
Permanent Representations of the Member States to the EU 
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 15-11-2005. 
Interview, Italian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 15-11-2005. 
Interview, Austrian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 15-11-2005. 
Interview, Belgian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 28-11-2005. 
Interview, Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 28-11-2005. 
Interview, Polish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 29-11-2005. 
Interview, Danish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 24-01-2006. 
Interview, Hungarian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 25-01-2006. 
Interview, Slovenian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 25-01-2006. 
Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 26-01-2006. 
Interview, Portuguese Permanent Representation, Brussels, 26-01-2006. 
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Interview, Czech Republic Permanent Representation, Brussels, 27-01-2006. 
Interview, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, 27-01-2006. 
Interview, Austrian Permanent Representation, Brussels, 27-01-2006. 
Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 27-01-2006. 
Interview, Estonian Permanent Representation, 31-01-2006. 
Other EU Member States' Officials 
Interview, Belgian MFA, Brussels, 6-04-2006. 
Interview, former British diplomat, 11 -07-06. 
Interview, Belgian MFA, Brussels, 13-09-06. 
Bosnian Government 
Interview, Directorate for European Integration, Sarajevo, 10-06-2005. 
Other International Organisations 
Interview, NATO-Headquarters, Sarajevo, 10-03-2005 
Interview, two members of the international defence reform community, Sarajevo, 16- 
03-2005. 
Interview, OSCE, Sarajevo, 14-04-2005. 
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Appendix III: Declaration of confidentiality 155 
In order to facilitate accuracy in social science research it is vitally important that the 
researcher have access to informed and authoritative sources. At the same time the 
researcher is under a strict obligation to protect the trust which such sources place in 
her/him. The recording of interviews is an important tool to ensure accuracy in the 
research process. 
In view of the above, I undertake to abide strictly by the following principles: 
No material gathered in an 'off-the-record' interview will be attributed to the 
interviewee, without the interviewee's written consent. 
Quoted remarks will be attributed only in an agreed formula (e. g. 'according to a 
national representative, according to a senior EU official'). 
The interviewee may, at anytime, opt to go'on background. ' Such information 
is provided solely for purposes of elucidation and may not be quoted in any 
form. 
An interviewee may, at any time, opt to go 'on-the-record. ' Such remarks are 
available for attributed quotation. 
A list of interviewees must be appended to the final thesis. Any sourccs wishing 
anonymity may request that their names be provided on a separate list which 
shall be submitted only to the examining authorities. 
The above rules may also apply to a transcribed interview - with written notes takcn in longhand. The undersigned would be happy to discuss emendations or additions to the 
above. 
Signed: 
Ana E. Juncos 
Date: 
155 The author would like to express her gratitude to Prof. Ben Tonra who kindly provided a prcvious 
version of this Declaration. 
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